Second-order False Belief Tasks Research Articles

Children's understanding of idioms and theory of mind development

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis according to which theory of mind competence was a prerequisite to ambiguous idioms understanding. We hypothesized that the child needs to understand that the literal interpretation could be a false world representation, a false belief, and that the speaker's intention is to mean something else, to correctly process idiomatic expressions. Two kinds of ambiguous idioms were of interest: decomposable and nondecomposable expressions (Titone & Connine, 1999). An experiment was designed to assess the figurative developmental changes that occur with theory of mind competence. Five-, 6- and 7-year-old children performed five theory of mind tasks (an appearance-reality task, three false-belief tasks and a second-order false-belief task) and listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions inserted in context, before performing a multiple choice task. Results indicated that only nondecomposable idiomatic expression was predicted from the theory of mind scores, and particularly from the second-order competences. Results are discussed with respect to theory of mind and verbal competences.

Children’s Application of Theory of Mind in Reasoning and Language

Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people's beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed to involve the application of second-order ToM is the comprehension of sentences that the hearer can only understand by considering the speaker's alternatives. In this study we tested 40 children between 8 and 10 years old and 27 adult controls on (adaptations of) the three tasks mentioned above: the false belief task, a strategic game, and a sentence comprehension task. The results show interesting differences between adults and children, between the three tasks, and between this study and previous research.

Pragmatic Language and Theory of Mind Deficits in People with Schizophrenia and Their Relatives

Background: Deficits in theory of mind have frequently been observed in people affected by illnesses characterized by disrupted social behaviour like autism and psychoses. In schizophrenia, a pragmatic deficit in expressive language can also be observed. The present study was designed in order to assess the suitability of theory of mind and pragmatic conversation abilities as possible cognitive endophenotypes of schizophrenia. Methods: First- and second-order false belief tasks and pragmatic deficits in expressive language were examined in 38 patients with schizophrenia, in 34 non-psychotic relatives and in 44 healthy controls. An extensive clinical and neuropsychological assessment was also conducted. Results: Schizophrenic people and their first-degree relatives performedworse than the normal control subjects in false belief and pragmatic conversation tasks. General cognitive ability and neuropsychological measures of executive functions were not related to social cognition tasks. Conclusions: Theory of mind disorders and failing to understand the gricean conversational maxims are associated with schizophrenia liability.

A Study of Theory of Mind in a Group of Schizophrenic Patients Using a Mental Verb Extension Task

An individual has a theory of mind (ToM) if he imputes mental states to himself and others and applies this system to make predictions about the behaviours of others. Findings of cognitive impairment could help us to understand faulty processing mechanisms in schizophrenia. The proposition is that individuals with schizophrenia may be unable to internalize adequately the points of view of others. We tested 27 schizophrenic patients (ICD; WHO). The positive and negative symptom scale (PANSS) was used to assess psychopathology, and the three ToM tasks – first- and second-order false belief tasks and the mental verb extension task – were administered to each subject. Patients who perform well on the ToM first and second order stories do not show problems in the verb extension task. However, the mistakes made in the first and second order stories are also reflected in the verb extension task. The group having difficulties with the first-order story presented more problems in the mental verbs task than the group showing difficulties with the second-order story. This leads us to conclude that the impairments found on the first-order false belief task are more severe and profound than those on the second-order task, and such specific deficits are also seen in the organization of verbs of knowing. It would seem that some schizophrenic patients do not impute mental states to themselves and others, and therefore use the mental verbs wrongly.

YOUNG CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF SECOND-ORDER MENTAL STATES

This study examined young children’s understanding of second-order mental states, which have embedded structures such as beliefs about beliefs. Participants were 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds. First-order and second-order false belief tasks were prepared with similar structures to minimize the difference between them. The results showed that over half of the 6-year-olds were successful on both tasks, while the 5-year-olds were successful on the first-order but not the second-order false belief task. This time lag between understanding first-order and second-order mental states is consistent with the findings of previous studies. These findings suggest that information processing of embedded mental states is a significant factor for understanding second-order mental states.

YOUNG CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF ANOTHER'S APPARENT CRYING AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THEORY OF MIND

This study examined young children’s understanding of apparent crying and its potentially misleading consequences. Gross and Harris (1988) showed that 6-year-olds can understand that one can simulate an emotion while feeling another, and that such a display can mislead others. In this study, 69 children aged 4, 5, and 6 were given “crying tasks” and “Standard and Second-order False Belief tasks”. In “crying tasks”, participants were asked to identify whether the protagonist was actually crying, and whether the other character believed that the protagonist was actually crying. The results indicate that children’s understanding of apparent crying develops between the ages of 4 and 6. However, most of the children did not understand its misleading consequences. Furthermore, relationships were found between the understanding of apparent crying and the False Belief tasks. This finding suggests that the development of young children’s understanding of apparent crying relates to the development of theory of mind.

Intact first- and second-order false belief reasoning in a patient with severely impaired grammar

The retention of first-order theory of mind (ToM) despite severe loss of grammar has been reported in two patients with left hemisphere brain damage (Varley & Siegal, 2000; Varley, Siegal, & Want, 2001). We report a third, and more detailed, case study. Patient PH shows significant general language impairment, and severe grammatical impairment similar to that reported in previous studies. In addition we were able to show that PH's impairment extends to grammatical constructions most closely related to ToM in studies of children (embedded complement clauses and relative clauses). Despite this, PH performed almost perfectly on first-order false belief tasks and on a novel nonverbal second-order false belief task. PH was also successful on a novel test of “ToM semantics” that required evaluation of the certainty implied by different mental state terms. The data strongly suggest that grammar is not a necessary source of structure for explicit ToM reasoning in adults, but do not rule out a critical role for “ToM semantics.” In turn this suggests that the relationship observed between grammar and ToM in studies of children is the result of an exclusively developmental process.

Impaired “Affective Theory of Mind” Is Associated with Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage

To examine the hypothesis that patients with ventromedial (VM) frontal lesions are impaired in the affective rather than cognitive facets of theory of mind (ToM). Prefrontal brain damage may result in impaired social behavior, especially when the damage involves the orbitofrontal/VM prefrontal cortex (PFC). It has been previously suggested that deficits in ToM may account for such aberrant behavior. However, inconsistent results have been reported, and different regions within the frontal cortex have been associated with ToM impairment. The performance of 26 patients with localized lesions in the PFC was compared with responses of 13 patients with posterior lesions and 13 normal control subjects. Three ToM tasks differing in the level of emotional processing involved were used: second-order false belief task, understanding ironic utterances, and identifying social faux pas. The results indicated that patients with VM (but not dorsolateral) prefrontal lesions were significantly impaired in irony and faux pas but not in second-order false belief as compared with patients with posterior lesions and normal control subjects. Lesions in the right VM area were associated with the most severe ToM deficit. These results are discussed in terms of the cognitive and affective facets of "mind-reading" processes mediated by the VM cortex.