The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States and Sub-Saharan Africa:In Search of Influence, Security, and New Markets Michael B. Bishku (bio) Introduction The GCC was established in 1981 and includes the countries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia and the UAE currently have the most interactions with Sub-Saharan Africa (defined as those areas on the continent south of the Arab North African states located on the Mediterranean),1 while Bahrain has the least. Oman has historical connections with Africa's east coast, while Qatar has become more active on the continent especially since its rivalry with Saudi Arabia and the UAE heated up in 2017, due to Qatar's military ties with Turkey and the perception that it was too favorable in its dealings with Iran and Islamist organizations. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (which received its independence from Britain in 1961), and the UAE became active on the African continent during the 1970s, especially following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when many African countries broke off diplomatic relations with Israel over its continued occupation of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula captured as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain received their independence from Britain in 1971, while the late-Sultan Qaboos of Oman was able to assume full control over his country's domestic and foreign policy [End Page 48] a year earlier, also from Britain. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE were involved with providing developmental aid in Africa and even working for the same purpose as Libya's leader Muammar Qaddafi on the continent when activities were directed in garnering support for the Arab world in its conflict against Israel. Investment and increased trade as well as counteracting the activities of Iran's Islamic Republic in Africa have become more important for Saudi Arabia since then and, in more recent years for the UAE, which has surpassed the Saudis in those endeavors as well as in regarding Turkey as a rival for influence on the African continent. This article will review the connections and interactions of the GCC states in Sub-Saharan Africa, something that is need of more study. This is especially important given the increased activity on the continent during post-Cold War period in both security arrangements for protecting shipping lanes and in dealing with the threat of terrorist organizations and/or in economic arrangements on the part of both bigger powers such as the U.S., Russia, China, and France, middle powers such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, India, and other countries with interests in the region such as the remainder of the Arab Gulf states. As scholars sometimes debate which countries to include in the category of middle powers, it is best to elaborate what might constitute such. A most succinct definition of a middle power is offered by Dong-min Shin: "…a state actor which has limited influence on deciding the distribution of power in a given regional system but is capable of deploying a variety of sources of power to change the position of great powers and to defend its own position on matters related to national or regional security that directly affect it."2 While greater attention is usually given by scholars of diplomatic history and international relations to the bigger powers, not enough is devoted to recognized middle powers and other countries seeking or on the verge of such status. Though there have been an increasing number of studies in recent years, especially [End Page 49] of Turkey's,3 Iran's,4 and Israel's5 activities in Africa, attention towards Saudi Arabia and the GCC states has been lagging behind; this article seeks to address that matter. The GCC States' Involvement in Africa during the Cold War Saudi Arabia's King Abdelaziz (also known as Ibn Saud) established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia's Haile Selassie in 1934 as his country was at the time one of only two independent states on the Arabian Peninsula, the other being Yemen. This was in part in response to fascist Italy's diplomatic moves in those two countries and...
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