Secret Intelligence Service Research Articles

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this issue. International Relations theory Barbarous philosophers: reflections on the nature of war from Heraclitus to Heisenberg. By Christopher Coker. Visions of world community. By Jens Bartelson. Rethinking world politics: a theory of transnational neopluralism. By Philip G. Cerny. Intenational law, human rights and ethics The limits of ethics in International Relations: natural law, natural rights, and human rights in transition. By David Boucher. The fog of law: pragmatism, security and international law. By Michael J. Glennon. Just war on terror? A Christian and Muslim response. Edited by David Fisher and Brian Wicker. International organization and foreign policy Deadlocks in multilateral negotiations: causes and solutions. Edited by Amrita Narlikar. A history of diplomacy. By Jeremy Black. The secret state: preparing for the worst, 1945–2010. By Peter Hennessy. The ultimate weapon is no weapon: human security and the new rules of war and peace. By Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor. The problem of force: grappling with the global battlefield. By Simon W. Murden. Governance, civil society and cultural politics Apart: alienated and engaged Muslims in the West. By Justin Gest. Political economy, economics and development Capital ideas: the IMF and the rise of financial liberalization. By Jeffrey M. Chwieroth. History M16: the history of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949. By Keith Jeffery. Fighting for Britain: African soldiers in the Second World War. David Killingray with Martin Plaut. Red plenty: inside the fifties’ Soviet dream. By Francis Spufford. Peru and the United States, 1960–1975: how their ambassadors managed foreign relations in a turbulent era. By Richard J. Walter. Europe In search of the Balkan recovery: the political and economic reemergence of SouthEastern Europe. By Christopher Cviic and Peter Sanfey. Russia and Eurasia Nationalist imaginings on the Russian past: Anatolii Fomenko and the rise of alternative history in post-communist Russia. By Konstantin Sheiko with Stephen Brown. The new nobility: the restoration of Russia's security state and the enduring legacy of the KGB. By Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan. Persian dreams: Moscow and Tehran since the fall of the Shah. By John W. Parker. Middle East and North Africa Meccanomics: the march of the new Muslim middle class. By Vali Nasr. Invisible war: the United States and the Iraq sanctions. By Joy Gordon. Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East. By Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said. Sub-Saharan Africa Blood on the stone: greed, corruption and war in the global diamond trade. By Ian Smillie. From blood diamonds to the Kimberley Process: how NGOs cleaned up the global diamond industry. By Franziska Bieri. Famine and foreigners: Ethiopia since Live Aid. By Peter Gill. The Ethiopian Revolution: war in the Horn of Africa. By Gebru Tareke. Zimbabwe's exodus: crisis, migration, survival. Edited by Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera. Ending apartheid. By J. E. Spence and David Welsh. South Asia The most dangerous place: Pakistan's lawless frontier. By Imtiaz Gul. The Afghanistan-Pakistan theater: militant Islam, security and stability. Edited by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Clifford May. Seeds of terror: how heroin is bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda. By Gretchen Peters. Opium: uncovering the politics of the poppy. By Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy. North America Washington rules: America's path to permanent war. By Andrew J. Bacevich. Advancing democracy abroad: why we should and how we can. By Michael McFaul. The survival and the success of liberty: a democracy agenda for U.S. foreign policy. By Morton H. Halperin and Michael Hochman Fuchs. Latin America and Caribbean Evo Morales: the extraordinary rise of the first indigenous president of Bolivia. By Martin Sivak. Amexica: war along the borderline. By Ed Vulliamy. Mexico: narco-violence and a failed state? By George W. Grayson. Cuba: what everyone needs to know. By Julia E. Sweig.

Larry Adler and the Cold War

In July 1951 the overseas British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) wrote to the internal British Security Service (MI5) seeking information about an American citizen living in London. The request was prefaced with a sentence that this essay seeks to explain: L. Adler cannot return to the United States with any hope of earning a living there, owing to the allegations against him that he is communist sympathiser. We have no trace of him, and should be grateful if you would let [us] know if you have any record ... or if anything is known about him in this country.

J.C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940–72

The significance of J.C. Masterman's relationship with the Security Service, MI5, has not been fully appreciated. As a junior officer during World War II, he consistently sought to achieve good working relations with the Secret Intelligence Service. After the war he continued to take an interest in the Security Service and worked closely with other MI5 elder statesmen to ensure that the successor to Percy Sillitoe as Director-General came from within the Service. Masterman always hoped that his account of the double agents run by British Intelligence during World War II would one day be published. As the public image of the British secret services deteriorated during the 1960s, Masterman believed that MI5 did not grasp how his book could promote its interests, and so he insisted on forcing through publication anyway. The correspondence from serving and former MI5 officers in Masterman's papers vividly illustrate changing attitudes to official secrecy and the declining ability of the British Government to enforce it.

British Radio Security and Intelligence, 1939-43

There is no previous monograph article on the Radio Security Service [RSS], the British organisation established to intercept the wireless messages of enemy spies during World War Two. This gap can be filled by drawing on private papers and documents in the National Archives from MI5, Bletchley Park, the War Office and the Admiralty. The official historians F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins praised RSS efficiency, but MI5 records suggest that while RSS voluntary interceptors were competent, the same was not always true of some other operatives.The most intellectually outstanding part of the Radio Security Service was its Analysis Bureau, which became part of Section V of the Secret Intelligence Service [SIS] as Vw when most of RSS was taken over by Section VIII of SIS in 1941. Under Hugh Trevor-Roper's leadership Vw produced analytical reports on Axis Intelligence activities, but Felix Cowgill, the head of Section V, sought to restrict the circulation of these reports and the decrypts of enemy secret service messages which they analysed. The diaries of MI5's Guy Liddell suggest that Cowgill's behaviour was a catalyst for the unsuccessful attempt by MI5 to take over Section V of SIS during 1942.By 1943 Stewart Menzies, the Chief of SIS, was so impressed by Vw that he made it independent of Cowgill as the Radio Intelligence Service. By the end of 1943 MI5 and RSS interception also achieved a better understanding of their mutual roles. But there was a potential threat to the achievements of British radio security and intelligence from the reports of the Cambridge spies to Moscow.

Covering up spying in the ‘Buster’ Crabb Affair: A note

F EWER COLD WAR myths are more enduring in the United Kingdom than that of ‘Buster’ Crabb. In April 1956, Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) coaxed Commander Lionel ‘Buster’ Crabb, a naval frogman from the Second World War, out of retirement to dive under the Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze, while it was docked in Portsmouth. It had brought the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita S. Khrushchev, to the United Kingdom on a state visit. The operation, routine by all accounts, ended in both personal and diplomatic failure. Fourteen months later, the decomposed body of a frogman washed up in Chichester harbour. Despite the British government’s hope that the discovery might be the end of the affair, it fired up the conspiracy theorists, who alleged that the body could not be Crabb’s; that, in fact, he had been kidnapped, taken to the Soviet Union, and renamed Korablev.1 The government did little to dispel such myths. A few days after Crabb’s disappearance, The Times succinctly summed up the situation: ‘official reticence about the activities which led to the death of Commander Crabb has caused much speculation.’2 Curiosity was further piqued a few days later when the prime minister, Sir Anthony Eden, stated m the house of commons on 9 May that ‘it would not be in the public interest to disclose the circumstances in which Commander Crabb is presumed to have met his death.’3

The pipeline: Botswana’s reception of refugees, 1956–68

This paper covers Botswana’s emergence as a place of refuge from its troubled white‐ruled neighbours. Botswana’s reception of refugees is seen as a symptom of, and as a catalyst for, its growing identification as a distinct nation in the region. From 1956, Bechuanaland colonial authorities distanced themselves from apartheid South Africa, and from 1957–58 the country received significant influxes of political refugees. The paper pays particular attention to the ‘pipeline’ that took refugees north across the Zambezi. This was initially protected from local police interference probably by Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). Nelson Mandela, alias ‘David Motsamayi’, used the pipeline ‘down’ as well as ‘up’ to re‐enter South Africa. Such arrangements continued through independence in 1966 but were almost terminated when guerrilla fighters tried to use Botswana as a refuge in 1966–67. Revaluation of policy towards refugees within Botswana government circles resulted after 1969 in more overt moral support for liberation movements and, boosted by new economic strength, more self‐confident assertion of national sovereignty against neighbouring countries. This set the scene for Botswana to receive a huge influx of refugees as a result of the Soweto rising of 1976.

On Secret Service for the Duce: Umberto Campini in Portuguese East Africa, 1941-1943

Historians differ over how closely Germany, Italy and Japan worked together during the Second World War. One indicator is the degree of intelligence co-operation concerning the Indian Ocean, where submarines from the three powers hunted Allied shipping. Significant archival sources for intelligence activities in Portuguese East Africa or Mozambique are available for Britain, America, Italy, and Germany. The Axis Consuls in Mozambique reported extensively on Allied convoys and their intelligence was passed to Japan, which especially valued the work of the Italian Consul Umberto Campini. In 1942 the British Secret Intelligence Service sent out Malcolm Muggeridge to counteract Campini and with the help of an MI5 agent he soon arranged for a Greek seaman working for Italy to be shanghaied.At the end of 1942 Britain complained to Portugal that Campini was directly responsible for the loss of British shipping. But when Portugual asked a British officer to investigate the submarine threat he concluded that the sinkings off Mozambique were not due to enemy agents in the country. Nevertheless, in May 1943 Muggeridge organised the violent kidnapping of Campini's spy-master, Alfredo Manna. After the fall of Mussolini in July Campini refused to desert his German friends. Loyalties developed between intelligence operatives of different nationalities working together on both sides of the conflict. But the material collected by Campini and the German Consul Werz did little to help Axis and Japanese submarines, and strategic co-operation in the Indian Ocean theatre was prevented by Hitler's ideological fixation with Russia.

For Queen and Company: The Role of Intelligence in the UK's Arms Trade

This article analyses the role that the UK intelligence services (particularly Secret Intelligence Service [SIS or MI6], the Defence Intelligence Staff [DIS], Government Communication Headquarters [GCHQ] and associated agencies) play in the legal UK arms trade. The article shows that intelligence has been used in support of British-based private commercial businesses, and occasionally in providing intelligence on the negotiating positions of rival manufacturers. This raises important questions about the role of the state in the private sphere, particularly the use of a large number of government assets in support of private interests and the elision of British government interests with those of a section of the manufacturing industry. This article also challenges existing conceptions of how the UK's intelligence agencies operate and relate to their customers. Conventional typologies of UK intelligence have emphasised the importance of the ‘central machinery’, highlighting the Joint Intelligence Committee as the focal point of intelligence tasking and analysis in the UK. However, in this case the intelligence support provided to the sale of military equipment suggests a range of parallel practices that are much more decentralised and often informal. This research therefore suggests that our conception of the UK intelligence architecture requires some reassessment.

The Shadow War against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret Intelligence Service By Christof Mauch. Translated by Jeremiah Riemer

<i>The Shadow War against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret Intelligence Service</i> By Christof Mauch. Translated by Jeremiah Riemer

The spy who came in from the cold

Some words occur to us in pairs, often to the extent that we find it difficult to hear the one without recalling the other. Thus ‘Romeo’ suggests ‘Juliet’; ‘Anthony’ invokes ‘Cleopatra’; ‘Heloise’ follows ‘Abelard’ and so on. Many further examples exist, particularly in the case of lovers. In intellectual property circles the concepts of ‘author’ and ‘royalties’ are also closely linked—but their relationship is strained. While the author’s love for royalties is sincere and undiminished by the vicissitudes of commerce, royalties are more fickle in their choice of destination. Some royalties remain an ideal, never to come to fruition. Other royalties remain imprisoned within the palace of the publisher, never to be handed over to their rightful suitor; some are claimed by the taxman as his due, whereas others again, secured in advance, must be surrendered following the failure of the author to comply with the terms of publication. A rare and unusual fate befell the royalties to which George Blake was contractually entitled for the publication in 1990 of his autobiography No Other Choice. At the time he wrote the book and entered into the contract that promised him the disputed royalties, Blake was a former member of the British Secret Intelligence Service; a strong selling factor for his book, no doubt, was his notoriety as a spy for the USSR and the circumstances under which his spymasters reputedly procured his escape from the secure jail in which he was serving a 42-year sentence. Blake clearly did not write his book in the course of the performance of his employment duties in the Secret Service. Nor could it be said that the circumstances of the book’s creation and publication were such as to impose upon him the duties of a trustee. Accordingly, there was no basis under copyright law upon which the British Government could claim ownership of the copyright or a beneficial entitlement to the royalties resulting from the book’s sale. Even if the author was disentitled to receive the royalties, there was no obvious ground of entitlement for the British Government either. The Attorney General (an officer of the Crown whose roles include the protection of public interest) commenced civil proceedings to recover the benefit of any royalties earned by Blake on the basis that the book disclosed information of a confidential nature. Although the information was no longer confidential when Blake disclosed it, because it was known to the public as well as to the Russians, the Attorney General’s argument was strengthened by the contention that, having acknowledged that he was bound by the terms of a criminal statute, the Official Secrets Act 1911, Blake was aware that any disclosure relating to his service duties was unlawful and should not have been made. The Attorney General’s claim was ultimately successful in that the decision of the Chancery Division of the High Court was upheld first by the Court of Appeal and later by the House of Lords. Blake was however distressed by two things. First, he had lost his royalties, through a complex web of legal reasoning that raised more than a small suspicion of judicial creativity. Second, it took him no less than nine years and two months to lose his royalties. This was a very long time to be kept in suspense, subjected to the stresses and anxieties that any individual litigant must suffer. Accordingly, Blake took his case to the European Court of Human Rights on a plea that the protracted litigation was incompatible with the requirement of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights that legal proceedings take a reasonable length of time. Blake’s claim was upheld by the Court, which awarded him damages of e5000. Although this was only a small fraction of the very large sums to which he was entitled by way of advance royalties, Blake must have obtained some personal satisfaction from his belated victory. The Court articulated the criteria that must be taken into account when considering unreasonable duration: the complexity of the issues involved, the scale or importance of the issue in contention, and the conduct of the parties. This episode has many lessons for intellectual property lawyers and litigants. When choosing a jurisdiction in which to litigate, choose a country which has only one appellate tribunal. Consider arbitration or mediation, to which Article 6(1) does not apply. Keep your arguments simple and sue local corporations rather than individuals living abroad. Finally, do not underestimate the motivation of an author shorn of royalties. doi:10.1093/jiplp/jpl178 Advance Access Publication 27 October 2006 * Editor, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Vol. 1, No. 13 813

Introduction: Special Operations Executive – New Approaches and Perspectives

Readers of this journal might ask why there is a need to dedicate an entire issue to the study of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), the organization famously tasked by Churchill to ‘set Europ...

The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming's Novels to the Big Screen (review)

Reviewed by: The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming's Novels to the Big Screen Skip Willman Jeremy Black . The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming's Novels to the Big Screen. Lincoln, NE: U of Nebraska P, 2004. xii + 227 pp. Jeremy Black explains that his study approaches the entire Bond corpus by analyzing British geopolitics in an effort "to re-create the international world within which Bond was supposed to operate" (ix). He notes that while Bond began as a product of the Cold [End Page 350] War, "the setting and dynamics of the adventures changed, as the cultural, historical and political environment in which the Bond character operates altered" (x). Unfortunately, this study merely sketches the broad contours of historical shifts in British geopolitics in the context of the Cold War and offers very little in-depth analysis of how British politics frames these novels, stories, and films. The complete absence of footnotes compounds this problem, so that if one wished to explore the historical backdrop of GoldenEye (1995) by learning more about the "Aldington-Tolstoy libel action" (162), for instance, one would be out of luck. The omission of footnotes and the absence of a proper bibliography (the book does contain a two-page listing of books for "Selected Further Reading") certainly suggest that the intended audience for the book is not an academic one. The most immediately apparent failure of the book, however, is its over-reliance on plot summary. The study provides lengthy recapitulations of the stories of every Bond novel and film, but only soundbites of the historical and political context. For example, the Burgess and Maclean spy scandal is briefly mentioned as a source of tension in the relationship between the intelligence services of Great Britain and the United States during the Fifties, but the impact of their defection on Fleming's representation of MI5 and MI6 isn't developed. The defections of Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and, later, Kim Philby represent traumatic moments in the history of British intelligence, shocking events that would fuel spy fiction on both sides of the Atlantic, most notably John LeCarré's Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974). Does Fleming respond to this blow to the integrity of the Secret Intelligence Service beyond making Bond infallible? Do the films? The scope of Black's study, encompassing all fourteen of Fleming's James Bond books and nineteen movies of the 007 franchise (from 1962-1999), leaves little time or space for anything but a cursory treatment of these historical events. Nevertheless, Black notes that changing social attitudes, primarily a more politically correct environment, thanks in large part to the feminist movement, contributed to the evolution of the Bond films. This begrudging response begins with the slightly less sexist treatment of female characters begun in The Spy Who Loved Me (1977) with Anya Amasova (Barbara Bach), Bond's KGB counterpart, competitor, and collaborator. What is perhaps more interesting, and unmentioned by Black, is the way in which Bond taps into the backlash against political correctness in the Nineties with the Pierce Brosnan films. Black duly notes the infamous speech by the new female M (Judi Dench) in GoldenEye, describing Bond as a "sexist, misogynist dinosaur, a relic of the Cold War" (qtd. in Black 100). This moment of self-criticism, however, exemplifies what Slavoj zizek calls "enlightened false consciousness": "I know very well that James Bond is precisely what M describes him as (sexist, misogynist, etc.), but nevertheless I will relish his objectification and callous treatment of women." In short, the film pays lip service to political correctness, thereby allowing the audience to enjoy more thoroughly Bond's notorious politically incorrect behavior. Black's study could only benefit from more theory in this vein, particularly in addressing the cultural work performed by the Bond texts on their particular historical context. Black briefly addresses this relationship in his conclusion, contending that the films undertake "a general move away from specific political contexts" to offer a compensatory form of "escapism," a "refuge from the reality of British decline and the decay of traditional British values" (213). The history of the film industry seems to be a significant blind spot in Black...

Englishmen in New York: The SIS American Station, 1915-21

This article examines the organization, personnel and selected operations of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in New York during and immediately after the First World War. Under the leadership of Sir William Wiseman, SIS agents successfully combated German intrigues as well as Irish and Indian nationalists. The greatest challenges, however, were managing the shifting relationship with American authorities and the encroachments of rival British agencies such as MI5. The roles of Guy Gaunt, Robert Nathan and Norman Thwaites are given particular attention.

Fiction, Faction and Intelligence

There is a demonstrable overlap between authentic intelligence operations and the way they have been portrayed in works of fiction, which is not entirely surprising considering the number of distinguished, and some lesser-known, novelists who have worked for MI5 and the Secret Intelligence Service over the years. Setting aside for a moment the work of Compton Mackenzie, Graham Greene, John le Carré and Somerset Maugham, arguably SIS's most renowned authors, what about Kenneth Benton, David Footman and Jack Cordeaux? The writing culture was especially prevalent in the Security Service, where the legendary case officer Jack Bingham, for whom David Cornwall once worked, raised no objection to the employment of authors. His colleague Max Knight wrote some terrible thrillers, and his assistant, William Younger, chose the interesting pen-name William Mole. Bingham's wife Madeleine and daughter Charlotte, who also worked for MI5, wrote many books, and they were not alone. Curiously, however, it is Ian Fleming who has attracted the greatest attention for his great invention, 007. Yet there remains some doubt about whether Bond may not have been inspired by his former tutor in pre-war Kitzbuhel, Phyllis Bottome, whose 1946 novel The Lifeline introduced a suave, German-speaking, Swiss-educated, mountaineering, British agent a full five years before the publication of Casino Royale. A coincidence? Maybe, but the paths taken by these two authors criss-cross on many occasions.

The shadow war against Hitler: the covert operations of America's wartime secret intelligence service

Introduction I. The Setting Historical Perspectives The Place of the OSS in American History Within the Secret Intelligence Service Anatomy of the OSS II. Donovan on the Offensive and America's Path to War The fifth column as a danger William J. Donovan's lessons for America On the eve of confrontation William J. Donovan as Director of Intelligence and the origins of the COI -The peace feeler of Federico Stallforth - Pearl Harbor The COI and the New Pattern Germany's Military and Economic Capabilities in the COI's calculations, 1941 - Assessing the Situation in the East Between Opinion Research and Counterespionage The Foreign Nationalities Branch and the Role of German Emigres - German-Americans, Exile, and Propaganda Excursus: Franklin D. Roosevelt, John Franklin Carter and Ernst Putzi Hanfstaengl The Secret Carter Organization - The S-Project: Ernst Putzi Hanfstaengl in the Service of American Secret Intelligence - Analyses of Germany and Propaganda Plans - The End of the S-Project The COI in Crisis and the Creation of the OSS III. 1943, The Turning Point Strategies and discourses State Department versus OSS: Initial Speculation about the German collapse, 1942 - The Discussion About Strategic Priorities, 1943 Lessons from Moscow and the OSS' Answer The National Committee for a Free Germany and the Beginnings of the Crisis Between the Allies - Secret Intelligence Initiatives for Mobilizing German Emigres Germany and the Germans The Mood of the Germans as Assessed by the OSS - A German Parallel: 1918 and 1943 Ideology and Economy in the Bombing War Theories and Experiences-The Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU) - From Casablanca to POINTBLANK - Tensions with the British and the philosophy of the EOU IV. Bern: the Big Window Onto the Fascist World Allen Dulles and the Establishment of the OSS Outpost in Bern - Psychological and Military Warfare - Opportunists and Conspirators - The German V Weapons and the Attack on Peenemunde - The Wood Story V. Media War and Black Propaganda The Difficult Beginnings of the OSS Morale Operations - From the Hamilton Plan to Operation Sauerkraut - Blankenhorn's Soldiers Councils Project and the Neues Deutschland movement - OSS Radio War: Joker and Matchbox - Operation Musac: American Pop Music in the War Against Hitler VI. Penetration of Germany Conceptions The Infiltration of Agents into Germany in the British Calculation - American Secret Intelligence Plans for Operations in the German Reich - The Post-invasion Syndrome and the Significance of the OSS Labor Division for Operations in Germany Excursus Paul Hagen, the Origins of the OSS Labor Division, and the Trade Union Contacts of British Intelligence - Goldberg's 'Philosophy of the Underground' and the FAUST Plan Operations Special Operations: Foreign Workers and CALPO Communists as Trojan horses - Infiltrating SI Agents into the Reich VII. Gotterdammerung - Between Peace and War Phantom Stronghold in the Alps: The as an Idee Fixe? Defense of the Alps and the Ideological Phantom of the Nazi Underground - The in the Calculation of the OSS - The Alpine Fortress from the Perspective of British Intelligence - The Redoubt Psychosis of the Americans and the Perspective of Gauleiter Hofer - Eisenhower, Marshall, Roosevelt Last-minute Putsch The Munich Pheasant Hunt and American intelligence - The Peace Feelers of Ritter von Epp - The Munich Putsch of April 28 - Operation Capricorn: Simulated Resistance Under the Sign of Zodiac Good and Bad Germans Allen Dulles as Promoter of Postwar German Politicians VIII. The Dream of the Miracle War: the Legacy of the OSS Conclusion and Summary The End of the OSS and the Origins of the Myth - Outline of the Shadow War: A summary - The Legacy of the OSS 3

Covert Operations and Official Collaboration: British Intelligence's Dual Approach to Ireland during World War II

Neutral Ireland posed a unique challenge to the wartime British intelligence community and the latter responded by adopting a dual approach. On the one hand, it carried out covert intelligence operations in Irish territory, involving the Service intelligence branches, the Ministry of Information, and, most importantly, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). On the other hand, unprecedented cooperation developed between military, police and intelligence agencies from Britain and Ireland, and in particular between MI5 and Irish military intelligence (G2). For most of the war British intelligence pursued this joint strategy of covert activity and official collaboration, and MI5 and SIS shared responsibility for Ireland. However, there was a gradual shift of emphasis towards cooperation and it was eventually concluded that the MI5-G2 link could serve all Britain's security needs. This article charts this evolution and places it within the context of Anglo-Irish wartime political relations.

De Gaulle, Colonel Passy and British Intelligence, 1940–42

De Gaulle's relationship with his secret intelligence and subversive services, the Bureau central de renseignements et d'action (BCRA) headed by Colonel Passy, as well as with British intelligence is examined in the light of the now declassified archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the BCRA. These archives reveal that de Gaulle failed to interest himself seriously in secret intelligence or subversion before the arrival of Jean Moulin in London in October 1941. De Gaulle's subsequent relationship with the BCRA and British intelligence was defined by an obsessive need for political control, which only served to compromise the BCRA's otherwise successful collaboration with British intelligence.

Declassification and release policies of the UK's intelligence agencies

This study sets out the declassification and release policies of the three principal UK intelligence bodies – the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – in regard to their archives. It sets out the legislative and administrative framework for the release or retention of Intelligence records, and explains that the agencies' declassification and release policies are all based on the imperative of protecting sources and methods. Where their policies differ – for example, both MI5 and GCHQ release records to the Public Record Office, while SIS does not – the reason can be found in the differing nature of their functions and operating methods.

Secret Messages: Codebreaking and American Diplomacy, 1930-1945

Intelligence history is a growing field. Where it used to be the domain of military historians and cryptanalytical specialists, it is now moving into the field of foreign relations and international history. While diplomatic historians are realizing that they can no longer ignore the dimension of intelligence, intelligence historians are increasingly placing their work into the broader context of international relations. Finally, following the American example, the British are now also beginning to release secret service records. Thus, David Alvarez, for his book Secret Messages, could draw on portions of a multivolume inhouse history of the Venona program (the American codebreaking operation ag ainst the Soviet Union), cryptog raphic col lec ti ons and special research histor ies of the National Security Agency (released in 1996), and records from the British Government Code and Cipher School, as well as personal papers, sources in presidential libraries, and interviews of a dozen former employees of the Signal Intelligence Service. Richard J. Aldrich, for his Intelligence and the War against Japan, located papers of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in armed services records, where they had not been weeded out because of SIS's Asian cover name of InterService Liaison Department, and used records of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) released in the 1990s, American intelligence records, and military and diplomatic records and private papers.

Intelligence and War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service

1. Introduction: intelligence and empire Part I. Before Pearl Harbor, 1937-41: 2. Wing Commander Wigglesworth flies east: the lamentable state of intelligence, 1937-9 3. Insecurity and the fall of Singapore 4. Surprise despite warning: intelligence and the fall of Singapore 5. Conspiracy or confusion? Churchill, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor 6. 'Imperial Security Services': the emergence of OSS and SOE Part II. India and Spheres of Influence, 1941-4: 7. 'Do-gooders' and 'bad men': Churchill, Roosevelt and rivalry over empire 8. American intelligence and the British Raj: OSS and OWI in India, 1941-4 9. Strange allies: British intelligence and security in India, 1941-4 Part III. Mountbatten's South East Asia Command, 1943-5: 10. Secret service and Mountbatten's South East Asia Command 11. Special operations in South East Asia 12. The British Secret Intelligence Service (M16) in the Far East 13. Centre and region: the politics of signals intelligence Part IV. Rivalry or Rivalries? China, 1942-5: 14. American struggles in China: OSS and Naval Group 15. Britain and her allies in China Part V. The End of the War in Asia, 1945-6: 16. Anti-colonialism, anti-communism and plans for post-war Asia 17. Resisting the resistance: Thailand, Malaya and Burma 18. Special operations in liberated areas: Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies, 1944-6 19. Hong Kong and the future of China 20. Conclusion: the hidden hand and the fancy foot.