Increasing concerns pertaining to environmental conservation and the promotion of circular economy have exerted pressure on the implementation of automotive parts remanufacturing (APR). In order to examine the influence of government regulations on the choice of end-of-life vehicle (ELV) recycling, this study develops APR models for ELV take-back within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). These models consist of two direct APR models and one hybrid APR model, all operating under the purview of government regulation. The Stackelberg game is employed to attain an equilibrium strategy concerning the profits of CLSC members. Furthermore, this study conducts an analysis of the impact of recycling license fees and remanufacturing recycling rates on each CLSC member, based on the “Management Measures for Scrap Vehicle Recycling” issued in 2019. In every recycling model, automotive parts manufacturers consistently achieved greater profits compared to the nonrecycling model, while retailers also benefited from their involvement in recycling activities. Additionally, third-party profits experienced an exponential increase with the escalation of recovery rates. Numerical analysis results indicate that as the remanufacturing level of ELV matures, the government is inclined to relax the restrictions on the “remanufacturing recycling rate,” thus promoting the proliferation of third-party recycling centers.