Influence Of Schopenhauer Research Articles

The Gulf between Music Theory and Practice: Subjectivity, Spirituality, and Other Scholarly Inconveniences

For much of history, philosophers and theorists have considered the abstract, rational contemplation of music to be the true form of spiritual activity. This has often come at the cost of making the practical aspect of music (which consists of listening, performance, subjective experience, among others) subservient to theory. This paper examines the implications of separating abstract music theory from its practical side and explores where spirituality can be situated. It was not until the nineteenth century, under the influence of Schopenhauer, that a proper unification of music theory and practice truly took on metaphysical and spiritual dimensions. Schopenhauerian metaphysics allowed music to legitimately become a spiritual refuge in the age of positivism, paving the way for projects such as Scriabin’s Mysterium. The described tension between theory and practice in Western music will be contrasted with Sufism as a point of comparison. The comparison will illustrate how a spiritual movement like Sufism poses a challenge for musicological research. Additionally, reflecting on the state of current music research, the paper explores how music and musicology of the twentieth century onward fall short of the spiritual aspirations of preceding generations.

MARÍA ARACIL Y SACHA SAVAROF: DOS PROTAGONISTAS BAROJIANAS

Pío Baroja ha sido considerado por la crítica como un hombre misógino y un escritor que no se ha detenido en los personajes femeninos. Este artículo pretende destacar el importante papel de dos figuras femeninas que son, además, protagonistas de tres novelas. Estas heroínas no son figuras estáticas sino que, como los demás héroes barojianos, van rodando de un lugar a otro. Baroja dedica los primeros capítulos para explicar cómo el medio en el que crecen determina su personalidad y, en la elaboración de la joven estudiante de Medicina Sacha Savarof, se observa la influencia de Schopenhauer. En las novelas aparecen temas de interés para la mujer como la educación, la amistad femenina o el divorcio, lo que sitúa el pensamiento barojiano en la vanguardia del feminismo.

Nietzsche on Art and Life

Nietzsche on Art and Life

Richard Wagner’in Siyasal Düşünceleri: Modernite Eleştirisi ve Ulusal Sanat Anlayışı

Richard Wagner wrote systematic accounts of his ideas on opera and on the relationships among art, politics, and society in the articles and books he published from the 1840s onward. He analyzed a variety of topics in his studies on politics and art, including cultural nationalism and critiques of modernity. He put emphasis on the specificity and superiorty of the German nation over other nations, and on the need to recover rural life, national history, and legends in order to create a national art. He was influenced by contemporary thinkers, including Feuerbach and Proudhon, and developed a romantic critique of modernity in the late 1840s and early 1850s. Although he changed some of his ideas under the influence of Schopenhauer, whom he discovered in the mid-1850s, he continued to make ciritiques of modernity. However, in this later writings, Wagner was far from adopting a utopian viewpoint or optimistic attitude towards the future. In this same period, he also developed more racialist aspects into his cultural nationalism. <br>

Danto as Educator

From the title as Educator (1874)1 it would be natural to expect Nietzsche to offer us a detailed account of how Schopenhauer's philosophical system influenced his own thought, or perhaps at a minimum how the sage of Frankfurt's work was crucial for his development as a thinker. After all, Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation clearly left a profound mark on Nietzsche's earliest published work, The Birth of Tragedy. But Nietzsche frustrates these reasonable expectations in the essay, as he is almost entirely silent on Schopenhauer's actual philosophical system. By the point in time of writing as Educator, Nietzsche has apparently taken for granted that this post-Kantian's version of transcendental idealism, his will-less aesthetics, the ethics of compassion, and the praise of asceticism as redemption from the will-to-life are just plain wrongheaded. So why would Nietzsche call Schopenhauer his educator, if Schopenhauer's oeuvre was not particularly educational?Nietzsche focuses on the man as educator. He lauds Schopenhauer as an example of how to be a true philosopher for one's time and culture. Most impressive to him was Schopenhauer's manner of living: independent, free from the dominant religious, political and social thinking of his day; free from the need to draw an income; and, accordingly, free from a formal academic environment. Above all, what was most worthy of emulation, according to Nietzsche, was Schopenhauer's quest for the truth and the suffering he undertook for truth's sake. He suffered in part because of the intellectual climate in which he philosophized that favored Hegelian currents rather antithetical to Schopenhauer's peculiar mixture of Plato, Kant, Vedic thought and attention to contemporary natural science. Ultimately, it is the example of the free, truth-seeking and suffering genius that creates a philosophy with the capacity to disturb that makes Schopenhauer his educator.2Arthur Danto was one of my most important educators. He is responsible, for better or for worse, for putting me on the intellectual and academic path I've been pursuing for the past 20 years, that is, to reconstruct many facets of Schopenhauer's thought, especially his metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics for contemporary use. Unlike Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche, however, it is both Danto's work and his personal example as an engaged philosopher and art critic that educated me. Further, Danto's model as a philosophical educator is anything but that of a solitary, untimely sufferer for the sake of the truth, though he did exemplify a kind of freedom from traditional academic style and freedom from the oftentimes-sterile academic concerns of his day. While Danto certainly sought out the truth about the nature and importance of art, history, and many other philosophically rich topics, he was no solitary sufferer. On the contrary, Danto was a very sociable and even joyful philosopher, deeply engaged in his contemporary society, in the academy, and especially in the world of art past and present.I decided to pursue graduate study in philosophy at Columbia in the early 1990s largely because of Arthur Danto. As an undergraduate I read The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981), and I recall reading the whole 200-page book in one sitting. In that book, Danto takes the reader on an exhilarating, ridiculously erudite journey through the history of philosophical aesthetics, the history of art, and through contemporary currents in the visual arts especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The meandering but purposive path he takes in the book delivers a compelling case that the essence of a work of art, as opposed to an ordinary object, is that it is an embodiment of meaning, and further, that one needs to understand the historical and institutional background of artistic practice in order to grasp that meaning and to grasp the essential nature of art and why it matters. …

On Catharsis, Conflict and the Coherence of Nietzsche’s Agonism

Abstract On the one hand, in CV 3 (Der griechische Staat) Nietzsche affirms physically destructive conflict as a means to cathartically discharging an immutably destructive drive underlying human nature; on the other hand, in CV 5 (Homer’s Wettkampf) and MA (Menschliches, Allzumenschliches), he criticises such conflict and promotes its transformation into productive, agonistic modes of contest. I first argue that, in a manner hitherto unappreciated, the possibility of transformation presupposed by CV 5 and MA, and indeed by agonistic readings of Nietzsche in general, is contradicted by the ontology of destructive conflict presented in CV 3. I continue by arguing that the problematic conception of destructive conflict found in CV 3 is based on the influence of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, which Nietzsche wholeheartedly rejects by MA. However, I conclude that in the 1880s, when Nietzsche turns to the discharge theory of Robert Mayer, we find an ontology of destructive conflict that is fully compatible with his agonistic project.

Texturen des Denkens: Nietzsches Inszenierung der Philosophie in “Jenseits von Gut und Böse.”

Texturen des Denkens: Nietzsches Inszenierung der Philosophie in “Jenseits von Gut und Böse.”

How much Schopenhauer is there really in Wagner?

The paper aims at analyzing some Wagnerian figures in order to show that the influence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy on Wagner is not as strong as commonly held – at least not in his operas. The figures that shall be considered are: Wotan and Brünnhilde, Tristan and Isolde, and finally Parsifal, who appears to be the only Schopenhauerian character of all.

Nietzsches Musikästhetik der Affekte

Nietzsches Musikästhetik der Affekte

Samuel Beckett's Encounter with the East

This article breaks new ground by demonstrating Beckett's appropriation of Buddhism and Hinduism, which he learned from Arthur Schopenhauer, and of Chinese Taoism, which he learned from H. A. Giles. Although critics have noted Schopenhauer's influence on Beckett, they have often neglected the ways in which the Eastern influence on Schopenhauer's philosophy continues to influence Beckett indirectly. My close reading of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea and Beckett's long essay Proust seeks to illuminate that indirect influence. The first part of the article elucidates Beckett's use of Buddhism and Hinduism in his two essays Proust and “Henri Hayden, homme-peintre”; the second part of the essay examines his use of Chinese music in two poems, as well as the ways in which Beckett's mystic ethics is inspired by the Chinese k'in music.

The Tragic and the Ecstatic: The Musical Revolution of Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde (review)

The Tragic and the Ecstatic: The Musical Revolution of Wagner's Tristan and Isolde. By Eric Chafe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. [viii, 330 p. ISBN-10: 0195176472; ISBN-13: 9780195176476. $60.] Bibliographical references, music examples, index. The early years of the new millennium (if one takes the millennium as beginning in 2000 rather than 2001) witnessed a flurry of books that take on the much-discussed but always slippery topic of the relationship between Wagner's Tristan and Schopenhauer's philosophy. First was The Tristan Chord: Wagner and Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), by the British historian of philosophy Bryan Magee. Although the book is about Wagner's engagement with philosophy during his whole career, not just his appropriation of Schopenhauer beginning in 1854, its central chapters offer an intelligent and useful discussion of the philosopher and his influence on the composer, especially with respect to Tristan. Then came Death-Devoted Heart: Sex and the Sacred in Wagner's Tristan and Isolde (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), by Roger Scruton, who like Magee has written compellingly about philosophy, but who also has a far deeper grasp of music (see, for example, his Aesthetics of Music [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999]), Scruton's fundamental claim is that Tristan is literally a sacred work-that it offers us a model by means of which we, as contemporary human beings, can enrich and ennoble our lives. In contrast to Magee, Scruton addresses in considerable detail both the literary work on which the opera is based, Gottfried von Strassburg's Tristan und Isot, and Wagner's music. Schopenhauer's philosophy plays a major role in his reading, but nothing like the commanding role accorded to it by Magee. In between Magee and Scruton is a strange (and massive) new biography by the German journalist and scholar Joachim Kohler, Richard Wagner: The Last of the Titans (trans. Stewart Spencer, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004; originally published as Der Letzte der Titanen: Richard Wagners Leben und Werk [Munich: Claassen, 2001]). Kohler's long chapter on Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Tristan (The Grand Passion, pp. 408-68) is noteworthy for its iconoclastic view that Wagner's undying acknowledgement of Schopenhauer's influence from 1854 to the end of his life is in fact proof that he was in fact no influence at all-the point being that the composer without exception hid the real influences on his work. Enter, improbably, Eric Chafe-a scholar known for his publications on the music of Monteverdi and Bach, not on nineteenthcentury opera, and indeed one who has no previous publications on Wagner whatsoever. Chafe's The Tragic and the Ecstatic dramatically trumps all the above works in every respect. This is not to say that they are not worth reading; they are, and one would do well to read them before attempting Chafe. But, in comparison with them, he offers by far the most detailed and persuasive account of Schopenhauer's influence on the opera. His discussion of the relation of Schopenhauerian philosophy to Tristan begins on the first page, and it is the central plank on which Chafe builds his entire interpretation of the work-philosophical, dramatic, and musical. Like Scruton, he engages Gottfried's Tristan in detail, but he argues convincingly that Wagner's opera is at bottom a Schopenhauerian drama with an overlay of Gottfried, not the reverse. Most important, he provides a magisterial analysis of the music, using Schopenhauer as his guide to develop dramatically and musically compelling readings of all levels of the work, from its global structure down to individual phrases, chords and notes. It is hardly possible to praise his musical acumen-his ear, his sensitivity to motive, harmony, tonal process, and line-sufficiently. And his musical skills are supplemented wonderfully by his philosophical, literary-critical, biographical, and archival ones. The Tragic and the Ecstatic is ultimately a work of synthesis, and Chafe's signal contribution is to tie all sorts of disparate threads-Wagner's pre-1854 philosophical and literary influences (Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, Griepenkerl), Schopenhauer, Gottfried, the composer's aesthetic writings, his letters, his sketches, the past 150 years of Wagner scholarship, and musical analysis-together into a compelling and convincing interpretation of the opera. …

Culture, Tragedy and Pessimism in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy

In this essay I look at The Birth of Tragedy in order to explore two related issues. First, beginning with Nietzsche’s own later critical look back at the book, I argue that in lamenting both the influence of Schopenhauer, and the inclusion of an extended discussion of contemporary German culture, Nietzsche underplayed the interdependence of these elements and his analysis of tragedy and its significance in the book. Second, I argue that to understand Nietzsche's Schopenhauerian concept of tragedy we may begin from the perspective of the term's common usage, attending to phenomena often labelled tragic, and glimpsing what holds sway just beneath their surfaces. Ultimately, although Nietzsche's expressed understanding of tragedy in these early years drew heavily on Schopenhauerian pessimism, it nevertheless exceeded that influence.

Philosophy, Solipsism and Thought

Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy in the Tractatus presupposes that thought may be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. It is commonly held, however, that in the Tractatus he treated thought as logically prior to language. If this view, expressed most lucidly by Norman Malcolm, were correct, Wittgenstein would be inconsistent in holding that thought can be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. I argue that this is not correct. Thought may be prior to language in time but not in logic, for non-verbal symbols must have a logical structure in common with verbal ones. A view comparable with Malcolm’s holds that Wittgenstein, under the influence of Schopenhauer, is committed to some form of solipsism. I argue that neither Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein held any version of solipsism. For both philosophers, subject and object are correlative, so that it is incoherent to affirm the existence of the one without presupposing the existence of the other.

Genius and Talent: Schopenhauer's Influence on Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 469 the morally contingent natural world, the symbolization of ideas or requisite analogical thinking for giving expression to transcendent ideas, and the notion of Denkungsart.s GISELA FELICITAS MUNZEL Univfrsity of Notre Dame David Avraham Weiner. Genius and Talent: Schopenhauer's Influence on Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy. Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1992. Pp. x38. Cloth, $28.5o. Weiner contends that "Wittgenstein's first philosophy was Schopenhauerian" (lo-11), and that though the Schopenhauerian link has been acknowledged (9, 15, 16, etc.), the "prevalent trend" (9, 17) is to ignore it. (Weiner nowhere mentions Pears's recent discussion of the Schopenhauerian link to Wittgenstein in Vol. 1 of The False Prison.) This may not be entirely the commentators' fault since Wittgenstein himself"misled a whole generation of readers" (18) by "conceal[ing] his connection to Sch.openhauer." (2 l, 25). Weiner's aim is to "reconstruct the conceptual steps that lead from Schopenhauer 's philosophy to Wittgenstein's" and to "offer textual evidence that Wittgenstein actually took these steps en route to the Tractatus (TLP for short)" (lo). Weiner quotes Griffiths, who holds that "one might regard parts of the Tractatus as a dialogue with [Schopenhauer]," and Weiner represents parts of the Notebooks and Tractatus in precisely this way. He does not claim that there is always similarity between Wittgenstein's and Schopenhauer's philosophies, but that sometimes the former adopts Schopenhauer's view, sometimes he reacts against it, and sometimes he falls between these two extremes (lO). The claim that TLP is a dialogue with Schopenhauer is a very strong claim, and may even be true. But Weiner would have been on safer ground had he claimed only that it had been influenced by Schopenhauer. The book is divided into three parts. In Chapter l, Weiner claims that Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer were similar in their disdain for metaphysical language, and that both develop a theory of language to combat groundless metaphysical pretensions (11, ~7, 34). In Chapter ~ he argues that, roughly, Wittgenstein accepts Schopenhauer's world-as-representation, but rejects the world-as-will (l l). In Chapter 3, he relates the final sections of the Tractatus to Schopenhauer's theories of virtue, beauty, etc. One might expect that Weiner's case is strongest with regard to the "ethical point" of TLP (18), and this is the case. But he also claims that the Schopenhauerian influence improves our understanding of Wittgenstein's first philosophy "as a whole" (17), including TLP views on language, science, metaphysics, and epistemology. He acknowledges that "it is easy to point to vague parallels" (1o), but some of the parallels emphasized by Weiner do appear to be too vague to shed great illumination on TLP. sThis term (meaning mode of thought) is not mentioned in the present study, although it appears frequently in the German text of the Religion. Often translated as castof mind, it is the act producing disposition (Gesinnung) and is ultimately definitive of human character. The Anthropologiein pragsmtischerHinsicta, pp. ~85-3oa, also gives an extended discussion of Derdmngsart. 470 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~1:3 JULY t99 5 For example, in Chapter 1 he argues first that Schopenhauer's critique of metaphysical language is built on Kant's distinction between intuition and concept (29). Like Kant, Schopenhauer thinks concepts require intuitions (percepts), but unlike Kant, intuitions do not require concepts (28, 30). "Pseudoconcepts are.., notes of issue with no perceptual concepts to back them up" (32). Metaphysical nonsense (reaching from Plato to Hegel) is built on words that symbolize pseudoconcepts (32-33). One can develop an "immanent metaphysics" where metaphysical words, as in Kant, are closely tied to "the ground of perception" (33). Weiner sees a continuity insofar as TLP also holds that metaphysics is nonsense. Both Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer hold that their "contemporaries are merely 'blowing hot air'" (34). However, that is a similarity that they share with almost every other philosopher. But Weiner thinks that Wittgenstein becomes a "Schopenhauerian with a vengeance" (38), insofar as he holds that not only metaphysics, but all philosophical, ethical, aesthetical, and religious propositions are nonsense (38, 43). Since Wittgenstein holds that only the propositions of natural science make...

Genius and talent: Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein's early philosophy

Genius and talent: Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein's early philosophy

THE NATURE OF MAN: MAX KLINGER AND DARWINISM

man nature, hidden beneath conventional civilities, is defined by an instinctual need for self-preservation and sexual fulfill ment. Klinger's harsh assessment of hu man potential was formed under the influ ence of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, scien tific research on the unconscious, and his observations of self and society. Equally important, however, was his response to the writings of Charles Darwin.1 Klinger's familiarity with Darwin is documented in an ink drawing from 1875, Darwinian Theory, and by a letter to his father, dated October 5 of that year, in which he men tions an exchange of their Darwin read ings: Und vergesst doch nicht mir meinen neuesten Darwin mit zu schicken damit ich

Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 503 transformative continuity between Kant and Hegel. This section involves a critical account of that development and is an excellent addition to the literature. In Part e, involving Chapters 5-7, Pippin offers an interpretation of the Phenomenology which essentially rejects the position that we are involved here in the education of natural consciousness to the absolute standpoint and the "existentialist" and Marxist themes which have often dominated the interpretation of the Phenomenology. Pippin's view is that Hegel's main objective is to establish absolute knowledge as science by "overcoming .., the possibility of skepticism about Absolute Knowledge" 003) and that to do this Hegel invents "a new form of philosophical argument." In place of Kant's transcendental deduction of the conditions for the possibility of experience Hegel gives us "a phenomenological account of the ideal development of constitutive forms of Spirit" (29x), an account which establishes the self-conscious spontaneity of thought. The account Hegel gives is dialectical, which Pippin argues is not a method showing the only possible resolution to difficulties encountered in each putative position covered, but showing rather that the inadequacies of each position are resolved in an "appropriate way" (lo8). In Part 3 Pippin turns to Hegel's Logic, concentrating for the most part but not exclusively on the "greater" Logic. In Chapters 8, 9, and 1o he discusses respectively the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of the Concept. In these chapters we are shown the "logical determinations" of the subject's self-definition of its self-conscious spontaneity, i.e., the structure of Absolute Knowledge. But this knowledge we gain in the Logic, Pippin again reminds us, is "an absolute or final account of what it is to know, and not a knowledge of a divine Absolute" (247). Throughout his analysis, then, Pippin has rejected any "Platonist," as well as any other pre-Kantian interpretation of what Hegel is doing and has consistently viewed Hegel as undertaking and expanding the Kantian project. There is much to be learned from this book simply because Pippin has so carefully worked out his argument. It would have been even more helpful if he had worked through the two Hegelian texts more thoroughly; instead he analyzes what he considers to be "key sections" of each of the works and makes his case on those grounds. In the matter of style, the book is written in a way that often distracts from the ongoing argument; many times the sentences are hopelessly complex in their construction . This is a fault not only of Pippin's but as well of poor editing on the part of Cambridge Press. A very good book would have been even better had the Press devoted some time to this. Be this as it may, this is a book to be strongly recommended. JOSEPH C. FLAY Pennsylvania State University Christopher Janaway. Selfand Worm in Schopenhauer's Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xii + 378. $69.oo. This book is a valuable and original contribution to the research on Schopenhauer. Janaway convincingly argues that many of Schopenhauer's thoughts are not merely 504 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 JULY 1991 elements of a curious metaphysical system, but are serious attempts to come to terms with the historical assumptions from which Schopenhauer's philosophy emerged and pose questions that are relevant for modern philosophy as well. The first part of the book is a historical analysis of the genesis of Schopenhauer's philosophy, proceeding from the assumption that a proper assessment of Schopenhauer requires awareness of his intellectual context. The second part investigates Schopenhauer 's philosophy itself and in particular the parts of his work related to the central theme of self and the world. The third and final part deals with those issues raised by Schopenhauer that still have to be addressed by modern philosophy and with Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. The book's title is somewhat misleading. It is not so much an account of Schopenhauer 's conceptions of the self and of the world, as it is an investigation of those strands and elements of Schopenhauer's philosophy...

Rethinking the Will and Idea of Sociology in the Light of Schopenhauer's Philosophy

Most accounts of sociology's origins ignore the role of Schopenhauer's philosophy andAn de siecle German philosophy in general in favor of a Kantian, positivistic scenario. Thus contemporary sociological theory remains trapped in Kant's dismissal of the noumenon, or the thing-in-itself, as unknowable. Evidence is presented to suggest that Schopenhauer's philosophy in particular influenced many of sociology's precursors, among them Durkheim, Simmel, Freud, Weber and Tonnies. Schopenhauer attempted to recover Kant's noumenon by renaming it the will, thereby informing a vocabulary that included 'the other side' of the phenomenon, including the unconscious, habit, perception, intuition, and judgment. The implications of recovering Schopenhauer's achievement for contemporary sociological theory as well as understanding its origins are discussed. It is curious that in most textbooks, secondary sources, as well as treatises, sociologists posit something like a straight line from the optimistic, rationalist philosophies that informed the works of SaintSimon, Comte, and Kant to current sociology. No acknowledgement is usually made of the long intellectual detour from that era to ours through what Ellenberger' calls theJin de siecle spirit exemplified by Schopenhauer's philosophy, the Romantic and pre-Romantic forces that led up to it, and his many disciples, especially Nietzsche. For example, Schopenhauer's philosophy is not even mentioned by such well-known theorists as Parsons2 and Habermas.3 Sociology presents itself as Kant's phenomenon) with the noumenon missing. Thus, today's sociology is mainly cognitive, conceptual, abstract, behavioral, cultural and anything but biological, perceptual, or even genuinely empirical. This is because it tries to derive empiricism from Kant's a priorism, a move that Schopenhauer considered impossible. In contradistinction to these and other one-sided Tlle Briti.sh lourn(lt of Sosiology I 'O/U777t () .tltN16eR^ 9 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.225 on Thu, 09 Jun 2016 06:12:23 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 272 Stjepan G. Mestrovic approaches to sociology's roots, it seems that Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, not Comte's or Kant's philosophies, constituted the starting point for much, if not most, turn of the century thought. What happened to sociology's noumenon, its early emphasis on 'the heart', habits, the unconscious, the perceptual, the will to life, 'the body' and its appetites? The seriousness of neglecting the 'other' side of sociology is evident from evaluating the extent of Schopenhauer's influence as well as the consequences of remaining trapped in Kant's claim that the noumenon, the thing-in-itself, is forever out of reach to knowledge the very claim that Schopenhauer attempted to transcend. Thus, the present-day account of sociology's origins is both distorted and limiting. This is immediately evident from comparing Kant's legacy with Schopenhauer's. Neo-Kantianism leads to preoccupations with abstractions, concepts, rationality, and phenomenalism, whereas Schopenhauer argued that the 'heart' was stronger and more important than the mind, a move that leads to emphasis on intuition, empiricism, induction, the unconscious, and unmasking the surface, illusory aspects of phenomena. If one examines the works of most social theorists from Parsons to Habermas, it seems that Schopenhauer's emphasis on the 'heart' and its derivatives has been deliberately suppressed in favor of rational, cognitive psychologies and sociologies. Regardless of one's preference with regard to the antagonistic unity between the 'heart' and 'mind', the point is that Schopenhauer's stature as a philosopher in the wake of Kant is too great to simply ignore as it has been in contemporary sociology. Georg Simmel attests to Schopenhauer's importance in his equally neglected Schopenhauer and Niettsche,4 which was not translated into English until 1986. Other notable authors who have traced the impact of Schopenhauer's philosophy in particular and German philosophy in general on turn of the century thought as a whole include Robert Bailey in his Sociology Faces Pessimism,5 Baillot in his Infuence de la thilosothie de Schopenhauer en France,6 Henri Ellenberger in his Discovery of the Unconscious,7 Janik and Toulmin in their Wittgenstein's Vienna,8 Georg Lukacs in his Destruction of Reason,9 Bryan Magee in his Philosothy of Schopenhauer,'° and even Alan Bloom in Closing of the American Mind, 1 1 although this list is not exhaustive. 1 2 Even by positivistic standards, it is a verifiable fact that turn of the century German philosophy played an important role in the genesis of the . .

The Social World as Will and Idea: Schopenhauer's Influence upon Durkheim's Thought

The starting-point for this analysis is a remark made by André Lalande, that Durkheim was so enamoured with Schopenhauer's philosophy that his students nicknamed him ‘Schopen’. The intellectual context shared by Schopenhauer and Durkheim is explored, especially with regard to the opposition between the id-like ‘will’ and the mind. Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim's contemporaries is examined briefly. Then, this new context for apprehending Durkheim's thought is applied to selected problems in Durkheimian scholarship, problems that have to do with the dualism of human nature, perception, the unconscious and the unity of knowledge relative to the object-subject debate. The implications for sociological theory are also discussed.

Durkheim, Schopenhauer and the Relationship Between Goals and Means: Reversing the Assumptions in the Parsonian Theory of Rational Action*

Scholars have approached Durkheim's thought primarily from the starting point that he was a positivist. Although Schopenhauer's philosophy is not generally invoked in Durkheim's work, it appears that Schopenhauer's philosophy supplanted Comte's positivism at the turn of the century and that Durkheim was enamored with Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this essay Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim is traced, and the implications of this influence are discussed in terms of their effect upon sociology. By applying this starting point to Durkheim's thought and the Parsonian‐Mertonian goals‐means schema, it is demonstrated that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, assumed the opposite of the Enlightenment belief that human reason could dominate passion. Implications for interpreting Durkheim's work are also discussed.