Sea Conference Research Articles

Chapter 2 Legal Status of International North Sea Conference Declarations

Chapter 2 Legal Status of International North Sea Conference Declarations

The Third International North Sea Conference: Ijlstra, Ton, 1990. Laws of the sea. Mar. Pollut. Bull., 21(5):223–226

The Third International North Sea Conference: Ijlstra, Ton, 1990. Laws of the sea. Mar. Pollut. Bull., 21(5):223–226

Chapter 1 The History of the International North Sea Conferences

Chapter 1 The History of the International North Sea Conferences

Chapter 1 The History of the International North Sea Conferences

Chapter 1 The History of the International North Sea Conferences

Chapter 2 Legal Status of International North Sea Conference Declarations

Chapter 2 Legal Status of International North Sea Conference Declarations

North Sea Conferences and Commissions

North Sea Conferences and Commissions

London North Sea Conference

Seconde conference internationale sur la protection de la Mer du Nord, au point de vue de la legislation

The law of the sea and the prospects for deep seabed mining: The position of the European community

The paper outlines the relationship between the Law of the Sea Conference and internal developments within the European Community, notably in regard to fishing. The European Community has signed the Convention, and the Declaration that was made is discussed. European participation in deep seabed mining activities is described in terms of government measures, the formation of consortia, and registration procedures. A fact sheet on the consortia, legislation of EC States, and international arrangements is given.

The legal regime governing seafloor polymetallic sulfide deposits

Abstract Beginning in 1977, oceanographers discovered seafloor vents spewing hot water into the surrounding water and sustaining exotic communities of marine life. They determined that the hydrothermal vent systems also produced deposits containing minerals of economic and strategic interest, thus sparking the interest of legislators and diplomats seeking the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This article examines the legal and regulatory regime which may govern development of these deposits off United States coastal waters, then turns to a discussion of how negotiators at the Law of the Sea Conference sought to incorporate the new sulfide discoveries into their efforts at international lawmaking.

Consensus and Confrontation

On January 9, 1984, 28 experts on the Law of the Sea met at the East‐West Center at the University of Hawaii for a week of intense discussions of the consequences of the refusal of the United States to sign the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The participants were from 12 Asian, Pacific, and North American countries. Proponents of the convention were led by Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore (last president of the Law of the Sea Conference), Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia, and Satya Nandan, former Ambassador of Fiji and now the special representative of the United Nations Secretary General for the Law of the Sea. Proponents of the U.S. position were Brian Hoyle, director of the Office of Ocean Law of the Department of State and David Colson of the Office of Legal Advisor of the Department of State. Many of the other participants presented papers, and all participated in the discussions, which are fully recorded in these proceedings of the workshop.

International North Sea Conference

International North Sea Conference

OIL SPILL POLLUTION: THE NORTH SEA EXPERIENCE OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES

ABSTRACT The North Sea is a relatively small yet intensely used area, rich in various resources. It is bounded by six highly industrialized states and contains the world's busiest shipping channel. It exemplifies the problems of control and management of marine resources, in particular in relation to oil pollution. This paper summarizes major sources of hydrocarbon pollution in the North Sea, discussing the levels and different types of oil pollution arising from different activities. The international and regional conventions bearing on hydrocarbon pollution in the North Sea are documented with reference to some recent comments on the adequacy of the existing legal regime. Initiatives to improve and develop scientific and technical knowledge and cooperation among North Sea states are examined. Specific measures to establish arrangements for monitoring and remedial action in the event of an oil spill are discussed. The paper also describes the implementation of MARPOL 73/78 for the North Sea, documents European Economic Community responses to oil pollution, and, finally, discusses the most recent initiative, the International North Sea Conference (November 1984) that will address the complex problem of oil pollution in the North Sea.

Canadian perspectives on seabed mining: The case of the production limitation formula

Abstract This paper will analyze the position Canada took on seabed mining in the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III). Canada is a major land‐based producer of nickel, an industrialized country with private interests in seabed mining, a NATO member, a major ally of the United States, and a country with extensive ties to less‐developed countries. At UNCLOS III Canada was concerned primarily about the management and control of its coastal resources and the protection of the marine environment. After having secured these interests, Canada emerged as the leader of the land‐based mineral‐producer group advocating production controls on seabed mining. The production limitation formula was one of the major reasons for the United States’ decision not to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty. In so forcefully advocating a production limitation formula, the Canadian delegation relinquished Canada's potential as a middle power to bridge the gap between the Group of 77 and the Western industrialized countries in order to formulate a widely acceptable regime to govern the seabed. A production limitation formula was not in Canada's best interests, given her potential role in seabed mining, and was rejected by officials in the Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, as well as the Canadian private sector.

To Sign or Not to Sign: The Debate in Britain on the Law of the Sea Convention

with the competing ideologies of domestic British politics rather than for any considerations to do with British foreign policy. It came nevertheless as an unwelcome reversal of policy to much of the British administrative machine itself, as it did to much of the British marine and maritime industry. Properly to explain it requires a short disquisition on three themes: the British role in the Law of the Sea Conference; the organization of British policymaking machinery on the Law of the Sea Conference; and the political origins of Mrs Thatcher and her supporters in the cabinet. There is, to begin with, no denying that the original United Nations initiative in calling the Third Law of the Sea Conference (unclos in) was greeted in Britain with a mixture of distrust and disbelief. In 1973 the popularity of the General Assembly, of the Group of 77, and of the movement towards a North-South dialogue on matters of access to resources was, to put it mildly, at a general low both in Foreign Office circles and with the Heath government, which was to hold office until the first general election of 1974 (which barely preceded the Caracas meeting). The specific issues involved in the movement towards the recodification of so much of the existing international law of the sea had

The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed Countries as Partners: A Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?

general agreement that anyone who has made a contribution to the Law of the Sea Conference would be regarded as having made a positive contribution to peace, security, and the rule of law. In that event, you will be hearing a minority point of view from me because my government considers-and I agree-that the Conference was a smashing success. We regret that the U.S. Government does not see things in the same way. It needs to be explained in brief what Conference I am talking about because we all seem to be talking about different conferences; indeed we seem to be talking about different Conventions according to our respective perceptions of this Convention. I therefore take the liberty of citing some high-level Canadian sources, and then I will plunge into the subject matter of my discussion, namely the negotiating process and its possible applicability to other conferences. I want to begin by recalling that when the conference began, the law of the sea was in a state of disorder bordering on chaos. I am thinking more of 1967 than 1973, but there had not been much improvement in the meantime. There were conflicting claims on the breadth of territorial sea, the nature and extent of coastal jurisdiction over fisheries, the regime for marine scientific research, coastal state rights and obligations concerning the preservation of the environment, disputes as to the outer edge of the continental shelf, disagreements concerning the rule for boundary delimitation, and even whether or not there existed an international seabed beyond national jurisdiction. It was not so long ago that two NATO allies of the United States and Canada (the United Kingdom and Iceland) were in a confrontation over fishing rights, while later, two others (Greece and Turkey) engaged in a dispute in the Aegean over seabed limits and delimitation issues.

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished?

At the Law of the Sea Conference we have acquired a vocabulary all our own. We have short forms for referring to concepts, even to groups of people and delegations, and something quite interesting happened one day when my predecessor in office and former president of the conference, Ambassador Amerasinghe, was dictating the draft of a speech to a gathering like this. He said to his secretary, The coastal states fall into two categories: are, first of all, those who claim a territorial sea of 200 miles, whom I shall hereafter refer to as the 'territorialists,' and there are other coastal states who have claimed an economic zone of 200 miles, whom I shall hereafter refer to as the 'zonists'. When the script came back from his secretary it read, There are two groups of coastal states: On the one hand there are the 'terrorists' and on the other hand there are the 'Zionists'. I told him

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the Way?

One of the important accomplishments of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference is the development of a veritable code for the settlement of the disputes which may arise with respect to the interpretation and application of the Law of the Sea Convention. It was recognized early in the negotiations that if the parties to the Convention had retained the right of unilateral interpretation, then the complex text drafted by the Conference would have lacked stability, certainty, and predictability.2 It is one of the prerogatives of sovereign equality that in the absence of an agreement on impartial third-party adjudication, the view of one state with respect to the interpretation of the Convention cannot prevail over the views of other member states.3 Each party can claim forever that its view alone is correct, but another party can make the same claim, resulting in an impasse. The only effective remedy in such a situation is to provide in advance in the Convention itself for an effective method of settling future interpretation disputes. In the past, several groups of states have usually refused to accept such a solution, and at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, agreement was reached only on an optional protocol which very few states ratified.4 The general importance of the

Technological trends in ocean mining

The ocean and, in particular, the deep-sea floor offer vast potentials of various minerals: polymetallic nodules, metalliferous sediments of hydrothermal origin, phosphorites, uraniferous mud and mineral sands, as well as oil and gas. It is now established that the manganese nodules of the North Pacific may exceed in nickel, copper and cobalt content all known reserves on land. Covered by several kilometres of water column and in what was once considered a hostile or even deadly environment, they can be turned into resources only with the aid of new techniques and technologies for exploration, mining and processing. Recent developments in acoustics, electronics and materials lead to new exploration equipment and strategies to locate and quantify the minerals on or below the deep ocean floor. Advances in hydraulics and offshore technology indicate ways to mine the ores, and recent results in mineral processing and metallurgy allow one to produce and refine the metals. These technical trends and results occur in certain, most important, settings: ocean space is no longer regarded as a hostile barrier but with ever-increasing awareness as an environment to be thoroughly protected; political trends as evolving from the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference influence the technology and are influenced by it; market factors, such as the future demand for nickel, have an important impact. And, above all, mineral recovery is an exercise to satisfy the human mind, curious and adventurous and concerned with this globe’s further wellbeing.

Environment and Development Revisited: Ten Years after Stockholm Conference

This paper traces the course of North-South dialogue in the space of ten years between the Stockholm Conference (held in June 1972) and the Law of the Sea Conference (held in April 1982), both under the aegis of the United Nations, to see if, and the extent to which, the spirit of accommodation shown at Stockholm enabling the two sides (which had initially taken diametrically opposed positions on the tangled relationship between development and environment) to hammer out a consensus had survived. The consensus at Stockholm centred round the principles and the code of conduct governing environmentally sound development and the international arrangements conducive to it – in other words, the sustainable husbanding of planetary resources and their equitable sharing so as to foster development in non-industrialized countries facing the acute problem of poverty and to prevent the degradation of environment by industrialized countries not prudent in the use of technology. The Law of the Sea conference was a negation of this spirit, and consensus failed to emerge. Intimation of this had been received earlier, when the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, strongly criticized the Cocoyoc Declaration passed by a conference sponsored by the UN and organized jointly by UNEP (which had been set up following the Stockholm conference to implant Stockholm decisions) and UNCTAD in 1974. The article nevertheless sees several indications that the issue of an alternative development is still very much alive and is gaining increasing support.

The Malacca/Singapore Straits

THE UNITED NATIONS Law of the Sea Conference (UNLOSC) is approaching what seems to be its final stages and is close to reaching an agreement on a new international regime for the oceans, to replace the existing regime established by the 1958 LOSC. One of the major components of the new regime is the rights of through and above international straits. Since some of these straits are of major strategic economic and political importance to the superpowers and other naval powers, the appropriate regime emerged only after difficult bargaining between the coastal states and the naval powers. right of transit passage is defined in Article 38 of the Draft Convention On The Law Of The Sea as follows: Transit means the exercise in accordance with this part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.' On this issue the Soviet Union and the United States took similar positions, while China adopted the position of the coastal states,2 which demanded the right to regulate