Sealed-bid Auction Scheme Research Articles

A Feasible Quantum Sealed-Bid Auction Scheme Without an Auctioneer

In this article, we first define a primitive problem of secure multiparty computations, i.e., secure multiparty disjunction (SMD), and present a novel quantum protocol for SMD that can ensure information-theoretical security, i.e., unconditional security. Furthermore, based on the quantum SMD protocol, we design a quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA) scheme without an auctioneer. In the proposed QSA scheme, all bidders can jointly find the winning bidder without the help of an auctioneer while it can perfectly protect the privacy of nonwinning bidders. The proposed quantum SMD protocol and quantum QSA scheme take Bell states as quantum resources and only perform single-particle Pauli operators and two-particle Bell measurements. Finally, we simulate the related quantum protocols in Qiskit and verify the correctness and the feasibility of the proposed protocols.

Quantum Sealed-Bid Auction Without a Trusted Third Party

A sealed-bid auction is an essential tool for trading commodities in modern society. However, the non-winning bidders in previously proposed sealed-bid auction schemes lack privacy protection. In this paper, we define a sealed-bid auction with strong privacy protection, which can protect the privacy of all non-winning bidders. In order to fulfil the task, we first present a quantum secret sharing protocol and a secure quantum summation protocol and then design their corresponding quantum circuits, where the security of the latter is guaranteed by the former, while the former is information-theoretically secure. We further present a quantum seal-bid auction (QSA) scheme with strong privacy protection based on the designed quantum protocols. In our QSA scheme, each bidder first encodes a private vector by his private bid and public agreement information, and then all bidders jointly compute the summations of their respective private vectors without a trusted third party. Finally, we verify the correctness and the feasibility of the proposed QSA scheme by circuit simulations in IBM Qiskit.

SEAL: Sealed-Bid Auction Without Auctioneers

We propose the first auctioneer-free sealed-bid auction protocol with a linear computation and communication complexity $O(c)$ , $c$ being the bit length of the bid price. Our protocol, called Self-Enforcing Auction Lot (SEAL), operates in a decentralized setting, where bidders jointly compute the maximum bid while preserving the privacy of losing bids. In our protocol, we do not require any secret channels between participants. All operations are publicly verifiable; everyone including third-party observers is able to verify the integrity of the auction outcome. Upon learning the highest bid, the winner comes forward with a proof to prove that she is the real winner. Based on the proof, everyone is able to check if there is only one winner or there is a tie. While our main protocol works with the first-price sealed-bid, it can be easily extended to support the second-price sealed-bid (also known as the Vickrey auction), revealing only the winner and the second highest bid, while keeping the highest bid and all other bids secret. To the best of our knowledge, this work establishes to date the best computation and communication complexity for sealed-bid auction schemes without involving any auctioneer.

Privacy-preserving Quantum Sealed-bid Auction Based on Grover\u2019s Search Algorithm

Sealed-bid auction is an important tool in modern economic especially concerned with networks. However, the bidders still lack the privacy protection in previously proposed sealed-bid auction schemes. In this paper, we focus on how to further protect the privacy of the bidders, especially the non-winning bidders. We first give a new privacy-preserving model of sealed-bid auction and then present a quantum sealed-bid auction scheme with stronger privacy protection. Our proposed scheme takes a general state in N-dimensional Hilbert space as the message carrier, in which each bidder privately marks his bid in an anonymous way, and further utilizes Grover’s search algorithm to find the current highest bid. By O(lnn) iterations, it can get the highest bid finally. Compared with any classical scheme in theory, our proposed quantum scheme gets the lower communication complexity.

Reputation auction games for cooperative communications over green wireless networks

Realizing energy-efficient wireless communications is essential in facilitating the development of green next-generation wireless networks. Existing studies have shown that cooperative communications can significantly reduce total energy consumption within a network. Most of these studies assume that all nodes in the network transmit cooperatively. However, in practical networks, nodes may act selfishly and refuse to participate. Accordingly, this study proposes a novel reputation auction framework based on an indirect reciprocity concept to stimulate node cooperation in green wireless networks and to provide a means to adapt to changing network dynamics. The proposed framework comprises two sealed-bid auction schemes in which node reputations in single- and multiple-relay transmission scenarios, respectively, are allocated in an efficient and fair manner to generate energy savings from application of the indirect reciprocity model. An analytical model is proposed to evaluate the outage probability of the proposed schemes. The results derived using this model agree with those obtained from computer simulations. Also, an adaptive scheme is proposed to combine the advantages of single- and multiple-relay transmission. Simulations show that the proposed framework achieves higher energy efficiency and a lower outage probability than non-cooperative schemes. Furthermore, the adaptive scheme outperforms other schemes in terms of outage probability.

A Verifiable Sealed-Bid Multi-Qualitative-Attribute Based Auction Scheme in the Semi-Honest Model

Recently, several privacy–preserving auction schemes are proposed for protecting the bid privacy and securing the auction. In this paper, a sealed-bid auction scheme focusing on multi-attribute is presented. And it mainly concentrates on the security issues of multi-qualitative-attribute auction and utilizes the Pedersen commitment scheme to bind the bid information into commitment for strong bid privacy. In order to accomplish the public verifiable correctness, the buyers and sellers construct the zero-knowledge signatures of knowledge and publish them to the bulletin board. In accordance with the security analysis, major properties, strong bid privacy and public verifiability, are provided under the semi-honest model. According to a comparison of computation, the proposal’s computation cost is reasonable.

BSEA: A Blind Sealed-Bid E-Auction Scheme for E-Commerce Applications

Due to an increase in the number of internet users, electronic commerce has grown significantly during the last decade. Electronic auction (e-auction) is one of the famous e-commerce applications. Even so, security and robustness of e-auction schemes still remain a challenge. Requirements like anonymity and privacy of the b i d value are under threat from the attackers. Any auction protocol must not leak the anonymity and the privacy of the b i d value of an honest Bidder. Keeping these requirements in mind, we have firstly proposed a controlled traceable blind signature scheme (CTBSS) because e-auction schemes should be able to trace the Bidders. Using CTBSS, a blind sealed-bid electronic auction scheme is proposed (BSEA). We have incorporated the notion of blind signature to e-auction schemes. Moreover, both the schemes are based upon elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which provides a similar level of security with a comparatively smaller key size than the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) based e-auction protocols. The analysis shows that BSEA fulfills all the requirements of e-auction protocol, and the total computation overhead is lower than the existing schemes.

Improving Wireless Security for Cooperation of Untrusted Secondary Transmitters

A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is exploited to study the interaction between the primary transmitter(PT) and multiple untrusted half-duplex secondary transmitters(STs). The STs will eavesdrop on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to transmit with the PT simultaneously. The auction scheme provides an opportunity for intensive cooperation between the PT and untrusted STs which leads to the performance improvement of all the players. In the proposed scheme, a trisection search algorithm is employed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, and a bisection search algorithm is employed for the optimal transmit power of the winning ST. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme not only improves the achievable secrecy rate of the primary link but also increases the access opportunity of the STs.

Improving the secrecy rate by turning foes to allies: An auction scheme**Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61271232 and 61372126) and the University Postgraduate Research and Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. CXZZ12-0472).

Security against eavesdroppers is a critical issue in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, a scenario consisting of one primary pair and multiple secondary pairs is considered. The secondary transmitters (STs) work in half-duplex mode and they are potential eavesdroppers on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to simultaneously transmit with the primary transmitter (PT). A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is employed to model the interaction between the PT and STs. With the proposed auction scheme, the hostile relationship between the PT and STs is transformed into a cooperative relationship. An iterative algorithm based on the max–min criteria is proposed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs for an access chance in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Numerical results show that the proposed auction scheme not only improves the PT’s security but also increases the access opportunities of the STs.

Comment on Lee et al.’s group signature and e-auction scheme

Recently, Lee et al. used their new group signature with the function of authenticated encryption to design a sealed-bid auction scheme, and they claimed that their schemes are secure. In this paper, we show that if the group manager has a valid group signature of a member, without the member's secret key, he can forge a group signature on arbitrary message on behalf of the member; then, if the registration manager (RM) and the auction manager (AM) conspired (with each other) in their auction scheme, they can forge a new bid on any goods on behalf of the bidder who has sent his/her bid to AM. Therefore, their group signature and auction scheme are insecure. Finally, we improve Lee et al.'s group signature scheme to overcome the modification attack and achieve the security requirements.

Sealed-bid electronic auction scheme based on new group signature

With the help of a group signature based on Hierarchical Identity-Based Signature(HIBS)and bilinear map,a new secure and efficient sealed-bid electronic auction scheme was presented.The scheme not only fulfilled the common security requirements,such as the anonymity of bidders,robustness,non-repudiation of the winner and public verifiability,but also had some other characteristics:compendiary steps,convenient construction,low cost of communications and computation,etc.Meanwhile,the scheme realized simple revocation,one-registration,and many times bidding.

A secure e-auction scheme based on group signatures

Recently, electronic auctions have been receiving more and more attention in the world of electronic commerce. The security and efficiency of electronic auctions are becoming important. We shall propose a securely sealed-bid auction scheme that uses our group signature scheme with the function of authenticated encryption. It can achieve the following goals: secrecy of bidding price, anonymity, verifiability, non-repudiation, and better performance.

New Sealed-Bid Electronic Auction with Fairness, Security and Efficiency

Electronic sealed-bid auction schemes usually have a common drawback, the third party (auction host) can conspire with a malicious bidder to leak all bidding prices before the opening stage. It results in the malicious bidder wining the auction with an optimal bidding price. Recently, Liaw et al. proposed an auction protocol for electronic online bidding in which they designed a deposit deduction certification for government procurement. However, it also has above mentioned flaw. Moreover, we further found that there were some extra security drawbacks in their protocol. First, the bidder can forge a bidding receipt to claim that he/she is a valid auction winner. Second, it may suffer from the third party forging attack. Third, their protocol leaked some bidders' private information to the third party, such as the bidder's bank account number and the authorization code. Thus, it cannot protect the bidder's privacy at all. In this paper, we not only point out the drawbacks from the previous scheme but also propose a new electronic auction scheme to overcome the above mentioned drawbacks. Furthermore, the computational complexity can be decreased in our online sealed-bid auction scheme.

The design of a secure and fair sealed-bid auction service

In this paper, we propose a secure and fair sealed-bid auction scheme. It uses a threshold cryptosystem without the assistance of a mutually entrusted party to guarantee fairness among bidders. In this scheme, the computations among bidders are independent and they only have to send an anonymous message to the clerk after the registration phase. Besides, we use modern cryptographic techniques like fair blind signatures and untraceable e-mail systems to design a real, fair, and secure sealed-bid auction scheme.