Secondary Market Yields Research Articles

Primary market demand for German government bonds

This paper provides evidence on the drivers of demand at government bond auctions using data on more than 600 German federal government bond auctions between 2005 and 2022. Applying the model averaging technique Weighted Average Least Squares robust determinants are identified from a large set of regressors representing auction-specific, institutional, regulatory and financial market conditions. To cover different characteristics of the empirical demand curves new measures of auction demand are introduced which i.a. reflect bidders’ estimated real-time allotment expectations. The main results can be summarised as follows: Demand is positively affected by the secondary market yield of the respective security, the announcement of upcoming syndications by the issuer, the volume offered, and underpricing at previous auctions. Furthermore, central bank net purchases in the secondary market have a robustly positive effect on demand at least for short-term bonds. Robustly negative effects are found for market volatility and the regulatory introduction of the leverage ratio for banks. The most noticeable null result is that I do not find robust evidence for crowding-out-like effects where the issuance activity of comparable issuers would dampen auction demand.

Virtual Competition and Cost of Capital: Evidence from Telehealth

Using the staggered implementation of telehealth parity laws in the U.S. Healthcare industry, we find causal evidence that virtual competition affects U.S. hospitals' cost of capital through a credit risk channel. Financial statements indicate that rural hospitals lose patients to urban hospitals in the same state after states require equivalent reimbursement of remote and in-person services. These effects increase rural hospital bankruptcy risk indicated by leverage and Z-Score. This increased financial stress translates into lower credit ratings and a higher cost of capital for rural hospitals. Controlling for bond characteristics, we find that affected rural hospitals' new bond costs rise by 20 - 38 bps relative to urban hospital bonds issued in the same state and in the same year. Secondary market yields of outstanding rural bonds increase by a significant 8 - 17 bps. Overall, we conclude that virtual competition in healthcare provision exacerbates healthcare inequality between rural and urban areas.

Corporate Bonds: Uniform Auction under Risk and Budget Limits

A perfectly divisible corporate bond is allocated to a set of bidders characterized by limits both to their budget, but most importantly to the risk entailed in their portfolio. Bidders possess symmetric information concerning the secondary market's yield. We choose to use a uniform pricing mechanism contrary to discriminatory as the former generates more revenues and reduces the winner's curse. As a first step, we prove the existence of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium when risk-neutral bidders respond to an exogenous secondary market providing the necessary comparative statics. In the second stage, we confirm the existence of equilibrium when bidders' types are affiliated with the secondary market by a copula.

Determinants of the bid-to-cover ratio in Eurozone sovereign debt auctions

Building on a unique dataset of Eurozone sovereign debt auctions, this paper analyzes the determinants of their bid-to-cover ratios, which is the most common measure of the outcome of an auction. We find that the secondary market yield on the same maturity instrument, past domestic and foreign bid-to-cover ratios and occasionally the number of primary dealers tend to exert a positive effect on the current bid-to-cover ratio, while the opposite is the case for the supply and the volatility of the yield. The results thus suggest that past information helps to predict the demand in auctions.

Zero-Coupon, Forward, and Par Yield Curves for the Nigerian Bond Market

The Nigerian bond market is currently one of the most liquid in sub-Saharan Africa. Many African countries regard it as a model from which to learn and based on which to develop their respective bond markets. The developments achieved in the Nigerian bond market are of particular interest to both investors and fixed income analysts—both domestic and international. One of the important tools required for fixed income analysis, pricing, and trading is the yield curve. To the best of our knowledge, even though the Nigerian bond market has a secondary market yield curve, the yield curve is a yield-to-maturity curve, and not zero-coupon yield curve. The purpose of this study is to model the zero-coupon, par, and forward yield curves for the Nigerian bond market. We use various methods such as the piecewise cubic Hermite method, the piecewise cubic spline method (with not-a-knot end condition), the Nelson–Siegel–Svensson method, and the variable roughness penalty method. Data are obtained from the FMDQ OTC website. The results show that the piecewise cubic Hermite method is very suitable for producing the Nigerian par and zero-coupon yield curves. Our best recommended method for producing the Nigerian zero-coupon yield curve is therefore the piecewise cubic Hermite method, followed by the Nelson–Siegel–Svensson method. For the forward yield curve, the results show that the best method is the Nelson–Siegel–Svensson method, followed by the variable roughness penalty method.

Spillovers in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Sovereign Eurobond Yields

ABSTRACT This study investigates the possibility of spillovers among Sub-Saharan African (SSA) eurobonds from January 2015 to June 2017 using secondary market yields. Our results indicate significant contagion effects among these bonds, effects that prove sensitive to major economic events and news announcements. They also suggest that less resilient economies transmit more to and receive less spillovers from their peers. SSA eurobond issuers can therefore increase their influence over the performance of their securities on secondary markets by mitigating their vulnerability to these effects. Besides strong macroeconomic fundamentals, an improvement in transparency and information disclosure is required in order to curb the asymmetry of information underlying investors’ behavior-based spillovers and contagion, which supports to a certain extent the market discipline hypothesis in the case of SSA eurobonds.

An Attempt to Predict Recession for the Indian Economy Using Leading Indicators

Every economy is subject to cyclical fluctuations, so it is desirable for policy makers to explore measures that may be taken in advance to ameliorate them. This paper attempts to do so for Indian economy. Growth Cycles and Growth Rate Cycles have been identified with the help of the Bry-Boschan (BB) Procedure, using data for the Index of Industrial Production (IIP). The corresponding Composite Index of Leading Indicators (CILI) for the growth cycle reference series has been constructed using Euro area Leading Indicator Index (EURO_LI), Bombay Stock Exchange-30 price index (BSE_SENSEX), United States Leading Indicator Index (US_LI), Index of Industrial Production- Manufacturing (IIP_MANF), Spread calculated as the difference between Monthly Average of secondary market yield on Government Securities with residual maturity of 10 years and 15-91 days (SPREAD_10_15_91), and Non-oil Imports (NOIL_IMPORTS). And CILI for the growth rate cycle reference series is constructed with leading indicators like Aggregate Deposits of Scheduled Commercial Banks (ADSCB), Bank Credit of Scheduled Commercial Banks (BCSCB), Gold Price (GP_MUMBAI), Index of Industrial Production- Manufacturing (IIP_MANF), and Broad Money (M3). Both composite indices are constructed by employing Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The results indicate that the Indian economy has experienced six growth cycles and five growth rate cycles during the period 1997:06 to 2017:06. The average duration of leads for peak and trough in growth cycles is reported to be 6.4 months and 7.8 months respectively, while the same for growth rate cycles is five months for peaks and three months for troughs. The probability of witnessing a recession in growth and growth rate cycles with forecast horizons of three, six, nine and 12 months, is in the vicinity of 0.4.

Sub-Saharan African Eurobond yields: What really matters beyond global factors?

This study explores the drivers of secondary market yields of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) sovereign Eurobonds from 2008 to mid-2017. Our results indicate that, beyond global ‘push’ factors, country-specific ‘pull’ factors such as inflation and GDP growth matter too for SSA Eurobond performance. A panel error-correction analysis suggests large heterogeneity in the short-term influence of our global and country variables across countries. We find no significant effect of bond-specific factors on yields when push and pull factors are accounted for. By emphasizing the prominence of country variables, reflecting the quality of countries’ macroeconomic management and their economic performance, our results qualify the common view that SSA countries have little control over their market borrowing costs.

Municipal Disclosure Timeliness and the Cost of Debt

AbstractA longstanding concern for municipal bond investors is the lack of timely financial statement disclosures. Municipalities are held to lower disclosure standards than corporations. Using continuing disclosure dates for audited financial statements, we find bond issuers with slower disclosure have higher secondary market yields and spreads, less frequent secondary market trading, and are less likely to issue new bonds. We observe that future disclosure is largely predictable based on past disclosure and that disclosure often improves prior to new bond issuances. When municipalities do not capitalize on the benefits of timely disclosure, economic consequences are imposed on bondholders and taxpayers.

The SDR Interest Rate Basket--Proposed Change of the Representative Interest Rate for the Euro and Amendment to Rule T-1(C)

The three-month Eurepo interest rate, the euro component of the SDR interest rate basket, will be discontinued as of the end of 2014. The three-month Eurepo rate, administered by the European Money Market Institute (EMMI), has been the representative interest rate instrument of the euro area in the SDR interest rate basket since 2006. However, faced with a significant shrinking in the number of banks participating in the rate-setting panel, the EMMI announced last month that the Eurepo interest rate will be discontinued after December 31, 2014. This paper proposes to replace the three-month Eurepo rate in the SDR interest rate basket with a transactions-based three-month interest rate. Staff has consulted with the European Central Bank (ECB), which recommends to replace the Eurepo rate with a three-month spot rate derived from the secondary market yield curve covering euro area government bonds rated either investment grade or AA and above. In staff’s view, the latter option (AA and above) would be most comparable to the other instruments in the SDR interest rate basket and would have characteristics that are most consistent with previous Board guidance for selection of financial instruments in the SDR basket. The proposed change would be implemented by an amendment to Rule T-1(c), requiring a 70 percent majority of the total voting power.

Price Effects of Sovereign Debt Auctions in the Euro-zone: The Role of the Crisis

Exploring the period since the inception of the euro, we show that secondary-market yields on Italian public debt increase in anticipation of auctions of new issues and decrease after the auction, while no or a smaller such effect is present for German public debt. However, these yield movements on the Italian debt are largely confined to the period of the crisis since mid-2007. We also find that there is some tendency of the yield movements to be larger when the demand for the new issue is smaller relative to its supply. Our results are consistent with a framework in which a small group of primary dealers require compensation for inventory risk and this compensation needs to be higher when market uncertainty is larger. We also find that the secondary-market behaviour of series with a maturity close to the auctioned series, but for which there is no auction, is very similar to the secondary-market behaviour of the auctioned series. These findings support an explanation of yield movements based on the behaviour of primary dealers with limited risk-bearing capacity. JEL Classification: G12, G18

Price Effects of Sovereign Debt Auctions in the Euro-Zone: The Role of the Crisis

Exploring the period since the inception of the euro, we show that secondary-market yields on Italian public debt increase in anticipation of auctions of new issues and decrease after the auction, while no or a smaller such effect is present for German public debt. However, these yield movements on the Italian debt are largely confined to the period of the crisis since mid-2007. We also find that there is some tendency of the yield movements to be larger when the demand for the new issue is smaller relative to its supply. Our results are consistent with a framework in which a small group of primary dealers require compensation for inventory risk and this compensation needs to be higher when market uncertainty is larger. We also find that the secondary-market behaviour of series with a maturity close to the auctioned series, but for which there is no auction, is very similar to the secondary-market behaviour of the auctioned series. These findings support an explanation of yield movements based on the behaviour of primary dealers with limited risk-bearing capacity.

A Descriptive Analysis of the Finnish Treasury Bond Market 1991-1999

This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for Finnish treasury bonds. The paper focuses on three issues. First, we report basic descriptive statistics such as auction volumes and secondary market yields and volumes. Second, we estimate the revenues earned by primary dealers from the treasury bond market. Third, we analyse the development of the price of the auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark bonds, around the time of the auction. We find evidence of a price decrease in the auctioned bond series before the auction and a price increase after the auction. This pattern is strongest for 1992-1994 when Treasury funding needs were heavy and secondary market trading volume of treasury bonds was modest.

Constant Maturity Yield Estimates for India: How well do they Depict the Term Structure?

Central banks over the world report the base interest rates of their economy in terms of constant maturity yield curves. We introduce estimation of constant maturity yields for the Indian economy and through a rigorous comparison with zero-coupon yield estimates using econometric techniques, show that even in economies with underdeveloped and imperfect bond markets, it is possible to generate qualitatively accurate term structure estimates, based on secondary market yields.

Bond restructuring and moral hazard: are collective action clauses costly?

Abstract Recent emerging market crises have prompted debate over the costs and benefits of collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts. CACs may facilitate the restructuring of repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Proponents of CACs argue they should lower borrowing costs, while opponents contend that they lead to moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper examines the pricing of bonds with and without CACs using data for both primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of CACs has increased yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers.

A Descriptive Analysis of the Finnish Treasury Bond Market 1991-1999

This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for Finnish treasury bonds.The paper focuses on three issues.First, we report basic descriptive statistics such as auction volumes and secondary market yields and volumes.Second, we estimate the revenues earned by primary dealers from the treasury bond market.Third, we analyse the development of the price of the auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark bonds, around the time of the auction.We find evidence of a price decrease in the auctioned bond series before the auction and a price increase after the auction.This pattern is strongest for 1992-1994 when Treasury funding needs were heavy and secondary market trading volume of treasury bonds was modest. Key words: treasury bond auctions, secondary market JEL classification numbers: D44, G12, G20

A Descriptive analysis of the finnish treasury bond market 1991-1999

This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for Finnish treasury bonds.The paper focuses on three issues.First, we report basic descriptive statistics such as auction volumes and secondary market yields and volumes.Second, we estimate the revenues earned by primary dealers from the treasury bond market.Third, we analyse the development of the price of the auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark bonds, around the time of the auction.We find evidence of a price decrease in the auctioned bond series before the auction and a price increase after the auction.This pattern is strongest for 1992-1994 when Treasury funding needs were heavy and secondary market trading volume of treasury bonds was modest. Key words: treasury bond auctions, secondary market JEL classification numbers: D44, G12, G20

A pricing model for secondary market yield based floating rate notes subject to default risk

The purpose of this article is to price secondary market yield based floating rate notes (SMY-FRNs) subject to default risk. SMY-FRNs are derivatives on the default-free term structure of interest rates, on the term structures for default-risky credit classes, and on the structure of a determined pool of bonds. The main problem in SMY-FRN pricing (as compared to the pricing of standard interest rate or credit derivatives) is market incompleteness, which makes traditional no-arbitrage pricing by replication fail. In general, SMY-FRNs are subject to two types of default risk. First, the SMY-FRN issuer may go bankrupt (direct default risk). Second, the possibility of the bankruptcy of the issuers in the underlying pool has an influence on the SMY-FRN coupons (indirect default risk). This article is the first one which provides a no-arbitrage pricing model for SMY-FRNs with direct and indirect default risks. It is also the first article applying incomplete market pricing methodology to SMY-FRNs.

Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?

Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper addresses this question empirically using primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of collective action clauses increases yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers. By implication, the perceived benefits from easier restructuring are at least as large as any costs from increased moral hazard.

Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?

Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper addresses this question empirically using primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of collective action clauses increases yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers. By implication, the perceived benefits from easier restructuring are at least as large as any costs from increased moral hazard.