Semantic Scope Research Articles

Goal and Source: Their Syntactic and Semantic Asymmetry

n/a

Putting some order into morphology: reflections on Rice (2000) and Stump (2001) Keren Rice, Morpheme order and semantic scope: word formation in the Athapaskan verb (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 90). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii+453. Gregory T. Stump, Inflectional morphology: a theory of paradigm structure (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 93). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi+308.

This article reviews two important recent contributions to the theory of morphology, which take significantly different approaches to the subject. Both are centrally concerned with questions of morphotactics. Rice argues that morpheme order in Athapaskan is largely the consequence of universal principles of semantic scope (coded as syntactic structure). Stump argues for a conception of inflection based on the paradigm. There is virtually no overlap between the two books, yet each raises questions that are of great significance for the other. In this review I briefly evaluate each book and then sketch the possibility of a synthesis.

Derived change-of-state verbs in French: a case of semantic equivalence between prefixes and suffixes

The paper reports on work carried out within Corbin's associative morphological model which postulates that form and meaning are deducible from one another. It is assumed that in French there is a neat semantic distribution between prefixes and suffixes because each affix is specified by its semantic instructional identity. If this is the case, then the affixes a-, en-, é- and -is(er), -ifi(er) seem to constitute exceptions and represent semantic equivalence because each of them constructs deadjectival change of state verbs. In order to explain this apparent discrepancy, it is proposed here that the notion of 'paradigm of morphological processes' is to be abandoned when characterizing the semantic scope of a rule and we should adopt the principle that one and only one affix corresponds to one and only one word formation rule.

How to be Universal when you are Existential: Negative Polarity Items in the Comparative: Entailment along a Scale

Fauconnier (1975a) noticed that existential quantification, if it is related to a scale endpoint, can force entailment along the scale and as such have the effect of universal quantification: assume a partially ordered set (X, ≥) and a predicate Φ such that for all x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y, if Φ is true of x, it is also true of y; then if there exists an element z that is ordered before all other elements and Φ(z) is true, then Φ is true for all elements in X. This paper claims that the clausal Comparative licences context sensitive Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) like English any and ever, and German jemals ('ever'), due to its property of enabling entailment along a scale. I argue that the licensing condition of any and ever/jemals is not itself the 'semantic scope of a downward entailing function' (Ladusaw 1979), but rather that a downward entailing function provides one appropriate kind of context that satisfies the actual condition which is part of the NPI's meaning (following Kadmon & Landman 1993; Krifka 1994, 1995; Jackson 1995): any and ever/jemals are indefinites that are licensed in particularly strong statements. The new idea is to define an assertion containing an indefinite NPI as strong if the existentially quantified formula entails a particular wide scope universal statement: assume that 'Babajaga doesn't see any tree' means that it is not true that there exists some tree that Babajaga sees. This entails that for all trees, Babajaga does not see them. In general, entailment will be granted if existential quantification is either in the scope of a downward entailing function or occurs in the context of a scale, the latter enabling entailment along the scale: if 'Babajaga is smarter than any witch' actually means that Babajaga is smarter than one of the smartest witches, then this entails that for all witches, Babajaga is smarter.

A Continuation Semantics of Interrogatives That Accounts for Baker's Ambiguity

No abstract.

The Combinatory Morphemic Lexicon

Grammars that expect words from the lexicon may be at odds with the transparent projection of syntactic and semantic scope relations of smaller units. We propose a morphosyntactic framework based on Combinatory Categorial Grammar that provides flexible constituency, flexible category consistency, and lexical projection of morphosyntactic properties and attachment to grammar in order to establish a morphemic grammar-lexicon. These mechanisms provide enough expressive power in the lexicon to formulate semantically transparent specifications without the necessity to confine structure forming to words and phrases. For instance, bound morphemes as lexical items can have phrasal scope or word scope, independent of their attachment characteristics but consistent with their semantics. The controls can be attuned in the lexicon to language-particular properties. The result is a transparent interface of inflectional morphology, syntax, and semantics. We present a computational system and show the application of the framework to English and Turkish.

Continuations and the Nature of Quantification

This paper proposes that the meanings of some natural language expressions should be thought of as functions on their own continuations. Continuations are a well-established analytic tool in the theory of programming language semantics; in brief, a continuation is the entire default future of a computation. I show how a continuation-based grammar can unify several aspects of natural language quantification in a new way: merely stating the truth conditions for quantificational expressions in terms of continuations automatically accounts for scope displacement and scope ambiguity. To prove this claim, I exhibit a simple finite context-free grammar with a strictly compositional semantics in which quantificational NPs are interpreted in situ but take semantic scope over larger constituents. There is no Quantifier Raising (nor any use of a level of Logical Form distinct from overt syntax), no Cooper Storage (or similar mechanisms used in many recent HPSG, Categorial, or Type-logical treatments), and no need for type-shifting (as in Hendriks' Flexible Types account). Continuations also provide a natural account of generalized coordination that does not require either type-shifting or type polymorphism. Compositionality issues are discussed in some detail.

Review of Rice (2000): Morpheme Order and Semantic Scope: Word formation in the Athapaskan verb

Review of Rice (2000): Morpheme Order and Semantic Scope: Word formation in the Athapaskan verb

Was-w construction in German

The so-called was-w-construction in German has received a fair amount of attention in recent syntactic theorizing. Most of the discussion has focused on the properties of was.
 One line of research maintains that was is a scope marker that indicates the semantic scope of the wh-phrase in the embedded interrogative clause. The alternative view, usually referred to as the indirect analysis, was first developed with respect to Hindi (Dayal 1994) and then generalized to German (Dayal 1996). It holds that the was of the was-w-construction is associated not with the embedded wh-phrase, but rather with the embedded clause as a whole.
 Hinrichs and Nakazawa present some novel evidence in favor of an indirect analysis of the was-w construction. However, the main focus of their research is on two questions that by comparison have received little attention, namely:
 
 what is the set of matrix predicates that can enter into this construction, and
 how can one account for the curious fact that predicates that ordinarily do not license wh-complements allow such complements in the was-w-construction?
 
 On the basis of Ginzburg and Sag's verb classification (Ginzburg and Sag, in preparation) Hinrichs and Nakazawa identify a natural class of predicates that license this construction and utilize the notion of type coercion to account for the apparent mismatch between the syntactic form of the embedded interrogative and its semantic function.

Adverbials with floating and fixed semantic scope

The present study offers the analysis of the role of adverbials in the semantic structure of a sentence. To clarify this role new notions "Adverbials with floating and fixed semantic scope" are proposed. This classification also can clarify the role of adverbials from the point of view of the division into arguments vs. adjuncts.

Positively Polar

Positive Polarity Items cannot appear in the scope of a clausemate negation. This statement stands in need of a double qualification. For one thing, not all negative environments are alike, and some PPIs can occur in one type of negative environment but not the other. I argue that indefinite NPs with a are PPIs of the weakest type, and therefore only incompatible with the weakest of negative contexts, basically those instantiated by the negative adverb not. Second, indefinites with a can be found to occur in the syntactic scope of not. This happens under either of two conditions: on the one hand, not may signal metalinguistic negation, which differs substantially from ordinary negation. On the other hand, the indefinite may (in a language like English at least) take semantic scope over not. The latter strategy is unavailable in a scrambling language like Dutch, where the indefinite can move overtly to a syntactic position having scope over the negative adverb.

Investigating causal relations in language with the help of path analysis*

The article presents the results of an experiment on the use of the method of Path analysis in identifying and measuring the causal relations in a system of linguistic objects. A survey is given of the main principles and techniques of Path analysis. The application of Path analysis to linguistic material is illustrated by a causal model exposing the dependences between four characteristics of vocabulary: the age of a word (A), frequency (F), length (L), and semantic scope or polysemy (S).

Licensing of negative polarity items under inverse scope

Negative polarity items are licensed ‘in the scope’ of their trigger. In this article, I take a closer look at the relevant notion of scope, which is shown to involve syntactic, semantic and pragmatic considerations. In general, a position in the c-command domain of its trigger at S-structure is sufficient for an NPI to be licensed. If the NPI precedes its trigger, the sentence is felicitous only if the NPI can be interpreted in the semantic scope of its trigger. The possibility of an inverse scope reading of negation is subject to a pragmatic constraint, which requires the sentence to convey positive information. The incapability of bare NPIs involving any in English or ook maar in Dutch to satisfy this constraint explains why they cannot precede their trigger. Embedded NPIs and the NPI hoeven ‘need to’ in Dutch can satisfy the pragmatic constraint on inverse scope, and are therefore licensed outside of the c-command domain of the trigger.

Donc et les Consécutifs. Des Systèmes de Contraintes Différentiels

In this paper, we investigate some syntactic and semantic properties of a subclass of consecution discourse markers, or "connectives", in French. Consecution connectives express causal, implicative, or deductive relations between propositional entities. Typical instances of the class in English are therefore, so, then. We study the specific properties of donc (resembling therefore) in contrast with de ce fait, du coup, and alors (which can be rendered by so or then in many cases). We first describe the surface position constraints for these connectives, and relate the observations to the general problem of adverb position. Next, we appeal to a basic distinction between illocutionary force, propositional attitude, and propositional content to explain some observed semantic scope differences among the four items. Focussing on donc, we turn to the problem of the (in)compatibility of these connectives with if-sentences, illustrated by the following contrast. (A) S'il fait beau, alors j'irai me promener If the weather is fine, (then) I'll have a walk (B ) ?? S'il fait beau, donc j'irai me promener If the weather is fine, (therefore) I'll have a walk We connect this difference with a variation in connexion "strength", a notion we substantiate in the final section by resorting to a version of generalized quantification. We also consider the influence of surfacc position on acceptability for examples of type (B), and we propose that this should be related to a difference in syntactic scope, which shows in explicative c 'est que structures as well.

Relevance and prosody in spoken Danish

The relation between pragmatics and prosody in Danish is a complex one; it probably is in any language. But since such a relation undisputedly exists, empirical investigations of prosody can be used to test the usefulness of pragmatic theories. In this paper the theory of relevance is put to a test. The point in case is whether relevance theory is useful in predicting stress in spoken Danish from the city of Copenhagen. The results suggest that certain paths must be followed in order to provide adequate hypotheses about prosody in spoken Danish. In short, it seems necessary to go beyond the scope of syntax and semantics, but also beyond the scope of universal pragmatics, i.e. pragmatics based on purely universal principles. Socio-pragmatic and sociological insights must be incorporated in the description if accurate hypotheses are to be formulated; a framework based merely on universal principles of cognitive information processing cannot explain the prosodic phenomena encountered.

Mental representations: The interface between language and reality Edited by Ruth M. Kempson (review)

408 LANGUAGE, VOLUME 67, NUMBER 2 (1991) The prefixes ko- and /- then have their own entries elsewhere in the dictionary. K includes the Proto-Athabaskan source and reconstructed morpheme for each entry for which this information is known. There is also a brief but interesting discussion of the relation of Ahtna to PA in the introduction. K has conducted his research in collaboration with a large number of Ahtna speakers. Ahtna has four regional dialects, which, according to K, differ only in lexical and phonological details . Each entry in this dictionary indicates the status of the lexical item in each of the dialects. In addition, the introduction includes a thorough overview of the major phonological differences among the dialects. The overall organization of this dictionary is based on K's theory of Ahtna word formation, and this foundation makes the work particularly accessible. K's model, which he has developed in more detail elsewhere, is lucidly summarized in the Introduction. The model distinguishes levels of word formation according to the abstract categories Lexicon, Derivation. Inflection, and Post-Inflection, rather than according to the surface order of the morphemes . Generalizations about lexical relatedness are thus captured in a perspicuous way, and the data are made transparent to the linguist who is interested in theoretical issues. The appendices provide (a) lists of loanwords, numerals, and kinship terms; (b) a summary of topics in verb phonology; (c) a discussion of directional words; and (d) paradigms of theme formation, aspectual derivation, nonaspectual derivation, and complete inflected verbs. For its target audiences, this dictionary is a superb achievement, and it is likely that lexicographers of non-Athabaskan languages will find that it provides a valuable model. [Margaret Speas, University of Massachusetts . Amherst.) Mental representations: The interface between language and reality. Ed. by Ruth M. Kempson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. viii, 229. Cloth $39.50. This book is a collection of papers originally presented at a conference on 'Mental Representations : Properties of Logical Form", held in England and organized by Ruth Kempson. The principal impetus behind the conference and the book was an interest in understanding to what degree some of the major approaches to the interface between language and cognition might be compatible, and especially to what degree these might inform research in Sperber & Wilson 's 'Relevance Theory'. The volume contains some excellent representative papers from researchers in Government & Binding Theory (GB; James Higginbotham, Robert May, and Michael Brody & M. Rita Manzini). Situation Semantics (Robin Cooper and Elisabet Engdahl), and Relevance Theory (Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber, Diane Blakemore, and Robyn Carston). The result is a very useful and interesting book that anyone with an interest in semantics, pragmatics, or syntax will enjoy reading. However. 1 myself was not persuaded that any synthesis of views is likely to be pieced together. In fact, these models still seem too far apart on even their object ofinquiry to consider a potential synthesis, although there are certainly areas of overlap, as Kempson points out in her introduction and concluding article. Kempson's thought-provoking and stimulating introductory article provides an excellent overview of the various approaches in the book. The articles by Higginbotham, Cooper, and Engdahl are concerned with the nature of linguistic semantics. Higginbotham argues for a view that finds relevant for natural-language semantics only those features of meaning which belong to the linguistic system, that is, those attributes which are used by speakers and referred to by grammatical rules. Purely technical issues, e.g. analyticity and syntheticity, fall outside the scope of linguistic semantics. He discusses the well-known problem of disquotational statements and how these can be used to shed light on interesting semantic problems. Cooper and Engdahl argue for ways of incorporating the notion of situation into linguistic semantics. Cooper proposes a situation model of negation, conjunction, and disjunction and then considers whether his findings should be interpreted in a mentalistic or platonistic fashion (more specifically whether invariants of linguistic interpretation are to be interpreted in terms of a language of mental representation or a general cognitive filter or part of the nonmental world). He largely suspends judgment on the matter, claiming (58) that ? do not think that the study of semantics alone will...

Defending Desire-as-Belief

Orthodoxy has it that rational action is a product of a two-part recipe, a consequence of the co-occurrence of two distinct kinds of mental states. The view stems from Hume. Hume distinguished reason from the passions, and argued 'that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; . . . that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will' (Treatise, Bk. II, Pt. III, Sect. III). In modern terminology the Humean view is thus that action is a joint product of an agent's beliefs and desires; and that these are distinct kinds of mental states, desires being distinguished from beliefs in virtue of their motivational role. In such a form the view has enormous application in contemporary thought. It is widely taken for granted by economists and decision theorists, by psychologists and cognitive scientists, and (somewhere in the middle, perhaps) by most philosophers. In recent years, however, several philosophers have questioned the Humean orthodoxy. They have suggested that certain beliefs might be intrinsically motivational-in effect, in other words, that some or all desires might themselves be beliefs. The challenge has come mainly from philosophers concerned to block certain applications of Humean psychology within philosophy. An attractive feature of the suggestion that (some) desires might be beliefs has been its evident potential to undermine emotivist accounts of moral discourse (and so to enable ethical statements to be brought within the scope of a truth-conditional general semantics). The challenge has in turn provoked three recent defences of the Humean view, all appearing in Mind. Michael Smith explicates and defends the Humean distinction in terms of the popular suggestion that belief and desire have different 'directions of fit' to the world. David Lewis offers a novel argument that the desire-as-belief thesis (as he calls it) is incompatible with standard formal theories of Bayesian decision and belief revision. And John Collins reaches a similar conclusion in terms of non-quantitative decision theory.1 In this paper I reply to these arguments on behalf of the non-Humean. My conclusion is not that desire is belief, but simply that the arguments of Smith, Lewis, and Collins do very little to show that desire is not belief.

Christ and Reproof (Matthew 7.1–5/Luke 6.37–42)

The saying of the Mote and Beam (properly Chaff and Pole) has caused some difficulty; but alas an intricate and subtle saying, paradoxical (not absurd), has been domesticated by being seen as a trite commonplace. The obvious questions are why onlyoneeye is involved: for only if both were affected could a foreign body not be extricated; and why does the seer of the Chaff have to have a Pole inhiseye; why, again, does he take the initiative, offering to attend to his ‘brother’, whereas in a case of a foreign body the initiative comes from the sufferer; why is it assumed that a ‘casting out’ will occur (έκβάλλειν has a very sombre semantic scope); and whence comes that grotesque Pole (conventionally ‘beam’)? The answers must be sought in many quarters, viz. (1) a popular saying known in more than one culture, (2) the behaviour of the eye, (3) a common Jewish cluster of idioms, (4) the pious ideal in Israel on the subject of rebuke, reproof, and (5) the Law and the Prophets. Our saying has languished because information from these quarters has not been combined.

The Narrow Semantics of Names

Narrow semantics is about the relation between utterance and thought: given a sentence, what beliefs (or desires) does it express; or, conversely, given your beliefs (and desires), what sentences is it linguistically proper for you to assent to? I would like to call this just 'semantics'. But unfortunately some philosophers have adopted a technical use of 'semantics' in which it refers to the relation between words and the world, rather than words and thought. The central epithet of semantics, in this technical sense, is 'true'. It is natural to think, however, that words latch onto the world only via people's thoughts. There is the relation between the words and the thought, which would be the same whatever the state of the world; and there is the relation between the thought and the world, which makes the thought true. Only the first of these relations would naturally be seen as specifically linguistic, within the scope of semantics. However, we need not quibble about terminology. The main point is that my topic is not the currently popular truth-conditional semantics. My topic is the narrow semantics of names and general terms. We can treat general terms as names-of sets, properties or whatever-by reading 'Fa' as 'a is a member of F', or 'a has F' or whatever.

Error diagnosis in logic programming an adaptation of E.Y. Shapiro's method

We study Shapiro's method of bug diagnosis in the theoretical framework of Horn clause logic programming. Within the framework of Clark's semantics (Herbrand's universe with variables, which is more general than the most usual semantics without variables) we extend the scope of fixpoint and declarative semantics of logic programming.