Selling Mechanism Research Articles

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

How to optimize posted price mechanisms? The sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanism is one of the widely used selling mechanisms in practice. In this mechanism, the seller presents each buyer with a price sequentially and the buyer can either accept or reject the mechanism's offer. Despite the widespread use of the SPP mechanism, the problem of optimizing prices in this mechanism has not been fully addressed. In a paper entitled, “Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms,” H. Beyhaghi, N. Golrezaei, R. Paes Leme, M. Pal, and B. Sivan construct SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the optimal mechanism and the other that posts a uniform price (same price for every buyer). Their simple pricing rules can be easily generalized to the setting with multiple units and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors.

The Driving Factors of Public’s Interest in The Use of QRIS to Achieve Cashless Society

The objective of the study is to investigate the public’s interest in the use of QRIS (Quick Response Indonesia Standard) in Oro-Oro Dowo Market, Malang – East Java. The market serves as a traditional market that has been renovated by the local government to transform the traditional system into a modern market without abandoning its traditional traits. The traditional system refers to the well-established buying and selling mechanisms, such as the products’ arrangement and layout. On the other hand, the modern system refers to improved sanitation and payment mechanisms. The payments in traditional markets have been done by using cash, but the modern market system promotes non-cash payments. In this case, the non-cash payments are implemented using a barcode scanning system provided by the Indonesian national bank under the name QRIS. Therefore, an in-depth study was essential to be carried out to understand the public’s interest in the use of QRIS or non-cash for transactions in the Oro-Oro Dowo Market. The research methods used in this study were field research and survey. For the data analysis, several theories were applied, namely Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), Theory of Planned Behaviour, and Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). Then, the theories were analyzed by utilizing a software called SMART PLS to identify whether there was a correlation and effect of the use of QRIS and the buying interest or transaction rates in the Oro-Oro Dowo Market. The results of this study indicate that the three variables of reliability, construct validity, structural model, and discussions related to complexity, the usefulness of QRIS, time constraints, ease of use, and e-learning self-efficiency show appropriate consistency as most of the respondents used QRIS as an electronic transaction system that allowed them to do a faster transaction due to its efficiency and accessibility

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising

We present a formal study of first-look and preferred deals that are a recently introduced generation of contracts for selling online advertisements, which generalize traditional reservation contracts and are suitable for advertisers with advanced targeting capabilities. Under these deals, one or more advertisers gain priority access to an inventory of impressions before others and can choose to purchase in real time. In particular, we propose constant-factor approximation algorithms for maximizing the revenue that can be obtained from these deals when offered to all or a subset of the advertisers, whose valuation distributions can be independent or correlated through a common value component. We evaluate our algorithms using data from Google’s ad exchange platform and show they perform better than the approximation guarantees and obtain significantly higher revenue than auctions; in certain cases, the observed revenue is 85%–96% of the optimal revenue achievable. We also prove the NP-hardness of designing deals when advertisers’ valuations are arbitrarily correlated and the optimality of menus of deals among a certain class of selling mechanisms in an incomplete distributional information setting.

Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search

We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal selling mechanism takes the form of a fixed first-stage price with price matching in the second stage. In contrast, when the outside price is the buyer's private information, the optimal mechanism is a menu of two contracts: a first-stage sale at a higher price with immediate delivery, or a first-stage sale at a lower price with second-stage delivery. Thus the optimal form of search deterrence depends on the observability of the buyer's outside option.

Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist

A durable goods monopolist proposes selling mechanisms in two periods, being unable to commit in the first period on the mechanism to propose in the second. Trade is anonymous and resale is not possible. Although buyers have a continuum of possible valuations, the optimal first-period mechanism is a menu with at most two possibilities: a high price guaranteeing delivery and a low price subject to rationing. This characterization is robust to the arrival of additional buyers in the second period. The optimal mechanism is fully characterized for linear demand, with priority pricing being optimal if agents are sufficiently patient.

Analisis Qiyās Transaksi Tawarruq dengan Bai’ al-’Īnah

This paper aimed to analyze the application of qiyas method in the prohibition of tawarruq transactions through qiyas tawarruq with bai' al-‘înah. This paper was qualitative research with a type of normative law research using conceptual approach. The results of paper showed that the application of the pillars of qiyas in qiyas tawarruq with bai' al-‘înah namely: bai' al-‘înah as ashl, tawarruq as far', the prohibition of bai' al-‘înah practice as hukm al-ashl and the main motive of the transaction in the form of obtaining cash (liquidity) instead of owning goods (commodities) with the mechanism of buying and selling and debt that represents hilah ribawiyah is as 'illat. Therefore, as is the prohibition against bai' al-‘înah, as it also applies to tawarruq. However, there is also a difference between bai' al-‘înah and tawarruq on the grounds of differences between the parties who make the second purchase, and some allow tawarruq on the condition that there is an urgent need or no agreement with a third party. Thus, it is very important in positioning ushul fiqh relevant to contemporary economy and finance, because the muamalah in Islam has flexibility, elasticity and openness to the development of the times.

The Moderating Effect of Family Business Ownership on the Relationship between Short-Selling Mechanism and Firm Value for Listed Companies in China

This study demonstrates an investigation of the external corporate governance effect of short selling mechanisms on firm value in the Chinese context. The effect of family businesses is also examined as a moderator of the relationship between short-selling and firm value. Using panel data analysis of Chinese listed companies, this paper tests a total sample of 22,468 firm-year observations from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2019 by applying the PSM-DID method in order to mitigate self-selection and endogenous problems caused by the uniqueness of Chinese short selling mechanisms. The findings suggest that both deregulation and the propensity of short selling can improve the firm value. Our findings also established that family ownership weakens firm value with the availability of short-selling, which indicates that family businesses have long orientations and conduct better corporate governance practices than non-family business, as short-selling shows a weaker external governance effect on firm value creation by family businesses in China. A robust test of alternative measurements is conducted and validated. This study provides significant insights for policymakers to consider in order to further relax short-selling constraints, which can act as effective external governance for better firm value creation, especially for non-family businesses in developing countries.

Selling mechanisms for perishable goods: An empirical analysis of an online resale market for event tickets

Selling mechanisms for perishable goods: An empirical analysis of an online resale market for event tickets

Revenue-Maximizing Auctions: A Bidder’s Standpoint

We address the problem of improving bidders’ strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. We propose a simple and agnostic strategy, independent of the distribution of the competition, that is robust to mechanism changes and local (as opposed to global) optimization of e.g. reserve prices by the seller. This strategy guarantees an increase in utility compared to the truthful strategy for any distribution of the competition. We generalize this result by showing that a best response, reaching the best tradeoff between beating the competition and reducing the reserve price in a large class of possible strategies, is a simple extension of this first strategy. Our new variational approach naturally yields itself to numerical optimization and algorithms for designing or improving the strategies in any given selling mechanisms. Our formulation enables to study some important robustness properties of the strategies, showing their impact even when the seller is using a data-driven approach to set the reserve prices. In this sample-size setting, we prove under what conditions, optimal bidding strategies can still improve the buyer’s utility. The gist of our approach is to see optimal auctions in practice as a Stackelberg game where the buyer is the leader, as he is the first one to move (here bid) when the seller is the follower as she has no prior information on the bidder.

The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation

Consider a monopolist selling n items to an additive buyer whose item values are drawn from independent distributions F1,F2,…,Fn possibly having unbounded support. Unlike in the single-item case, it is well known that the revenue-optimal selling mechanism (a pricing scheme) may be complex, sometimes requiring a continuum of menu entries. Also known is that simple mechanisms with a bounded number of menu entries can extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Nonetheless, whether an arbitrarily high fraction of the optimal revenue can be extracted via a bounded menu size remained open.We give an affirmative answer: for every n and ε>0, there exists C=C(n,ε) s.t. mechanisms of menu size at most C suffice for obtaining (1−ε) of the optimal revenue from anyF1,…,Fn. We prove upper and lower bounds on the revenue-approximation complexity C(n,ε) and on the deterministic communication complexity required to run a mechanism achieving such an approximation.

Curious about the price? Consumers’ behavior in price reveal auctions

ABSTRACT We exploit some specific features of a peculiar online selling mechanism, the so-called price reveal auctions, to empirically investigate how consumers’ behaviour changes in response to an item’s ‘social attributes.’ We document a significant effect of the item’s brand and portability in influencing consumers’ willingness to pay. We show that, although both characteristics have some explanatory power when considered in isolation, it is their interaction that really matters.

On the effects of antitrust policy intervention in pricing strategies in a distribution channel

AbstractIn this article, we examine the economic and welfare ramifications of antitrust policy intervention in primary‐ and secondary‐line price discrimination in a distribution channel where downstream retailers are vertically related through a strategic upstream manufacturer. Particularly, we focus on a distribution channel where a manufacturer sells his product through retailers in two asymmetric markets. The markets are asymmetric along two dimensions: One exhibits a higher demand/profit potential than does the other; and one is a competitive market where two retailers engage in imperfect price competition, whereas the other is a captive market monopolized by one of the retailers. We characterize the effect of antitrust policy intervention in each form of third‐degree price discrimination on the pricing and selling mechanisms of channel members, consumers, and the channel profits (and hence on the total welfare) for varying degrees of asymmetry on demand potential between the two markets and the extent of product substitutability. We show that under practical demand and competition conditions, contrary to prior literature, antitrust policy intervention in secondary‐line discrimination always benefits the local retailer (the disfavored customer of the manufacturer) and yet is apt to result in a lose–win or lose–lose outcome in addition to a win–win outcome for the channel and society. Second, antitrust policy intervention in primary‐line discrimination so as to protect a localized retailer from the selective price cuts of a chain‐store retailer (rather than to protect competition) can actually result in a win–win outcome. Third, in the absence of antitrust policy intervention, consumers are always harmed by (discriminatory) pricing practices employed in a channel. Those and other findings contribute to the intense debate over the merits and goals of antitrust policy intervention in third‐degree price discrimination in distribution channels by shedding some light on the contractual relationships between manufacturers and retailers and economic forces at play.

Strategic Overbidding in Dynamic Auctions: Structural Estimation of Value of Synergy

In this study, we formulate and estimate a dynamic procurement auction game where bidder asymmetry due to synergy is endogenous. The seller sells multiple goods via a sequence of first‐price auctions. While bidders are ex‐ante symmetric, the first‐period winner has a valuation advantage as a result of such synergy in the second‐period bidding game and becomes a strong bidder. This endogenous synergy creation leads to overbidding in the first‐period auction relative to a static bidding game. We characterize the equilibrium in terms of the observed bid distribution and suggest a two‐step estimation procedure. We apply our method to data on OCS oil‐tract auctions. We find that the federal government recovers 52% of the “strong” buyers’ willingness to pay in the second period. Bidders perceive the value of synergy to be about 5% of their first period’s informational rent. Counterfactual experiments show that government revenue could have increased by about 27% under alternative selling mechanisms.

Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer’s values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pricing problem as a zero-sum game between the seller, who chooses a selling mechanism, and a fictitious adversary or ‘nature’, who chooses the buyer’s values from within the uncertainty set. Using duality techniques rooted in robust optimization, we prove that this game admits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies that can be computed in closed form. The Nash strategy of the seller is a randomized posted price mechanism under which the goods are sold separately, while the Nash strategy of nature is a distribution on the uncertainty set under which the buyer’s values are comonotonic. We further show that the restriction of the pricing problem to deterministic mechanisms is solved by a deteministic posted price mechanism under which the goods are sold separately.

Maximizing revenue for publishers using header bidding and ad exchange auctions

We study how web publishers should set their floor prices in order to maximize expected revenues when they have access to two selling mechanisms, namely an ad exchange and header bidding, in order to sell impressions on the real-time bidding market. We consider the publisher’s problem under incomplete information, propose bandit-type algorithms, and show that their regret – the performance loss compared to the optimal algorithm – is sub-linear in the time horizon. Experiments illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithms.

Optimal Pricing for MHR and λ-regular Distributions

We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have i.i.d. valuations for a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, offering the same, take-it-or-leave-it price to all bidders can achieve an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. In particular, the approximation ratio is shown to be 1+ O (ln ln n / ln n ), matched by a tight lower bound for the case of exponential distributions. This improves upon the previously best-known upper bound of e /( e −1)≈ 1.58 for the slightly more general class of regular distributions. In the worst case (over n ), we still show a global upper bound of 1.35. We give a simple, closed-form description of our prices, which, interestingly enough, relies only on minimal knowledge of the prior distribution, namely, just the expectation of its second-highest order statistic. Furthermore, we extend our techniques to handle the more general class of λ-regular distributions that interpolate between MHR (λ =0) and regular (λ =1). Our anonymous pricing rule now results in an asymptotic approximation ratio that ranges smoothly, with respect to λ, from 1 (MHR distributions) to e /( e −1) (regular distributions). Finally, we explicitly give a class of continuous distributions that provide matching lower bounds, for every λ.

Information Disclosure in Housing Auctions

We study the optimal selling mechanism and information disclosure policy for a house seller. The seller can select any selling mechanism, including an auction, and release additional information about the house to buyers. Release of information adjusts the buyers' values and bids. We find that the optimal mechanism is a combination of the optimal auction and full information disclosure. But if the seller uses a second-price auction instead, concealing additional information about the house may be optimal for her. Moreover, the seller can extract buyers' private value adjustments by selling them contracts similar to European call options.

Optimal Dynamic Selling Mechanism and Deal Protections in Mergers and Acquisitions

We study the dynamic profit-maximizing selling mechanism in an MA they shed light on how to use deal protections in practice.

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements

Recent literature on approximately optimal revenue maximization has shown that in settings where agent valuations for items are complement free, the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together guarantees a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. However, most real-world settings involve some degree of complementarity among items. The role that complementarity plays in the trade-off of simplicity versus optimality has been an obvious missing piece of the puzzle. In “A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements,” the authors show that the same simple selling mechanism—the better of selling separately and as a grand bundle—guarantees a $\Theta(d)$ fraction of the optimal revenue, where $d$ is a measure of the degree of complementarity. One key modeling contribution is a tractable notion of “degree of complementarity” that admits meaningful results and insights—they demonstrate that previous definitions fall short in this regard.

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism when bidders have ownership links among them (crossholdings). This mechanism discriminates against bidders who enjoy a value comparative advantage resulting from the extent to which they appropriate their own surplus. It is shown that since crossholdings improve the seller’s ability to selectively extract surplus from bidders, expected seller revenue is increasing with the asymmetry in these stakes. The optimal mechanism is implemented by a hybrid procedure that combines an auction with price preferences and a possible exclusive deal. An alternative negotiation procedure replicates some properties of the optimal one, and revenue-dominates most commonly used auction formats.