In 'A Causal Theory of Enjoyment' (Mind i982), Wayne Davis raises three objections to my own 'causal theory' of enjoyment (Warner, 'Enjoyment', Phil. Rev. (ig80), pp. 506-526). These objections raise issues of interest beyond the mere defence of my account. I begin with a brief synopsis of Davis' account since it provides the background for his criticism of my views. Davis suggests that to enjoy an experience E is for E to cause one to 'experience pleasure by causing occurrent beliefs which satisfy desires concerning the experience itself' (p. 240). One may wonder what progress is achieved by defining enjoyment in terms of experiencing pleasure. But Davis explains that 'a person experiences pleasure if he feels happy, or experiences happiness' (p. 240), and adds that 'occurrent happiness can be defined in terms of belief, desire, and thought'. He explains: 'Take every proposition or thought a person is thinking at the moment, multiply the degree to which it is believed by the degree to which it is desired, add up all the products, and the sum is the degree of happiness' (p. 248). So Davis finally defines enjoyment as follows: 'A is enjoying E if E is causing A to have a number of occurrent beliefs concerning E, which collectively add significantly to the pleasure (happiness) A is experiencing' (p. 249). One may wonder about the 'add significantly' requirement. What is the criterion of significance? We will return to this point later. The basic idea behind this account is very similar to the basic idea behind my account. What I suggest is that an enjoyed experience (or activity) E causes (or causally sustains) a desire that it is also simultaneously satisfies (Warner, p. 517). The desire is the desire, of E, that it be an experience of such-and-such a sort. E ensures the satisfaction of this desire by causing one to believe, of E, that it is of such-and-such sort. So, given that E is occurring, and that one believes, of E, that it is such-and-such, one's desire, of E, that it be such-and-such must be satisfied. This harmony between causation and satisfaction is enjoyment. With two qualifications. First, it is not really true that one's desire must be satisfied. What is true is that one must experience its satisfaction. Here I am understanding 'experience' as creating an intentional context so that 'you experience the satisfaction of your desire' does not imply 'your desire is satisfied.' This emendation is needed to handle examples of the following sort. Suppose I enjoy -looking at a painting. I desire to be looking at a Cezanne and believe falsely that I am. I experience the satisfaction of my desire, but the desire is not really satisfied. The second qualification is that one must desire E for its own sake, and not merely as a means to an end.