Selective Explanations Research Articles

Grounding the Selectionist Explanation for the Success of Science in the External Physical World

AbstractI identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist’s selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen’s original and K. Brad Wray’s newer interpretation. In Wray’s version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community – viz. scientists’ interests, goals, and preferences – explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray’s version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change over time. Theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science are however not faddish. They are mostly stable; that is, long-lived and consistent over time. This is because scientists (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to what I will call the testability norm: scientific theories must make falsifiable claims about the external physical world. The testability norm and not psycho-sociology explains the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science. Contra Wray, scientific anti-realists can then maintain that the external physical world (as expressed in the testability norm) explains theory-success.

Natural selection versus neutral mutation in the evolution of subterranean life: A false dichotomy?

Throughout the evolutionary tree, there are gains and losses of morphological features, physiological processes, and behavioral patterns. Losses are perhaps nowhere so prominent as for subterranean organisms, which typically show reductions or losses of eyes and pigment. These losses seem easy to explain without recourse to natural selection. Its most modern form is the accumulation of selectively neutral, structurally reducing mutations. Selectionist explanations include direct selection, often involving metabolic efficiency in resource poor subterranean environments, and pleiotropy, where genes affecting eyes and pigment have other effects, such as increasing extra-optic sensory structures. This dichotomy echoes the debate in evolutionary biology in general about the sufficiency of natural selection as an explanation of evolution, e.g., Kimura’s neutral mutation theory. Tests of the two hypotheses have largely been one-sided, with data supporting that one or the other processes is occurring. While these tests have utilized a variety of subterranean organisms, the Mexican cavefish,Astyanax mexicanus, which has eyed extant ancestral-like surface fish conspecifics, is easily bred in the lab, and whose whole genome has been sequenced, is the favored experimental organism. However, with few exceptions, tests for selection versus neutral mutations contain limitations or flaws. Notably, these tests are often one sided, testing for the presence of one or the other process. In fact, it is most likely that both processes occur and make a significant contribution to the two most studied traits in cave evolution: eye and pigment reduction. Furthermore, narrow focus on neutral mutation hypothesis versus selection to explain cave-evolved traits often fails, at least in the simplest forms of these hypotheses, to account for aspects that are likely essential for understanding cave evolution: migration or epigenetic effects. Further, epigenetic effects and phenotypic plasticity have been demonstrated to play an important role in cave evolution in recent studies. Phenotypic plasticity does not by itself result in genetic change of course, but plasticity can reveal cryptic genetic variation which then selection can act on. These processes may result in a radical change in our thinking about evolution of subterranean life, especially the speed with which it may occur. Thus, perhaps it is better to ask what role the interaction of genes and environment plays, in addition to natural selection and neutral mutation.

The realist and selectionist explanations for the success of science

According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectionists, theories are successful because they have gone through a rigorous selection process. Wray claims that the realist and selectionist explanations are rivals to each other. Lee objects that they are instead complementary to each other. In my view, Lee’s objection presupposes that the realist explanation is true, and thus it begs the question against selectionists. By contrast, the selectionist explanation invokes a scientific theory, and thus it is not clear whether it is a realist explanation or an antirealist explanation. Finally, the six new arguments for scientific realism in the literature truly complement the no-miracles argument.

Pregnant Females as Historical Individuals: An Insight From the Philosophy of Evo-Devo.

Criticisms of the “container” model of pregnancy picturing female and embryo as separate entities multiply in various philosophical and scientific contexts during the last decades. In this paper, we examine how this model underlies received views of pregnancy in evolutionary biology, in the characterization of the transition from oviparity to viviparity in mammals and in the selectionist explanations of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy. In contrast, recent evo-devo studies on eutherian reproduction, including the role of inflammation and new maternal cell types, gather evidence in favor of considering pregnancy as an evolved relational novelty. Our thesis is that from this perspective we can identify the emergence of a new historical individual in evolution. In evo-devo, historical units are conceptualized as evolved entities which fulfill two main criteria, their continuous persistence and their non-exchangeability. As pregnancy can be individuated in this way, we contend that pregnant females are historical individuals. We argue that historical individuality differs from, and coexists with, other views of biological individuality as applied to pregnancy (the physiological, the evolutionary and the ecological one), but brings forward an important new insight which might help dissolve misguided conceptions.

Selection at Three Levels of Organization: Does Structure Matter?

The structure, function, and processes of a system modulate human behavior on at least 3 levels of selection: biological, behavioral, and cultural. During phylogenesis, an acquired biological structure will enable the organism to discriminate antecedent and consequent stimuli that are functionally related to response classes. Although the reinforcing value of most stimuli is based on natural selection, the stimuli’s control over behavior is mediated by a verbal community. Thus, the reinforcing value of a stimulus is established (a) during phylogenesis when it has adaptive value for that species, (b) during ontogenesis when it has adaptive value for the organism, and (c) culturally when it has adaptive value for a group. If a gene sequence/phenotype, response class, or set of contingencies matches the environment over time (i.e., function), then a structure will become recurrent. Structures are networks of relations that carry information about the adaptive history of a certain system. This paper discusses the ways in which a selectionist explanation of human behavior may incorporate the interdependence of processes, function, and structure at 3 levels of complexity. The cultural behavioral perspective represented by the concept of metacontingency will have its parallel to processes (interlocking behavioral contingencies IBC), function (aggregated product AP), context (receiving system RS), and a recurrent structure (nested interlocking behavioral contingencies n-IBC).

The Coincidentalist Reply to the No-Miracles Argument

Proponents of the no-miracles argument contend that scientific realism is “the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.” Bas van Fraassen argued, however, that the success of our best theories can be explained in Darwinian terms—by the fact they are survivors of a winnowing process in which unsuccessful theories are rejected. Critics of this selectionist explanation complain that while it may account for the fact we have chosen successful theories, it does not explain why any particular one of those theories succeeds. Against this I defend the claim that if selectionists manage to account for the former, they have no burden to account for the latter; the success of any particular one of our best theories might as well be an extraordinary coincidence. I refer to this enhanced selectionist reply as “coincidentalism” and argue that it is a serious but underappreciated response to the no-miracles argument. More generally, I argue the considerations raised in favor of this response show that versions of the no-miracles argument focusing on the success of particular theories are misguided.

Two Tokens of the Inference to the Best Explanation: No-Miracle Argument and the Selectionist Explanation

In this paper, I evaluate van Fraassen’s critique of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by focusing mainly on his argument of bad lot. First, I argue that his attack is about the reliability of IBE as a rule of inference. Secondly, I evaluate the most famous realist IBE in the philosophy of science literature, namely the No-Miracle Argument (NMA). I stick to Mark Newman’s attack to realist NMA and admit his claim that NMA is viciously circular. Thirdly, I introduce the anti-realist alternative to the NMA, which is argued by van Fraassen, namely the Selectionist Explanation. Ultimately, I claim that, even though van Fraassen finds IBE wanting, SA has a form of IBE and thus it is a token of IBE as well.

On the Evolutionary Defense of Scientific Antirealism

Van Fraassen (The scientific image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) claims that successful theories exist today because successful theories survive and unsuccessful ones die. Wray (Erkenntnis 67:81–89, 2007; Erkenntnis 72:365–377, 2010) appeals to Stanford’s new pessimistic induction (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), arguing that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation is better than the realist explanation that successful theories exist because they are approximately true. I argue that if the pessimistic induction is correct, then the evolutionary explanation is neither true nor empirically adequate, and that realism is better than selectionism because realism explains more phenomena in science than selectionism.

Natural Selection: A Case for the Counterfactual Approach

This paper investigates the conception of causation required in order to make sense of natural selection as a causal explanation of changes in traits or allele frequencies. It claims that under a counterfactual account of causation, natural selection is constituted by the causal relevance of traits and alleles to the variation in traits and alleles frequencies. The “statisticalist” view of selection (Walsh, Matthen, Ariew, Lewens) has shown that natural selection is not a cause superadded to the causal interactions between individual organisms. It also claimed that the only causation at work is those aggregated individual interactions, natural selection being only predictive and explanatory, but it is implicitly committed to a process-view of causation. I formulate a counterfactual construal of the causal statements underlying selectionist explanations, and show that they hold because of the reference they make to ecological reliable factors. Considering case studies, I argue that this counterfactual view of causal relevance proper to natural selection captures more salient features of evolutionary explanations than the statisticalist view, and especially makes sense of the difference between selection and drift. I eventually establish equivalence between causal relevance of traits and natural selection itself as a cause.

Selection and Predictive Success

Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as why it is reasonable to expect past successful theories to be successful in the future. I also argue that the plausibility of the realists’ explanation rests on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of predictive success. The predictive success of our best theories is a relative success.

A perturbative view of protein structural variation

It was recently found that the lowest-energy collective normal modes dominate the evolutionary divergence of protein structures. This was attributed to a presumed functional importance of such motions, i.e., to natural selection. In contrast to this selectionist explanation, we proposed that the observed behavior could be just the expected physical response of proteins to random mutations. This proposal was based on the success of a linearly forced elastic network model (LFENM) of mutational effects on structure to account for the observed pattern of structural divergence. Here, to further test the mutational explanation and the LFENM, we analyze the structural differences observed not only in homologous (globin-like) proteins but also in unselected experimentally engineered myoglobin mutants and in wild-type variants subject to other perturbations such as ligand-binding and pH changes. We show that the lowest normal modes dominate structural change in all the cases considered and that the LFENM reproduces this behavior quantitatively. The collective nature of the lowest normal modes results in global conformational changes that depend little on the exact nature or location of the perturbation. Significantly, the evolutionarily conserved structural core matches the regions observed to be more robust with respect to mutations, so that the core would be more conserved even under unselected random mutations. In a word, the observed patterns of structural variation can be seen as the natural response of proteins to perturbations and can be adequately modeled using the LFENM, which serves as a common framework to relate a priori different phenomena.

Epidermal club cells do not protect fathead minnows against trematode cercariae: a test of the anti-parasite hypothesis

Epidermal club cells of fishes in the superorder ostariophysi have puzzled evolutionary biologists because they were historically linked to chemical alarm signalling and relied on group selectionist explanations. Alternative hypoth- eses to explain the existence of these cells include the possibility of an anti-pathogenic or anti-parasitic function. If this is so, individual fish should invest in increased numbers of club cells after exposure to parasites, and club cells should contain components that reduce the infectivity of skin-penetrating larvae. Infectivity of cercariae of the trematode Ornithodiplostomum sp. was significantly reduced when exposed to the skin extract of fathead minnows (an ostariophysan), but also to skin extract of mollies (a non-ostariophysan that lacks club cells), respectively, compared to controls. Moreover, club cell density was not affected by exposure to cercariae. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with an anti-parasite function for these cells and instead suggest a generic role in response to injury. © 2009 The Linnean Society of London, Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 2009, 98, 884-890. ADDITIONAL KEYWORDS: alarm substance - anti-predation - Ornithodiplostomum - Ostariophysi - infectivity - Pimephales.

Against Darwinism

Abstract: Darwinism consists of two parts: a phylogenesis of biological species (ours included) and the claim that the primary mechanism of the evolution of phenotypes is natural selection. I assume that Darwin’s account of phylogeny is essentially correct; attention is directed to the theory of natural selection. I claim that Darwin’s account of evolution by natural selection cannot be sustained. The basic problem is that, according to the consensus view, evolution consists in changes of the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations of organisms. An evolutionary theory must therefore explicate not just the notion of organisms being selected, but also the notion of organisms being selected for their phenotypic traits. I argue that that there is no way for a theory of natural selection to do so, and that Darwin’s assumption to the contrary was likely the consequence of placing too much weight on the analogy between natural selection and artificial selection. The paper ends with the suggestion that selectionist explanations, insofar as they are convincing, are best construed aspost hochistorical narratives: natural history rather than biology.

A selectionist explanation for the success and failures of science

I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation. Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world, the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.

A case of stunted development? Existential reasoning is contingent on a developing theory of mind

Missing from Bering's account of the evolutionary origins of existential reasoning is an explicit developmental framework, one that takes into account community input. If Bering's selectionist explanation was on target then one might predict a unique and relatively robust developmental trajectory, regardless of input. Evidence suggests instead that children's existential reasoning is contingent on their developing theory of mind.

Evolutionary social science beyond culture

Mesoudi et al.'s case can be improved by expanding to compelling selectionist explanations elsewhere in the social sciences and by seeing that natural selection is an instance of general selectionist process. Obstacles include the common use of extreme idealizations and optimality evidence, the copresence of nonselectionist social processes, and the fact that selectionist explanations often presuppose other kinds of social explanations.

Not Elective but Selective Affinities

Max Weber’s ambivalent attitude to the application of the concepts of selection and adaptation to the study of cultural and social evolution is readily understandable in view of his scepticism about the reducibility of sociology to biology and his suspicion that selectionist explanations will turn out on close inspection to be either value-laden or circular. His concerns can be dispelled with the help of developments in evolutionary theory which he could not have anticipated in his lifetime but which enable the basic agenda of his sociology of religion to be reformulated in more rather than less persuasive terms. That, however, requires his metaphor of ‘elective affinities’ between religious ideas and the behaviour of ideal-typical agents to be replaced by empirically testable hypotheses linking the adaptiveness of specific religious memes to the adaptiveness of specific economic practices.

THE PRICE OF METAPHOR

In his critical response to our skeptical inquiry, “Does Culture Evolve?” (History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 [December 1999], 52–78), W. G. Runciman affirms that “Culture Does Evolve.” However, we find nothing in his essay that convinces us to alter our initial position. And we must confess that in composing an answer to Runciman, our first temptation was simply to urge those interested to read our original article–both as a basis for evaluating Runciman's attempted refutation of it and as a framework for reading this essay, which addresses in greater detail issues we have already raised. Runciman views the “selectionist paradigm” as a “scientific”“puzzle-solving device” now validated by an “expanding literature” that has successfully modeled social and cultural change as “evolutionary.” All paradigms, however, including scientific ones, give rise to self-validating “normal science.” The real issue, accordingly, is not whether explanations can be successfully manufactured on the basis of paradigmatic assumptions, but whether the paradigmatic assumptions are appropriate to the object of analysis. The selectionist paradigm requires the reduction of society and culture to inheritance systems that consist of randomly varying, individual units, some of which are selected, and some not; and with society and culture thus reduced to inheritance systems, history can be reduced to “evolution.” But these reductions, which are required by the selectionist paradigm, exclude much that is essential to a satisfactory historical explanation–particularly the systemic properties of society and culture and the combination of systemic logic and contingency. Now as before, therefore, we conclude that while historical phenomena can always be modeled selectionistically, selectionist explanations do no work, nor do they contribute anything new except a misleading vocabulary that anesthetizes history.

Expanding the explanatory base of behavior analysis via modern connectionism: Selectionism as a common explanatory core.

Abstract Selection is an important component of Darwin's functional explanation of the origin and extinction of species. It is an equally important component of Skinner's functional explanation of the origin and extinction of behavior. Darwin's functional explanation was marginalized within biology on the basis that it was an incomplete explanation because it lacked any plausible proximal causal mechanism for how variation was instantiated and for how natural selection could operate on this variation. Population genetics completed Darwin's evolutionary explanation by providing the required proximal causal mechanism information. Skinner's functional explanation of behavior has been marginalized within psychology for the same general reason that Darwin's theory was marginalized within biology. No proximal causal mechanisms are available to explain behavioral variation and how contingent consequences can selectively reinforce or strengthen target behaviors. Arguments that the experimental analysis of behavior can proceed without this information are correct in the same way that Darwin could continue his research in the absence of population genetics. However, history demonstrates that marginalization will remain until proximal causal information is provided. Parallel Distributed Processing Connectionist Neural Networks provide the requisite proximal causal explanations. This article demonstrates how this explanatory approach is fully compatible with the experimental analysis of behavior. Expansion of the explanatory basis of behavior analysis could potentially promote it within psychology to the same degree that population genetics promoted evolution within biology. ********** This article notes that applied behavior analysis and its selectionist orientation have been marginalized but that selectionism is gaining acceptance at an exponential rate in the form of Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) connectionism (10) which is theoretically consistent with radical behaviorism because it is a superset of radical behaviorism. It therefore follows that applied behavior analysis may be able to expand its appeal by extending its explanatory base to include the new selectionist explanations used by PDP connectionism. The first section of this article summarizes the selectionist approach that underlies the experimental analysis of behavior and its behavior therapeutic applications. This is done to emphasize the importance and value of this explanatory approach and to demonstrate my commitment to this perspective so that there can be no doubt as to my sincerity in this matter. Another reason for beginning with this section is that PDP connectionism supports selectionism. The second section of this article notes that explanation based on selection outside of PDP connectionism has become severely marginalized within psychology. A future consequence of this trend, if left unchecked, is that fewer and fewer proponents of applied behavior analysis will have less and less impact on science, clinical practice, and education. Representation and influence in professional societies will continue to wane. It is time to act in new more effective ways before extinction fully occurs. The third portion of this article proposes a recovery plan based on PDP connectionism. The main reasons are: 1) this form of connectionism fully embraces selectionist explanation, 2) it constitutes a superset of behaviorism that is compatible with mainstream psychology, and 3) its growth is exponential. Empirical support for these three claims is provided by the work of John Donahoe, a card-carrying behaviorist. SELECTION OF BEHAVIOR The word operant means to operate on the physical and/or social environment. Operants refer to theoretical distributions that describe slight variations in how the same behavior recurs in the same situation. We shall refer to them as response variations to highlight explanation by selection. …

The Evolutionary Ecology of Mycorrhizal Networks

Mycorrhizal networks which allow carbon compounds and mineral nutrients to be passed between individual plants, even members of different species, are potentially of great ecological importance. The evolution of such systems is of particular interest as they appear to need a group selectionist explanation. I suggest that such explanations are not necessary to explain the evolution of these systems as gene level explanations can be provided which appear to be sufficient to explain their evolution. Such explanations are to be preferred since they are less open to problems with cheating by the symbionts and therefore more stable.