Pregnant Females as Historical Individuals: An Insight From the Philosophy of Evo-Devo.

Laura Nuño De La Rosa,Arantza Etxeberria,Mihaela Pavličev

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.572106

Laura Nuño De La Rosa, Arantza Etxeberria + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.572106

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Abstract

Criticisms of the “container” model of pregnancy picturing female and embryo as separate entities multiply in various philosophical and scientific contexts during the last decades. In this paper, we examine how this model underlies received views of pregnancy in evolutionary biology, in the characterization of the transition from oviparity to viviparity in mammals and in the selectionist explanations of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy. In contrast, recent evo-devo studies on eutherian reproduction, including the role of inflammation and new maternal cell types, gather evidence in favor of considering pregnancy as an evolved relational novelty. Our thesis is that from this perspective we can identify the emergence of a new historical individual in evolution. In evo-devo, historical units are conceptualized as evolved entities which fulfill two main criteria, their continuous persistence and their non-exchangeability. As pregnancy can be individuated in this way, we contend that pregnant females are historical individuals. We argue that historical individuality differs from, and coexists with, other views of biological individuality as applied to pregnancy (the physiological, the evolutionary and the ecological one), but brings forward an important new insight which might help dissolve misguided conceptions.

Highlights

The individuality of pregnancy constitutes an intriguing philosophical problem concerning the kind and number of biological individuals and the process of individuation involved
The implications of evo-devo studies for the individuation of living entities are often ignored. Even those critical of the sufficiency of evolutionary notions of individuality still tend to associate evolution with selection. In contrast with this trend, we show that extant notions of individuality do not faithfully grasp the unique biological features of pregnancy as they are highlighted in our evolutionary account, and that new criteria for historical individuation used in evo-devo render significant new insights on biological individuality
In the remainder of this section, we present some results of recent evo-devo studies of eutherian reproduction and show how they support a conception of pregnancy that, in attributing a central importance to the evolved active maternal role and the relational novelties of pregnancy, significantly differs from the one presented in the previous section

Summary

Introduction

The individuality of pregnancy constitutes an intriguing philosophical problem concerning the kind and number of biological individuals and the process of individuation involved. The perspective we adopt in this article pays attention to recent work on the evolution of reproduction, in particular relevant evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) on pregnancy, to examine the philosophical question of the kind and number of individuals involved.

Results

Conclusion