War Security Research Articles

Understanding nonviolent resistance

The events of the Arab Spring of 2011 have made clear the importance and potential efficacy of nonviolent resistance, as well as the field’s inability to explain the onset and outcome of major nonviolent uprisings. Until recently, conflict scholars have largely ignored nonviolent resistance. This issue features new theoretical and empirical explorations of the causes and consequences of nonviolent resistance, stressing the role that unarmed, organized civilians can play in shaping the course of conflicts. Contributors demonstrate the importance of treating nonviolent and violent strategies, as well as conventional politics strategies, as alternative choices for engaging the state, show how gender ideology can influence which opposition groups use nonviolent resistance, and suggest that the causes of civil war and nonviolent resistance often differ. Other pieces highlight the role of public attitudes regarding whether nonviolent resistance and violence are employed, how experience with activism and repression by the state can shape activists’ perceptions of justice, and how the perceptions of resistance leaders can influence strategic choices. Moreover, several articles examine the key role that security force defections can play in the success of nonviolent resistance, how micro-level nonviolent tactics can improve security in civil war, and how nonviolent campaigns can influence the stability of autocratic states. These contributions suggest that rigorous empirical study of civilian-based contentious politics (rather than only violent contention by armed non-state actors) must be incorporated into the conflict literature. Improved theory and data on the subject will help researchers and policymakers to shape strategies to support these movements when appropriate, and to manage changes in the international system that result from the success of nonviolent uprisings.

Forward to the future? The democratic peace after the Cold War

This paper helps resolve the ongoing debate concerning whether the democratic peace is limited to the Cold War period. Some critics have attributed the democratic peace to a set of common interests among democracies that uniquely existed during the Cold War. This study is the first direct test of this proposition. I use a new measure of Cold War preferences to test if the effect of joint democracy is rendered statistically insignificant either during or after the Cold War as critics contend. I also test, as some democratic peace proponents have suggested, whether the pacifying effect of democracy is strengthened in the post-Cold War era. Evidence from period-specific logit analyses suggests that joint democracy promotes peace independently of Cold War security interests. Indeed, the democratic peace exists in the post-Cold War era.

After Fukushima: An Introduction

Asian Perspective 37 (2013), 473-474 After Fukushima: An Introduction Norifumi Namatame The nuclear disasters at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March 11, 2011, startled people in Japan and throughout the world. The consequences of the massive earthquake and tsunami apparently went far beyond the assumptions that the Japanese government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had made before that day. Their responses to the nuclear accidents were tardy, insufficient, and confused. Nearly three years have passed, but the problems at Fukushima Daiichi are still far from resolved. The leaking of nuclear materials from the power plant continues, the cost of decommissioning of the reactors is enormous and mounting, and the people who were forced to evacuate from the heavily contam­ inated area still live in fear and despair. Furthermore, the Japanese people in general do not know exactly where to find safe places to live, safe foods they can eat, and information they can really trust. From May 10 to 12, 2012, Australian National University (ANU) and Tohoku Fukushi University (TFU) cohosted a work­ shop in Sendai, Japan, called Nuclear Disaster Response: The Need to Know. Scholars in various fields were invited from Japan, the United States, Australia, and Taiwan. For the first two days in closed sessions, and then in a public forum, we had intensive debates on what kind of information the people in Fukushima and Japan generally should be given about nuclear power and a nuclear disaster. This special issue represents the arguments that were offered in Sendai, reinforced by additional authors whose contributions were invited subsequently, in order to respond to “the need to know” and fulfill requirements stemming from “the right to know.” Richard Tanter examines the issue of corruption in the nuclear power industry, arguing that it is not a problem peculiar to Japan. Jeff Kingston extends Tanter’s argument by detailing the pemi473 474 After Fukushima: An Introduction cious influence of the so-called nuclear village in Japan, which embraces TEPCO, powerful politicians, and members of the media and academia. Tilman A. Ruff provides a deeply informed perspective on public health, scrutinizing the long-term and short­ term risks of exposure to low-dose radiation. Drawing on many years of study of the Chernobyl disaster’s biological impact, Anders Pape Mpller and Timothy A. Mousseau make comparisons with what has happened to birds and other animals in the contam­ inated areas around Fukushima. Shoko Yoneyama offers a sociological analysis of the nuclear disaster, comparing it with the case of Minamata disease, one of the most tragic pollution incidents in Japanese history. Kawasaki Akira explores the future of energy policy in Japan from the point of view of civil society. Finally, Michael Edwards analyzes the psychological effects of the accident through several interviews with victims. This project received support from many scholars and volun­ teer graduate students. I would like to express special thanks to Koki Hagino, president of TFU, for cohosting the workshop; Peter Van Ness of ANU for organizing it; Mel Gurtov of Portland State University for supporting publication of the results; and Mark Selden, coordinator of japanfocus.org, for allowing us to publish revised versions of two articles that appeared there earlier. This study was also supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology-Japan (MEXT) Program for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities, provided to the Kansei Fukushi Research Institute of Tohoku Fukushi Univer­ sity (2012-2016). Note Norifumi Namatame is associate professor at Tohoku Fukushi University in Sendai, Japan. He was visiting fellow at the Australian National University from May 2011 to January 2012. He has published articles on Japan’s mis­ sile defense programs and on realist and pacifist approaches to Japan’s post­ war security policy and national identity. He can be reached at namatame @tfu-mail.tfu.ac.jp. ...

A Cold War Tourist and His Camera (review)

Reviewed by: A Cold War Tourist and His Camera Jacqueline Cannata A Cold War Tourist and His Camera. Martha Langford and John Langford. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011. Pp. 208, $39.95 Martha Langford and John Langford’s A Cold War Tourist and His Camera offers a unique analysis of images of Canada’s global presence during the Cold War. This study revolves around the sixteenth class year of Canada’s National Defence College as it learned about Canada’s national and international Cold War security strategies and later travelled through North America, Africa, and Europe in 1963. Asserting that ‘any photographic collection, amateur or professional, from the Cold War era can be interpreted contextually and imaginatively to shine light on the rhetoric and preoccupations of those times’ (4), Langford and Langford show that tourist photography at this time was an attempt to position the photographer and the audience within the Cold War and its surrounding landscape. Their treatment of the topic certainly confirms this view, as they reveal the intricate relationships between political climate, culture, personal vision, and slide photography. Part of the book’s appeal lies in its approach; rather than gathering the photos of just any National Defence College participant, the authors [End Page 516] use the slide photographs taken by their father, Warren Langford, as the basis of their study. Supplementing his 1963 slide collection are letters and postcards he wrote to his family while he travelled. This presents an opportunity to evaluate the image within its historical context and how the photos were displayed. Since the photos used in this study are slides, they were necessarily presented to other viewers – an act that Langford and Langford both remember from their childhoods and use as a fundamental piece of evidence. Consequently, they have endeavoured to organize and analyze the collection according to their father’s travel itinerary because it preserves ‘something of the photographic impulse’ (20). Important here is that the authors discuss their findings within the context of the photographer–viewer relationship, so casting the act of taking a photo as equal to its resulting image. Although using their father’s slide and communication collections is ultimately an effective and novel approach to Cold War–era photography, there were some points of this more personal account of the Cold War experience that could have benefitted from further explanation. At times, it seemed as though a familial anecdote’s meaning had been assumed but not explained. This is not to say that Langford and Langford’s approach was not objective enough – they generally successfully present their evidence and analysis without familial bias. However, that there are still some areas that need more attention does emphasize the challenges of maintaining a balance of personal histories within broader political and cultural events. Because of its emphasis on photography, Langford and Langford’s study is of particular interest to art, tourism, and cultural historians. However, the authors have made sure to situate their analysis within the historical context of the Cold War and so have provided detailed accounts of Canada’s foreign policies, its relations with other countries, and the international political climate. Consequently, by showing how these efforts were perceived by a ‘Cold War tourist’ and displayed to his family, this work presents a personal interpretation of Canada’s participation in the Cold War while simultaneously keeping a global perspective. The methodology employed by Langford and Langford is also commendable and quite useful to those working with photography collections or integrating photos within their research because of the authors’ attention to the process of taking and displaying slide photographs. The quality of the book itself enhances its use for photo historians. Not only are the images carefully chosen, explained, and analyzed, they are also reproduced with the utmost care and attention to quality. The images were not cropped and they are, where possible, organized [End Page 517] sequentially, so helping to illustrate the photographic impulse the authors incorporate within their analysis of the slide collection. In addition, the variety of photos included by the authors is partially what makes this study so important for scholars of tourism and Cold War histories because they collectively...

Sexual violence as a war tactic security council resolution 1888: Next steps

Sexual violence as a war tactic security council resolution 1888: Next steps

Mobilising uncertainty and the making of responsible sovereigns

AbstractThe past few decades have witnessed a fundamental change in the perception of threats to the security of states and individuals. Issues of security are no longer primarily framed in terms of threats posed by an identifiable, conventional enemy. Instead, post-Cold War security policies have emphasised the global and radically uncertain nature of threats such as environmental degradation, terrorism and financial risks. What are the implications of this transformation for one of the constitutive principles of international society: state sovereignty? Existing literature has provided two possible answers to this question. The first focuses on the alleged need for states to seek international cooperation and to relax claims of national sovereignty. In Ulrich Beck's terminology, this would amount to a transformation of sovereign states into ‘cosmopolitan states’. The second takes the opposite position: in response to uncertain threats states rely on their sovereign prerogatives to take exceptional measures and set aside provisions of positive law. In Beck's terminology, this would amount to the creation of a ‘surveillance state’. None of these two answers, however, does justice to the complex relation between sovereignty, power and (international) law. As this article will show, the invocation of radical uncertainty has led to a transformation in sovereignty that cannot be captured in terms of the cosmopolitan/surveillance dichotomy. What is at stake is a more fundamental transformation of the way in which sovereignty is used to counter threats. Based on a study of the UN Counterterrorism Committee, this article demonstrates how state sovereignty is used as a governmental technology that aims to create proactive, responsible subjects.

The Value of the Military Commissions Act as Non-Judicial Precedent in the Context of Litigation Over National Security Policymaking

At this writing, President Barack Obama has authorized the resumption of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, for those detainees eligible for trial before the commissions. By the time this essay is published, the war on terror will be entering its tenth year. By any reasonable measure, the emergency has ended, and it seems an appropriate time to examine the way in which the three branches of the federal government have responded to the terrorist threat. Here, we focus on the extent to which Congress can and should play a role in directing the war and national security issues related to terrorism. We have little doubt that the constitutional text allocates national security power between the legislative and executive branches. The question is whether Congress can wield that power in a meaningful way. We contend not just that Congress can do so, but that courts should invest particular Congressional actions with some presumptive weight when addressing disputes over the breadth of the executive’s national security powers. This is, to be sure, a modest point, but we should not overlook any potential lessons that can be learned from the legal battles over the conduct of the war on terror.

Stability, War and Human Security in the 21st Century: Addendum to Desai

Stability, War and Human Security in the 21st Century: Addendum to Desai

Security Governance and Networks: New Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security

The end of the Cold War has not only witnessed the rise of new transnational threats such as terrorism, crime, proliferation and civil war; it has also seen the growing role of non-state actors in the provision of security in Europe and North America. Two concepts in particular have been used to describe these transformations: security governance and networks. However, the differences and potential theoretical utility of these two concepts for the study of contemporary security have so far been under-examined. This article seeks to address this gap. It proposes that security governance can help to explain the transformation of Cold War security structures, whereas network analysis is particularly useful for understanding the relations and interactions between public and private actors in the making and implementation of national and international security policies.

Alliance Endangered? Challenges from the Changing Political-Economic Context of U.S.-Japan Relations

[ 21 ] roundtable • a new stage for the u.s.-japan alliance? Alliance Endangered? Challenges from the Changing Political-Economic Context of U.S.-Japan Relations Kent E. Calder This anniversary year of the revised U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 is justifiably a time of celebration. An alliance that endures for fifty years is historically unusual, although not unprecedented. And this particular alliance has undeniable strategic significance as a cornerstone of the United States’ political-military position in the Pacific, not to mention Japan’s global diplomacy. Yet the unusual durability of Washington-Tokyo security ties in the past should not lead us to wallow today in the dangerous swamp of selfcongratulation . The alliance may continue to have a compelling strategic logic, but it is embedded in a broader political, economic, and social support base that has long been fragile, has often complicated optimal bilateral defense cooperation in the past, and is even now dangerously eroding. Supporters of the alliance in this celebratory year need look no further than the protracted Futenma mess, ongoing for nearly fifteen years, oblivious to a solemn 1996 summit-level agreement, to realize that all is not well on the political side of trans-Pacific security relations. What exactly is wrong? From the outset, one should stress that the problem does not lie primarily with the technical capabilities of the traditional alliance managers—professional diplomats and defense personnel. They are, in general, committed, discreet, and intelligent. So too are most of the professional defense analysts beyond the U.S. and Japanese governments themselves who monitor the U.S.-Japan relationship. The problem lies instead in the vitally important interface between the defense community in each country and the broader society in which each is embedded, with the difficulties being especially complex and intractable on the Japanese side. Due to the traumas of World War II, the ensuing occupation, the “no-war” constitution, and the way the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) emerged as a police-reserve force, ostensibly to preserve domestic order during the Korean War, Japan’s military has long had a serious legitimacy problem. Such limited domestic political support as it enjoyed kent calderis Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at SAIS/Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations (2009), as well as seven other books, and served as Special Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan (1997–2001). He can be reached at . [ 22 ] asia policy flowed partly from the backing given by the United States, an indispensable protector and economic partner of Japan. The alliance itself, by extension, also had a legitimacy problem with many Japanese, although at the same time it was broadly recognized as a necessary quid pro quo for the diplomatic and economic support that war-torn Japan desperately needed to revive its economy and rejoin international society during the 1950s. The alliance of the early postwar period was embedded, in short, in the “San Francisco system” of trans-Pacific political-economic relations. Under this arrangement, Japan provided military bases, and from the late 1970s also host-nation support, to the U.S. military based in Japan, under the bilateral Mutual Security Treaty, in return for broad access to the American market and diplomatic support for Japan’s inclusion in a wide range of multilateral economic institutions.1 When the arrangement was conceived by John Foster Dulles in the early 1950s, as the political-economic underpinning of the San Francisco Peace Treaty ending World War II in the Pacific, the United States generated close to half of global GDP, and Japan only about 3%. The huge asymmetries, and the closed character of much of the world economy outside the United States, made this system attractive for Japan, reinforcing the Cold War security commitment on which Washington adamantly insisted. What I call the “world that Dulles built” amid the turbulence of the Korean War has persisted to a remarkable degree over the ensuing half century.2 U.S. bases remain in Japan, and the military alliance endures. Yet the international political-economic context of the alliance and the domestic context in both nations have changed...

Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In

Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided “to bribe the Soviets out,” as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward. The goal was to establish NATO as the main post–Cold War security institution before alternative structures could arise and potentially diminish U.S. influence. Admirers of a muscular U.S. foreign policy and of NATO will view this strategy as sound; critics will note that it alienated Russia and made NATO's later expansion possible. Either way, this finding challenges the scholarly view that the United States sought to integrate its former superpower enemy into postconflict structures after the end of the Cold War.

Dynamics of Japanese and Chinese Security Policies in East Asia and Implications for Regional Stability

This article examines the dynamics of Japanese and Chinese post–Cold War security policies in East Asia and assesses the implications for regional stability. To this end, the discussion explores elements in both countries' security policy behavior, and Sino‐Japanese relations that have a stabilizing and/or destabilizing impact on the region. The article argues that, on the whole, Japanese and Chinese security policies have contributed to more stability than instability. Although the security dilemma between Japan (and the United States) and China may have become more pronounced, the balance of power currently maintained may be assessed in positive terms for the region. In addition, Sino‐Japanese competition for influence has led to strengthening East Asian institution building and thereby fostered stability. While there is ground for cautious optimism regarding the future of Sino‐Japanese cooperation, mutual strategic distrust between Tokyo and Beijing will underpin the security dilemma and their competitive policies in the region.

James Schwoch . Global TV: New Media and the Cold War, 1946–69 . Urbana and Chicago : University of Illinois Press . 2009 . Pp. xv, 220. Cloth $70.00, paper $25.00.

This book provides both less and more than the title suggests. Readers hoping for an international or transnational history of television during the first quarter century of the Cold War will be disappointed, as James Schwoch concentrates on American actors and policies. Schwoch discusses far more, however, than the growth of television. He deals with other information technologies, such as computer systems, and explores the thinking of U.S. officials about psychological warfare, propaganda, and national security. The result is a book that is both rewarding and frustrating. It is an ambitious and informative study, but, at times, it devotes too much attention to tangential or tedious subjects. Schwoch's primary goal is to explain how television became “the dominant form of global media” (p. 2). The author at first focuses on occupied Germany, where concerns about Cold War security led to decisions that influenced the early development of TV in Europe and the policies of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Subsequent chapters discuss the United States Information Agency's increasingly ambitious programs to shape mass opinion in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and also address the work of social science researchers, sponsored both by private foundations and federal grants, to gauge the effectiveness of those efforts. Schwoch then examines the American quest for live transatlantic television, a goal finally achieved with the launch of the first Telstar satellite in July 1962, fifteen months after the Soviets telecast live scenes across Europe of the celebrations that followed the orbital space flight of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin.

Engaging Russia: Prospects for a Long-Term European Security Compact

Abstract. Europe’s still-evolving post-Cold War security system is at the origin of the recurrent tensions and disagreements between the West and Russia. Although rejecting the notion of spheres of influence as a relic of the past, the United States and European countries have kept conceiving of Europe’s security as centred on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). And yet, a stable security order for Europe in the twenty-first century can hardly be achieved without involving Russia as one of its constitutive parts. This implies envisioning a system that is not NATO-centric but ‘multi-pillar’ and thus able to reflect the plurality of actors – the United States, NATO, Russia, and the European Union – and the variety of security and security-related interests currently existing in the European space. The vision informing such a system is that of a Europe as a ‘single security space’ where all parties behave as responsible stakeholders even though they do not share the same values.

Reforms in the NPT and Prospects for India's Accession: A Situational Analysis

Since its indefinite extension in 1995, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been on the sidelines, with its utility eroding in the post-Cold War security environment, as new instruments took over the anti-proliferation mantle. Being the cornerstone of the regime and near-universal in character, the NPT has nonetheless survived despite a host of challenges threatening its existence. Its future, however, is imperilled unless the member states take remedial actions, including a restructuring of the treaty to suit 21st century requirements. Such structural reforms should meet new challenges as well as redress existing shortcomings, including the means to ensure total universalisation.

Catching the Change of Tide. Italy's Post-Cold War Security Policy

At the beginning of the 1990s, Italy went through two tectonic changes. Externally, the end of the Cold War called for a redefinition of the roles of NATO and the EU, the pillars on which Italy had built its foreign and security policy for forty years. Internally, Italy's old ruling elites vanished under the huge mani pulite corruption scandal. The new political parties that rose in their place have remained committed to NATO and the EU, but have often met with obstacles in reconciling the national, European and Atlantic components of Italy's security. While this hinges mostly on structural factors – like the rising costs of participation in NATO or EU operations abroad, including in terms of public support – the tendency of the new elites to emphasize their differences and neglect their more fundamental commonalities have multiplied the “grey zones” in Italian security policy.

The Security and Development Nexus in Cape Town: War on Gangs, Counterinsurgency and Citizenship

In this article, I argue that the security and development nexus takes on specific forms depending on the context, and that in Cape Town’s coloured townships it is embodied in policies and practices around what has come to be known as the ‘war on gangs’. Furthermore, the war on gangs in Cape Town bears resemblances to counterinsurgency strategies — not least in the sense that both are responses to a similar problem of governance. This comparison allows us explore how citizenship is being reconfigured for residents of the townships in ways that resemble what James Holston (2007) calls ‘differentiated citizenship’. Such differentiated citizenship is opposed to the universal inclusivity promised by post-apartheid South Africa. By exploring the specific merging of security and development in the Capetonian war on gangs as compared to counterinsurgency and the subsequent reconfiguration of citizenship, I am able to address a central question: How — and with what consequences — does power maintain itself when faced with an onslaught from those that it restricts to the margins of institutions and social life?

The European Union and the Globalisation of Criminal Law

Abstract In the new post-Cold War security era, there is a perception that the nature of cross-border security threats has changed. The need to respond to these new threats has led to a proliferation of multilateral international and regional treaties in this area, as well as unilateral demands made by the United States post-9/11. We have, then, seen a process of globalisation of criminal law, a field traditionally linked to State sovereignty. This chapter examines, first, EU action with regard to UN multilateral conventions and the impact of those conventions on internal EU law, as well as the impact of EU action within the framework of the regional treaties of the Council of Europe; secondly, the interrelationship between Union law and the global production of norms in criminal matters by the UN Security Council and by the Financial Action Task Force; thirdly, bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, in particular in connection with the transfer of Passenger Name Records data; fourthly, the question of compliance by the EU in this area, in both the internal and the external context; and, fifthly, the Court of Justice’s approach to the protection of fundamental rights when global criminal law is engaged. The EU has managed to take centre stage in international developments in the field of global criminal law through a clear commitment to multilateral negotiations as well as a clear political will to implement at the Union level norms agreed internationally without a high degree of transparency. The Court of Justice has also been reluctant to overturn Union security decisions in the name of fundamental rights. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will eliminate some complexity in this area, but not all, and it still remains to be seen whether in the process of globalisation of criminal law the European values proclaimed in Article 2 of the new EU Treaty will be promoted or compromised.

The European Union and the Globalisation of Criminal Law

AbstractIn the new post-Cold War security era, there is a perception that the nature of cross-border security threats has changed. The need to respond to these new threats has led to a proliferation of multilateral international and regional treaties in this area, as well as unilateral demands made by the United States post-9/11. We have, then, seen a process of globalisation of criminal law, a field traditionally linked to State sovereignty. This chapter examines, first, EU action with regard to UN multilateral conventions and the impact of those conventions on internal EU law, as well as the impact of EU action within the framework of the regional treaties of the Council of Europe; secondly, the interrelationship between Union law and the global production of norms in criminal matters by the UN Security Council and by the Financial Action Task Force; thirdly, bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, in particular in connection with the transfer of Passenger Name Records data; fourthly, the question of compliance by the EU in this area, in both the internal and the external context; and, fifthly, the Court of Justice’s approach to the protection of fundamental rights when global criminal law is engaged. The EU has managed to take centre stage in international developments in the field of global criminal law through a clear commitment to multilateral negotiations as well as a clear political will to implement at the Union level norms agreed internationally without a high degree of transparency. The Court of Justice has also been reluctant to overturn Union security decisions in the name of fundamental rights. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will eliminate some complexity in this area, but not all, and it still remains to be seen whether in the process of globalisation of criminal law the European values proclaimed in Article 2 of the new EU Treaty will be promoted or compromised.

From Periphery to Priority

No bilateral relationship between Canada and an Asian country has been as tumultuous as that ofthe Canada-India relationship. Sour memories of the fundamental divergences over Cold War security issues and nuclear nonproliferation that corroded ties between Ottawa and New Delhi have lingered until recently. The legacy of those divergences profoundly affected the depth of interaction between the two countries for the better part of three decades. Bilateral relations had been in decline since the late 1950s due to tension between Canadians and Indians serving on the Indochina commissions. During that era, politicians and a generation of young diplomats grumbled about what they interpreted as India's hypocrisy in pursuing a policy of nonalignment that appeared too heavily tilted toward Moscow. Other officials observed that at the United Nations the Indians were rarely easy to cooperate with on matters such as the law of the sea negotiations. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's decision to follow through with the 1974 nuclear test that relied on Canadian nuclear technology intended strictly for peaceful purposes served as the capstone for many in the Department of External Affairs who were disillusioned with the Indian government and arguing that Ottawa must tone down its political relationship with New Delhi. Skeptics of India concluded that that country's suspension of civil liberties during the 1975 emergency confirmed the wisdom of their analysis that neither country had much in common in terms of political interests or common values. The fact that India's economy remained stagnant further subtracted from India's charms of old. India did have its champions in External Affairs, notably Geoffrey Pearson and David Reece, but its boosters were few, outnumbered the veterans of the Indochina commissions, who the 1980s filled the senior ranks of the department. The passage of time did little to soften their negative memories of Indian foreign policy. During the 1980s, neither government chose to divert resources and attention to overcome the malaise that had set in. India remained on the periphery of Ottawa's political and bureaucratic interest, much as it had been since the 1960s. This influenced the direction of the bilateral relationship profoundly, not least because precious few actors were engaged in building links between the two countries.However, a slow evolution is occurring that has led Canada to move India closer to the centre of its foreign policy agenda. India is increasingly considered a priority Canadian decision-makers. This article will assess how that transformation occurred, and in so doing, posits a few lessons from the past that may resonate in assessing the present state of bilateral relations. These lessons include the questionable influence of perceived common values; the need to consider the impact of the US-India relationship on Canadian policy; the need for a sustained and substantive political will towards India; and, finally, the need to consider how a lack of knowledge of the other has historically affected the state of relations.THE AFTERMATH OF POKHRAN: 1976-93Allan MacEachen was secretary of state for external affairs in March 1976 when the Trudeau cabinet agreed to suspend all nuclear cooperation with India. MacEachen strongly supported the decision and agreed with the assessment of his under-secretary, Basil Robinson, that for the foreseeable future Canada's relations with India would not be particularly close.1 Seven years later, MacEachen travelled to south Asia as part of Ottawa's attempt to emphasize ties with the Asia- Pacific region and he visited India. In doing so, MacEachen became the first secretary of state to visit India since Lester Pearson in 1955. News of the visit was warmly welcomed the Canadian high commissioner in New Delhi, John Hadwen, who had lobbied for such a visit, noting that there had been major efforts by our competitors, particularly [the] British, French and Germans to improve relations with India, involving more senior contacts. …