Self-enhancement Bias Research Articles

Implicit evaluations about driving skills predicting driving performance

Self-reported measures of driving skills have the potential shortcomings of the general self-report methodology such as social responding and self-enhancement biases. In the present study, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) procedure was adapted to measure the implicit evaluations of driving skills. The performance of IAT and an explicit, self-report measure of driving skills were compared in predicting driver behaviors and performance. Ninety-one Turkish male drivers participated in the study. The results showed that the implicit test and the self-reported driving skills scale showed different patterns of relationships with the outcome measures in the regression analyses. In addition, the implicit measure of driving skills moderated the relationship between self-reported driving skills and some of the outcome measures used in the current study. These results support the need to use the implicit measures in addition to self-report measures to better understand drivers evaluations of their driving skills, which has the potential to influence their risky driving.

Happier than thou? A self-enhancement bias in emotion attribution.

People tend to judge themselves as exhibiting above average levels of desirable traits-including competence, kindness, and life satisfaction-but does this self-enhancement extend to emotional responses? Here, we explore this question by having people attribute emotions to themselves and others following simple gambles. We demonstrate that people display an emotional self-enhancement bias that varies with the context of the emotion-eliciting situation. People judge themselves as experiencing more positive emotional reactions on average, and they also believed that others' emotions are more sensitive to gamble outcomes, such that people judge others to experience stronger negative affect in response to negative outcomes (Study 1). This self-enhancement bias further tracks social distance, such that people attribute less positive and more negative emotion to more dissimilar, as compared with more similar others (Study 2). People also predict less favorable emotional states for themselves and others experiencing events in the future, as compared with the present (Study 3), suggesting that this attribution bias extends across multiple dimensions of psychological distance. Broadly, these data suggest that people exhibit self-enhancement in emotion attribution, but do so in subtle ways that depend on situational and social factors. (PsycINFO Database Record

People have access to implicit self-esteem unless they do not apply an ego defence

BackgroundEarly definitions of implicit self-esteem (ISE) assumed its unconscious character. Although researchers have shown ways to achieve consistency between explicit and implicit self-esteem measures, no one has demonstrated that people may be aware of their ISE.Participants and procedureIn the experiment with 85 participants aged from 19 to 45 years a “lie detector” procedure was used to overcome the self-enhancement bias. The definition of ISE, given to participants, referred to the phenomenon, manifested in popular ISE measures.ResultsIn participants who were convinced that they were being assessed in the presence of a lie detector, a significant correlation between referred and actual ISE was shown. Individuals characterised by defensive high self-esteem in natural conditions were less accurate in ISE estimation than those with secure high self-esteem.ConclusionsThe results, demonstrating people’s access to their implicit self-esteem, may have important implications for clinical, well-being, self-acceptance, or educational issues.

Self-Attribution Bias and Overconfidence Among Nonprofessional Traders

Abstract We investigate consequences of the self-attribution bias for nonprofessional traders. By applying a textual analysis of more than 44,000 public comments on a large social trading platform, we contribute to empirical literature on investment and trading behavior in three ways: First, we show that one component of the self-attribution bias, the self-enhancement bias, leads to subsequent underperformance. Second, results support the theory that traders become overconfident due to biased self-enhancement. Third, we find that traders’ social trading portfolios attract higher investment flows from investors when showing self-enhancement biased behavior.

The devil's in the detail: Accessibility of specific personal memories supports rose-tinted self-generalizations in mental health and toxic self-generalizations in clinical depression.

Models of memory propose that separate systems underpin the storage and recollection of specific events from our past (e.g., the first day at school), and of the generic structure of our experiences (e.g., how lonely I am), and that interplay between these systems serves to optimize everyday cognition. Specifically, it is proposed that memories of discrete events help define the circumstances (boundary conditions) in which our generalized knowledge applies, thereby enhancing accuracy of memory-dependent cognitive processes. However, in the domain of self-judgment, cognition is systematically biased, with a robust self-enhancement bias characterizing healthy individuals and a negativity bias characterizing the clinically depressed. We hypothesized that self-enhancement effects in the mentally healthy may partly rest on an impaired ability for specific memories to set appropriate boundary conditions on positive self-generalizations, while the opposite may be true for self-referred negative traits in the depressed. To assess this, we asked healthy and depressed individuals to think about the applicability of a trait to themselves, then to recall a specific memory that was inconsistent with that trait which would therefore index a boundary condition for its applicability. Healthy individuals showed faster recall only for specific positive memories following negative trait evaluations, while depressed individuals demonstrated faster recall only of specific negative memories following positive trait evaluations—the pattern expected given the respective self-enhancement and negativity biases. Results suggest that specific memories may serve to delimit self-generalizations in biased ways, and thus support systemic biases in trait judgments characteristic of healthy and depressed individuals.

Helpers' Self-Assessment Biases Before and after Helping Skills Training.

Several studies have shown that therapists are generally biased concerning their performed helping skills, as compared to judges' ratings. As clients' ratings of therapists' performance are better predictors of psychotherapy effectiveness than judges' ratings, this study examined the validity and effectiveness of a helping skills training program at reducing novice helpers' self-enhancement biases concerning their helping skills, in comparison to their clients' ratings. Helping skills were assessed by three objective measures (a knowledge multiple choice test, a video test and a role play), as well as by a self- and peer-reported questionnaire. In addition, some performed helping skills' correlates (relationship quality, session quality, and helpers' therapeutic attitudes) were assessed both by helpers and their simulated helpees. Seventy-two sophomores in psychology participated to this study, 37 being assigned to a 12-h helping skills training program, and 35 to a control group. Helpers were expected to assess the aforementioned performed helping skills and correlates as being better than their helpees' assessments at pretest, thus revealing a self-enhancement bias. At posttest, we expected that trained helpers would objectively exhibit better helping skills than untrained helpers while beginning to underestimate their performance, thus indexing a self-diminishment bias. In contrast, we hypothesized that untrained helpers would continue to overestimate their performance. Our hypotheses were only partly confirmed but results reflected a skilled-unaware pattern among trainees. Trained helpers went either from a pretest overestimation to a posttest equivalence (performed helping skills and performed therapeutic attitudes), or from a pretest equivalence to a posttest underestimation (performed session quality and performed therapeutic relationship), as compared to helpees' ratings. Results showed that trained helpers improved on all helping skills objective measures and that helpees' perceptions of their performance had increased at posttest. In conclusion, helping skills training leads helpers not only to improve their helping skills but also to have more doubts about their skills, two variables associated with psychotherapy outcome.

The Better-Than-Average Effect Is Observed Because "Average" Is Often Construed as Below-Median Ability.

Most people rate their abilities as better than “average” even though it is statistically impossible for most people to have better-than-median abilities. Some investigators explained this phenomenon in terms of a self-enhancement bias. The present study complements this motivational explanation with the parsimonious cognitive explanation that the phrase “average ability” may be interpreted as below-median ability rather than median ability. We believe people tend to construe an “average” target that is based on the most representative exemplar, and this result in different levels of “average” in different domains. Participants compared their abilities to those of an average person, typical person, and a person whose abilities are at the 40th, 50th, or 60th percentile. We found that participants’ interpretation of “average” ability depended on the perceived difficulty of the ability. For abilities perceived as easy (e.g., spoken and written expression), participants construed an “average” target at the 40th percentile (i.e., below-median ability) and showed a marked better-than-average effect. On the contrary, for abilities perceived to be difficult, participants construed an “average” target at the median or even above the median.

Supplemental Material for Happier Than Thou? A Self-Enhancement Bias in Emotion Attribution

Supplemental Material for Happier Than Thou? A Self-Enhancement Bias in Emotion Attribution

The effect of performance feedback on drivers’ hazard perception ability and self-ratings

Drivers’ hazard perception ability has been found to predict crash risk, and novice drivers appear to be particularly poor at this skill. This competency appears to develop only slowly with experience, and this could partially be a result of poor quality performance feedback. We report an experiment in which we provided high-quality artificial feedback on individual drivers’ performance in a validated video-based hazard perception test via either: (1) a graph-based comparison of hazard perception response times between the test-taker, the average driver, and an expert driver; (2) a video-based comparison between the same groups; or (3) both. All three types of feedback resulted in both an improvement in hazard perception performance and a reduction in self-rated hazard perception skill, compared with a no-feedback control group. Video-based and graph-based feedback combined resulted in a greater improvement in hazard perception performance than either of the individual components, which did not differ from one another. All three types of feedback eliminated participants’ self-enhancement bias for hazard perception skill. Participants judged both interventions involving video feedback to be significantly more likely to improve their real-world driving than the no feedback control group. While all three forms of feedback had some value, the combined video and graph feedback intervention appeared to be the most effective across all outcome measures.

Self-enhancement: Conceptualization and Assessment

Self-enhancement bias is conventionally construed as an unwarranted social comparison in social psychology and a misperception of social reality in personality psychology. Researchers in both fields rely heavily on discrepancy scores to represent self-enhancement and fail to distinguish between a general tendency or bias to self-enhance and a self-enhancement error, or false perception of own excellence. We critically review prominent discrepancy measures and then propose a decision-theoretic alternative that [a] mitigates confounds between self-positivity and self-superiority, [b] separates error from bias, and [c] discourages reliance on measures that reify self-enhancement as a stable personality trait. To evaluate our hypotheses, we re-analyze data collected in our laboratory and perform a series of simulation studies. We share these materials with interested researchers.

Social Perception of Self-Enhancement Bias and Error

Abstract. How do social observers perceive and judge individuals who self-enhance (vs. not)? Using a decision-theoretic framework, we distinguish between self-enhancement bias and error, where the former comprises both correct and incorrect self-perceptions of being better than average. The latter occurs when a claim to be better than others is found to be false. In two studies, we find that when judging people’s competence, observers are sensitive to the accuracy of self-perception. When judging their morality, however, they tend to respond negatively to any claims of being better than average. These findings are further modulated by the domain of performance (intelligence vs. moral aptitude). Implications for the strategic use of self-enhancement claims are discussed.

Quantifying the Association of Self-Enhancement Bias With Self-Ratings of Personality and Life Satisfaction.

Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, and Robins conceptualize self-enhancement as a favorable comparison of self-judgments with judgments of and by others. Applying a modified version of Kwan et al.'s approach to behavior observation data, we show that the resulting measure of self-enhancement bias is highly reliable, predicts self-ratings of intelligence as well as does actual intelligence, interacts with item desirability in predicting responses to questionnaire items, and also predicts general life satisfaction. Consistent with previous research, however, self-ratings of intelligence did not become more valid when controlling for self-enhancement bias. We also show that common personality scales like the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale reflect self-enhancement at least as strongly as do scales that were designed particularly for that purpose (i.e., "social desirability scales"). The relevance of these findings in regard to the validity and utility of social desirability scales is discussed.

Overoptimism about future knowledge: Early arrogance?

Three studies explored whether young children (5–7 years) have more optimistic views of their future knowledge than older children (8–12 years) and adults. In Study 1, younger children were more likely than older children and adults to expect greater knowledge in both young and mature protagonists. Both groups of children saw knowledge rising at a faster rate into adulthood than adult participants did. All ages judged moral knowledge as much easier to acquire than other types of knowledge, such as artifacts. In Study 2, all children saw their own future knowledge in especially optimistic terms in comparison to ratings by adults, and the older children exhibited a self-enhancement bias. Study 3 found an overall preference for the acquisition of positively valenced future knowledge, particularly for the 8- to 12-year olds and in the domain of morality, suggesting pragmatic underpinnings for these judgments.

The Self-Enhancement Bias in Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Origin, Nature, and Consequences

Despite exhibiting functional impairments in a number of key domains, children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) tend to overestimate their own competence more than their peers without ADHD. In this review, we describe the evidence in support of a self-enhancement bias (SEB) in children with ADHD and factors that are associated with the presence of this bias. We discuss possible explanations for a SEB and the extent to which these inaccurate self-appraisals are adaptive or impairing. We conclude with implications for practice and further research. There is considerable evidence that the SEB exists in a substantial proportion of children with ADHD in several domains and likely persists into adolescence and adulthood. In treatment, clinicians may need to determine if any observed SEB is adaptive or maladaptive for the individual and act accordingly.

The relationship between social support and acculturative stress from cultural adaptation of people displaced from North Korea to South Korea

This study analysed the relationship between social support, financial independence, self-enhancement bias, and stress from cultural adaptation. For an empirical analysis, the data from 225 people displaced from North Korea were analysed. Our results suggest that social support has a positively significant effect on financial independence and self-enhancement bias; furthermore, financial independence has been shown to reduce stress from cultural adaptation. Therefore, social support reduces stress from cultural adaptation through financial independence. These results demonstrate that the social support of South Korea is very important for people displaced from North Korea in terms of their safely establishing settled living. In addition, considering the fact that the status of China is rising in international society, the results of the present study provide important insights into the provision of psychological stability to people displaced from North Korea.

Optimism and well-being: a prospective multi-method and multi-dimensional examination of optimism as a resilience factor following the occurrence of stressful life events

ABSTRACTOptimism has been conceptualised variously as positive expectations (PE) for the future , optimistic attributions , illusion of control , and self-enhancing biases. Relatively little research has examined these multiple dimensions of optimism in relation to psychological and physical health. The current study assessed the multi-dimensional nature of optimism within a prospective vulnerability-stress framework. Initial principal component analyses revealed the following dimensions: PEs, Inferential Style (IS), Sense of Invulnerability (SI), and Overconfidence (O). Prospective follow-up analyses demonstrated that PE was associated with fewer depressive episodes and moderated the effect of stressful life events on depressive symptoms. SI also moderated the effect of life stress on anxiety symptoms. Generally, our findings indicated that optimism is a multifaceted construct and not all forms of optimism have the same effects on well-being. Specifically, our findings indicted that PE may be the most relevant to depression, whereas SI may be the most relevant to anxiety.

Self-Enhancement Bias and Academic Achievement: A Negative Quadratic Relation

본 연구는 대학생들을 대상으로 자기고양편향과 학업성취 사이의 관련성을 검토하였다. 연구의 참여자는 미국 사립대 신입생 135명으로, 학기 첫 달에 온라인으로 설문에 참여하였다. 참여자들은 같은 학교에 재학 중인 평균적인 고등학생 및 대학생과 비교해 자신의 학업능력을 평가하였고, 참여자들의 고등학교 성적과 대학 수학 능력 시험(ACT) 성적이 수집되어 실제 학업능력의 지표로 사용되었다. 참여자들은 또한 자기보고식 나르시시즘 척도에 응답하고, 학문적으로 성공하는 것이 얼마나 중요한지에 대해서도 응답하였다. 자기고양편향은 자기지각 학업능력과 실제 학업능력 간의 차이로 측정되었다. 학기가 끝난 후 대학에서의 평점 평균이 수집되었고, 학업성취의 지표로 사용되었다. 자기지각 학업능력은 한 학기 후의 평점 평균과 정적 상관관계에 있었다. 하지만, 자기고양편향은 평점 평균과 부적 곡선 상관을 가졌다. 즉, 자신을 지나치게 긍정적 혹은 부정적으로 평가하는 것은 모두 상대적으로 낮은 학업성취와 관련이 있었다. 그리고 이러한 부적 곡선 상관은 나르시시즘과 학업의 중요성을 통제한 후에도 유의미하였다. 본 연구에서는 객관적 기준을 이용해 자기고양편향의 지표를 얻음으로써 자기고양편향과 긍정적인 자기지각을 구분하고자 했고, 둘은 학업성취를 서로 다른 방식으로 예측했다. 두 변인을 동일시했던 연구들과 관련해, 자기고양편향을 어떻게 조작적으로 정의해야 할지 논의되었다.

The Enlightenment Scale: Further Evidence for Validity

The purpose of this study was to find further evidence for the validity of the Enlightenment Scale, a measure that has two factors: At Peace and Open-Hearted. The scale was designed to measure the simple experience of enlightenment. Enlightenment is essentially a way of being and is difficult to define in scientific terms; however, it can be said to involve the complete surrender of the separate self, and to be characterized by qualities such as authenticity, living in the moment, compassion, and a sense of wholeness and inner peace — although not necessarily the absence of pain. Further evidence for the validity of the scale was sought through replication of its factor structure and through investigations into associations between its scores and those on the key predictor variables: Mindfulness and Self-Enhancement Bias. The results largely supported the predictions made. A confirmatory factor analysis performed on an independent data set showed that the two-factor structure of the scale replicated, and there was a strong correlation particularly between At Peace and Mindfulness scores but also between Open-Hearted and Mindfulness scores. There was no relationship between Self-Enhancement Bias and At Peace scores, and Self-Enhancement Bias dropped as Open-Hearted scores rose above low levels. By contrast, Self-Enhancement Bias rose as Mindfulness rose from medium to high levels. Thus, the results provide further evidence of the incremental and construct validity of the Enlightenment Scale. Possible limitations of the study and future research directions are discussed.

Validating Power Makes Communal Narcissists Less Communal

What motivates communal self-enhancement? Paulhus and John [1998. Egoistic and moralistic biases in self-perception: The interplay of self-deceptive styles with basic traits and motives. Journal of Personality, 66, 1025–1060] posit that agentic and communal self-enhancement biases are independently motivated by needs for power and approval, respectively. In contrast, the agency-communion model of narcissism [Gebauer, J. E., Sedikides, C., Verplanken, B., & Maio, G. R. (2012). Communal narcissism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103, 854–878] posits that communal narcissists’ communal self-enhancement is driven by the need for power. We examined whether validating a sense of power affects the communal behavior and self-perceptions of communal narcissists. We observed that communal narcissists behaved less communally (Study 1) and displayed less communal self-enhancement (Study 2) when their need for power is validated rather than threatened. Consistent with the agency-communion model of narcissism, these results suggest communal narcissists are indeed motivated by the need to validate power.

Support and compliance with 20 mph speed limits in Great Britain

There are a number of challenges relating to both the support of and compliance with speed limits. The introduction of 20mph limits in Great Britain is no exception: the recent rise in the deployment of these limits in urban settings has created a need to understand these issues in more depth. This paper reports a study undertaken by the authors that used a population wide survey of GB drivers to explore how support and compliance were interlinked. Whilst as expected many supporters said they would comply with the limits, and many opponents might not comply, more surprisingly it was also found that some supporters claimed not to comply, while some opponents of 20mph limits were compliers. Explanations included the strong likelihood of strong moral adherence to not breaking laws amongst opponent–compliers, and self-enhancement bias amongst supporter–non-compliers. This paper explores the incidence of these effects and their implications in detail.