Secularism Research Articles

Affected by Ritual. Predictors of Agreement with Church Marriage Rites in The Netherlands

AbstractWhy do couples opt for a church wedding ritual living in a modern secularized society. Based on the ritual form hypothesis of Lawson and McCauley, the authors identify the specific church wedding rites as special agent rituals and the rites that form the ritual framework of every eucharist or prayer (and communion) services (eucharistic rites) as special instrument rituals. The participants not only distinguished the church wedding rites from the eucharistic rites, but also discerned a third group of rites, musical rites. 26% of the participants were affected by the eucharistic rites, whereas 63% and 80% were affected respectively by the musical and church wedding rites. The research shows that different indicators of religious socialisation and conceptions of marriage predict the extent to which participants feel affected by the three types of rites. In the case of the musical and church marriage rites the sole influence is the importance attached to participation in ecclesiastic transitional rituals. Conceptions of marriage account for only a small part of the relation between religious socialisation and the extent to which people feel affected by church marriage rituals. Only in the case of the eucharistic rites religious socialisation and conceptions of marriage are decisive. The extend of affection by the church wedding rituals depends mostly on the importance the participants attach to ecclesiastic transitional rituals. The church is seen as a service institution that dispenses transitional rituals. In this way, the church helps marrital couples and their social environment to cope with the contingent elements of these pivotal moments.

A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey

This article is primarily concerned with an agency, the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, which was instituted to regulate Islamic services, but in actuality was used as a means of 'securing' secularism in Turkey for over a period of 80 years. This apparent paradox in terms was the muse which led me reflect on the representation of the construction (and deconstruction) of 'modernity' and of 'state and religion' in Turkey. In order to develop my argument I focus on the legal and bureaucratic structure of the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

Beyond Secularism and Dogmatism

Beyond Secularism and Dogmatism

Dechristendomization as an Alternative to Secularization: Theology, History, and Sociology in Conversation

Dechristendomization as an Alternative to Secularization: Theology, History, and Sociology in Conversation

A world abandoned by God: narrative and secularism

A world abandoned by God: narrative and secularism

Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel

Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the religion‐market model. According to the former, sometimes called a demand‐side theory, economic development reduces religious participation and beliefs. According to the latter, described as a supply‐side theory, religiosity depends on the presence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, suppression of organized religion under Communism, and the degree of religious pluralism. We assess the theories by using survey information for 68 countries over the last 20 years, measuring attendance at formal religious services, religious beliefs, and self‐identification as religious. In accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development—represented by per capita GDP—tends to reduce religiosity. Moreover, instrumental estimates suggest that this link reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. The presence of an official state religion tends to increase religiosity, probably because of the subsidies that flow to organized religion. However, in accordance with the religion‐market model, religiosity falls with government regulation of the religion market and Communist suppression. Greater religious pluralism raises attendance at formal services but has no significant effects on religious beliefs or self‐identification as religious. Although religiosity declines overall with economic development, the nature of the interaction varies with the dimension of development. For example, religiosity is positively related to education and the presence of children and negatively related to urbanization.

Book Review: Humanism and Secularization: From Petrarch to Valla

Book Review: Humanism and Secularization: From Petrarch to Valla

Ockham's Modal Moves: Crossing the Threshold of Modernity

The Blumenberg-Löwith debate over the secularization hypothesis has attracted the attention of scholars interested in the history of ideas. In this paper, Fernández draws from Hans Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age in order to suggest how appeal to modality, in the form of William of Ockham’s notion that God’s absolute power entails the radical contingency of the universe, helped set the stage for the crossing of the epochal threshold of modernity. In the first section, Fernández gives a preliminary background to the famed dispute over the secularization hypothesis. In the second section, he argues that Blumenberg’s thesis of man’s self-assertion of reason trades on Ockham’s notion of radical contingency. And in the third section, Fernández suggests how notions of God’s absolute power helped to replace ideas of “providence” with “progress,” thus ushering in the Modern Age.

Familles nombreuses et couples sans enfant

espanolIndependientemente del sexo y de la edad, la esperanza de vida no ha dejado casi de aumentar en Francia desde principios de los anos 50. Al nacer las mujeres ya han ganado 14,6 anos de esperanza de vida entre 1950 y 2005 y los hombres 13,3 anos. A lo largo de las dos ultimas decadas, la diferencia entre la esperanza de vida de los dos sexos se ha estabilizado e incluso ha empezado a reducirse y dicha reduccion se debe fundamentalmente a una aceleracion de los progresos masculinos y a una relajacion de los progresos femeninos antes de los 60 anos, faciles de percibir en ambos casos. En las edades mas avanzadas, en cambio, los progresos se han mantenido a un ritmo mas rapido para las mujeres que para los hombres. A pesar de que la mortalidad tumoral esta disminuyendo tanto para las mujeres como para los hombres, los canceres siguen siendo la principal causa de los decesos, por delante de las enfermedades cardiovasculares, para las que la mortalidad ha disminuido considerablemente. En las edades avanzadas, la sobremortalidad excepcional debido a las altas temperaturas de 2003 no hizo mas que interrumpir brevemente una evolucion muy favorable, fundamentalmente vinculada al retroceso de la mortalidad cardiovascular. Los progresos venideros dependeran de los exitos de la lucha contra el cancer y del control de las enfermedades neurodegenerativas. francaisQuels que soient le sexe et l’âge, l’esperance de vie n’a quasiment pas cesse d’augmenter en France depuis le debut des annees 1950. A la naissance, les femmes ont ainsi gagne 14,6 ans d’esperance de vie entre 1950 et 2005 et les hommes 13,3 ans. Au cours des deux dernieres decennies, l’ecart d’esperance de vie entre les sexes s’est stabilise et a meme commence a se reduire. Cette reduction tient pour l’essentiel a une acceleration des progres masculins, mais un essoufflement des progres feminins avant 60 ans est egalement perceptible. Aux âges les plus eleves, en revanche, les progres se sont poursuivis a un rythme plus rapide pour les femmes que pour les hommes. Bien que la mortalite tumorale soit en baisse aussi bien pour les femmes que pour les hommes, les cancers arrivent desormais au premier rang des causes de deces, devant les maladies cardio-vasculaires pour lesquelles la mortalite a considerablement diminue. Aux grands âges, la surmortalite exceptionnelle due a la canicule de 2003 n’a interrompu que brievement une evolution tres favorable, essentiellement liee au recul de la mortalite cardio-vasculaire. Les progres a venir dependront des succes remportes dans la lutte anti-cancereuse et dans le controle des maladies neuro-degeneratives.

The Paradox of Public Secularism

The Paradox of Public Secularism

A reaction to Samuel Heilman’s analysis of orthodoxy

In his characteristically insightful fashion, Samuel Heilman provides a subtle reading of many of the dynamics at play today in the Orthodox Jewish world, as there appears to be a shift toward fundamentalism in many Orthodox precincts. While quantitative evidence in support of these observations is not part of his presentation, the directions Heilman delineates as marking the trajectory of Orthodox Judaism in the United States and Israel today certainly are not unfamiliar to any contemporary observer of the Jewish scene, and they can also be viewed as part of a larger trend that has promoted the revival of religious traditionalism in the modern world. I therefore will expand and hopefully illuminate the argument Heilman makes in his paper by placing his analysis within larger sociological frameworks. Academic scholars of religion hold as axiomatic the notion that religious traditions constantly draw from the past while simultaneously being embedded in a current socio-cultural reality. Synchronic as well as diachronic elements are present in the life of all living religions. On the one hand, the heritage of the past, no matter how broadly conceived, informs the identity and beliefs of a contemporary religious community. At the same time, as Heilman demonstrates in his paper, present-day factors of culture and place directly influence the way that identity and those beliefs are configured and in many instances re-formed. Peter Berger, in his address, "A Sociological View of the Secular ization of Theology," which he delivered in 1966 upon his inauguration as president of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, articu lated how these variables of received tradition and belief, as well as present-day cultural context and change, play themselves out in Western religious traditions by identifying the challenges the processes of secu larization posed for traditional religions in the modern setting.1 In his address, Berger pointed out that secularization did not mean that reli gions disappear as a result of the advent of modernization. Rather, he maintained, secularization denoted a process whereby the influence of religion came to be constricted so that religious values and perspectives direct fewer and fewer precincts of life for modern persons. Berger then constructed a typology of two ideal types to account for the variety of choices placed before adherents of religion in the modern

SCIENCE AND SCIENTISM: THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISTINCTION

. John Caiazza's interesting argument is an important one and deserves a close hearing. However, his article could be more forceful if he would distinguish more carefully between science on the one hand and “scientific secularism” and “materialism” on the other.

Crafting a national identity amidst contentious politics in contemporary Iran

It is perhaps no exaggeration to suggest that the crafting and re-crafting of national identity through actions of authorities and/or political mobilization and struggle has been a national preoccupation in modern Iranian history. This is not to imply that Iranians and their political leaders, going through the global process of modernity, have been any more or less creative than others in the world in re-inventing their "national" selves. However, a case can be made that in the past century Iranians2 have been afforded, or have produced, more opportunities to re-create themselves in a bombastic and dualistic fashion, energetically vacillating between extremes of contentious Islamism and secularism, pre-Islamic and Islamic imagination, and avid anti-imperialism and absorption in global trends. The result of these century-long Manichean struggles, some would argue, is tired bodies and souls. Having recently mustered youthful energy, yet again, to attempt the transcendence of these contentious identities, by taking refuge in a constitutionalism that could make cohabitation of these so far conflicting identities not only possible but also mutually reinforcing, many people in Iran seem to have packed their bags after their disappointment with the reform process and are finding solace in their private homes and selves.3 An editorial in Shargh newspaper

Secularism, Utopia and the Discernment of Myth

Secularism, Utopia and the Discernment of Myth

Empire of Barbarism

A new age of barbarism is upon us. These were the opening words of an editorial in the September 20, 2004, issue of Business Week clearly designed to stoke the flames of anti-terrorist hysteria. Pointing to the murder of schoolchildren in Russia, women and children killed on buses in Israel, the beheading of American, Turkish, and Nepalese workers in Iraq, and the killing of hundreds on a Spanish commuter train and hundreds more in Bali, Business Week declared: America, Europe, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and governments everywhere are under attack by Islamic extremists. These terrorists have but one demand—the destruction of modern secular society. Western civilization was portrayed as standing in opposition to the barbarians, who desire to destroy what is assumed to be the pinnacle of social evolution.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

A leap of faith: thoughts on secularistic practices and progressive politics*

The political sentiment represented by the WSF celebrates diversity, and cultivates a substrate where movements can be incubated, and prosper. This paper questions a particular secular(ist) vocabulary, grammar, and culture of politics exhibited at the WSF in Mumbai. It asks whether the political space of the Forum, which is defined as open, democratic, and tolerant, must necessarily be a secular one, or whether a secularistic political affect closes potentialities by narrowing the possibilities for anti-imperial critiques, thus excluding valid forms of dissent? The paper will argue that a secularistic culture of politics can be an impediment for an emerging and growing revolutionary phenomenon because of its exclusionary and limiting tendencies. Building on a critique of affective politics, it will be shown that the imperative of a politics of resistance free from religious sentiments will both fail to address the needs of vast majorities of the planet's inhabitants and continue to provide opportunities for more fundamental and violent alternatives to flourish. Drawing from the work of Connolly, Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Ramadan, this paper critiques the privileged space allotted to secularism, and invites discussion about how to provide scope for the possibility of a political ethic which does not alienate believers, instead creating the potential for new models of political pluralism.

The changing impact of social background on lifestyle: “culturalization” instead of individualization?

In this study, a number of hypotheses on the changing effects of social background on cultural consumption and other leisure activities were tested. Based on notions regarding the waning of traditional cultural hierarchies, a decrease in the effects of age, gender, education, income, religion, and political party preference on popular cultural activities was expected. The second hypothesis, inspired by the notion of the elitist rearguard, predicted increasing effects of age and education on highbrow culture. Third, based on the alleged culturalization of lifestyles, it was hypothesized that social categorizations based on cultural socialization (education, age) had become more relevant overall lifestyle predictors, whereas categorizations based on economic resources (income) were losing their impact. Finally, the secularization hypothesis predicted overall diminishing effects of religion. The analyses, based on data on 12,478 Dutch respondents gathered between 1980 and 2000, largely confirmed the second and third hypothesis. There were no signs of a general decline in the impact of social background, with some exceptions for gender and income. The effects of education and age often became larger, corroborating the idea that socialization has become a more important determinant of lifestyles. The impact of financial barriers and gender roles seems to have become somewhat less influential. Religion and political preference have mostly stable effects.

What's God Got to Do with It? Waldron on Equality

Not that long ago, historians and political scientists could speak of the secularization of the western mind as though it were a done deal.1 The Enlightenment stigmatization of religion as superstition and unreason and hence an instrument of bondage had led to its successful privatization and removal from the public sphere.2 Confined to the realm of individual conscience and corralled within designated 'safe havens' the church (or equivalent) and the home religion gradually ceded its place at the epicentre of civic life. Religion, for centuries one of the core dimensions of political argument, ceased to have direct influence on the course of politics.3 The contours of the liberal catechism took shape, in large measure, in opposition to the religious: state and church were to be kept separate, theologians and

Secularism and Relativism

Research Article| May 01 2004 Secularism and Relativism Akeel Bilgrami Akeel Bilgrami Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google boundary 2 (2004) 31 (2): 173–196. https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-31-2-173 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Akeel Bilgrami; Secularism and Relativism. boundary 2 1 May 2004; 31 (2): 173–196. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-31-2-173 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll Journalsboundary 2 Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Akeel Bilgrami2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Articles You do not currently have access to this content.

Book Review: Humanism and Secularization: From Petrarch to Valla

Book Review: Humanism and Secularization: From Petrarch to Valla