Secretary Of Defense Research Articles

Dear Mom and Dad

You two were the ideal role models for parents, demonstrating a total devotion to the family. You taught us to believe in ourselves, to be loyal to our beliefs, and to work hard every day. And most importantly, you told all of us kids to just do our best: “Try to do your best and that is all you can do.” If I heard that once, I heard it a thousand times growing up (and was still hearing it many years into adulthood). And then, of course, the famous follow-up: “Did you do your best? If you did, then that is all you did and we are proud of you.” I have tried to write this letter a few times as I mulled over things I wanted to share with you about my experience as Chief Defense Counsel for the Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My thoughts, of course, reflect so much more than just my experience of being mobilized, because I feel like I have failed for many years to capture the words to express what you two have provided to me and instilled in me—and thus how you prepared me for what I was tasked to do. But I hope my actions reflected more favorably upon your guiding hands. I tried to do my best. I remember when I was first contacted about the vacancy of the Chief Defense Counsel at Guantanamo Bay. I responded that I really didn’t want to be the Chief Defense Counsel and asked if I could be the Chief Prosecutor instead. I was told “not to worry” because I probably wouldn’t be nominated by the Army’s Judge Advocate General; and even if I were nominated by the Army, the other military branches could nominate someone, too; and the Secretary of Defense’s office would make the final selection anyway. So the life lesson here, that I think you both experienced, is that if someone says not to worry—worry. Remember, Dad, when I ultimately received the final telephone call from Washington, D.C., advising me that I was going to be mobilized from my civilian position as the Circuit Court Judge in Boone County to become the Chief Defense Counsel at Guantanamo Bay? You had a little trouble understanding exactly what I was going to be doing. Well trust me, you

A Tested Alliance: The American Airlift to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War

When the Yom Kippur War broke out, Israel turned to the United States, asking for quick replacement of the arms it was losing in the war. It took more than a week before the Americans launched a massive airlift to Israel, consisting of the supply Israel was asking for. The feeling in Israel, and in later historiography, is that the Nixon administration had deliberately delayed the airlift for reasons that are subject to historiographical debate. Some put the blame on James Schlesinger, the secretary of defense, and some on Henry Kissinger, the secretary of state and the president’s national security adviser. This article suggests a different explanation, according to which on the one hand, for the Americans, the delay was not really a delay, and on the second hand, the way Israel made the requests did not transmit to the administration the sense of urgency the Israelis were feeling.

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969-1975, Part two: January 1972-January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re-election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.

Evidence-Based Building Design and Organizational Culture

I want you to imagine how our future military hospitals will look, feel and act …. We will have healthy settings that are quiet, organized and full of light. —S. Ward Casscells, MD, assistant secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, September 15, 2008

The essential role of democracy in the Bush Doctrine: the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan

Everyone knows that democracy played a role in the Bush Doctrine. What not everyone knows is that this role was essential for the doctrine to be put into operation under which the Iraq invasion was prepared and launched. We argue moreover that, even if aggressive, the Bush doctrine is compatible with the American Liberal Tradition. To demonstrate these arguments we analyze the links between democracy, security, and the US national interests as expressed in the pillars of the American foreign policy since the end of Cold War. The consequential belief of the Bush Administration on the positive effect of exporting democracy by the use of force to Afghanistan and Iraq to fight terrorism will be remarked. It will be shown, however, that in the first years of the Bush Administration, among the justifications for the military interventions in the two countries, security reasons prevailed over democratic concerns, although the latter was significantly present since the early hours after September 11. It was only when it became clear that WMDs did not exist in Iraq that the exporting of democracy as the ultimate weapon to fight terrorism grew remarkably and prevailed over security reasons to invade those rogue states. The paper uses quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the speeches of President Bush and his Secretaries of State and Defense.

Military Graduate Medical Education: Are the King's Clothes Tattered?

Military Graduate Medical Education (GME) has long been considered a cornerstone of the Military Health System (MHS) and comprises 3% of the nation’s GME positions. In these times of fiscal uncertainty, the $9.5 billion the federal government annually contributes to teaching hospitals through Medicare is under significant scrutiny. With MHS consuming 10% of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget, the cost-benefit of military GME is likely to be questioned yet again. As early as 2006, an Office of the Secretary of Defense, Health Affair’s sponsored report stated we must be willing to “admit the rhetoric of needing GME to maintain the force structure as it relates to quality, recruitment, and cost effectiveness may not be true.” This report concluded, “A critical re-look at DoD-sponsored GME is needed today. The King may not be naked—but his clothing is tattered.” As I pondered whether the allure of military GME was more rhetoric than reality, a question crossed my mind. “Why do a number of cost-conscience, quality health care delivery institutions such as Kaiser Permanente (KP), Geisinger Health System, and Intermountain Healthcare engage and value GME?” The President of KP Southern California, after noting a lack of financial incentive, stated their health care system should become even more involved in GME. Are there insights into the value of GME the MHS might gain from health care systems like KP? Further, any significant changes in military GME should be considered in the context of growing challenges in meeting the health care needs of the country, the shifting accreditation emphasis on patient safety and quality improvement, and the impact of residency training on future practice. Senior leaders at KP reported several reasons for being engaged in GME for over 60 years: grounding residents in their culture; growing future leaders; positive impact on faculty recruitment, quality, satisfaction, and retention; workforce contribution; research; and enhancing the image of the organization. They assert “grounding of trainees in the fundamentals of Permanente Medicine virtually ensures a cultural fit.” Given the unique nature of military medicine, the value of MHS acculturation during training should not be underestimated. A military physician’s career may result in movement among five different cultures: academic, clinical, research, administrative, and military-unique operations. During the last decade of conflict, military GME teaching faculty, nurses, support staff, and patients have lived the “raison d’etre,” as the operational culture has been described. They bring this back to the classroom, the health care team, and the bedside. Like KP, we breed our future health care leaders in this training culture. Our military treatment facilities (MTFs) contain key ingredients described by a Nobel Laureate, Robert Fogel, found in a flourishing culture: a common sense of community, purpose, general discipline, and a strong work ethic. Given challenges with military life (deployments, moves, lower career pay), incentives are needed to retain top physicians, who, in turn, recruit our future DoD physicians. Yet recruitment, satisfaction, and retention of highly qualified providers remain vexing problems for the MHS, with 15% to 30% annual turnover. Turnover is expensive, costing one college of medicine with an annual 6.7% turnover an estimated 45 million dollars over 5 years. A significant proportion of the cost was due to orienting to the new practice setting. Perhaps this further explains why KP is willing to finance GME. KP hires 30% of their former residents, who make up 15% of their faculty workforce. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), with an annual turnover of 9%, found residents are twice as likely to consider a VA career after their rotations. Office of the Dean, Graduate Medical Education, San Antonio Uniformed Services Health Education Consortium, 3551 Roger Brooke Drive, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234-4504. This article was presented at the Department of Pediatrics Grand Rounds, Uniformed Services University, Bethesda, MD, April 11, 2013. The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This work was prepared as part of their official duties and, as such, there is no copyright to be transferred. doi: 10.7205/MILMED-D-13-00283

Caring for Military Families Across the Deployment Cycle

Over 2 million service members have been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation New Dawn since the Global War on Terror (GWOT) began well over a decade ago. 1 Department of Defense Strengthening Our Military Families—Meeting America’s Commitment. Department of Defense, Washington, DC2011 Google Scholar There are over 3.6 million service members within the total force of the Armed Services. Total force service members include all those currently serving on active duty as well as the reserve components, which consist of service members in the National Guard and Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Reserves. Approximately 44% of the total force is married with children. Thus the total military force personnel and their immediate family members encompass greater than 5.3 million individuals within the US population. Although the number and length of deployments have been steadily declining, the number of individuals affected since the GWOT began is substantial. 2 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 2011 Demographic Report. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC2012 Google Scholar Diane Padden is Associate Professor, Graduate School of Nursing, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD. Janice Agazio is Associate Professor and Director of PhD/DNP Programs, School of Nursing, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC.

FDA Warning Highlights Mefloquine’s Mental Health Risks

FDA Warning Highlights Mefloquine’s Mental Health Risks

Strategic Landpower and the Arabian Gulf

Abstract: recent years, a variety of threats have become more ominous for Gulf nations, and these countries have sought to strengthen ties to the United States in ways do not appear to compromise their sovereignty. The US Army has responded through a robust series of military exercises and through the development of regionally aligned forces. Consequently, the Army has played a vital role in meeting a variety of training challenges including preparation for conventional war, counterinsurgency, and missile defense. It has also asserted an important landpower presence in ways reassure local allies and deter potential regional aggressors. ********** The Middle Eastern strategic environment has been especially dynamic in the last decade due to factors such as the 2003-11 X US combat operations in Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and the continuing rise in sectarian tensions and violence throughout a number of regional countries. the midst of these developments, the stability of the region remains of central importance to the United States according to numerous presidents who have enumerated the American in the region. (1) Most recently, President Barack Obama stated US core interests in the Middle East include: (1) safeguarding energy supplies exported to the world, (2) counterterrorism, (3) countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and (4) the defense of Israel and advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace process. (2) Other US leaders have elaborated on the president's views by noting the Middle East will remain vital to the United States even if Washington moves closer to energy independence. (3) this regard, America garners tremendous global influence by using its military forces to guarantee freedom of navigation for the transportation of Persian/Arabian Gulf energy supplies. (4) If the United States relinquished this position, other powers, such as China, could become interested in this role and the global clout it provides. The next decade will be a particularly important era for defining how Washington can best protect its in the Middle East and especially the Gulf region. The legacy of the Iraq war will contribute to this debate since conflict generated significant US public and policymaker concerns about the future use of military force to fight major ground wars and then engage in long occupations, nation-building efforts, and counterinsurgencies. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates represented this view in a particularly straightforward way when he stated, In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined, as General MacArthur so delicately put it. (5) President Obama underscored Gates's comment by indicating he will seek to avoid using massive conventional military force except in cases involving US national survival interest. (6) This reluctance reflects the current political values of American society and is motivated by the administration's concern about developing open-ended military commitments to support secondary or peripheral in ways that we can no longer afford. (7) Additionally, according to a variety of polls, the general public is extremely wary of getting involved in new Middle Eastern wars in places such as Syria and Iran. (8) Likewise, Arab public opinion remains deeply concerned about future American military action in the region, although US favorability ratings improved beginning in 2011 as the United States implemented its withdrawal from Iraq. (9) Nevertheless, understanding the dangers of military interventions does not allow one to reach the conclusion conventional war and counterinsurgency actions will never again be required. Some challenges to US may not be viewed as immediate threats to national survival, but the long-term consequences such challenges could affect both US global leadership and economic future. …

Pitfalls in Egypt

Abstract: The US embrace of President Morsi tended to neglect his authoritarian and pro-Muslim Brotherhood policies, angering secular-liberal Egyptians. When the military ousted Morsi with the support of the latter, US officials tried to steer a middle course, but wound up alienating both sides of the divide. This article recommends that the US should continue to use its aid to encourage the new regime to meet its democratic benchmarks and curb its excesses. ********** The 3 July 2013 ouster of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi I by the Egyptian military put the United States in a quandary. The J. White House did not wish to endorse a military coup, which would make a mockery of US democratization policy and alienate the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most powerful political organization from which Morsi hailed. US policymakers also did not wish to alienate either the Egyptian military, which it had cultivated and supported for more than three decades, or the country's liberal establishment, which supported the removal of Morsi. American policy vacillated between tacit support and criticism of the new government, especially after its crackdown on Morsi supporters in mid-August, but did not fundamentally change as Washington tried to preserve its equities in amidst its low standing in the country. In many respects, this most recent episode was symptomatic of US policy toward since the 2011 revolution and reflects conflicting US policy goals in the Arab world's most populous country. Before examining US policy since Morsi's ouster, it is important to understand why the United States had become so controversial in before the events of 3 July. The Morsi Presidency After Mohamed Morsi was sworn in as president on 30 June 2012, he was visited in July by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in an effort to show support and ensure the bilateral relationship would continue under his leadership. Prior to these visits, the leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi, stated: Egypt will never fall to a certain group ... the armed forces will not allow it. (1) However, Secretary Clinton, right after meeting with Morsi and right before meeting with Tantawi, stated the United States supported Egypt's full transition to civilian rule and the return of the military to a purely national security role. (2) Morsi then used the occasion of a security incident in the Sinai--the killing of some 16 Egyptian soldiers by extremists on 5 August 2012--to undertake a major restructure of armed forces' leadership. After firing the head of the intelligence service as well as the chiefs of the navy, air force, and air defense command, Morsi forced the two top SCAF officials, Tantawi and army chief of staff Sami Anan, to retire. (3) He picked General Abdel Fatah Al-Sissi, a younger member of the SCAF and head of military intelligence, to be the new Defense Minister. Al-Sissi evidently reached an accord with Morsi of some sort, and the military essentially returned to the barracks, but probably with the understanding that the new president would not take any further actions against the military. The White House was not alarmed by Morsi's actions because Al-Sissi was well-known to the US military (having studied at the United States Army War College) and official policy was for the Egyptian military to return to the barracks. (4) Morsi's moves against the SCAF's old guard were welcomed by many of Egypt's young revolutionaries and liberals. (5) However, his other moves were more controversial. He assumed both presidential and legislative powers and took action against some of his media critics. The Shura Council (the upper body of the parliament) replaced the editors of the government-owned newspapers with pro-Brotherhood figures. Many observers believed Morsi was personally involved in this decision. …

The Question of Israel

As I write in January 2013, President Obama has nominated former Senator and decorated Marine from the Vietnam era, Chuck Hagel, to be Secretary of Defense in his second administration. This has cr...

Risking It In Russia

Many global companies maintain that Russia’s chemical market is like any other and, with an annual growth rate of close to 4%, one that they fully intend to participate in. But doing business in Russia carries risks, as companies such as BP and Solvay have learned in recent years. If foreign companies want to be successful in Russia—Lanxess and Evonik Industries are building factories and Dow Chemical is already there—they must go in with their eyes wide open, experts say. “One of the riskiest places in the world to be involved in is Russia,” Robert M. Gates, former U.S. secretary of defense and chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, told delegates at last year’s annual meeting of the American Chemistry Council, the U.S. chemical industry’s main trade association. Solvay’s encounter with the Russian administration dates back to 2009. The company struck an agreement to acquire a majority stake in Berezniki ...

A Midcourse Correction For U.S. Missile Defense System

The U.S. secretary of defense made a surprise announcement bolstering the U.S. national missile defense system and effectively ending a controversial interceptor program.

Guam

Guam Kelly G. Marsh (bio) and Tyrone J. Taitano (bio) Reviews of the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and Nauru are not included in this issue. This year as in previous years, the economy and government finances were the dominant concerns in Guam. Perhaps in some ways these issues have helped assure the continuation and revitalization of Chamorro culture and cultural events—which had a strong presence this year—as a means to provide a sense of stability and to remind Chamorros and others of their survival as a people through thousands of years of challenges. The central economic issue was the long-planned military buildup involving the redeployment of the US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The year began with opposition in the US Congress to the redeployment from leaders like Senator John McCain (PDN, 1 Jan 2012). Military plans for a firing range near the ancient Chamorro settlement of Pågat Village, considered an extremely significant cultural site, were the subject of a court dispute. In 2010, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Guam Preservation Trust, and the "We are Guåhan" organization filed a lawsuit against the US Navy to protect and preserve Pågat Village. Dating to 700 AD, Pågat holds the remains of prehistoric structural stone foundations (known as latte), freshwater caves, and medicinal plants, as well as stone mortars, pottery, and tools of the Chamorro people. The National Trust and the Guam Preservation Trust asserted that a major legal victory had been scored in November 2011 when the navy publicly announced its intent to consider alternative locations for firing ranges (PreservationDirectory.com, 7 Dec 2011). Another obstacle to the redeployment was the issue of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa. The transfer of US Marines to Guam had been linked to progress in relocating the Futenma facility to a less populated part of Okinawa. However, the Japanese government had difficulties securing the consent of Okinawans to the relocation plan. In February, both the US and Japanese governments agreed to decouple the transfer of the marines from the Futenma relocation issue (Reuters, 10 Feb 2012). In April, the two governments announced that 5,000 marines would be moved to Guam in the coming years, and the military buildup price tag has been reduced to about $8.6 billion. The original plan would have brought about 8,600 marines to Guam and cost at least $10.27 billion. Despite the plans for the number of marines on Guam being reduced by more than 40 percent, the cost of the marine transfer only went down by about 15 percent. Also, although [End Page 128] Japan increased its cash contribution, Pentagon officials said that previously announced financing support by Japan is no longer necessary. Funding for some of Guam's civilian infrastructure projects related to the military buildup was supposed to have been drawn from this financing. But Guam's congresswoman, Madeleine Bordallo, characterized the move as a "better framework" for progress on the buildup. Senator Judith Guthertz, chairwoman of the Guam Legislature's Military Buildup Committee, echoed Bordallo's comments and said that the revised buildup plan is good for Guam. She went on to say that she still believed there would be a significant economic boost to the island from the buildup due to the civilian personnel and military families who would accompany the expansion of the current military presence (PDN, 25 April 2012). In May, it was further clarified that two-thirds of the marines redeployed to Guam would be on a rotational rather than permanent basis (PNC, 2 May 2012). That same month, the US Senate froze deployment funds, pending more information from the US Department of Defense on the expense of the move (UPI, 15 May 2012). Even so, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans Robert Scher stated that he hopes the marines can start moving to Guam as early as 2014 (PNC, 23 May 2012). After years of determined effort, a meeting of the Guam First Commission was finally convened in April (MV, 16 April 2012). Senator Rory Respicio had in 2008 sponsored a law creating the commission in order to bring...

Women in Combat

The US secretary of defense announced in January 2013 that, from 2016, women will be allowed to serve in ground-combat roles in the US armed forces. The UK is likely to soon be faced with the need to make a similarly historic decision, having answered key questions such as what is actually known so far about the integration of women into combat units, and its potential impact on cohesion. Anthony King provides a fascinating comparison of the experiences of several Western armed forces, and concludes that in today's world of professional armies, it is not gender that determines cohesion, but training and competence.

Formalizing the Ban: My Experience in the Reagan Administration

The repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) is a success story. As of September 20, 2011, one of the most egregious cases of modern day government-sanctioned discrimination has been overturned. But my (Lawrence Korb) involvement with military policy toward gays and lesbians began early in our country's journey toward open service—18 years before the creation of DADT and 30 years before the Obama Administration successfully opened the armed forces to gay and lesbian service members. In 1981, I joined the Pentagon shortly after the Carter administration announced a new Pentagon policy stating that “homosexuality is incompatible with military service” (U.S. Naval Institute [USNI], 2011). As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Logistics, the responsibility of writing the directive to implement this ban fell to my office. In this article, I detail my recollections from this period in American military history: the codification of the gay ban in U.S. Department of Defense policy.

Challenges and Needs Faced by Female Combat Veterans.

This article presents findings of a study conducted to identify stressors that may contribute to mental health issues of military female veterans. Female members in the U.S. Armed Forces currently occupy more non-traditional roles; therefore deployment to combat zones, commonly reserved for males, is being taken on by females. While at the present time females serving in the military are not allowed to serve in combat occupations, the reality is that many are being placed in combat roles or environments. Consequently, many are now confronted with stressors related to combat and multiple deployments. This study was based on a descriptive, non-probability, snowball design. In cases where participants displayed a reluctance to share some information in front of counterparts who may have been at a higher or lower rank level; subsequent semi-structured, one-to-one interviews were conducted. The latter approach proved more effective in gathering important information, such as issues of military sexual trauma (MST) and issues of intimacy upon re-entering the home environment. This study was conducted before January 2013, when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced the lift of the ban on women serving in combat. Therefore, future studies will need to be conducted to discern how these stressors will affect them in their new role as active combatants.

Mental Health Issues of Women Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan

The number of women serving in the military and deployed to active-duty is unprecedented in the history of the United States. When women became a permanent sector of the U.S. Armed Services in 1948, their involvement was restricted to comprise only 2% of the military population; today women constitute approximately 14.5% of the 1.4 million active component and 18% of the 850,000 reserve component. Yet, little attention has been paid to the mental health needs of women military members. This review article highlights the history of women in the military and then focuses on the impact of combat exposure and injuries, military sexual trauma, alcohol use, and family separations which are associated with PTSD, depression, suicide, difficulty with reintegration, and homelessness.

The Long and Short of It: Cognitive Constraints on Leaders' Assessments of “Postwar” Iraq

The George W. Bush administration's assessments of challenges that might come after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq were wide of the mark, but it is unclear why this was the case. Along with the difficulty of anticipating the future, perhaps the opportunity costs of allocating resources to postconflict considerations were simply too high. Institutional biases and civil-military friction may have also led actors to privilege certain information and plans over others. Although plausible, these hypotheses do not sufficiently explain strategic assessment prior to the 2003 invasion. They cannot account for the substance of most senior policymakers' assessments, especially those of President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which was optimistic when late-stage operations were considered but not when combat plans were deliberated. An established psychological theory that describes how people mentally represent distant future actions—as opposed to those that are seen as impending—explains the nature of strategic assessment in the Iraq case. As individuals think about actions at the end of a sequence of events, the desirability of their goals becomes increasingly salient relative to the feasibility of achieving them. This makes decisionmakers more prone to underestimate the costs and risks of future actions.

Working towards a better world

Admiral James G. Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Admiral James G. Stavridis assumed duties as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in early summer 2009. A Surface Warfare Officer, Admiral Stavridis has also served ashore as strategic and long-range planner on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and holds a PhD and a MALD in International Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.