Self-serving Attributional Bias Research Articles

A statistical review of the literature concerning the self-serving attribution bias in interpersonal influence situations

Based upon his review of the self-serving attribution bias literature, Zuckerman (1979) concluded that research employing an interpersonal influence setting was less likely than other research paradigms to produce significant differences in self-attribution for success and failure. A survey of the research reviewed by Zuckerman as well as a more current survey of the relevant literature were undertaken. Statistical combinations of these two sets of evidence revealed Zuckerman's assessment may have been too conservative, at least with respect to two of three experimental paradigms. Additionally, a general tendency of individuals to assume more personal responsibility for success than failure on interpersonal influence tasks was found in the more comprehensive survey. Finally, the evidence concerning interactions of performance outcome with either contextual variables or individual differences indicated that the self-serving bias may be stronger under certain conditions than others and for certain types of individuals. Discussion centered on the conceptual distinctions between interpersonal influence and other achievement settings.

Social anxiety, self-presentation, and the self-serving bias in causal attribution.

Two experiments were conducted to provide evidence concerning the contribution of self-presentation concerns to the self-serving bias in causal attribution (individuals' tendency to assume more personal responsibility for a success than for a failure outcome) and its occasional, but systematic, reversal. In Experiment 1 high- but not low-social-anxiety participants presented themselves in a far more modest light when a committee of high prestige others was to join the experimenter in evaluating their behavior than when the committee evaluation was canceled. In Experiment 2 this reversal of the self-serving bias among high-social-anxiety subjects (in the evaluative context) was replicated, and it was also found that both high- and low-social-anxiety participants portrayed the causes of their behavior in a more modest fashion when they responded via the "bogus pipeline," a measurement technique designed to reduce distortion and dissimulation in verbal responses, than when they responded in the traditional paper-and-pencil format (although the influence of the bogus pipeline above and beyond the committee evaluation in eliciting "honest" responses from subjects only reached significance for low-social-anxiety subjects). These findings are discussed in terms of the varying self-presentation strategies and differing self-concepts of individuals high and low in social anxiety, as well as the self-presentation component to apparently self-enhancing and self-effacing causal attributions for performance.

Social anxiety, self-presentation, and the self-serving bias in causal attribution.

Social anxiety, self-presentation, and the self-serving bias in causal attribution.

Self-serving attributional biases: Perceptual or response distortions?

Self-serving attributional biases: Perceptual or response distortions?

Self-serving attributional biases: Perceptual or response distortions?

Self-serving attributional biases: Perceptual or response distortions?

Self-Presentation, Self-Monitoring, and the Self-Serving Bias in Causal Attribution

Research has shown that individuals' causal attributions are affected by the degree of public scrutiny of their behavior (Bradley, 1978). An experiment was conducted to test a self-presentational explanation of this finding. High and low self-monitors were or were not closely scrutinized (videotaped) during their performance of a task at which they either succeeded or failed. Low self-monitors were expected to provide an attributional baseline (little or no self-presentation) against which the self-presentational tendencies of high self-monitors could be assessed. It was found that high self-monitors assumed significantly greater responsibility for success than for failure when videotaped, but assumed only somewhat more responsibility for success than for failure when not taped. Surprisingly, low self-monitors' attributions were affected by the manipulation of evaluation intensity. Low self-monitors assumed more responsibility for success than for failure when they were not taped, but assumed no more responsibility for success than for failure when they were taped.

What constitutes a self-serving attributional bias? A reply to Bradley.

What constitutes a self-serving attributional bias? A reply to Bradley.

What constitutes a self-serving attributional bias? A reply to Bradley.

What constitutes a self-serving attributional bias? A reply to Bradley.