Sentience Research Articles

Effects of experimentally induced self-affirmation on the openness to meat reduction and alternative protein sources.

Consumption of animals entails disregarding the pain of sentient beings, and acknowledging this can threaten an individual's image of oneself as a moral person. Also, abstaining from meat in a meat-eating culture can threaten an individual's valued group identity. Previous research on inter-group relations suggests that self-affirmation, affirmation of personally or collectively important values, can help individuals alleviate self-threats since it enhances one's global self-image and decreases threat perceptions. We tested for potential effects of self-affirmation on openness toward reducing meat consumption in an experimental study. Participants (N = 277) were randomized into an individual affirmation, group affirmation, or a control condition. Individual affirmation participants ranked a list of values and then wrote a short paragraph about their first-ranked value. Group affirmation participants did a similar task, focusing on the values of their ethnic group, while participants in the control condition had an unrelated task of ranking their color preferences. Participants then read a persuasive message presenting health risks related to meat consumption and the health benefits of reducing meat. Finally, they indicated their openness toward reducing meat consumption and acceptability of plant-based alternatives and lab-grown meat. Results show that affirmed participants expressed more readiness to reconsider their meat consumption habits, reduced perceptions of vegetarianism as a threat to the local culture, and more positive perceptions of the idea of lab-grown meat. However, self-esteem and frequency of meat consumption pose important limitations to the experimental effects. We discuss the findings from the perspective of self-and collective identity threats and the potential of self-affirmations to create a more open debate about animal product consumption.

Positive Duties to Wild Animals: Introduction

ABSTRACT Though we’ve always known that the wild is a nasty place where predators lethally attack prey, only recently have most animal ethicists come to realize that most wild animals fail to flourish. In fact, what we know about wild animal reproduction suggests that the majority of sentient beings born into the world may not even live lives worth living. It’s not unreasonable for one to initially respond to the above with a sense of depressed resignation, but a growing number ethicists believe that we both can and should intervene. The purpose of this special issue is to further develop the interventionist literature by bringing togeher authors who agree that we owe significant postive duties to wild animals, but who use different theoretical frameworks, or who disagree about the details, e.g., about the reasons that ground our positive obligations to wild animals, about how those positive obligations should be classififed, about the content of our positive obligations, about the means we should use to fulfill our positive obligations, etc.

Exploring the limits to our understanding of whether fish feel pain.

Exploring the limits to our understanding of whether fish feel pain.

Hakuin’s system of practice and its background

ABSTRACT Based on the works of Hakuin Ekaku 白隱慧鶴 (1686–1769), this article analyses the practice system he constructed and its background and clarifies the following two conclusions. First, the system of practice demonstrated by Hakuin involves focus on one specific kind of practice to achieve ‘seeing one’s nature’ (kenshō 見性), and then ‘practice after insight’ (gogo no shugyō 悟後の修行). Among them, ‘practice after insight’ consists of two parts: ‘seeking bodhi above’ (jōgu bodai 上求菩提) by constantly consulting kōan cases to refine one’s own realisation, and ‘cultivating sentient beings below’ (geke shujō 下化眾生) by guiding other people through giving dharma teachings. Second, the core of Hakuin’s practice system is the three essential elements consisting of ‘insight,’ ‘seeking bodhi above,’ and ‘cultivating sentient beings below.’ The background against which they formed was the three enlightenments obtained in Hakuin Ekaku’s life.

Sentience and the Primordial ‘We’: Contributions to Animal Ethics from Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy

This paper explores the ontological bases for ethical behaviour between human animals and non-human animals drawing on phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Alongside Singer and utilitarianism, I argue that ethical behaviour regarding animals is most effectively justified and motivated by considerations of sentience. Nonetheless, utilitarianism misses crucial aspects of sentience. Buddhist ethics is from the beginning focused on all sentient beings, not solely humans. This inclusivity, and refined interrogations of suffering, means it can furnish more nuanced understandings of sentience. For phenomenology, sentience includes the capacities for self-awareness and, I will argue, a plural self-awareness; the ‘I’ belongs to a ‘we’, and the ‘we’ is constitutive of the ‘I’. This ‘primordial we’ provides the basis for rethinking the moral relations between human animals and non-human animals. I contend finally we thus have an ontological basis in ‘interanimality’ to explain why we most often do and should care about all sentient beings.

Experimental Environments and the Aesthetic Experience of Metabolic Processes

AbstractThis article explores the aesthetic experience of metabolic processes in two projects: the newly designed Jade Eco Park in Taiwan, by architect Philippe Rahm, and the virtual reality environment Give and Take, developed by Desiree Foerster, Michaela Büsse, Sarah Hermanutz, and Andreas Rau. The authors argue that a heightened sensitivity to atmospheric and metabolic processes enabled by these projects brings to the foreground a different mode of aesthetic perception, toward how we experience and not only what we feel. They propose further that an aesthetics of metabolism allows us to become more sensitive to our own bodily involvement with the world and other sentient beings with whom humans share the world.

대순사상의 영성인본주의 비교연구

This comparative study combines the methodologies of comparative research and literature review to examine Daesoon Thought. Comparative religious analysis in the social sciences, does not presuppose an a priori framework of the essence of religion because it targets various aspects of religion which are revealed within a historical field. However, it does not decompose and return to psychological or social phenomena like social sciences. In addition, with the emergence of religious pluralism, the climate of focusing on similarities between religions has already been accomplished to some degree. Furthermore, it is worth noting that many spiritual movements in modern spirituality reveal mixed or amorphous characteristics without being restricted by specific religious membership. It is time to overcome instrumentation and restore the transcendence of its original appearance even in secular humanist reasoning. It can be said that this reveals the perception that the ills and crises of modern civilization should be overcome in connection with the opening of the acquired world of Daesoon Thought. It could further be said that the main culprit of evil behavior is instrumental reason or degenerated reason rather than spirituality. Religion is the intellectual crystalline body of humankind and aims at human perfection and salvation. However, extremists in previous times amplified conflicts between religions and formed ideas suitable for their specific regions through different experiences. This generated mental rifts that proved greatly influential. At the time of initial inception, each religion confronted and fought other ideologies, but when the era of religious pluralism began, the necessity for inter-spiritual communication became urgent. It could be said that happiness is the realization of human spirituality by exploring the vision of humanism. In that case, the combined methodologies of comparative research and literature review reveal that the spirituality of Daesoon Thought would enable a humanism based on human dignity. This would be a path for seeking spirituality through human life and living as a true human being. Spiritual humanism as discussed through this study aims to share the problems of modern civilization and provide a critical view of modern civilization that shows the roots of prevailing thought are stuck in a Cartesian dualistic view of humanity and the world. The type of spiritual humanism to examined here focuses on a cosmotheandric vision by considering the spiritual return to Daoism via Daesoon Thought. This would treat human beings like heaven in alignment with Donghak ideology and honor the human dignity proposed by Daesoon Thought. It would also deliver sentient beings from suffering and to bliss in accordance with the aims of faith in Maitreya Buddha, and it would implement the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence in fulfillment of Daesoon Thought.

Animal Soundscapes in Anglo-Norman Texts. By Liam Lewis

Professional medieval thinkers habitually characterized humans as the only truly linguistic animal. Liam Lewis’s book joins recent work on medieval animals by describing cases that elude the strictures of such hierarchical binaries. Lewis’s examples, drawn from Anglo-Norman encyclopaedias, conduct manuals, fables, and hagiography, show that animal noise was not simply the opposite of rational sound but rather something bon à penser. In Philippe de Thaon’s Bestiaire, the earliest vernacular bestiary, Lewis finds some anxiety about sound in the representation of sirens. While illustrations show them with their mouths closed, as if refusing to imagine their threatening song, Philippe’s text itself focuses exclusively on their physical attractiveness, which medieval misogynist moralizing knew better how to handle. With the bestiary’s mandrake, we have a creature whose deadly cry muddles easy distinctions between sentient and non-sentient life. Next, Lewis considers the list of animal noises in Walter of Bibbesworth’s Le Tretiz: humans lead off the list (‘home parle’), followed immediately by the roaring of bears (‘ourse braie’) with the noun glossed in Middle English. As he traces further entanglement of animal sounds and human languages, Lewis also imagines the young readers of Le Tretiz learning their roles as aristocrats and men both by imitating animal sounds, and by gathering geese and women together into the same collective noun, a ‘compaignie’: the category in Le Tretiz of ‘home’, the human or more simply man, allies with (certain) animals while reducing most humans to servitude. The third chapter, on an anonymous Vye de Seynt Fraunceys, relies on Angelo Clareno’s division of zoē, mere life, from bios, holy life, practised by the saints: drawing from Giorgio Agamben, but eschewing Agamben’s gloominess, Lewis studies how St Francis of Assisi allies with animal sounds — crickets’ chirps, sheep’s bleating, and birdsong — to worship with them, or to help human and animal both rise from zoē to bios. His last full chapter considers the fables attributed to Marie de France. Though famously a genre featuring animals that talk, their animal sound matters too: Marie’s goats bleat to summon rescuing dogs, while elsewhere a dog’s reasoning with a thief ends with a bark, as if it’s raising the hue and cry, a human legal mechanism enacted not through language but through noise. Mouth and muzzle, as Lewis observes, are not so obviously different in their effects. Lewis writes well, creatively attends to poetics, and generates new readings without distorting his sources. Overall, I am more pessimistic than Lewis about the positive benefits of ‘reassessing human exceptionalism’ (p. 161). The landed aristocrats who learned to be men by imitating animals asserted their dominance in part by imagining themselves bestial. St Francis is one model; these rapacious men another. Lewis’s book, to its credit, urges us to be more like the former than the latter.

On the Subjective Value of Life

Claims (or the implicit assumption) of the inherent worth of life are pervasive and remain virtually unchallenged. I have already argued that these outright moral dictates are thinly veiled vestiges of theological ethics which, following the removal of their theological foundations, remain little more than nebulous claims supported only by fear of the consequences of a challenge. In my previous work, I rejected an a priori claim of an objective life’s worth, which is the worth that we should assign to others’ lives, and elucidated a principled framework that gives rise to the said worth immediately, as a consequence of the experiences of its sentient environment. Herein, I address the complementary question of the value of one’s own life, which is the subjective value of life and, thus, Camus’s (in)famous view that “there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide”. As before, I rejected the inherency of a life’s worth, showing it to be contradictio in adjecto, and instead show how this worth too can in large part be seen to emerge from sentient experiences of the subject. Many of these are innately linked to experiences of other sentient beings as objects, thus erecting a framework that is both principled and thoroughly humane with Schopenhauer’s ‘loving kindness’ running through it. Practically, my framework illuminates an understanding of suicide as a real-world phenomenon, helping those who remain living to understand a deceased one’s decision, and paving the way to answering questions, such as when there should be an attempt to prevent suicide, and what means of suicide prevention are ethically permissible.

Divine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism

Divine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism

Literary Bioethics: Animality, Disability, and the Human by Maren Tova Linett

<i>Literary Bioethics: Animality, Disability, and the Human</i> by Maren Tova Linett

The Significance and Ethics of Digital Livestock Farming

The emergence of precision and digital livestock farming presents an opportunity for sustainable animal farming practices that enhance animal welfare and health. However, this transformation of modern animal farming through digital technology has several implications for the technological, social, economic, and environmental aspects of farming. It is crucial to analyze the ethical considerations associated with the digitalization of modern animal farming, particularly in the context of human–animal relationships and potential objectification. This analysis can help develop frameworks for improving animal welfare and promoting sustainability in animal farming. One of the primary ethical concerns of digital livestock farming is the potential for a digital divide between farmers who have access to advanced technologies and those who do not. This could lead to a disparity in animal welfare and health outcomes for different groups of animals. Additionally, the use of artificial intelligence in digital livestock farming may lead to a loss of personal connection between farmers and animals, which could impact the animal’s well-being. Another ethical concern of digital livestock farming is the potential for the objectification of animals as mere data points. The use of sensors and other monitoring technologies can provide valuable data on animal health and behavior, but it is important to remember that animals are sentient beings with complex emotional and social needs. The use of digital technologies should not lead to neglect of animal welfare or a lack of human responsibility toward animals. Furthermore, social context becomes essential while integrating technologies in livestock farming to overcome ethics. By considering the cultural and societal norms of different communities, we can ensure that the use of digital technologies does not undermine these values. To address these ethical challenges, the development of standards and codes of conduct for the adoption and implementation of digital livestock farming tools and platforms can help ensure that animal welfare and sustainability are prioritized. This can help alleviate the privacy concerns of stakeholders and improve sustainability in animal farming practices. Additionally, the use of virtual and augmented reality technologies can provide a way to enhance human–animal interactions and provide more personalized care to animals, further promoting animal welfare.

Exit Duty Generator.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one's autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author's perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo.

The Political Salience of Animal Protection in the Netherlands (2012–2021) and Belgium (2010–2019): What do Dutch and Belgian Political Parties Pledge on Animal Welfare and Wildlife Conservation?

The Netherlands and Belgium are European Union (EU) states with a shared border and cultural similarities. Article 13 of the EU Treaty of Lisbon recognises animals as sentient beings. EU laws protect animal welfare and conservation, and member states can implement more stringent legislation. Political salience refers to the extent to which citizens are concerned about political issues. Issue salience can be measured by assessing references to animal protection in party political manifestos. This research analyses the political salience of animal protection in the Netherlands and Belgium. It analyses over 2600 statements on animal protection in Dutch (2012–2021) and Belgian (2010–2019) party manifestos across three consecutive national elections. Quantitative analysis reveals that in both the Netherlands and Belgium, animal protection became more salient during successive elections, with the total number of positive statements increasing and the total number of negative statements decreasing. Farmed animal welfare and wildlife/biodiversity were the most salient issues, although the focus in countries and regions differed. Dutch parties and those in the Walloon region of Belgium focused on farmed animal health and unnecessary suffering; Flemish parties stressed intensive agriculture and animal welfare. In Belgium, wildlife/biodiversity statements stressed the protection of local species; Dutch statements were strongly linked to agriculture. In both the Netherlands and Belgium, left-wing parties had more progressive policy statements, whilst right-wing parties prioritised economic prosperity over animal protection. This research provides the first academic analysis of animal protection policies in political manifestos in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Against Project Arcadia

This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years’ time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future contexts? How will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries. Our earth is approaching its end. Through Project Arcadia our species has a chance at escape. In this paper, I want to argue that Arcadia is all things considered unjustifiable and unadvisable. It is unjustifiable because human beings have proven themselves incapable of stewarding sentient life on planet earth; for example, our collective response to climate change has been dire, handled almost exclusively through adaptation, committing vast areas of the world to desolation, desertification, or disappearance. Basic respect for life, and what we likely will make of some other instances of it, should counsel humility as we contemplate relocating ourselves to other life-supporting domains. It is inadvisable because our species, like the world, is impermanent. We will, at some point, have to contemplate the ceasing of our existence, and it is my argument that we contemplate this ceasing on the terra firm of our own planet. In conclusion, and drawing on the work of Samuel Scheffler and the Japanese concept of mono no aware, I will argue that there is considerable value, admittedly tainted with considerable melancholy, to be had in grasping the opportunity provided by planetary devastation to achieve some semblance of narrative completion.

The Buddhist philosophic origins of the literary xingling theory

The literary theory of xingling (“soul”) is an early category in the history of Chinese literature, which was first proposed by the famed Buddhist literati Fan Tai, Xie Lingyun, Yan Yanzhi, He Shangzhi and other figures during the Southern Dynasties, Liu and Song periods, and broadly applied by figures such as Liu Xie, Zhong Rong and Yu Xin to esthetic theory and poetry criticism. There are chiefly two aspects to the origins of the literary theory of xingling in Buddhist philosophy: The first is the idea of foxing (“Buddhatā, Buddha-nature”) within teachings on nirvana in Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the second is the idea of shishen (“vijñāna, consciousness”) in Hīnayāna Buddhism. After being introduced into China, the theories of “Buddha-nature” and “consciousness” were ingeniously combined with the concepts of guishen (“supernatural beings”) and linghun (“spirit”) in the native Chinese tradition. “Buddha-nature,” “consciousness,” and shenling (“divinity”) were organically integrated, forming the basic content of the Buddhist theory of xingling, which referred not only to a constant and immutable, supremely powerful, and mystical force intrinsically possessed by all living creatures (sentient beings), but also to a foundational energy that filled the cosmos and obliterated differences. This provided a profound and substantial philosophical basis for the literary theory of xingling by Liu Xie, Zhong Rong, Yu Xin and other figures, imbuing xingling with the status and power of a universal center with supreme sublimity and matchless energy.

Virus as Metaphor in the Age of Catastrophe

Virus as Metaphor in the Age of Catastrophe

Exploring the Recognition of Dogs as Sentient Beings: Understanding the Evolution of Dog Psychology

Exploring the Recognition of Dogs as Sentient Beings: Understanding the Evolution of Dog Psychology

The Trouble of Rocks and Waters

This article considers the possibility of constructing an authentic environmental ethic from Buddhist sources. It first outlines the major critiques of historical Buddhist approaches to the natural world and parses some of the philological and linguistic barriers to such a construction. It then considers some of the recent philosophical critiques of such a project and reviews the major points of tension between the Buddhist philosophical tradition and the kinds of environmental ethics found in the land ethic and deep ecology. Ultimately, this article asserts that such tension is relieved if we begin from Buddhist philosophical principles and construct an environmental ethic from the ground up. It argues a Buddhist environmental ethic emerges from the combination of the goal of liberating all sentient beings from duḥkha, an understanding of duḥkha as dependently arising, and a novel recognition of the environment as a major cause of this duḥkha.

Virtue Ethics and Animal Moral Status

A person of good character treats other sentient beings with care and compassion. Yet virtue ethics apparently has trouble accounting for the moral status of nonhuman animals because of its focus on excellent character traits, rather than the moral “patient,” and because of its non-codifiability, at least in some forms. The task of this article is to answer the question: How can virtue ethics account for the moral value of nonhuman animals in the context of biomedical research? I argue that it can do so through attention to animal good lives, human-animal bonds, and the virtues themselves. The virtue ethics resources I draw on to support nonhuman animal value are not the same as those typically brought to bear in moral status discussions, but I suggest that moral status as usually conceived has its own problems as a tool for use in practical contexts like animal research.