Scientific Theory Of Consciousness Research Articles

Content-state dimensions characterize different types of neuronal markers of consciousness.

Identifying the neuronal markers of consciousness is key to supporting the different scientific theories of consciousness. Neuronal markers of consciousness can be defined to reflect either the brain signatures underlying specific conscious content or those supporting different states of consciousness, two aspects traditionally studied separately. In this paper, we introduce a framework to characterize markers according to their dynamics in both the "state" and "content" dimensions. The 2D space is defined by the marker's capacity to distinguish the conscious states from non-conscious states (on the x-axis) and the content (e.g. perceived versus unperceived or different levels of cognitive processing on the y-axis). According to the sign of the x- and y-axis, markers are separated into four quadrants in terms of how they distinguish the state and content dimensions. We implement the framework using three types of electroencephalography markers: markers of connectivity, markers of complexity, and spectral summaries. The neuronal markers of state are represented by the level of consciousness in (i) healthy participants during a nap and (ii) patients with disorders of consciousness. On the other hand, the neuronal markers of content are represented by (i) the conscious content in healthy participants' perception task using a visual awareness paradigm and (ii) conscious processing of hierarchical regularities using an auditory local-global paradigm. In both cases, we see separate clusters of markers with correlated and anticorrelated dynamics, shedding light on the complex relationship between the state and content of consciousness and emphasizing the importance of considering them simultaneously. This work presents an innovative framework for studying consciousness by examining neuronal markers in a 2D space, providing a valuable resource for future research, with potential applications using diverse experimental paradigms, neural recording techniques, and modeling investigations.

The many‐worlds theory of consciousness

AbstractThis paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many‐worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first‐personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first‐personal realizers” of a shared “third‐personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first‐personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.

THE PHENOMENON OF CONSCIOUSNESS FROM AN INTER AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE

Contemporary science, in recent decades, reflects intensely on the phenomenon of consciousness. This fact is due to the accelerated development of cognitive sciences, biological and physical sciences, neuroscience, which have achieved certain successes in researching the problem of mind-body, consciousness. However, what is strictly required is the issue of the possibility of a scientific theory of consciousness, which would apply a new research methodology. The most recent approaches in this direction substantiate the need for research from a phenomenological structural perspective, which explains consciousness as a phenomenon determined by the subquantum level. Structural-phenomenological theory holds that this level is a profound reality regulated by specific principles and laws that make consciousness possible.

Formalizing falsification for theories of consciousness across computational hierarchies.

The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because it quantified subjective experience in a scalar mathematical measure called that is in principle measurable. Epistemological issues in the form of the “unfolding argument” have provided a concrete refutation of IIT by demonstrating how it permits functionally identical systems to have differences in their predicted consciousness. The implication is that IIT and any other proposed theory based on a physical system’s causal structure may already be falsified even in the absence of experimental refutation. However, so far many of these arguments surrounding the epistemological foundations of falsification arguments, such as the unfolding argument, are too abstract to determine the full scope of their implications. Here, we make these abstract arguments concrete, by providing a simple example of functionally equivalent machines realizable with table-top electronics that take the form of isomorphic digital circuits with and without feedback. This allows us to explicitly demonstrate the different levels of abstraction at which a theory of consciousness can be assessed. Within this computational hierarchy, we show how IIT is simultaneously falsified at the finite-state automaton level and unfalsifiable at the combinatorial-state automaton level. We use this example to illustrate a more general set of falsification criteria for theories of consciousness: to avoid being already falsified, or conversely unfalsifiable, scientific theories of consciousness must be invariant with respect to changes that leave the inference procedure fixed at a particular level in a computational hierarchy.

Philosophy and cognitive science on spatial and temporal experience

The study of the contrast between fundamental aspects of spatial and temporal awareness offers a good opportunity to bring to light the relation between philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness. In this paper we critically examine important work by Rick Grush on spatial and temporal experience, and we show that while there is a valid claim for the relevant neuroscientific model to be one that supports Gareth Evans's stance on "behavioral space", there is not at present any scientific model that offers comparable support for philosophical theories of temporal experience, despite some claims by Grush that might suggest the contrary. Moreover, we argue that careful attention to the spatial case allows us to locate the point at which even relatively successful cases of neuroscientific modeling and explanation are left wanting when their aim is to show that phenomenal features of experience are a function of the representational structures produced by our neural information-processing machinery: an aim widely shared by the predominant programmatic stance in current neuroscience research.

Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal

Most scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non‐human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call the specificity problem. After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely the theory‐light approach proposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this that I term the modest theoretical approach, arguing that it may provide insights into challenging cases that would otherwise be intractable.

Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness

This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.

El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatría

Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el signifi­cado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas suge­rencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría.

Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 2 (An anthology of various other models)

The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed.

Hierarchical approaches to understanding consciousness

There has been much discussion on what a scientific theory of consciousness would look like, and even whether such a theory is possible. Some common misunderstandings of the nature of theories (e.g., in the physical sciences) have confused the discussion of theories concerning consciousness. Theories in the physical sciences establish hierarchies of descriptions that relate high-level descriptions of macro-level phenomena to detailed-level descriptions at a micro level. Detailed descriptions are usually more accurate but information-dense and therefore often beyond human comprehensibility (unless limited to tiny segments of a macro-level phenomenon). High-level descriptions are usually much less information-dense but more approximate. The ability to map between levels of description, and in particular the understanding of when a shift from a higher-level to a more detailed description is needed to achieve a desired degree of accuracy, is fundamental to an effective theory in any field. The form of such a theory of consciousness is sketched, and the limitations of some alternative approaches described.

Consciousness, art, and the brain: Lessons from Marcel Proust

In his novel Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust argues that conventional descriptions of the phenomenology of consciousness are incomplete because they focus too much on the highly-salient sensory information that dominates each moment of awareness and ignore the network of associations that lies in the background. In this paper, I explicate Proust’s theory of conscious experience and show how it leads him directly to a theory of aesthetic perception. Proust’s division of awareness into two components roughly corresponds to William James’ division of the stream of thought into a “nucleus” and “fringe.” Proust argues that the function of art is to evoke the underlying associative network indirectly in the mind of the observer by using carefully chosen sensory surfaces to control the stream of thought. I propose a possible neural basis for this Proustian/Jamesian phenomenology, and argue that the general principles of Proustian aesthetics can be applied to all forms of art. I conclude that a scientific theory of art should follow in a straightforward manner from a scientific theory of consciousness.