Animal Consciousness Research Articles

Biotechnological metabolization system has the potential to improve the predictive ability of the fish embryo acute toxicity (FET) test with the zebrafish (Danio rerio)

BackgroundThe fish embryo acute toxicity (FET) test with the zebrafish (Danio rerio) was developed to assess the acute fish toxicity of chemicals or environmental samples as a replacement for the Acute Fish Test (AFT) with juvenile fish. However, the FET is not yet established in the regulatory context. One reason is the (postulated) difference between the biotransformation capacities of embryos and juvenile fish.The present study was designed to develop a procedure for external metabolization of test substances prior to testing in the FET. The workflow allows simultaneous exposure of the embryos to the maternal substances and their potential metabolites throughout the entire exposure period. After a 2 h incubation of the samples at 37 °C with non-toxic concentrations of a rat liver S9 homogenate or an animal-free (ewoS9R) metabolization system, freshly fertilized zebrafish embryos are added and incubated up to 120 h post-fertilization at 26 °C. Five biotransformable model substances (allyl alcohol, benzo[a]pyrene (B[a]P), chlorpyrifos (CP), tris(1,3-dichloro-2-propyl) phosphate (TDCPP) and bisphenol A (BPA)) were evaluated for embryotoxicity with and without external metabolization.ResultsOnly for allyl alcohol, external metabolization with both rat S9 and ewoS9R resulted in significantly higher embryotoxicity than under non-premetabolized conditions and, thus, in a better correlation of FET and AFT data. For B[a]P, CP, TDCPP and BPA, there was no relevant difference between data derived from the FET (with and without pre-metabolization) and literature AFT data; even though the FET results with and without pre-metabolization differed significantly for BPA (with rat S9 and ewoS9R) and TDCPP (rat S9 only).ConclusionsExternal pre-metabolization appears a promising add-on to the FET protocol to improve the correlation with AFT data of certain biotransformable substances and might help to strengthen the FET as an alternative to the AFT and finally to reduce or replace sentient animals used for acute fish toxicity data in the regulatory context.Graphical

The role of the Animal Sentience Committee

The Animal Sentience Committee has a remit to look at policies which may impact the welfare needs of sentient animals.

Electrical stimulation of the ventral tegmental area restores consciousness from sevoflurane-, dexmedetomidine-, and fentanyl-induced unconsciousness in rats

BackgroundDopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) are crucially involved in regulating arousal, making them a potential target for reversing general anesthesia. Electrical deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the VTA restores consciousness in animals anesthetized with drugs that primarily enhance GABAA receptors. However, it is unknown if VTA DBS restores consciousness in animals anesthetized with drugs that target other receptors. ObjectiveTo evaluate the efficacy of VTA DBS in restoring consciousness after exposure to four anesthetics with distinct receptor targets. MethodsSixteen adult Sprague-Dawley rats (8 female, 8 male) with bipolar electrodes implanted in the VTA were exposed to dexmedetomidine, fentanyl, ketamine, or sevoflurane to produce loss of righting, a proxy for unconsciousness. After receiving the dopamine D1 receptor antagonist, SCH-23390, or saline (vehicle), DBS was initiated at 30 μA and increased by 10 μA until reaching a maximum of 100 μA. The current that evoked behavioral arousal and restored righting was recorded for each anesthetic and compared across drug (saline/SCH-23390) condition. Electroencephalogram, heart rate and pulse oximetry were recorded continuously. ResultsVTA DBS restored righting after sevoflurane, dexmedetomidine, and fentanyl-induced unconsciousness, but not ketamine-induced unconsciousness. D1 receptor antagonism diminished the efficacy of VTA stimulation following sevoflurane and fentanyl, but not dexmedetomidine. ConclusionsElectrical DBS of the VTA restores consciousness in animals anesthetized with mechanistically distinct drugs, excluding ketamine. The involvement of the D1 receptor in mediating this effect is anesthetic-specific.

Animal sentience: The science and its implications, with particular reference to farmed animals

AbstractThere is an increasing amount of scientific research into animal sentience. Many scientists are studying the cognitive, emotional, and communicative capacities of a range of animals. The results of this research have led to a number of legal recognitions of the sentience of a range of animals. In 1997, the European Union (EU) gave legal recognition to the sentience of animals and updated and elevated this recognition in the Treaty of Lisbon. Other countries and states as well as the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE) have followed it. Scientists are increasingly acknowledging that sentience and emotion have arisen in a wide range of species. Research now emphasizes that there is an extraordinary variation in how different animal species (such as mammals, birds, fish, or insects) perceive the world and their environment. This paper looks at the sentience of the main farmed land and aquatic animals and the implications of this for how such animals are bred and housed. The paper concludes that intensive farming systems deprive animals of opportunities for positive emotions, such as play, exploration, social interaction, and feeding to satiation, and stops them from satisfying naturally motivated behaviors. To truly respect animal sentience, production systems should be designed with the animal's characteristics and needs in mind. The authors conclude that regenerative, agroecological, or organic farming systems better protect and respect the sentience of animals leading to less suffering and more opportunities for positive experiences.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective.

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

Re-evaluating the agency of non-human subjects in Adrian Tchaikovsky's Dogs of War

Adrian Tchaikovsky is renowned for exploring animal consciousness and non-human perspectives in his works. His 2017 novel Dogs of War exemplifies the dominance of anthropocentrism within the novel’s transhumanist context, wherein genetically engineered non-human bioforms are exploited by humans. This study argues the way humans perceive and treat non-human subjects in the novel, which are reduced to “disposable bodies” (Braidotti, 2013, p.15), extends the reach of human-centred ideology into transhumanism. Therefore, the termination of the bioforms once they are deemed obsolete demonstrates a utilitarian view of life within transhumanist thought. Building upon these arguments, this study examines whether genetically engineered non-human entities in the novel are entitled to the same rights as their human creators, who design and command them in the pursuit of technological and military advancements. By extension, this study proposes Tchaikovsky's portrayal of bioform animals resonating with Donna Haraway’s concept of the “cyborg,” which challenges the traditional concept of humans by attributing agency and sentience to these beings. The study seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between human and non-human agency, thereby questioning the established hierarchy of beings in the context of transhumanist thought.

Anthropocentrism and Two Phenomenological Approaches to Animal Life

This article analyzes two phenomenological approaches to animal life in the context of criticism of anthropocentrism. The first part considers the question of anthropocentrism. Beginning with the posthumanist criticism of anthropocentrism as an ideology of human exceptionalism, the article proposes to reflect human anthropocentricity phenomenologically as a condition of experience. The second part discusses San Martín and Pintos’ approach, which, grounded in Husserl’s analysis of transcendental ego, considers the human-animal relation in terms of egotic subjectivity, corporeality, and the constitution of sense. San Martín and Pintos’ position is very important in the criticism of anthropocentrism, and yet it is considered insufficient when reflecting the diversity of human-animal relations. The third part analyses Depraz’s four-stage structure of empathy and aims to determine the conditions and limits of access to animals as liminal subjects. Corporeality is considered as the most general layer; the accessibility of animal consciousness, the approach to their experience, the possibilities and limits of it are analyzed. Finally, it is concluded that the two positions can contribute to the understanding of the limits of anthropocentrism and its failures.

Beyond Sentience: Legally Recognizing Animals’ Sociability and Agency

Abstract The recognition of animal sentience in law has created high expectations but has not yet lived up to them. In some jurisdictions, the recognition of animal sentience has formed the basis of new legal obligations imposed on humans to protect animal interests. So far, however, its potential has been limited because legal officials have interpreted sentience narrowly, as mainly referring to pain. This article proposes identifying other animal characteristics to better serve animal interests, namely sociability and agency. These animal characteristics could, like sentience, be legally recognized by legislatures and receive normative force from the courts. This article argues that the legal recognition of sociability and agency could address animal exploitation and killing. Animal sociability and agency are already implicitly recognized by the law of most Western states, making it easier for them to be explicitly recognized in the future. Although these characteristics are already found in the law, they have the potential to be more disruptive than sentience because they have never served as the basis for the legal protection of animals. In other words, their potential as protective tools remains underexplored and underexploited. Moreover, sociability and agency more intuitively suggest normative implications because of their demanding nature. Acknowledging that a being is social and agential implies recognizing her need for social relationships and ensuring that her choices are fulfilled. This research article provides antispeciesist scholars and activists with a critical overview of new concepts around which some may wish to rally, particularly since the legal recognition of sentience has shown limits in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the potential of legally recognizing sociability and agency by taking examples from the lives of dogs, cows, cats, horses, northern gannets, and dolphins.

Stakeholder perceptions of primary school education about food sustainability and farm animal welfare in England

ABSTRACT Background There is growing consensus on the negative impacts of food production on the natural environment and planetary viability. UK society is also increasingly concerned about the impact of intensive farming systems on the billions of sentient farmed animals within them. In liberal democracies and capitalist economies, enlightened citizens and informed consumers are key to the solution to environmental crises, such as anthropogenic climate change. Despite this, there is minimal provision for food sustainability and farm animal welfare in England’s National Curriculum. Purpose To investigate the views of stakeholders on the provision of food sustainability and farm animal welfare education in English primary schools. Sample Ten stakeholders selected for their knowledge or interest in food sustainability and farm animal welfare education. Design and methods In-depth, semi-structured interviews, analysed naturalistically within an interpretivist framework. Results Barriers to teaching food sustainability and farm animal welfare reported by stakeholders were restraints caused by the curriculum, the need and lack of funding, a lack of teacher knowledge about the topic, and concerns about its controversy. Best methods identified for teaching were teaching from an early age and throughout all of schooling, adopting a cross-curricular approach, facilitating learning in a hands-on way, and not waiting for change from government reform. Conclusion This research informs the debate on the provision of food sustainability and farm animal welfare education in English primary schools. Given that the environmental crisis is a global one, and that sentient animals are farmed across the world, the research may also inform discussion on inclusion of food sustainability and farm animal welfare outside of the English education context.

Is cell-based meat a climate solution for Canada?

Interest and technological know-how in cell-based meat production has grown tremendously in recent years. The appeal is wide ranging, but two main drivers include: i) the possibility of producing edible meat without requiring the slaughter of sentient animals; and ii) the potential to significantly reduce the environmental impact of animal agriculture. Owing to these potential benefits, proponents have called for major government investments in cell-based meat to further develop the technology and help launch the industry. This article critically examines the environmental promise of cell-based meat, focussing specifically on its potential role in climate change mitigation, and specifically within the context of Canada’s agri-food sector. The analysis is founded upon a comparison of available life cycle greenhouse gas assessments of cell-based and conventional meat, supplemented with contextual data about the Canadian agri-food sector. Cell-based meat in Canada is found to have a likely carbon footprint similar in scale to poultry meat, pork, and beef from dairy cattle, though considerably lower than meat from beef cattle. Alongside these findings and additional contextual factors pertaining to Canada’s agri-food sector, the paper argues that cell-based meat is best understood as one tool among many which could potentially support greenhouse gas emissions reductions in domestic food production if supporting conditions are met, not a silver bullet climate solution obtained by fully replacing conventional meat.

Extrapolating animal consciousness

I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, technologies and medical applications developed by extrapolating and aggregating findings from multiple models. Crucially important, this methodology does not require a commitment to any particular theory or construct of consciousness, thus avoiding theory-biased reinterpretations of empirical findings rampant in the literature.

Beyond anthropocentrism in agricultural and resource economics

AbstractWe argue that it is both possible and timely to relax the assumption of anthropocentrism in agricultural and resource economics. We advocate for the incorporation of sentientist principles by including the welfare of sentient animals within the social welfare function. To exemplify this non‐anthropocentric stance, we build on our recent works that incorporate the intrinsic value of farmed animals into food production and consumption. By recognising the externalities affecting animals, we justify the implementation of specific policies, such as a meat tax, which redistributes welfare from consumers and producers to farmed animals. Furthermore, we delve into the quantitative assessment of animal welfare and demonstrate its application to food policy, revealing the substantial economic and welfare impacts at stake. Expanding on our earlier model, we also emphasize the importance of introducing a ‘sentience premium’ within species conservation policies. This additional consideration ensures that the conservation efforts appropriately account for the intrinsic value of sentient beings living in the wild.

HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness

HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness

Dimensions of well-being

The notion of well-being is relative to the needs of organisms, both non-human and human. I argue that what we have learned about development, animal consciousness and ecological interrelations requires an evolution-informed extension of the way we think about well- and ill-being. Studies of epigenetic inheritance, mostly in animals, but also in humans, show that the effects of both stress and well-being go deeper ‘under the skin’ and extend further into the future than we thought. Studies of animals’ consciousness suggest that welfare considerations should be extended to many more animal species than most of us imagined. Technological innovations and ecological studies show that well-being depends critically, far more than we anticipated, on global social and environmental politics, social justice and the uses of technology.

Her Parasites: A poetic ecospiritual perspective of the COVID-19 pandemic and nature's intelligence

In this transdisciplinary perspective, I present my initial ecospiritual thinking about the COVID-19 pandemic in a poem, titled Her Parasites. I identify with other thinkers – both those in science and not – who articulated ecophilosophical musings about the pandemic in various ways, some of whom were met with mockery and censure. In the hope that it will inspire openness and a sense of curiosity, I draw on metaphysical insights from Vedic treatises and the literature on environmental decline, zoonotic epidemiology, health science, animal agriculture, animal ethics, and animal sentience to explain my poem’s philosophical and ecological framework. I focus on the scientific knowledge of epidemics caused by viruses that transcend species boundaries, why cross-species hopping occurs, and the nature (and incredible intelligence) of such viruses. I invite readers to consider ancient Vedic principles that articulate the rationale for living harmoniously with other sentient beings and entities. Considering the unseen metaphysical association between the pandemic and animal cruelty explained through the Vedic laws of Karmā, I present the possibility that one of the lessons Mother Earth might have wanted the Homo sapiens species to learn from the COVID-19 pandemic is its need to alter its diet. I end with a discussion on the possibility and value of this change. The downplaying or denial of animal sentience (strategies to overcome the psychological discomfort of incongruence between loving animals and eating them, as described in social psychology), is a barrier to this change. However, observed through a Vedic lens, this cognitive dissonance suggests that the Homo sapiens species is innately humane, the realisation of which might hold the key to this dietary change.

Growing Confidence and Remaining Uncertainty About Animal Consciousness

While the study of consciousness has had a controversial history and, until recently, a pessimistic prognosis, recent views within the neuroscientific community suggest that a maturing if incomplete scientific understanding of consciousness is close at hand. The purpose of this essay is to specify the major points on which in my opinion there is widespread though not universal agreement, as proposed benchmarks for the current state of consciousness research across the phylogenetic spectrum. Most published definitions of consciousness boil down to a focus on it as a process arising in a nervous system engaged with a body and its environment, giving rise to subjective (personal) experience. A broad consensus on the phenomenology of consciousness sees it consisting at a minimum of (1) awarenessand focused attention, (2) unity of perception, (3) qualitative variations in content, (4) mental causation, and (5) a sense of self. There is also broad agreement that the substrate of consciousness requires sizeable, complex nervous systems organized into several hierarchical levels of processing. Further insight is gained by reconstructing the evolution of subjective phenomenological experience ― most likely from multiple origins, hosted by a diversity of body and brain architectures, and diverging into markedly different forms across the animal kingdom. However, three major mysteries about phenomenological experience that remain unresolved are (1) the neurological correlates of consciousness, (2) the apparent gap between phenomenology and mechanism, and (3) the process that monitors the brain activity admitted into consciousness.

Continuities of Consciousness, Life-Worlds, and Numinous Experience: Cognitive-Phenomenological Foundations for an Empirical Neo-Shamanism

Numinous experience—as the felt sense of the sacred—evokes feelings of allone unity, communality, humility, and healing. Its schematization in the absolutes of traditional religion can also be seen as all-encompassing symbolic unifications of an otherwise fragmented human life-world—as more analytically depicted in the life-world phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. In both feeling and concept the numinous would be the semantic amplification of the more concrete organism-surround nonduality of non symbolic organisms—as reflected in a primary consciousness shared across Uexkuell’s sentient animal umwelten and Gibson’s “envelopes of flow.” H usserl’s phenomenology of passive synthesis and James on pure experience can be understood as intuiting the implicit forms underlying such a primary transspecies consciousness, as both differentiated into these concrete lifeworlds, to the level of the inferably sentient protozoa, and abstractly amplified as the human numinous. The latter, with its original social template in an ethically responsible shamanism, becomes similarly responsible in the contemporary context of a human caused global climate crisis for the care and conservation of that Spirit it both develops as such and accurately intuits as a universal is-like shared with all sentient beings.

What is it like to be an AI bat?

Consciousness is a natural phenomenon, familiar to every person. At the same time, it cannot be described in singular terms. The rise of Artificial Intelligence in recent years has made the topic of Artificial Consciousness highly debated. The paper discusses the main general theories of consciousness and their relationship with proposed Artificial Consciousness solutions. There are a number of well-established models accepted in the area of research: Higher Order Thoughts/Higher Order Perception, Global Network Workspace, Integrated Information Theory, reflexive, representative, functional, connective, Multiple Draft Model, Neural Correlate of Consciousness, quantum consciousness, to name just a few. Some theories overlap, which allows for speaking about more advanced, complex models. The disagreement in theories leads to different views on animal consciousness and human conscious states. As a result, there are also variations in the opinions about Artificial Consciousness based on the discrepancy between qualia and the nature of AI. The hard problem of consciousness, an epitome of qualia, is often seen as an insurmountable barrier or, at least, an “explanatory gap”. Nevertheless, AI constructs allow imitations of some models in silico, which are presented by several authors as full-fledged Artificial Consciousness or as strong AI. This itself does not make the translation of consciousness into the AI space easier but allows decent progress in the domain. As argued in this paper, there will be no universal solution to the Artificial Consciousness problem, and the answer depends on the type of consciousness model. A more pragmatic view suggests the instrumental interaction between humans and AI in the environment of the Fifth Industrial Revolution, limiting expectations of strong AI outcomes to cognition but not consciousness in wide terms.

The intrinsic moral value of individuals: A bioethical approach to domestic cats and damaged species

The domestic cat (Felis silvestris catus) is present on all continents, but only in some regions of the earth it can be considered native. All domestic cats originated from SWA and Egypt and, in theory, can be considered alien species in the rest of the world. However, the expansion of the cat in the Old World has begun during the Neolithic and ended, hypothetically, a thousand years ago. This time is probably sufficient to allow predator-prey relationships to develop, unlike in countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the New World, where the domestic cat was introduced between the early 1600 s and 1800 s. In these countries, the domestic cats do much more damage, contributing to the declines and, in some cases, to the extinction of vulnerable wild species, in particular on islands. But how can we define 'damage'? In biological terms, it is not possible to give a definition because ‘damage' is a human moral category. Consequently, decisions on the management of 'harmful' animal populations are entirely the prerogative of human beings and at the service of resolving the interests of the human species, which vary in different parts of the earth. Based on the most basic dictates of bioethics, the domestic cats deserve 'humane' methods of control because they are sentient animals capable of experiencing suffering and, as such, have intrinsic moral value. But prey are sentient animals, too. And, therefore, have intrinsic moral value as well and are bearers of interests. The problem of safeguarding domestic cats and wildlife survival and welfare of both is, at present, unsolved. There are several positions on this issue, and some of them are mentioned. Probably, there is no solution to this problem except to humanize the methods of controlling feral and owned domestic cats, and other species of super-predators and meso-predators, as much as possible, in order to safeguard the damaged prey species. To this aim, it is urgent to increase scientific research to make usable those methods, like genetic biocontrols and/or contraceptive baits to reduce cat fertility, that are already under study but not yet available.But it is time to give up with further hypocrisy: this is a problem created by human beings through their unwise behaviour and choices. Humans represent the most invasive vertebrate species and, in a way, their management of other species, including the domestic cat, is one of the many factors by which he has manifested his invasiveness.

Growing Confidence and Remaining Uncertainty About Animal Consciousness

While the study of consciousness has had a controversial history and, until recently, a pessimistic prognosis, recent views within the neuroscientific community suggest that a maturing if incomplete scientific understanding of consciousness is close at hand. Most published definitions of consciousness boil down to a focus on it as a process arising in a nervous system engaged with a body and its environment, giving rise to subjective (personal) experience. A broad consensus on the phenomenology of consciousness sees it consisting at a minimum of (1) awarenessand focused attention, (2) unity of perception, (3) qualitative variations in content, (4) mental causation, and (5) a sense of self. There is also broad agreement that the substrate of consciousness requires sizeable, complex nervous systems organized into several hierarchical levels of processing. Further insight is gained by reconstructing the evolution of subjective phenomenological experience ― most likely from multiple origins, hosted by a diversity of body and brain architectures, and diverging into markedly different forms across the animal kingdom. The three major mysteries that remain about phenomenological experience are (1) the neurological correlates of consciousness, (2) the apparent gap between phenomenology and mechanism, and (3) the agent that monitors the brain activity admitted into consciousness.