Secretary Of Defense Research Articles

The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam and International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis

The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam. By Richard Sobel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 288p. $24.95. International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis. Edited by Richard Sobel and Eric Shiraev. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 344p. $80.00 cloth, $25.95 paper. In 2001, Richard Sobel published four case studies chronicling the impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy since the start of the Vietnam War. He used public opinion surveys and interviews with senior policymakers, including three secretaries of state and four secretaries of defense, to document how opinions fluctuated throughout each crisis and how various movers and shakers felt about the weight that they should assign to public opinion in their deliberations. The crises—the Vietnam War, the Nicaraguan Contra-funding controversy, the Persian Gulf War, and the Bosnia crisis—demonstrate that public opinion did constrain policy options, but did not determine the specific policies that were chosen. This finding confirms V. O. Key's theory, first expressed in his pathbreaking study Public Opinion and American Democracy (1961) that public opinion operates like a system of dikes. These dikes limit how far policymakers can go in committing the country to actions in the policy sphere.

Phantom Fracas: The 1968 American Sale of F-4 Aircraft to Israel

In a late November 1968 exchange of letters between Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin, the Johnson administration formally agreed to supply Israel with 50 F-4 Phantom aircraft.' Under the terms of the sale, the Israel Air Force (IAF) would also receive associated ordnance, spare parts, maintenance equipment and training. Six of the Phantoms would be specially configured to serve as reconnaissance platforms, though they would be capable of fulfilling standard combat missions as well. The first batch of aircraft would reach Israel in September 1969, according to an accelerated delivery schedule one that would not, however, interfere with Phantom production for American military forces.2 On both military and diplomatic grounds, the Phantom sale held great significance for Israel. Militarily speaking, the addition of this state-of-the-art aircraft to the Israeli order of battle massively upgraded the IAF's fighting power. Diplomatically speaking, the deal signalled an enhanced American commitment to Israel's security. Likewise, the sale had very important implications for American foreign policy. It meant that the United States had now chosen, in effect, to become Israel's principal arms supplier, a role that it had strenuously sought to avoid before the 1967 Six-Day War. Furthermore, at least insofar as concerned airpower, the United States had now also reconciled itself to providing Israel with better arms than those in the hands of its Arab opponents, another departure from past policy. Not every Johnson administration official necessarily viewed the Phantom sale as quite so consequential at the time, but they all nevertheless recognized that it could seriously affect America's standing in the Middle East by infuriating the Soviet Union and the Arab world. For this reason, the administration thought long and hard about its decision to sell the Phantom to Israel, meticulously weighing the potential benefits and potential costs of such a deal. Indeed, it took almost all of 1968 to make up its mind on the sale. Moreover, the administration's most senior foreign policy officials -

Staying for an answer

Should the truth-value of statements be thought of as epistemically constrained or as determined by objective factors that stand quite apart from our best knowledge, evidence, or powers of conceptual grasp? The anti-realist/realist debate turns ultimately on this disagreement. My article takes its lead from a famous pronouncement by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield to the effect that there are ‘known knowns’, i.e. ‘things that we know we know’; ‘known unknowns’, or ‘things we know we do not know’; and lastly, ‘unknown unknowns’, ‘things we don’t know we don’t know’. Whether Rumsfeld was talking gobbledegook, making some acute logical points, or just pulling the wool with regard to Iraq’s disputed weapons capability is matter for debate. Still, his remarks may be useful for clarifying certain fundamental issues about knowledge and truth, especially in the context of assertions - by anti-realist philosophers such as Michael Dummett - that truth cannot possibly transcend our best powers of proof or ascertainment. On the other hand such scruples may have just the opposite (obfuscating) effect when we are faced with a complex and case-specific question, such as whether or not Iraq truly possessed weapons of mass destruction. My article contends that a wide range of reliably knowledge-conducive procedures, while indeed they fall short of absolute, indubitable truth, nonetheless offer grounds for arriving at a reasoned assessment of the evidence and for not consigning statements of the Dummettian ‘disputed class’ to a limbo of ultimate undecidability.

Towards a Theory of Cruel Britannia: Coolness, Cruelty, and the 'Nineties

The explosion of ‘in-yer-face’ theatre that dominated the British stage in the 'nineties has had both vocal champions and detractors. Here, Ken Urban examines the emergence of this kind of theatre within the cultural context of ‘cool Britannia’ and suggests that the plays of writers such as Mark Ravenhill and Sarah Kane explore the possibilities of cruelty and nihilism as a means of countering cynicism and challenging mainstream morality's interpretation of the world. Ken Urban is a playwright and director, whose plays The Female Terrorist Project and I [hearts] KANT are currently being produced by the Committee Theatre Company in New York City. His play about the first US Secretary of Defense, The Absence of Weather, will premiere in Los Angeles at Moving Arts Theatre Company, which has named it the winner of its national new play award. At the request of the Sarah Kane Estate, Urban directed the New York premiere of her play Cleansed. He teaches Modern Drama and Creative Writing in the English Department at Rutgers University, New Brunswick. An early version of this article was first presented at the ‘In-Yer-Face? British Drama in the 1990s’ conference at the University of the West of England, Bristol, in September 2002.

D1. TOP-RANKING RETIRED U.S. DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS, STATEMENT ON CURRENT U.S. POLICIES, 16 JUNE 2004.

The twenty-seven signatories of the Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change initiative include a former director of the CIA; a former chairman of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee; several former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a former commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command; a former director of the U.S. Information Agency; and several former secretaries of defense. The text of the initiative is available online at www.diplomatsforchanage.com.

Neo-conservatives and their American critics

This review article examines four recent American books relating, in very different ways, to the rise of unilateralism and neo-conservatism in the United States. Richard Perle and David Frum, former advisors to George W. Bush robustly present the ‘neo-conservative’ case. Max Boot, another unilateralist, argues from the experience of American history that small wars have often been as important as big wars in projecting American power; and he suggests that this experience has a present-day relevance. Ivo Daalder (who served in the Clinton administration) and his co-author James Lindsay, set out to explain the ‘Bush revolution’ in foreign policy and put it in context. They insist that Bush is not a mere tool of his advisors, who are in any case not homogenous. His foreign policy strategy is indeed new, although it has given rise to certain unresolved problems. Robert McNamara (a former US Defense Secretary) and James Blight, share the fear of nuclear terrorism but argue that it can only be contained through the universal elimination of weapons of mass destruction, under the supervision of a possibly reformed UN. They oppose the unilateral use of force by the US except when America itself is attacked. They also argue that the US must change its posture from ‘deterrence’ to ‘reassurance’ and show more empathy in addressing the concerns of other countries and communities. The review concludes that America is now deeply divided over its foreign policy and that events, rather than arguments, may decide the outcome of the debate.

Editor's Column: Collateral Damage

In an interview following his 7 may 2004 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Donald Rumsfeld, the United States secretary of defense, admitted knowing about abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison since they were first exposed in January. He also knew of the existence of photographs documenting the abuses, but he had not studied the images until shortly before they were shown to the public during the first week of May. In asserting that “[i]t is the photographs that give one the vivid realization of what actually took place” and that “[w]ords don't do it,” Rumsfeld expressed, and even surpassed, one of the prime clichés of our time, that a picture is worth a thousand words. Before the power of visual images, the subject has an uncontrollable emotional response: “you cannot help but be outraged.”

Editor's Column: Collateral Damage

In an interview following his 7 may 2004 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Donald Rumsfeld, the United States secretary of defense, admitted knowing about abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison since they were first exposed in January. He also knew of the existence of photographs documenting the abuses, but he had not studied the images until shortly before they were shown to the public during the first week of May. In asserting that “[i]t is the photographs that give one the vivid realization of what actually took place” and that “[w]ords don't do it,” Rumsfeld expressed, and even surpassed, one of the prime clichés of our time, that a picture is worth a thousand words. Before the power of visual images, the subject has an uncontrollable emotional response: “you cannot help but be outraged.”

Network centric interoperability - Using a variable message format (VMF) based data-link to improve situational awareness and close air support (CAS)

Clearly demonstrated in the recent military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, one of the most significant challenges now facing the warfighter is how to seamlessly interface the myriad of disparate stand-alone situational awareness (SA) and close air support (CAS) systems into the DoD's Network Centric Warfare (NCW) infrastructure. This point was recently highlighted in the Secretary of Defense's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Referring to mission critical shortfalls that occurred during the IRAQ deployment, the Secretary discussed the state of the current warfighting environment (Rumsfeld and Franks, 2003). Although tremendous progress has been made in the integration of new and emerging technologies and their applications on the battlefield, there is still a significant lack of interoperability between various communication systems. To address these battlespace management environment issues, Raytheon Technical Services Company's Engineering and Production Support facility underwent a product development effort to provide a network centric interoperability demonstration for CAS. This demonstration utilized various Raytheon-fielded SA and CAS products in a representative CAS scenario interfacing to variable message format (VMF) based data links. This paper addresses the systems and software issues encountered during this successful demonstration of CAS battlespace connectivity. This presentation will also discuss lessons learned during our product development from both a systems and a software engineering perspective.

‘New’ and ‘old Europe’ in the context of the Iraq war and its implications for European security

American secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld's characterisation in early 2003 of an ‘Old Europe’ and a ‘New Europe’, provides particular challenges when applied to the exploration of European security.The ‘New Europe’ is a very elusive concept. As far as the Iraq war is concerned, the ‘New European’ states have less in common than the US secretary of defence might have thoughtThis is indicated by an exploration of specific factors that have affected the attitudes of supposed ‘New European’ states towards the Iraq war in general, and towards their own security in particular. Slovenia is particularly interesting in this regard, as a country that found it especially hard to address the ‘New‐Old’ Europe dilemma. A theoretical framework for the analysis of this aspect of contemporary European diplomacy can be constructed on the basis of the two main positivist (rational) theories of International Relations: realism and liberalism, although neither offers any conclusive explanation of the post‐cold war division in Europe as constructed by Rumsfeld.

Constraints and Adjustments in Portugal's Policy toward Israel

Throughout most of its existence the State of Israel had only a handful of friends and allies. However, even during the era of pan-Arabism, when Arab nationalism held sway over the Middle East, eng...

Organizing Safety: Conditions for Successful Information Assurance Programs

Organizations must continuously seek safety. When considering computerized health information systems, "safety" includes protecting the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information assets such as patient information, key components of the technical information system, and critical personnel. "High Reliability Theory" (HRT) argues that organizations with strong leadership support, continuous training, redundant safety mechanisms, and "cultures of high reliability" can deploy and safely manage complex, risky technologies such as nuclear weapons systems or computerized health information systems. In preparation for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the Offices of the Surgeons General of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command sponsored organizational, doctrinal, and technical projects that individually and collectively promote conditions for a "culture of information assurance." These efforts include sponsoring the "P3 Working Group" (P3WG), an interdisciplinary, tri-service taskforce that reviewed all relevant Department of Defense (DoD), Miliary Health System (MHS), Army, Navy and Air Force policies for compliance with the HIPAA medical privacy and data security regulations; supporting development, training, and deployment of OCTAVE(sm), a self-directed information security risk assessment process; and sponsoring development of the Risk Information Management Resource (RIMR), a Web-enabled enterprise portal about health information assurance.

The weakest link strategic management of human capital

Performance ImprovementVolume 43, Issue 8 p. 25-29 Article The weakest link strategic management of human capital Lenora Peters Gant PhD, Lenora Peters Gant PhD Lenora Peters Gant, PhD, is a member of the Senior Executive Intelligence Service. Since August 2002, she has been on a sabbatical at Trinity College (DC), a premier university for women, as a visiting professor/officer in residence in the Programs in International Affairs. From November 1998 to August 2002, Dr. Gant directed Intelligence Community Work Force Issues. She performed oversight for human resources, training and education, and diversity management for 14 national-level intelligence agencies and components. She served as the Special Assistant for Diversity Management to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy DCI for Community Management (DDCI/CM). She represented the DCI and DDCI/CM as a member of the Private Sector Council. Her experiences and assignments with the Department of Defense Military Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense include Okinawa, Japan; Oxfordshire, England; and NATO in Brussels, Belgium. Based on her broad range of experiences, Dr. Gant brings a unique understanding and appreciation about the importance of strategically managing human capital issues. Dr. Gant received her BS from Florida A&M University, School of Business and Industry, her MA from George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, and her PhD from Virginia Polytechnic University and State University. She is a graduate of several executive and management programs, including the DOD Executive Leadership Development Program, The JFK School of Government, Harvard University, George Washington University and the Brookings Institute. She may be reached at PetersgantL@trinitydc.edu.Search for more papers by this author Lenora Peters Gant PhD, Lenora Peters Gant PhD Lenora Peters Gant, PhD, is a member of the Senior Executive Intelligence Service. Since August 2002, she has been on a sabbatical at Trinity College (DC), a premier university for women, as a visiting professor/officer in residence in the Programs in International Affairs. From November 1998 to August 2002, Dr. Gant directed Intelligence Community Work Force Issues. She performed oversight for human resources, training and education, and diversity management for 14 national-level intelligence agencies and components. She served as the Special Assistant for Diversity Management to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy DCI for Community Management (DDCI/CM). She represented the DCI and DDCI/CM as a member of the Private Sector Council. Her experiences and assignments with the Department of Defense Military Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense include Okinawa, Japan; Oxfordshire, England; and NATO in Brussels, Belgium. Based on her broad range of experiences, Dr. Gant brings a unique understanding and appreciation about the importance of strategically managing human capital issues. Dr. Gant received her BS from Florida A&M University, School of Business and Industry, her MA from George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, and her PhD from Virginia Polytechnic University and State University. She is a graduate of several executive and management programs, including the DOD Executive Leadership Development Program, The JFK School of Government, Harvard University, George Washington University and the Brookings Institute. She may be reached at PetersgantL@trinitydc.edu.Search for more papers by this author First published: 09 February 2007 https://doi.org/10.1002/pfi.4140430808 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume43, Issue8September 2004Pages 25-29 RelatedInformation

Combining the Roles of Actor and Observer: Comments on Russell Burgos's “An N of 1”

I read Captain Russell Burgos's essay with both delight and empathy. He is obviously a talented and thoughtful scholar who has served his country in a vital way in very interesting times. My empathy comes from the fact that for the last 25 years I have divided my life between academic institutions and the Pentagon, where I have been on the planning end of four conflicts. Like Mr. Burgos, I have lived in a world where the realities of war and peace should have been the laboratory for the theories of international relations that I have learned and taught. Like Mr. Burgos, however, I often find the reality of contemporary war to be confusing. The theories that I have studied are a rather incomplete guide to the problems—both tactical and strategic—that the global war on terrorism has brought us.Joseph J. Collins recently completed three years as deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations. During that time he was charged with some of the early planning for post-conflict Iraq, though he did not have day-to-day responsibility for policy management in that area. A former career army officer, he holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University and has taught at Georgetown, Columbia, and West Point.

Vietnam: The War That Won't Go Away

Four years into the new century and twenty-nine years after the fall of Saigon, memories of the Vietnam War continue to preoccupy many Americans. In Errol Morris's prize-winning film, The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons From the Life of Robert McNamara, the former secretary of defense confronts once again the ghosts of the war, while the 2004 presidential campaign and the growing controversy over the war in and the occupation there have pulled Americans back to the controversies surrounding the Vietnam War. The war records of President George W. Bush and of his Democratic challenger, John E Kerry, have raised the question of the relevance of military service to presidential leadership. And issues familiar to those who lived through the Vietnam era have now returned-issues such as the credibility of American leaders, their inability to understand a distant society and culture, the paucity of international support for a foreign intervention, and the lack of an exit strategy from the bloody and troubled occupation of Iraq. One critic of the administration, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, claims that Iraq is George Bush's while Senator Kerry notes that Vietnam seems to be the war that won't ever go away ... [and believes that it was] the pivotal event of our generation.1 The authors of these three books all assume the continuing fascination of the American people with the war, writing long, leisurely narratives-all over five hundred pages-aimed at a general audience. Douglas Brinkley's Tour Of Duty traces Kerry's early life, his service in Vietnam, and his involvement in

Organizing Safety: Conditions for Successful Information Assurance Programs

Organizations must continuously seek safety. When considering computerized health information systems, "safety" includes protecting the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information assets such as patient information, key components of the technical information system, and critical personnel. "High Reliability Theory" (HRT) argues that organizations with strong leadership support, continuous training, redundant safety mechanisms, and "cultures of high reliability" can deploy and safely manage complex, risky technologies such as nuclear weapons systems or computerized health information systems. In preparation for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the Offices of the Surgeons General of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command sponsored organizational, doctrinal, and technical projects that individually and collectively promote conditions for a "culture of information assurance." These efforts include sponsoring the "P3 Working Group" (P3WG), an interdisciplinary, tri-service taskforce that reviewed all relevant Department of Defense (DoD), Miliary Health System (MHS), Army, Navy and Air Force policies for compliance with the HIPAA medical privacy and data security regulations; supporting development, training, and deployment of OCTAVEsm, a self-directed information security risk assessment process; and sponsoring development of the Risk Information Management Resource (RIMR), a Web-enabled enterprise portal about health information assurance.

Challenge — Naval Force Development

Challenge — Naval Force Development

Balancing Acts: The Gulf States and Israel

The national interests of weak states are subject both to external pressures, applied by strong states, and internal pressures. It is assumed that due to their weakness, external demands have a gre...

Engineering Innovation

Naval Engineers JournalVolume 116, Issue 3 p. 73-78 Engineering Innovation ADM. MIKE MULLEN, ADM. MIKE MULLEN Vice Chief of Naval Operations Since graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1968, ADMIRAL MULLEN'S sea assignments have included tours in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets. Adm. Mullen commanded three ships, USS Noxubee (AOG 56), USS Goldsborough (DDG 20), and USS Yorktown (CG 48). Following his second com-mand, USS Goldsborough (DDG 20), Adm. Mullen was named the 1987 recipient of the Admiral James Bond Stockdale award for Inspirational Leadership. He also served as executive officer USS Sterett (CG 31), homeported in Subic Bay, Republic of Philippines. Adm. Mullen has served in a variety of shore assignments including the United States Naval Academy, Surface Warfare Officers School Command, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and assignments in the Pentagon on the staffs of the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations. As a flag officer, Adm. Mullen has served on the Chief of Naval Operations staff first as head, Surface Warfare Plans/Programs/ and Requirements Branch, followed briefly as deputy director, Surface Warfare, and from 1998–2000 as the director of Surface Warfare. In 1985, Adm. Mullen graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School with a masters of science degree in operations research, and in 1991 he attended the Harvard Business School Advanced Management Program. Adm. Mullen was commander of Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO, commander George Washington Battle Group from 1996-1998. His last command at sea tour was as commander SECOND Fleet/commander Striking Fleet Atlantic from October 2000 to August 2001. Prior to assuming his current duties on August 28, 2003 as vice chief of Naval Operations, he served as deputy chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments (N8).Search for more papers by this author ADM. MIKE MULLEN, ADM. MIKE MULLEN Vice Chief of Naval Operations Since graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1968, ADMIRAL MULLEN'S sea assignments have included tours in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets. Adm. Mullen commanded three ships, USS Noxubee (AOG 56), USS Goldsborough (DDG 20), and USS Yorktown (CG 48). Following his second com-mand, USS Goldsborough (DDG 20), Adm. Mullen was named the 1987 recipient of the Admiral James Bond Stockdale award for Inspirational Leadership. He also served as executive officer USS Sterett (CG 31), homeported in Subic Bay, Republic of Philippines. Adm. Mullen has served in a variety of shore assignments including the United States Naval Academy, Surface Warfare Officers School Command, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and assignments in the Pentagon on the staffs of the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations. As a flag officer, Adm. Mullen has served on the Chief of Naval Operations staff first as head, Surface Warfare Plans/Programs/ and Requirements Branch, followed briefly as deputy director, Surface Warfare, and from 1998–2000 as the director of Surface Warfare. In 1985, Adm. Mullen graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School with a masters of science degree in operations research, and in 1991 he attended the Harvard Business School Advanced Management Program. Adm. Mullen was commander of Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO, commander George Washington Battle Group from 1996-1998. His last command at sea tour was as commander SECOND Fleet/commander Striking Fleet Atlantic from October 2000 to August 2001. Prior to assuming his current duties on August 28, 2003 as vice chief of Naval Operations, he served as deputy chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments (N8).Search for more papers by this author First published: 29 October 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-3584.2004.tb00285.x AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume116, Issue3July 2004Pages 73-78 RelatedInformation

Bill Says Pentagon Must Upgrade Mental Health Services

Back to table of contents Next article Government NewsFull AccessBill Says Pentagon Must Upgrade Mental Health ServicesChristine LehmannChristine LehmannSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:18 Jun 2004https://doi.org/10.1176/pn.39.12.0390001aAre the Department of Defense (DoD) and the armed forces devoting enough resources to meet the mental health needs of the troops before, during, and after deployment to combat areas?The amendment's cosponsors: Reps. Brian Baird (D-Wash.) (top) and Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.).An amendment to the Fiscal 2005 DoD budget bill (HR 4200) by Reps. Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.) and Brian Baird (D-Wash.) calls on the secretary of defense to study that question and present the findings to Congress within 90 days of the bill's enactment.HR 4200 was approved with the amendment by the House of Representatives last month and awaits Senate action.“The amendment will force the DoD to address tough issues such as how the decision to seek mental health care can impact a serviceman's career and the extent to which the military's lack of firm confidentiality policies hinders treatment of soldiers and combat veterans,” a press release from Kennedy stated.The amendment will also require the DoD to examine disparities between the mental health services available to active-duty military and members of the Reserve and National Guard.Kennedy sent Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld a letter last month signed by 30 of his House colleagues stating that deficiencies in mental health services available to deployed troops were mentioned during testimony before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security in March and the House Armed Services Total Force Subcommittee in January.The representatives signing the letter asked DoD to assess whethertroops are being thoroughly and accurately assessed for health and mental health problems as required by legislation.troops have enough combat-stress control units in Iraq to meet their mental health needs.troops know that seeking help for stress and psychological problems doesn't mean they are weak and that treatment can be beneficial.troops know that seeking help will not damage their careers.returning troops, including reservists and National Guard personnel, have adequate mental health care follow-up and psychiatric support.“We are concerned about the accessibility and continuity of postdeployment mental health services. A seamless transition of care from the Department of Defense to the Department of Veterans Affairs is crucial to avoiding any gap in postdeployment mental health coverage,” the congressional letter stated.Although a transitional health care benefit program for reservists was extended from 120 days to 180 days, the program ends in December.“We are concerned that military personnel who develop post-traumatic stress symptoms months after deployment won't have benefits,” the letter said.The representatives asked the DoD to assess whether military families are being informed in a timely and accurate manner of all their options for obtaining and maintaining mental health services.The amendment can be accessed online at<http://thomas.loc.gov> by searching on the bill number, HR 4200, and clicking on “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Placed on Calendar in Senate) [H.R.4200.PCS].” ▪ ISSUES NewArchived