Abstract
A perfectly divisible corporate bond is allocated to a set of bidders characterized by limits both to their budget, but most importantly to the risk entailed in their portfolio. Bidders possess symmetric information concerning the secondary market's yield. We choose to use a uniform pricing mechanism contrary to discriminatory as the former generates more revenues and reduces the winner's curse. As a first step, we prove the existence of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium when risk-neutral bidders respond to an exogenous secondary market providing the necessary comparative statics. In the second stage, we confirm the existence of equilibrium when bidders' types are affiliated with the secondary market by a copula.
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