Equilibrium Search Research Articles

Auctions and Posted Prices in Directed Search Equilibrium

Abstract We compare equilibrium allocations in directed search models where prices are determined alternatively by posting and by competing auctions, with the following results. With finite numbers of players, sellers' expected payoffs are higher when all sellers auction than when all sellers post. This difference is largest in the 2-by-2 case, where payoffs to sellers are 1/3 higher if they auction. The difference in the payoffs decreases rapidly with market size and vanishes in the limit "large" economy. When sellers can choose whether to post prices or auction in the 2-by-2- case, all combinations (auction-auction, post-post, and auction-post) can occur in equilibrium if sellers choose mechanism and price simultaneously. However, if sellers choose mechanism before price then the dominant strategy equilibrium has both sellers auctioning.

Bayesian inference in models based on equilibrium search theory

The equilibrium search model represents a substantial advance over previous models of job search, but its empirical performance fails in some crucial ways. Hence, flexible extensions are called for. In this paper, we consider three such extensions in areas where Bayesian methods can be used to great advantage. These are: (i) a specification where Bayesian priors are used to center a model over the restrictions implied by economic theory; (ii) a model involving a nonlinear production function where a closed form expression for the likelihood function does not exist; and (iii) a model which allows for unobserved heterogeneity. We show how posterior simulation methods can be used for empirical analysis for all three models. The paper includes an empirical exercise involving the school-to-work transitions of Canadian and US school leavers.

Equilibrium Search Models and the Transition From School To Work

This paper applies the Burdett–Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search model to study the school to work transitions of U.S. high school graduates. We consider the case of discrete firm heterogeneity and provide a computational method to obtain the MLE. Our results show that unemployed blacks receive fewer offers than whites and employed blacks are more likely to lose their jobs. Importantly, employed blacks and whites receive job offers at the same rate. Assigning the whites' search parameters to the blacks and re‐solving reveals that 75 percent of the observed wage differential is explained by the job destruction rate differences.

Equilibrium Price Distribution with Sequential Search

This paper develops a model of multi-commodity search, where a continuum of identical consumers search optimally (sequentially) and with strictly positive search costs for two types of commodities. A continuum of homogenous firms, having the same, constant, marginal costs, select and post prices for either one of the commodities types. It is shown that any equilibrium in this model will display price dispersion, with no two firms charging the same price with positive probability. A specific equilibrium is identified, and comparative statics conducted - showing that the equilibrium distribution of prices converges to the competitive price as the cost of search converges to zero. These results are generated without the need for any heterogeneity amongst agents, or sub-optimal search strategies, required for price dispersion in existing models, and suggest that Diamond's (1971) 'monopoly price paradox' is an artefact of his single-commodity search assumption. A further extension shows that, in the search equilibrium identified, homogeneous firms may optimally choose to adopt differing production techniques for a homogeneous commodity, and that multiple equilibria with differing levels of technological adoption may also result. The results highlight the importance the process of search may have, not only on prices, but also on the structure and the efficiency of the market in general.

An explanation of international differences in education and workplace training

We develop a simple search equilibrium model of workplace training and education based on two features. First, investment in education improves job-related learning skills and reduces training costs by firms. Second, firms with vacant skilled job slots can choose between recruitment from the market and training. Compared to Germany and Japan, the US has both a higher inflow rate into unemployment and a higher efficiency of the matching process. While the combined effect of these differences on the share of educated labor is ambiguous, the effect on the percentage of firms undertaking workplace training is to unambiguously reduce it.

Equilibrium Search with Time-Varying Unemployment Benefits

We show how time-varying unemployment benefits can generate equilibrium wage dispersion when identical firms post wages and homogeneous risk-averse workers search for jobs. We model a two-tier system similar to real-world UI programmes. The unemployed initially receive benefit b. Eventually, if a worker does not find a job, the benefit falls to zero. The duration of high benefits is treated as an exponential random variable, so the model is stationary. We characterise the equilibrium and derive the comparative statics effects of changes in the two benefit levels and the expected duration of the high-benefit state on equilibrium wages and unemployment.

Optimal Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

Optimal Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment as long as the tax does not affect the replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance, i.e., unemployment benefits relative to after-tax earnings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home production to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes. The employment effect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative for sufficiently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate that employment generally falls when proportional labor taxes are raised. Progressive labor taxes increase labor market tightness but have ambiguous effects on search effort and employment. The numerical calibrations indicate positive employment effects.

Specification and Estimation of Equilibrium Search Models

This paper considers estimation of a pure equilibrium search model in which all heterogeneity is endogenous and due to information asymmetries, and of variations that allow better fits to the data: Measurement error and heterogeneity in the productivity levels of firms. The model is fit to a random sample of individuals representing 1% of the Danish population in the age group 16–75 years over the period 1981–1990. All specifications are fit by maximum likelihood and provide readily interpretable parameter estimates. Variation in estimates across demographic groups is discussed. Several parameters are common across specifications, and their estimates are reasonably robust. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C33, C34, C41, C51, C61, C72, J24, J31, J41, J42, J64

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt. The optimal sanction rates implied by our calibrated model are much higher than the sanction rates typically observed in European labor markets.

A NEW LOOK AT THE DIAMOND SEARCH MODEL: STOCHASTIC CYCLES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM

We recast Diamond's search equilibrium model into that with a finite number of agents. The state of the model is described by a jump-Markov process, the transition rates of which are functions of the reservation cost, which are endogenously determined by value maximization by rational agents. The existence of stochastic fluctuations causes the fraction of the employed to move from one basin of attraction to the other with positive probabilities when the dynamics have multiple equilibria. Stochastic asymmetric cycles that arise are quite different from the cycles of the set of Diamond–Fudenberg nonlinear deterministic differential equations. By taking the number of agents to infinity, we get a limiting probability distribution over the stationary state equilibria. This provides a natural basis for equilibrium selection in models with multiple equilibria, which is new in the economic literature.

Measuring the equilibrium effects of unemployment benefits dispersion

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the Journal of Applied Econometrics (2000). Volume 15, issue 6, pages 547-574. We analyze the impact of unemployment benefits and minimum wagesusing an equilibrium search model which allows for dispersion ofbenefits and productivity levels, job-to-job transitions, andstructural and frictional unemployment. The estimation method usesreadily available aggregate data on marginal distributions ofunemployment durations as well as wages and benefit levels.Different causes of structural and frictional unemployment areinvestigated. We investigate the efficiency of the imposition of asingle benefit level for all household types and the introductionof an Earned Income Tax Credit.

Measuring the equilibrium effects of unemployment benefits dispersion

AbstractWe analyse the impact of unemployment benefits and minimum wages using an equilibrium search model which allows for dispersion of benefits and productivity levels, job‐to‐job transitions, and structural and frictional unemployment. The estimation method uses readily available aggregate data on marginal distributions of unemployment durations as well as wages and benefit levels. Different causes of structural and frictional unemployment are investigated. We investigate the efficiency of the imposition of a single benefit level for all household types and the introduction of a tax credit on earned income. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment

The objective of this paper is to model explicitly the possibility to form temporary matching in a model of two-sided search. The agents (workers and employers) differ by their human quality endowment. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents within their class. The introduction of a temporary market can have a positive impact on unemployment, but it may have a negative impact on low-skilled agents' utility. When a delay cost is introduced, this negative impact can be reduced especially if an education policy is implemented to decrease the heterogeneity of the human capital.

Unemployment and the Rental Rate of Capital

This paper introduces a standard neoclassical production function in an equilibrium search model of the labour market, in order to analyse the effects that changes in the (exogenous) rental rate of capital have on the unemployment rate. When the number of firms is kept fixed, an increase in the rental rate affects unemployment only through its impact on selectivity, with the direction of the change depending on the size of the worker’s unemployment benefits relative to the firm’s search costs. Regardless of the behaviour of selectivity, when the number of firms is determined endogenously, an increase in the rental rate always increases unemployment through a process of job destruction.

A Schumpeterian model of equilibrium unemployment and labor turnover

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model of equilibrium unemployment by combining an endogenous growth model with a variant of equilibrium search theory. The analysis offers two explanations for the causes of widening wage gap between skilled and less-skilled labor, and rising unemployment rate among the less skilled: technological change in the form of an increase in the size of innovations or skilled labor saving technological change in R&D activity.

Measuring the Equilibrium Effect of Unemployment Benefits Dispersion

We analyze the impact of unemployment benefits and minimum wages using an equilibrium search model which allows for dispersion of benefits and productivity levels, job-to-job transitions, and structural and frictional unemployment. The estimation method uses readily available aggregate data on marginal distributions of unemployment durations as well as wages and benefit levels. Different causes of structural and frictional unemployment are investigated. We investigate the efficiency of the imposition of a single benefit level for all household types and the introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit.

Equilibrium Search with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation

In this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market. We characterize equilibrium, derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions, and characterize the set of wage distributions that can be generated by the model. We develop a structural nonparametric estimation method for the productivity distribution. We estimate the model using French longitudinal survey data on labor supply, and we compare the results with those from a French panel data set of firms. The results are informative on the degree to which firms exploit search frictions.

Assortative Matching and Search

In Becker's (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types are complements: i.e., match output f(x, y) is suipermoddlar in x and y. We reprise this famous result assuming time-intensive partner search and transferable output. We prove existence of a search equilibrium with a continuum of types, and then characterize matching. After showing that Becker's conditions on match output no longer suffice for assortative matching, we find sufficient conditions valid for any search frictions and type distribution: supermodularity not only of output f, but also of log f, and log f Symmetric submodularity conditions imply negatively assortative matching. Examples show these conditions are necessary.

Two‐Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers

This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two‐sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary.