Samir Okasha Research Articles

Review: Samir Okasha: Evolution and the Levels of Selection

Evolution and the Levels of Selection Samir Okasha New York Oxford University Press 2006 Pp. xi + 263 H/b $65.00

Samir Okasha, Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 263 pp., $55.00 (cloth).

Samir Okasha, <b><i>Evolution and the Levels of Selection</i></b>. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 263 pp., $55.00 (cloth).

Samir Okasha: Evolution and the levels of selection

The debate about the levels of selection has been one of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of science. Okasha’s book makes the sort of contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to come. However, my interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of “theory” through a combination of standard mathematical treatments and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but be welcome.

A Multilevel Exploration

Evolution and the Levels of Selection . By Samir Okasha . Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006. 275 pp. $55, £30. ISBN 9780199267972. Considering conceptual and foundational aspects of the debates over levels of selection--natural selection acting on genes, individuals, groups, or species--Okasha pays particular attention to effects that filter from one level up or down to others.

Coherence, Consistency, and Cohesion: Clade Selection in Okasha and Beyond

Samir Okasha argues that clade selection is an incoherent concept, because the relation that constitutes clades is such that it renders parent-offspring (reproduction) relations between clades impossible. He reasons that since clades cannot reproduce, it is not coherent to speak of natural selection operating at the clade level. We argue, however, that when species-level lineages and clade-level lineages are treated consistently according to standard cladist commitments, clade reproduction is indeed possible and clade selection is coherent if certain conditions obtain. Despite clade selection's logical coherence, however, we share some of Okasha's pessimism. Whether or not clades are a unit of selection is ultimately a question of empirical support and theoretical import.

On the Breadth and Significance of Niche Construction: A Reply to Griffiths, Okasha and Sterelny

We thank Paul Griffiths, Samir Okasha, and Kim Sterelny for devoting what must have been considerable time, energy and care to scrutinising our book – we are quite aware that it is not always an ‘easy read’ and for their thoughtful and stimulating remarks. We sense that all three ‘see the big picture’ and we are greatly encouraged by their enthusiasm and positive comments. They raise many interesting issues, but the broadly supportive tone of these commentaries encourages us to believe that the niche-construction perspective has a strong theoretical foundation. The major questions, or reservations, raised relate to (1) the breadth and inclusive nature of our conceptions of ‘niche construction’ and ‘ecological inheritance’, (2) our emphasis on ‘genetic information’ and ‘semantic information’, (3) our claim that niche construction is a ‘selective’, ‘predictive’ and ‘profitable’ process, (4) ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ niche construction, and how they associate with fitness, and (5) whether ‘The Extended Phenotype’ offers a more compelling alternative.

Okasha on Inductive Scepticism

In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha’s argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive sceptic’s argument, and (pace Okasha) are not at all remote from actual scientific practice. I discuss several scientific examples involving such contexts.