Hume as an Essayist:Comments on Harris's Hume: An Intellectual Biography Mikko Tolonen (bio) I was a Leverhulme visiting fellow at the University of St Andrews in 2012–13 when James Harris was working on Hume: An Intellectual Biography. At the time, I expected his book to take decades to finish due to the daunting nature of the task. During those years there were periods when we sat daily discussing Hume at the National Library of Scotland and its near vicinity. As a result of those conversations, we also wrote and published an article about Hume in the Scottish context.1 I look back to those days with warmth. I wanted to say this to point out that I am not impartial towards Harris, who I consider a friend, nevertheless, I am not responsible for what is advanced in James's book, and thus I can comment on it. James Harris succeeded in his undertaking much faster and better than what I expected—and my expectations were high. The focus of this paper is on Hume's essays in a broad sense. The topics I will engage with include writing an intellectual biography, style, method, political perspectives, religion, and what I call "a defense of the unity thesis" in Hume, in contrast to Harris's argument that, surprisingly bluntly, claims that there is no real continuity throughout Hume's works. What is it that you do when you write an intellectual biography? To me, it seems that the responsibility is overwhelming because you are not engaging in a regular scholarly debate, or what Quentin Skinner encourages us to do in historical research. The goal in Skinnerian intellectual history is not to put forward a "refereed perspective," but to find a new perspective which often means purposely arguing against what others have said. The objective is thus to formulate a novel, justified stance on some particular aspect of political thought. This approach is apt also due to the practical reasons. We do not have access to the past as such that would enable us to formulate an "objective" perspective on intellectual history qua facts. [End Page 29] Hence, we are always engaged in a hermeneutic undertaking of a dialogue between previous interpretations and what we take away from our reading of the original sources, trying to find some new angle to a debate that is justified within some context of previous scholarship.2 If we share this idea of what intellectual history is, then we are willing to allow that even going to the extremes of the argumentative style will advance our understanding of the past, as long as the perspective is contextualized. This, I believe, can be contrasted to some extent to what Harris does in his book, which is about carefully considering the different sides of previous arguments in scholarship and formulating a position based on it. In a sense, the question then is whether it is possible to act as a referee and write an intellectual biography that would be more objective than other studies of Hume's intellectual development, to be flagged out as the general point of reference. To illustrate what I mean in Harris's case, let us consider the influence of Mandeville on Hume, a topic that I have been keenly interested in in my own past, and which Harris takes to be a relevant part of his story about Hume. When I attended my first Hume Society conference in 2005, I was afraid to defend the position of Hume as a Mandevillean thinker, because it was an unorthodox stance in the Hume Society at the time. Has this thinking about Mandeville's positive influence on Hume now become orthodox? I am not entirely sure about it. The reason why I am pointing this out is just to illustrate the nature of the game when one begins to write an intellectual biography—it is a tricky business to canonize different perspectives, because scholarship is consistently on the move. Whether we want it or not, this process of canonizing different perspectives, is also what separates a "regular" study of Hume's intellectual development from an intellectual biography. Balancing Act Over the years there have...
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