Semantic Account Research Articles

Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom

Abstract This article grapples with Robert Brandom’s account of singular terms. I argue that neither Brandom’s answer to the question “What are singular terms?” nor his answer to the question “Why are there any singular terms?” works as they currently stand. Brandom’s substitution-inferential semantic account of what singular terms are fails to distinguish between the semantic role of singular terms and indefinite descriptions, and Brandom’s “expressive transcendental deduction” for why there are any singular terms fails to deciseively show that singular terms are expressively necessary for the use of logical vocabulary. Still, I then characterize how Brandom does have resources within his substitution-inferential semantics to give a better, revised answer to the question “What are singular terms?” that both fits programmatically within his framework and has a curious Kantian parallel. I leave the matter offering a Brandom-friendly replacement account for why there are any singular terms thus conceived for another occasion.

On the semantics of number morphology

This paper develops a semantic account of morphological number marking, specifically in the presence of numerals. In addition to accounting for number marking on basic nouns like book in English, the account handles variation in patterns of number marking along two dimensions: cross-linguistically, between languages that either necessitate or prohibit singular morphology in the presence of numerals greater than ‘one’; and within one and the same language on the various nominal elements in English. Building off the presuppositional approach to morphological number from Sauerland (Proc SALT 13:258–275, 2003), the proposed semantics accounts for both sorts of variation by assuming flexibility in the selection of the measure relevant to the one-ness presupposition of the morphological singular form.

The roles of object and action, and concreteness and imageability, in the distinction between nouns and verbs: An ERP study on monosyllabic words in Chinese

The dissociation between nouns and verbs has been reported in behavioral, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging studies. It is still unclear whether the spatial and temporal differences between nouns and verbs arise from semantic differences or morpho-syntactic differences associated with the two word classes. Regarding the semantic accounts, it is also unknown whether the word class effect should be attributed to differences in object and action, or in concreteness and imageability, associated with nouns and verbs. As the question with respect to semantic accounts for the word class effect is unsettled, the two types of semantic attributes have not been well distinguished in previous studies that support morpho-syntactic accounts, and this may lead to a confounding effect between morpho-syntactic factors and semantic factors. Therefore, to better understand the origins of the noun-verb distinction, it is essential to figure out whether the word class effect is driven by the contrast between object and action or by concreteness and imageability. With tight matching of stimuli and the use of event-related potentials (ERPs), we investigated the neural processing of monosyllabic nouns and verbs in Chinese that were presented without context. The results showed that when concreteness and imageability were balanced, nouns elicited more negative N400 than verbs over a broad scalp region, suggesting distinct semantic processing between the two word classes. Furthermore, nouns elicited more late negativity than verbs at frontal sites, which may reflect differences in the semantic representation of nouns and verbs in the working memory or differences in the working memory load associated with the word classes. These ERP results showed that the distinction between nouns and verbs persists even after concreteness and imageability are matched, revealing that the semantic account for the word class effect might arise from the contrast of object and action rather than the concreteness and imageability effect. The findings of the current study draw attention to the importance of object and action distinction in studies on nouns and verbs.

Revisiting aspectualsein Spanish: telicity, statives, and maximization

AbstractThis paper addresses aspectualsein Spanish. Building on the previous analyses that have been proposed in the literature to account for constructions with aspectualsethat mainly focus on the syntax of these (see, e.g., MacDonald, Jonathan E. 2017. Spanish aspectualseas an indirect object reflexive: The import of atelicity, bare nouns, and leísta PCC repairs.Probus. International Journal of Romance Linguistics29(1). 73–118), this paper provides a semantic account that makes explicit (i) why dynamic predicates must be telic in the presence ofse, and (ii) why the very samesecan appear with a limited number of stative predicates, which are atelic. The account is implemented in the Figure/Path Relation model in Beavers, John. 2011. On affectedness.Natural Language & Linguistic Theory29(2). 335–370, Figure/Path Relation model. I propose a maximization strategy that captures that dynamic predicates in constructions withseare always telic by indicating the conditions under which the theme has a fixed quantity and the scale/path that may be associated with the verb is bounded. This maximization strategy is then compared to and distinguished from the event maximization strategies proposed for Slavic languages (Filip, Hana. 2008. Events and maximalization: The case of telicity and perfectivity. In Susan Rothstein (ed.),Theoretical and crosslinguistic approaches to the semantics of aspect, 217–256. Amsterdam: John Benjamins) and Hungarian (Kardos, Éva. 2016. Telicity marking in Hungarian.Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics1(1). 1–37), and to the scale/path maximization strategy proposed for Southern Aymara (Martínez Vera, Gabriel. 2021a. Degree achievements and degree morphemes in competition in Southern Aymara.Linguistics and Philosophy44. 695–735).

Resultatives and low depictives in English

AbstractWe argue against a purely semantic account of the Unique Path Constraint (Goldberg, Adele. 1991. It can’t go down the chimney up: Paths and the English resultative. InProceedings of the seventeenth annual meeting of theBerkeley Linguistics Society, 368–378.), i.e., the constraint that there can only be one result state in a single clause, and in favor of a syntactic restriction regarding event structure. We propose, following Mateu, Jaume & Víctor Acedo-Matellán. 2012. The manner/result complementarity revisited: A syntactic approach. In M. Cristina Cuervo & Yves Roberge (eds.),The end of argument structure? Syntax and semantics, 209–228. New York: Academic Press, that structurally there can only be one result predicate per clause since the littlevhead selects for one result predicate as its complement. In order to make our claim, we provide novel data that violate the Unique Path Constraint defined as a semantic constraint. Further, we analyze examples that at first blush pose a problem for the present account as they appear to involve two result phrases, e.g.,shot him dead off the horse. We argue, however, that the second result phrase is not syntactically a result, but rather constitutes a case of what Acedo-Matellán, Víctor, Josep Ausensi, Josep Maria Fontana & Cristina Real-Puigdollers. forthcoming. Old Spanish resultatives as low depictives. In Chad L. Howe, Timothy Gupton, Margaret Renwick & Pilar Chamorro (eds.),Open romance linguistics 1. Selected papers from the 49th linguistic symposium on romance languages. Berlin: Language Science Press have called low depictives, which join the syntactic derivation through a low applicative head.

Potentials for grammaticalization

Abstract This paper discusses the grammaticalization of motion verbs in Mandarin. A class of motion verbs in Mandarin that regularly appears at either V1 or V2 position in the V1+V2 construction is only grammaticalized at the V2 position, where the verb becomes a directional complement. We provide a cognitive semantic account and propose a new hypothesis that we call the syntactic position and event type sensitivity hypothesis in grammaticalization. We analyze corpus data across five historical stages for 11 simplex directional complements. The analysis draws on Talmy’s macro-event theory and Lehmann’s grammaticalization parameters. It is concluded that motion verbs at the V1 position are most likely to have agentive subjects, which foregrounds the idea of motion in V1, while V2 focuses on the Agent’s purpose. Motion verbs at V2 are relatively more likely to have non-agentive subjects, which foregrounds the Path element in V2 and complements the action of V1, rather than the purpose of the Agent. What triggers the grammaticalization of the V2 is the foregrounding of the Path element in V2, which complements the action of V1, and its non-agentive subject.

THE ‘POLITE’ AORIST: TENSE OR ASPECT?

AbstractThis article investigates the semantics and pragmatics of the ‘hortative’ aorist (the aorist indicative in questions with τί οὐ ‘why don't …’) and the ‘tragic’ or ‘performative’ aorist (for example ὤμοσα ‘I swear’). Lloyd argued in 1999 that the tragic aorist is a more polite alternative for the corresponding present (ὄμνυμι ‘I swear’). Recently, he has extended this view to the hortative aorist, suggesting that, for example, τί οὐκ ἐκαλέσαμεν; is a polite alternative for τί οὐ καλοῦμεν; Lloyd argues that the politeness value of the aorist derives from its being a past tense, comparing the so-called ‘attitudinal’ past (as in I wanted to ask you something instead of I want to ask you something). The present article, building on work by Colvin, Bary and Nijk, argues instead that the semantic value of the aorist is purely aspectual in these cases: the hortative and tragic aorists serve to construe the designated event as bounded, while the corresponding present forms serve to construe the designated event as unbounded. An extensive discussion of the evidence for the hortative aorist and present is presented, as well as a case study concerning the aspectual behaviour of the verb ὄμνυμι. Moreover, I argue that the proposed semantic account of the hortative and tragic aorists in terms of aspect can be unified with Lloyd's pragmatic account in terms of politeness: the difference in tone between the present and the aorist can be derived from their respective aspectual values, rather than from their temporal values.

Essentializing inferences

Predicate nominals (e.g., “is a female”) seem to label or categorize their subjects, while their adjectival correlates (e.g., “is female”) merely attribute a property. Predicate nominals also elicit essentializing inferential judgments about inductive potential and stable explanatory membership. Data from psychology and semantics support that this distinction is robust and productive. I argue that while the difference between predicate nominals and predicate adjectives is elided by standard semantic theories, it ought not be. I then develop and defend a psychologically motivated semantic account on which predicate nominals attribute kind membership and trigger a presupposition that underpins our essentialist judgments.

Updating the typology of definiteness: Evidence from bare nouns in Shan

This paper demonstrates that bare nouns in Shan (Tai-Kadai) can express both unique and anaphoric definiteness, a distinction first noted by Schwarz (2009). This pattern of data as well as similar patterns found in Serbian and Kannada motivate adding a category to the typology of definiteness marking described by Jenks (2018) to include languages that allow bare nouns to express anaphoric definiteness. An extended type-shifting analysis offers an account of the availability of bare noun anaphora, as well as the other bare noun interpretations, such as the indefinite, generic, and kind interpretations. Variation in the use of bare nouns versus more marked anaphoric expressions is tied to pragmatic factors such as what anaphoric definite expressions are available in the language, contrast, information structure, and potential ambiguity of nominal expressions. This account proposes that a constrained semantic account of the interpretations of nominal expressions combined with a pragmatic account of their use can model much of the cross-linguistic data on definiteness.

Real-time processing of event descriptions for partially- and fully-completed events: Evidence from the visual world paradigm

The current study investigated non-culminating accomplishments through an experimental lens. We used a well-established paradigm for studying real-time language processing using eye-tracking, the visual world paradigm. Our study was modeled after Altmann and Kamide’s (2007) investigation of processing of aspectual information contained in a perfect verb form (e.g., has eaten). We compared English-speaking adults’ interpretations of sentences like ‘The girl has eaten a cookie’ and ‘The girl was eating a cookie’ in the context of one of two visual scenes. In the Full Completion condition, the scene depicted two referents that were compatible with the predicate: one was compatible with the expected end state of the event (e.g., an empty plate), the other with an unrealized version of the event (e.g., an uneaten cookie). In the Partial Completion condition, the scene depicted a referent that was compatible with a partially-completed version of the event (e.g., part of a cookie on a plate) and an unrealized interpretation (e.g., an uneaten cookie). For verb forms in the perfect (e.g., has eaten) but not in the progressive, we found a difference between conditions; listeners preferred to look at the fully-affected referent in the Full Completion condition as compared to the partially-affected referent in the Partial Completion condition. We take the results as suggestive in favor of a pragmatic rather than semantic account of non-culmination interpretations in English.

Revisiting Olga, the beautiful dancer: An intersective A-analysis

The paper presents a novel semantic account of the so-called "intersective/non-intersective" ambiguity of structures such as beautiful dancer. The proposal contrasts with Larson's (1998) famous N-analysis in taking the adjective as the ambiguity trigger and in unmasking the bracketing paradox perception of the non-intersective reading as a grammatical illusion. The adjective has no compositional access to the verbal root's event argument but is always linked to the referential argument of the noun. -er nominals are analyzed as a special kind of role noun (such as king, guest, judge). They introduce a social role r that manifests itself via the verbal root's e-argument. (However, neither r nor e are compositionally active.) An evaluative adjective such as beautiful introduces an underspecified trope variable, which calls for a pragmatic specification of the adjectival predicate's ultimate target. A general pragmatic parsimony condition ensures that referents introduced by linguistic material are chosen as best target candidates whenever possible. The -er nominal's social role r is an ideal choice in this respect. The linking of the adjective to the verbal root's e-argument is mediated via r and thus a secondary pragmatic effect. The proposal provides a unified analysis for modified -er nominals (beautiful dancer) and other instances of role- and event-related interpretations for adnominal modification such as, e.g., just king.

A Puzzle about Belief-about

AbstractI present a puzzle for the standard, propositional semantic account of belief reports by considering novel inferences which it incorrectly predicts to be invalid under assumptions that are plausible by its advocates’ own lights. In response, I propose a conservative departure from the standard view on which certain ‘that’-clauses designate novel devices of semantic type <e,t> that I call open propositions. After outlining some desiderata for a theory of open propositions, I provide some reasons for advocates of the standard view to treat them as properties of a certain kind. Then I give a bridge principle between the core notions of belief and belief-about before showing how the resulting view can be implemented in accordance with formal theories of syntax and semantics. I bring out some of the consequences this investigation has beyond our semantic theorizing and conclude, more generally, that any response to the puzzle requires paying some surprising cost or another.

A semantic account of partial reduplication in Turkish

This study analyzes the factors governing the scope of partial reduplication in Turkish, with particular emphasis on why certain forms are unattested. We propose that whether a given adjective participates in partial reduplication can be determined based on its semantic class: scalar adjectives can, non-scalars cannot. We further demonstrate that, among scalar adjectives, partial reduplication is also sensitive to maximal/non-maximal contrast; the former yields “completely” semantics while the latter yields “very” semantics. The model we propose captures both the class of adjectives that can undergo partial reduplication as well as the resulting interpretation when they do so. As such, our proposal contrasts with earlier ones in providing principled reasons for the class of partially reduplicated adjectives.

A semantic account of partial reduplication in Turkish

A semantic account of partial reduplication in Turkish

Are Russellian Indexicals Eliminable?

It is widely thought that, in his later work An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Bertrand Russell argued that our natural languages could in principle do away with indexicals. This brief piece, by contrast, aims to show that, instead of suggesting the potential eliminability of such expressions, Russell outlined a semantic account of indexicals according to which such expressions fundamentally depend on the perspectival way in which they refer to worldly items. If correct, this proposal would not only show that, in Russell’s later work, the meaning of expressions like indexicals is not exhaustively determined by the items they refer to: it would also show that Russell did not mean to eliminate indexicals from our natural languages at all.

De se or not de se: a question of grammar

Self-reference said to be ‘de se’ is often explicated by reference to the grammatical first Person (1p), but the nature or necessity of this link are unclear and have not been investigated systematically from a linguistic point of view. We argue that 1p in a referential and unbound position in a matrix clause, or as occurring in an embedded clause with grammatical agreement to the matrix 1p, provides necessary and sufficient grammatical conditions for a speaker to express a thought de se. Insofar as analytical concepts involved in these conditions are not themselves grounded in any known independent semantic or psychological principles, this suggests a potential foundational role of grammar for the phenomenon in question. Convergent evidence for this conclusion comes from two universal generalizations about personal pronouns, the Associative and Suppletive Plural generalizations. These, we argue, follow from the grammar of Person directly, have no semantic explanations, and do not support a semantic account of the de se. As a final piece of evidence, we point out that pathological forms of self-reference in mental disorders centrally involve distinctive anomalies relating to personal pronoun use –thus again suggesting a foundationally important connection between grammar and human-specific aspects of self-referential thought. We conclude that while reference de se has been largely conceptualized as a semantic or psychological phenomenon, it reflects an inherently linguistic form of thought, which is mediated grammatically.

Quine’s Ontology

This paper elaborates on the relation between Quine’s notion of ontological commitment and his philosophy of science. I distinguish and present Quine’s solutions to two problems of existence, a semantic problem, roughly amounting to asking how existence can be expressed within a certain language, and an epistemological problem, roughly amounting to how the members of the scientific community can decide which theories are warranted. The gap between these problems is filled by noticing that existence is equated by Quine with reference, and that the principle of context imposes the epistemological primacy of truth over reference. Truth, in its turn, albeit given a purely semantic account along the lines of Tarski, is coextensive with the notion of warranted belief.

The Irrationality of Adaptive Preferences: A Psychological and Semantic Account

AbstractThere is little agreement among moral and political philosophers when it comes to determining what it is that makes adaptive preferences problematic. The large number of competing explanations offered by philosophers illustrates the absence of any consensus. The most prominent versions of these explanations have recently come under attack by Dale Dorsey, who argues that adaptive preferences are a red herring: the problematic nature of adaptive preferences is not explained by the fact of adaptation but by an appeal to some other normative consideration. In this article I offer an account of adaptive preferences that both accommodates the thought that only some of our adaptive preferences are problematic and responds to the skeptical challenge pressed by Dorsey. I argue that some adaptive preferences are prima facie irrational as they exhibit a peculiar error in reasoning where individuals change the semantic content of the reasons underpinning the new preference.

Every Word is a Name: Autonymy and Quotation in Augustine

AbstractAugustine famously claims every word is a name. Some readers take Augustine to thereby maintain a purely referentialist semantic account according to which every word is a referential expression whose meaning is its extension. Other readers think that Augustine is no referentialist and is merely claiming that every word has some meaning. In this paper, I clarify Augustine’s arguments to the effect that every word is a name and argue that ‘every word is a name’ amounts to the claim that for any word, there exist tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns. Augustine takes this to be the result of universal lexical ambiguity or equivocity (that is, the fact that every word has more than one literal meaning) and I clarify how Augustine’s account of metalinguistic discourse, which is one of the most detailed to have survived from antiquity, differs from some ancient and modern theories.

Conceptions of scientific progress in scientific practice: an empirical study

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works.