Separation Of Religion Research Articles

Till the Judge Do Them Part: The Prospect of Absolute Divorce in the Philippines

The Philippines is the only member State of the United Nations without a general divorce law which is attributed to the influence of the Roman Catholic Church for more than 300 years of Spanish colonization. Currently, the Philippine legal regime permits legal separation, annulment, and declaration of nullity of marriage, although divorce by Muslims and indigenous people as well as one validly obtained abroad by a foreigner against a Filipino spouse, is recognized. Legal separation authorizes the couple’s separation from bed and board but leaves the marital cord unsevered. Any new relationship for either party may result in criminal prosecution in a country where marital infidelity is a crime. Annulment and declaration of nullity are concerned with validity and nullity issues. Causes of marital discord that develop after the couple take each other as husband and wife are beyond the province of the latter two remedies. The Constitution protects marriage as an inviolable social institution. It is argued that this is not an express or implied prohibition of divorce as the dissolution of marital unions where vows of love and fidelity are routinely breached and debased is also necessary to preserve the sanctity of marriage. Divorce is now customary international law which the Philippines must honor, judging from the fact all other UN member States permit it. Divorce is also an aspect of the human rights to marry and to life which the Philippines committed to respect, protect, and fulfill under its treaty obligations. Moreover, despite its strong Roman Catholic background, Philippine culture is receptive to divorce and in fact had a general divorce law for 33 years mostly as a colony of the United States. Religious dogma as basis for Congress’ phlegmatic attitude to divorce is misplaced in view of the separation of religion and State and the fact that even Canon Law authorizes annulment of marriage.

New Steps in the “Cosmic Dance of Dialogue”

It has been our privilege to work (beginning in 2007 and 2008, respectively) with Leonard Swidler as colleagues on the staff of the Dialogue Institute (DI) at Temple University, the outreach arm, as it was envisioned in its earliest incarnation, of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies. These years have marked a crucial transitional period, when the DI was evolving from being identified largely with Swidler's individual initiatives (though always in collaboration with a cadre of partners around the globe) toward its establishment as a mission-driven organization contributing--through custom-designed training programs, networking, and resource development--to the ever-expanding twenty-first-century landscape of interreligious dialogue. Learning well from Swidler's mantras of deep and critical thinking, we, together with other DI colleagues, have continued to draw from the richness of his legacy, while examining its theoretical foundations and teasing out its applicability to new cultural and historical contexts. (1) In particular, the broadening work of the DI has afforded a kind of laboratory for designing and carrying out on-the-ground experiences of interreligious and intercultural engagement, affording a window into the interplay of theory and practice in these new contexts. I. The SUSI Program This essay explores shifts in emphasis and refinements that are called for by twenty-first-century global challenges and contexts by focusing on one of the DI's major programs. Since 2010, the DI has led eight five-week student seminars for international students on religious pluralism in the United States. These are part of a U.S. State Department initiative, the Study of the U.S. Institutes (SUSI), which teaches undergraduate students from various countries about American democracy and civil society through the lens of different topics--in this case, through the lens of religious pluralism. Each seminar group is comprised of twenty student leaders; in the summer session they come from four countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey); in the winter session, from Indonesia. Through a wide range of experiential activities, complemented by workshops and classroom sessions, participants are given multiple windows through which to observe and experience U.S. religious diversity. The program is built around six stated objectives: 1. Increase understanding of democratic principles and religious liberty in the United States through the study of its founding vision and the evolution of its culture and institutions, especially as revealed through the rich historical legacy of Philadelphia. 2. Deepen knowledge of the key structures and principles of the U.S. government and society that set the context for religious pluralism: the rule of law, individual rights and freedoms/responsibilities, separation of religion and state, equality, and tolerance of diversity. 3. Expand understanding of the beliefs and practices of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Baha'is, and Native Americans in the U.S. and enable students to see and experience U.S. religious diversity and neighborhood coexistence. Deepen appreciation of both the strengths and challenges inherent in the positive practice of religious pluralism and demonstrate how the U.S. government guarantees religious freedom and safety for majority and minority communities. 4. Foster in students a stance of respect for religious and other differences and an awareness of the negative outcomes of a lack of respect, especially when it results in violence. Teach students the principles and practices of interfaith dialogue and provide opportunities for them to develop skills that will enable them to initiate and engage in interreligious and intercultural dialogue in then-home contexts. 5. Provide collaborative experiences that develop students' leadership skills in the areas of clear communication (effective speaking and discerning listening), community-building, project-management, and cooperative learning. …

TRANSLATING CULTURES: THE CREATION OF SIN IN THE PUBLIC SPACE OF BATSWANA

This article seeks to trace the fussy boundaries of religion and the public space in the modern colonial archive of southern Africa. It investigates how drawing such boundaries became a central strategy in translating indigenous cultures into sin and creating guilt in communities that did not observe the sacred and secular boundaries. The article uses the attestations of the 19 th century letters to Mahoko a Becwana, a London Missionary Society public paper, printed from Kuruman. While the Batswana worldview kneaded religion and all spheres of individual and collective public space, modern western colonial perspectives claimed otherwise. This paper analyses the letters for the intrusion of colonial religion into the public space of Batswana; the colonial agenda to translate key cultural beliefs and activities into the realm of evil and the various responses it initiated – thereby uncovering that perhaps the separation of religion from state has always been a mythological and ideological construction.

Interventionist Secularism: A Comparative Analysis of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1923–1928) and the Indian Constituent Assembly (1946–1949) Debates

The debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1923–1928) and the Indian Constituent Assembly (1946–1949) inscribed the secular infrastructures of these states into law. A close examination of these debates shows that while the separation of religion and state was an important aspect of Turkish and Indian secularisms, both allowed the state to intervene in the religious sphere. In both, state intervention in religion sought to transform the majority religion into a secularized and modernized form that would complement national identity. However, whereas Turkish secularism adopted “restrictive intervention,” which sanctions state interference to construct a monolithic national identity, the Indian nationalist leaders adopted “emancipative intervention,” which seeks to create an overarching national identity while preserving the cultural and religious diversity of society. While the former type of secularist intervention limits religion's public visibility and places it under state control, the latter seeks to eliminate and reform religious practices that hinder social justice and equality. Based on this analysis, I argue that secularism may be seen as a tool state authorities utilize in the service of the political project of creating a modern nation.

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey by M. Hakan Yavuz, and: Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt by Hussein Ali Agrama, and: Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity by Talal Asad, and: Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech by Talal Asad et al.

Reviewed by: Islamic Political Identity in Turkeyby M. Hakan Yavuz, and: Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egyptby Hussein Ali Agrama, and: Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernityby Talal Asad, and: Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speechby Talal Asad et al. Zouhair Ghazzal Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. By m. hakan yavuz. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 342 pp. $32.11 (paper). Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt. By hussein ali agrama. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 288 pp. $27.50 (paper). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. By talal asad. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. 280 pp. $18.92 (paper). Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. By talal asad, wendy brown, judith butler, and saba mahmood. New York: Fordham University Press, 2ndrevised edition, 2013. 176 pp. $16.20 (paper). How relevant is secularism for the modern Middle East? The problem is that many studies take it for granted that secularism, simply defined as the separation of religion from state and politics, is a key component for the success and well-being of the modern nation-state. It is as if without the state openly declaring itself secular, as the Turkish Republic did in its formative period in 1923–1927, the nation and its institutions would be faced with relentless religious struggles. Education, law, and even the economy would share the burden of a society with core religious values, with the state itself being enmeshed in the struggle. For other scholars, the borderline between the religious and the secular is [End Page 691]fairly flexible, lacking the clear distinctions that the secularists would like us to believe exist. And for yet other scholars, religion cannot be contained through an open declaration of the secular nature of the state: Even Turkey, which for over a decade has been under the guidance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is “going back” to its Islamic roots. In sum, the importance of religion cannot be denied. Notwithstanding such diversity of opinions, studies on religion and secularism share common shortcomings—namely, that secularism tends to be isolated on its own as either a sign of modernity and progress or a lack thereof. When we think, for example, of Turkey as the prime example of state secularism being constitutionally adopted, the conditions that made such declaration possible tend to be overlooked—most especially the fact that there was in the 1920s and later a class configuration that was “hegemonic” in its structure. That is, within the heterogeneous class structure, that of landowners, industrialists, politicians, and army and civilian officers, a certain configuration predominates all others by ascertaining a political mission to the newly formed “nation.” Most countries in the Middle East, beginning with influential players like Iran and Egypt, came to modernity with a large class of big landowners, which was immensely influential in politics and the economy. By contrast Turkey’s élite class structure was polyvalent, composed in large part of military and civilian officers that had to be repatriated “home” from the Arab provinces and elsewhere when the Ottoman Empire was in full decline. Consequently, in the top echelons of society, Turkey had an intelligentsia, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (who would become Turkey’s first president and founding figure), with enough expertise to develop solutions to the formation of the new republic. The heterogeneous nature of these groups pushed for the creation of a political space that was portrayed as “secular,” in the precise sense that state and politics should be set free from religious discourse. In practice, however, secularism was no more than a secularization of Sunni Islam, whereby minorities were brutally marginalized in a process that began with the Armenian genocide of 1915–1916 and the relentless bloody attempts to integrate Kurdish nationalism within the framework of Turkish nationalism. According to M. Hakan Yavuz, a key factor in the “return” of political Islam is the solidification of class structure around the bourgeoisie. Initially, the predominantly one-party system of the 1930s and 1940s fostered the creation of an entrepreneurial bourgeois class that was acting...

The Difference that Religion Makes: Transplanting Legal Ideas from the West to Japan and India

What is the fate of legal transplants when they arrive from one culture, the Western culture, which is religious, to another culture that has no religion? Using the theoretical framework of legal transplantation developed by Masaji Chiba and the theory of religion developed by S.N. Balagangadhara the problem is tested with two different types of indigenous law, drawn from cultures - Japan and India. Dysfunctional effects result when certain kinds of legal ideas, embedded as norms within the Western culture, which is constituted by a religion, Christianity, are transplanted into those non-Western cultures that do not have religion. Religion and the ideas linked to it (such as the freedom of religion and the separation of religion and state) break down, and become distorted, absurd or nonsensical, and potentially conflict-inducing when placed in a culture without religion. This occurs as the secular state engages in the process of suppressing what it implicitly regards as false religion or idolatrous practices existing within the indigenous culture of a people. As Chiba foresaw, this process can even lead to the identity postulate of a legal culture being altered or destroyed.

Can the Effects of Religion and Spirituality on Both Physical and Mental Health be Scientifically Measured? An Overview of the Key Sources, with Particular Reference to the Teachings of Said Nursi.

Within Western secular societies, everything has to be substantiated by empirical evidence; this means it has to be quantifiable and measurable. Research, particularly quantitative research, then, is the criterion by which everything, including religion, is either accepted or rejected. The separation of religion from science began with the Renaissance, the Reformation and the advent of the Enlightenment. It was perceived that religion did not match the language of science and that there was no logical proof or empirical evidence for the existence of God. Religion therefore, due to its inability to be measured and quantified, has since been largely marginalised. In recent times, in order to integrate 'religion' into everyday life, attempts have been made to argue and bring in scientific proof for the effectiveness of religion for improved health and well-being. The psychiatrist Harold Koenig has been one of the key people whose collation of research evidence has shown that religion has a positive effect on both physical and mental health. By looking firstly at the definitions of religion and spirituality and then discussing various opinions from both secular and religious perspectives, including those of Said Nursi, this paper aimed to determine whether religion and spirituality can indeed be measured.

The 21st-century impact of European Muslim minorities on ‘Official Islam’ in the Muslim-majority world

The article argues that the growth of religious service provision directed at the Muslim diaspora in Europe has led to greater professionalization and pluralism within the Islam state in Muslim countries. Contemporary Muslim governments have claimed a monopoly over public prayer and religious education and have heavily invested in a network of infrastructure and services – the Islam state. The recent breakthrough of Islamist parties into governments in Turkey and across North Africa poses a challenge to the continued ‘civilian control’ over religion. What will become of the enormous Islamic Affairs ministries that Islamist parties have inherited – the hundreds of thousands of public servants of state Islam across the region, the tens of thousands of mosques and thousands of religious schools? Liberals demand the abolition of the Islam state because it violates the separation of religion and state; Islamists detest it for its repressive qualities. Despite progressive liberalization, governments in the past decade have not sought disestablishment, and have instead increased the resources and policing of state-run religion. I draw on the experience of Muslim governments in the competitive field of state–Islam relations in European countries to explain the modest beginnings of reform of the official religion apparatus in Muslim-majority countries.

Political Religion: Outcome and Continuity of Religious Fundamentalism

In the modern age without fundamentalism as a middle stage, reaching the level of political religion is not possible even in religious and traditional society. Without making a space or field by fundamentalists and against modernity, the forming of theocratic state and using the political function of religion by religio-political groups is difficult. Maybe the relationship between religious fundamentalism and political religion is so obvious that it triggers questions as; is political religion possible without fundamentalist reaction in this modern era of traditional society? Does every fundamentalist movement lead to theocratic state? How is the relationship between religious fundamentalism and political religion? Or in the other words, what is the requirement or main factor of emergence of political religion? This article tries to answer these questions and clarify the priority of fundamentalism, as a requirement for political religion in modern age. However, it is possible for a traditional society to remain with a secular state. We can relatively witness the separation between religion and state but not separation of religion from politics. So, a traditional society in itself will not suffice in attaining a full-fledged political religion and religious government; and hence the need of fundamentalism becomes the crux of the hour.

Islamic education and colonial secularism: the Amroha experiment of 1895–96

In September 1895, a boldly innovative trial was begun with the teaching of Islam in a British government school in the town of Amroha, near Delhi. This article returns to the Amroha experiment to consider what it reveals about Indian Muslim exchanges with European administrators on the subject of secular colonial education and, more broadly, to bring under scrutiny the historical engagement of Muslim parties with colonial secularism. By the final decade of the nineteenth century, European officials had joined a number of their Muslim subjects in rejecting the imparting of exclusively secular education in schools and colleges under the management of the colonial state. Arguing for the reconciliation of religious and secular instruction, Viqar-ul-Mulk and his contemporaries capitalized upon growing British anxieties about the moral deficiency of Indian students taught in state educational institutions, exposing colonial concerns over the likelihood of inculcating moral improvement in the absence of religious teaching. Challenging the official separation of religion and pedagogy, they raised the possibility of the accommodation of multiple faiths within the modern Indian nation and state. The Amroha experiment served as a precedent for elite Muslim attempts to found an Indian Muslim university in which Islamic instruction would be imparted. Viqar-ul-Mulk’s successful negotiations with the government inspired further efforts for the revitalization of religious education on the part of Muslim leaders concerned about the survival and strengthening of Islam under colonial rule.

Communication Bridges between Religion Andscience: Route Saint Augustine - Blaise Pascal

This study examines the flow of ideas that led to the final separation of religion and science. The research found that route, which occurred this segregation has the obligatory points of passage in Saint Augustine and Blaise Pascal. Decisively, the two contribute to the gradual release of pressing close personal ego exercised by universal self. Science and religionseparation begins with the right human desire to be free, with the idea of freedom. The Pascalian "I" is actually a human presence in the center of discourse. Saint Augustine, nor Pascal does not apply "generally to man". They know that always the faith comes to a person in his singularity and his historical context.

Secularism in the Indian Context

Indian constitutional framers sought to tie their new state to ideas of modernity and liberalism by creating a government that would ensure citizens' rights while also creating the conditions for democratic citizenship. Balancing these two goals has been particularly challenging with regard to religion, as exemplified by the emergence of a peculiarly Indian understanding of secularism which requires the nonestablishment of religion but not the separation of religion and state. Supporters argue that this brand of secularism is best suited to the particular social and historical circumstances of independent India. This article suggests that the desire to separate religion and state is integral to any understanding of secularism and that, consequently, the Indian state neither is nor was meant to be secular. However, Indian secularists correctly identify the Indian state's distinctive approach to religion-state relations as appropriate to the Indian context and in keeping with India's constitutional goals.

The Political Causes of Party Closures in Turkey

Political parties are the integral components of democratic systems. Without political parties, democratic systems cannot function. Yet, not all political parties embrace the existing ‘rules of the game’. After the experience with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy during the interwar period, dealing with anti-systemic parties has become a central debate in democratic systems. Even though party closures have taken place in some European democracies, the high frequency of party closures in Turkey raised criticisms that Turkey has become the ‘graveyard’ of political parties. Since the 1960s, a total of 27 parties were banned in Turkey. The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of the justifications of party closures in Turkey. In doing so, the article examines two major political causes of party closures on two major party traditions in Turkey: (1) Political Islamists and violation of secularism (separation of religion and politics) and (2) Kurdish left and violation of territorial integrity/national unity.

Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East

The right to religious freedom is widely regarded as a crowning achievement of secular-liberal democracies, one that guarantees the peaceful coexistence of religiously diverse populations. Enshrined in national constitutions and international laws and treaties, the right to religious liberty promises to ensure two stable goods: (1) the ability to choose one's religion freely without coercion by the state, church, or other institutions; and (2) the creation of a polity in which one's economic, civil, legal, or political status is unaffected by one's religious beliefs. While all members of a polity are supposed to be protected by this right, modern wisdom has it that religious minorities are its greatest beneficiaries and their ability to practice their traditions without fear of discrimination is a critical marker of a tolerant and civilized polity. The right to religious freedom marks an important distinction between liberal secularism and the kind practiced in authoritarian states (such as China, Syria, or the former Soviet Union): while the latter abide by the separation of religion and state (a central principle of political secularism), they also regularly abrogate religious freedoms of their minority and majority populations. Despite claims to religious neutrality, liberal secular states frequently regulate religious affairs but they do so in accord with a strong concern for protecting the individual's right to practice his or her religion freely, without coercion or state intervention.

Separation of Religion and State in Stable Christian Democracies: Fact or Myth?

This study compares separation of religion and state (SRAS) as it is conceived in theory with its realization in practice in 40 stable Christian democracies between 1990 and 2008 based on data from the Religion and State Round 2 dataset. There is no agreement in the literature on how SRAS ought to be conceived. Many scholars argue that SRAS is a necessary condition for liberal democracies. The present study examines four models of SRAS found in the literature, and a non-SRAS model that addresses the appropriate role of religion in democracies: secularism-laicism, absolute SRAS, neutral political concern, exclusion of ideals, and acceptable support for religion. The study analyzes three factors: (a) whether the state supports one or some religions more than others; (b) the extent of religious legislation; and (c) restrictions on the religious practices and institutions of religious minorities. The analysis shows that depending on the definition of SRAS used, between zero and eight of the 40 countries practice SRAS. Based on this finding, I conclude that either SRAS is not a necessary condition for liberal democracy or many states commonly considered to be liberal democracies are not.

Separation of Religion and State and Secularism in Theory and in Practice

This study examines whether states follow the religion policies they declare in their constitutions. It identifies four types of policies which officially seek to limit religion's role in government: absolute separation of religion and state (SRAS); neutral political concern; exclusion of ideals; and secularism–laicism. I determine whether states follow these policies using the religion and state (RAS) dataset and compare this to constitutional declarations that the state is secular and declarations of separation of religion and state. The results show that a majority of states which make both types of declaration do not follow these policies based on any of the four standards used in this study. However, the presence and wording of these clauses are correlated with state religion policy.

Ijtihad and Lower-Middle-Class Women: Secularism in Rural Bangladesh

Scholars who argue for the compatibility of Islam with democracy tend to gloss over the fact that the separation of religion and state has not taken place in the history of the Muslim world. In fact, little research has been carried out on contemporary efforts to make this structural distinction, an imperative of the democratic state. I begin this article with an analysis of the nineteenth-century debates between Islamic scholars and European positivists and how they created a polarized perspective that frames Western secular tenets as inherently opposed to Islamic religious principles and that continues to the present day. I then examine the call by scholars and activists to separate religion and state in the Muslim world. Against this backdrop, I analyze the Bangladesh Supreme Court's decision in 2001 to declare the fatwa unconstitutional. I investigate to what extent this decree has led to the separation of religion and state and how it has influenced the future of political Islam in Bangladesh. Since fatwas target low-income rural women, I conclude by exploring the implication of this decision on notions of gender, Muslim identity, and citizenship in Bangladesh.

Retreat and Return of the Secular in Iran

For nearly a century and a half, Iranian intellectuals' demands for secularism and democracy have remained unfulfilled. Needless to say, the establishment of a religious state has further exacerbated the formidable challenges in achieving their goals. Nonetheless, amid the current difficulties, there are new opportunities that were not available to previous generations of intellectuals. Thirty years of Islamic rule has made the calls for the separation of religion from the state far more widespread; despite ceaseless suppression of the opposition, a lively and vibrant civil society challenges the clerical oligarchy; the postrevolutionary secular Left and liberal intellectuals tend to be more tolerant and more independent-minded than their predecessors; and a new genre of secular Muslim intellectuals, unlike the Muslim reformers of the past, have begun challenging some basic tenets of Islam and the Islamic state. The article discusses the evolution of secularist thought in Iran and the tormented relationship among secular forces in the past. It explores the possibilities for more collaborative action among secularists of diverse persuasions, on the basis of new consensus models of secularism, with the goal of establishing a more effective counterhegemony to the clerical state.

Reconceptualizing Church and State: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Separation of Religion and State on Democracy

AbstractThis article argues that the relationship between democracy and the separation of religion and state needs to be reexamined. We argue that previous studies have misconceptualized the impact that a lack of church-state separation can have on democracy, or have taken a narrow focus by concentrating on specific cases. We use principal component analysis and a large-ndata set covering 125 countries to show that the separation of religion and state should be conceptualized multi-dimensionally and that it should be considered a component of democracy. Our findings show that as separation of religion and state increases, the level of democracy also increases.

The Character of Shinto as a World Religion : For a Fundamental Study of the "Separation of Religion and State"

The Character of Shinto as a World Religion : For a Fundamental Study of the "Separation of Religion and State"