Semantic Conventions Research Articles

Semantic minimalism and the “miracle of communication”

According to semantic minimalism, context-invariant minimal semantic propositions play an essential role in linguistic communication. This claim is key to minimalists’ argument against semantic contextualism: if there were no such minimal semantic propositions, and semantic content varied widely with shifts in context, then it would be “miraculous” if communication were ever to occur. This paper offers a critical examination of the minimalist account of communication, focusing on a series of examples where communication occurs without a minimal semantic proposition shared between speaker and hearer. The only way for minimalists to respond to these examples is by restricting the scope of their account to intra-lingual communication. It can then be shown (1) that the minimalist’s notion of a language shrinks to a point, such that practically no instances of communication will fall under that account, and (2) that the retreat to intra-lingual communication is in any case self-defeating, since the only way for minimalists to account for the individuation of languages is by resort to precisely the kinds of contextual considerations they abjured in the first place. In short, if, as minimalists allege, contextualism founders because it renders communication contingent on speaker and hearer sharing a context, it can now be seen that minimalism faces a parallel problem because it renders communication contingent on speaker and hearer sharing a language. I end by arguing that the possibility of communication cannot, as minimalists assume, be grounded in shared semantic conventions; rather, successful communication must precede the establishment of any particular set of semantic conventions.

Leadership and Language Games

Process theories of leadership ITS Emphasize relational in nature But Lack Substantial method of analysis. method of analysis. We offer an account of leadership as a language-game, employing the concepts We offer an account of leadership as a language-game, Employing the concepts of opaque context and propositional attitudes. of opaque context and propositional attitudes. Using established methods of linguistic analysis, we Using Established methods of linguistic analysis, we reformulate Weber's understanding of charismatic leadership. reformulate Weber's understanding of charismatic leadership. A by-product of this approach is to A by-product of this approach is to limit the epistemological role of individual psychology in leadership studies, and to increase the epistemological limit the role of individual psychology in leadership studies, and to Increase the relevance of linguistic and semantic conventions. relevance of linguistic and semantic conventions.

Representation of coordinate reference systems for the rodent brain in the INCF Digital Atlasing Infrastructure

Representation of coordinate reference systems for the rodent brain in the INCF Digital Atlasing Infrastructure

Survey-based naming conventions for use in OBO Foundry ontology development.

BackgroundA wide variety of ontologies relevant to the biological and medical domains are available through the OBO Foundry portal, and their number is growing rapidly. Integration of these ontologies, while requiring considerable effort, is extremely desirable. However, heterogeneities in format and style pose serious obstacles to such integration. In particular, inconsistencies in naming conventions can impair the readability and navigability of ontology class hierarchies, and hinder their alignment and integration. While other sources of diversity are tremendously complex and challenging, agreeing a set of common naming conventions is an achievable goal, particularly if those conventions are based on lessons drawn from pooled practical experience and surveys of community opinion.ResultsWe summarize a review of existing naming conventions and highlight certain disadvantages with respect to general applicability in the biological domain. We also present the results of a survey carried out to establish which naming conventions are currently employed by OBO Foundry ontologies and to determine what their special requirements regarding the naming of entities might be. Lastly, we propose an initial set of typographic, syntactic and semantic conventions for labelling classes in OBO Foundry ontologies.ConclusionAdherence to common naming conventions is more than just a matter of aesthetics. Such conventions provide guidance to ontology creators, help developers avoid flaws and inaccuracies when editing, and especially when interlinking, ontologies. Common naming conventions will also assist consumers of ontologies to more readily understand what meanings were intended by the authors of ontologies used in annotating bodies of data.

Explanatory warrant for scientific realism

Nancy Cartwright relies upon an inference pattern known as inference to the best causal explanation (IBCE) to support a limited form of entity realism, according to which we are warranted in believing in entities that purportively cause observable effects. IBCE, as usually understood, is valid, even though all other forms of inference to the best explanation (IBE) are usually understood to be invalid. We argue that IBCE and IBE are in the same boat with respect to their ability to support realist conclusions. Either rule can be interpreted as valid, this is a matter of semantic convention. However, doing so deprives the rule of the empirical content the realist needs, requiring the realist to find independent warrant for a strong (theoretical or causal) premise. We then examine the proposed means of obtaining this warrant, and find them as inadequate in the case of IBCE as they are in the case of IBE.

Public Sources of the Personal Mind

Social constructionism emphasizes the social and interactive aspects of the development of higher-order cognitive functions, in the manner of Vygotsky. Nevertheless, the general character of the human organism sets limits to the kind and level of functions which can be appropriated. On the question of the nature of psychological and especially cognitive phenomena, social constructionism points to the many cases in which a type of psychological phenomenon, such as remembering, is at least as much an attribute of a discursive interaction as it is an attribute of an individual mind. If this reflects etiological priority, then we must also exchange explanations in terms of laws for explanations in terms of social and especially semantic conventions. Positioning theory, as a development of the general social constructionist viewpoint, puts considerable stress on the way assumed and ascribed rights and duties to think and act in certain ways work as constraints on human thought and action. Postmodernism and critical realism, with its emphasis on the intractable reality and causal efficacy of social structures (whatever they may be), are at opposite poles, the former requiring that all be malleable and the latter that nothing be. Social constructionism, while denying the efficacy of social structures, affirms the reality of the discursive domain without falling into the fallacy of supposing that because many aspects of our lives are our own constructions, all must be.

Roads not taken: The case for multiple functional-level routes to emotion

This review focuses on the theory of emotion outlined in Chapter 3 of Rolls's The brain and emotion. It is proposed that Rolls's emphasis on a relatively simple neurobiologically derived emotion scheme does not allow him to present a comprehensive account of emotion. Consequently, high-level cognitive processes, such as appraisal, end up being retained in the theory despite Rolls's skepticism about their utility. An argument is put forward that the concept of appraisal in the emotion literature is more than semantic convention and actually allows us to talk about multiple functional-level routes to the generation of emotion – a characteristic of the latest generation of theories in the cognition-emotion literature.

日本手話の動作成分に内在する意味について

This article proposed the existence of a factor which might facilitate inferential meaning in sign language. This factor would be derived from formational parameter components of signs associated with emotion. We assume that it was introduced into sign language system, and fixed as a semantic convention. In order to demonstrate such hypothesis, emotional and abstract expressions from lexical items of Japanese Sign Language were extracted, excluding iconic or socio-conventional expressions derived from conventional gestures. Thirty-six noniconic lexical items of JSL were presented, with neutral facial expressions, to 98 testee adult subjects. Using 20 semantic differential rating scales, subjects were to report impressions on the meaning of each sign item. Kinesic components of the signs were divided into 8 categories and 25 subcategories. A multivariate analysis (HAYASHI 1) was applied to these data. The results showed that some kinesic components greatly contributed to particular semantic ratings. An additional experiment with artificial body movements was executed, and similar results were obtained. These findings support the authors' predictions.

A sense-based, process model of belief

A process-oriented model of belief is presented which permits the representation of nested propositional attitudes within first-order logic. The model (NIM, for ‘nested intensional model’) is axiomatized, sense-based (via intensions), and sanctions inferences involving nested epistemic attitudes, with different agents and different times. Because NIM is grounded upon senses, it provides a framework in which agents may reason about the beliefs of another agent while remaining neutral with respect to the syntactic forms used to express the latter agent's beliefs. Moreover, NIM provides agents with a conceptual map, interrelating the concepts of ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’, ‘truth’, and a number of cognate concepts, such as ‘infers’, ‘retracts’, and ‘questions’. The broad scope of NIM arises in part from the fact that its axioms are represented in a novel extension of first-order logic, ℐ-FOL (presented herein). ℐ-FOL simultaneously permits the representation of truth ascriptions, implicit self-reference, and arbitrarily embedded sentences within a first-order setting. Through the combined use of principles derived from Frege, Montague, and Kripke, together with context-sensitive semantic conventions, ℐ-FOL captures the logic of truth inferences, while avoiding the inconsistencies exhibited by Tarski. Applications of ℐ-FOL and NIM to interagent reasoning are described and the soundness and completeness of ℐ-FOL are established herein.

On the formalization of semantic conventions

AbstractThis paper discusses six formalization techniques, of varying strengths, for extending a formal system based on traditional mathematical logic. The purpose of these formalization techniques is to simulate the introduction of new syntactic constructs, along with associated semantics for them. We show that certain techniques (among the six) subsume others. To illustrate sharpness, we also consider a selection of constructs and show which techniques can and cannot be used to introduce them. The six studied techniques were selected on the basis of actual practice in logic and computing. They do not form an exhaustive list.

Does speaker's reference have semantic relevance?

My immediate conclusion, therefore, is a modest one. I only specifically rule out the semantic convention for definite descriptions in which the semantic referent just is the speaker's referent. In arguing for that I carefully avoided relying on the helpfulness assumption. But I did, implicitly, make use of the following procedure.

Semantics or pragmatics of fictionality? a modest proposal

Fictionality is usually treated as a problem of ‘fiction’, i.e. of narrative literature alone. But in the drama, the action performed is, of course, fictional as well. In trying to elucidate both common and differing features in these two kinds of fictionality, the present article offers a new answer to the question whether fictionality should rather be analyzed in terms of semantics or of pragmatics. Within the framework of the author's ‘norm and deviation’ theory of literature it is shown that narrative fictionality is constituted by infraction of semantic conventions of standard language. dramatic fictionality, however, by infraction of pragmatic conventions. By means of this approach, a number of generic problems can be solved not only in clear cases of the drama (like Shakespeare) and the novel (like Sterne), but also in borderline cases as in the dramatic monologue, the philosophical dialogue, the documentary play, or the specific blend of Joyce's Ulysses. Narrative and dramatic fictionality coincide in the demand for fictional conclusiveness justiifying the respective linguistic deviations as their internal function.

Derrida, Searle, Contexts, Games, Riddles

cordance with publicly agreed canons of recognition of context, determinacy is regained. Strawson and Searle are here Altieri's authorities: though we cannot specify meaning by talking of application of a sentence on a particular occasion, we can teach general directions for its use, and these are embedded conventions of constitutive rule, semantic conventions, and pragmatic conventions. Once we have learned these conventions in a wide variety of action contexts,3 then we have competence common to all users of language. It is this competence, learned linguistic behavior, that guarantees what certainty we have. He further accuses Derrida of allowing the world to be source of instability of meaning and thus forcing us to have recourse to supplementary codes which remain chronically unstable. The conclusion is that if all we are left with is a play of signifiers, a shifting interaction of traces from other texts, relativism is inescapable. Those who are now turning upon deconstructionists are making this their chief accusation.4

Language Analysis and the Concept "Environment"

you want to find out anything from the theoretical about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds. To him who is a discoverer in this field the products of his imagination appear so necessary and natural that he would like to have them regarded by others, not as creations of thought but as given realities. These words sound like an invitation to you to walk out of this lecture. You will say to yourselves, the fellow's a working physicist himself and ought therefore to leave all questions of the structure of theoretical to the epistemologists. (Einstein, 1934) Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience correspond to a uniform system of In this system single experiences must be correlated with the theoretic structure in such a way that the resulting coordination is unique and convincing. sense-experiences are the given subjectmatter. But the theory that shall interpret them is man-made. It is the result of an extremely laborious process of adaptation: hypothetical, never completely final, always subject to question and doubt. scientific way of forming concepts differs from that which we use in our daily life, not basically, but merely in the more precise definition of concepts and conclusions; more painstaking and systematic choice of experimental material; and greater logical economy. By this last we mean the effort to reduce all concepts and correlations to as few as possible independent basic concepts and axioms. (Einstein, I940) If we substitute the words and for the words physicists and science in the above quotations from Einstein, we will have succinctly stated the problem we ecologists face in ridding ourselves of our confusions of ideas with realities and in translating our observations and experiments into communicable knowledge as a logically uniform system of thought. The development of Ecology has been characterized by many controversies that appear to us to be largely in the realm of words rather than deeds. This is not surprising, however, because the highly complex nature of the relations between the environment and organisms often leads to both frustration in interpretation and to vagueness in generalization. The aggregate nature of vegetation and the ensuing abstract conceptual complexities as they are necessarily handled in language, have contributed to a compounding of this confusion. Such perennially current questions as Do communities really exist ?, Should the fundamental unit of study be the individual, the population, the community, or the ecosystem ?, Is the classification of communities desirable?, and Is the ecosystem so complex as to defy significant analysis ? appear by their context to be resolvable largely upon the basis of additional empirical phenomena. But, in reality, they can be enormously clarified through a proper knowledge of our medium of understanding and communication without recourse to new facts. We have become convinced that where controversy reigns for long periods in science, in spite of the discoveries and new techniques developed by generations of scientists, the difficulty is probably not so much inherent in the material as in the language in which it is being discussed. Language analysis provides an approach to the resolution of some of these difficulties. Several scientific fields have been illuminated by the use of these methods, the most prominent among them being physics and psychology. It seems to us that there might be some values here for the ecologist. We have investigated, in particular, the Theory of Signs (Morris, 1938) and applied these methods to the language in which our various concepts of the environment have been expressed. As a result we have been led to a reappraisal of this key concept in the structure of ecological knowledge. Although we cannot here deal with the Theory of Signs in great detail, we would like to present a brief resume before embarking upon our analysis of the concept environment.' We solicit patience with what may seem to be a tedious presentation of subtle details which we hope will give a background in the terminology and the concepts that we employ in our explanations. We hope that the reader will not leave us as Einstein thought his listeners might, convinced that this is not Ecology. We wish to express our appreciation to David Rynin for many helpful suggestions in the formulation of our concepts, but we do not imply that he is in any way responsible for what may prove to be our misuse of them. Albert Ulrich read the 1 Following semantic convention, the same word may appear in quotation marks, in italics, and in ordinary type. This indicates as the subject respectively the word, the concept, or the phenomenon of nature.

PHILADELPHIA PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY

The scientifically unproductive nature-nurture controversy in relation to disorders of human behavior, particularly schizophrenia and the manic-depressive psychosis, will cease as soon as it becomes generally accepted that an understanding of the principles of human genetics is indispensable for many diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive purposes of psychiatry. The need and feasibility of a consistent system of diagnostic classification with respect to schizophrenic, manic-depressive and involutional psychoses are indicated by a comparative analysis of the taint distribution observed in a total of 6,115 blood relatives (parents, siblings and co-twins) of statistically representative samples of psychotic twin index cases (1,232 twin index families). There is no evidence supporting either the popular hypothesis of a genetic relation between the entities of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis (in the sense of interchangeable or somehow complementary genie elements of causation) or their pessimistic relegation to the status of semantic conventions. It is safe to assume that the mode of inheritance is that of a single recessive in schizophrenia and an irregularly dominant in manicdepressive psychosis. The principal genetic affinity of involutional psychosis is to the group of schizoid personality traits, and therefore at least indirectly to the schizophrenic disease entity, rather than to that of the manic-depressive psychosis.