Salva Kiir Research Articles

Examining the Prospects of Consociational Power Sharing as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in South Sudan

South Sudan has not escaped the world’s attention even after the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. This agreement brought the main antagonists— President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Dr Riek Machar—to the negotiation table for the twelfth time since the conflict began in 2013. Even with the aura of a shaky peace, the main question is whether the new agreement will stand the test of time in light of the history of the failed implementation of peace agreements. This paper recognises the vital nature of the prevailing peace and examines whether consociational democracy can be propped up during this period of relative peace. The discussion hinges on consociationalism theory that contains a broad array of principles, including power sharing, requisite for consociational democracy. We argue that although South Sudan’s context could favour consociational democracy, there are several barriers characterising Sudan’s social and political spheres that should be alleviated. We elucidate on the barriers and suggest in broad strokes the need for strong independent institutions and vibrant civil society amongst others. We also recognise that overreliance on individuals in resolving the conflict is detrimental to the young nation, and there is a need for a citizen-centred approach that entrenches consociational principles in South Sudan’s political sphere.

Hard Lessons from South Sudan

South Sudan's tragic history of independent statehood raises important questions about the future of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UNMISS cannot bring peace to the country on its own. For that to happen, South Sudan's militarised form of governance and political economy must be transformed. Recognising UNMISS's limitations does not, however, preclude a vital and continuing role for the mission. UNMISS must work to reduce alarming levels of local and sub-national violence and help shore up the fragile peace agreement reached between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in 2018. The mission must also manage the risks of further instability posed by poorly managed security-sector reform and elections scheduled for 2022. Finally, UNMISS and the UN must intensify the search for political avenues out of violence. To this end, renewed and constructive international engagement must be marshalled, and the UN must absorb important lessons from its own performance.

The South Sudan Conflict: Continentalan and International Implications

The South Sudan conflict which started in December 2013 is now entering its second year with continental and international implications far beyond comprehension in terms of human tragedy in one of the world’s newest nations. Continued fi ghting between the government troops and the rebel forces has displaced more than 1 000 000 and killed over 10 0000 people while a humanitarian crisis threatens many more South Sudanese and their neighbouring states. The war risks tearing the country apart as well as creating a potential humanitarian crisis of epic proportions on neighbouring states. Hence, this article examines the continental and international implications of the current South Sudanese confl ict which has roped in the African Union spearheaded by the Inter-Governmental Organization and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. It argues that the heart of this post-independence conflict in South Sudan is the personal rivalry between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar. This study attempts to provide a detailed outline of the South Sudanese civil confl ict by conducting an in-depth investigation of secondary data as well as interviews with military peacekeepers imbued with experience on the ground in South Sudan. To address the conflict, this paper suggests that the international community and the country’s leadership need to focus on resolving this personality-driven rivalry to pave way for sustainable peace in the country

The State Building of South Sudan: From Civil War to Independence and Back to Conflict

South Sudan gaining independence in July 2011 became a great relief for the Southerners ending a long period of marginalization dating back to the 19th century. Things would however not go as expected as exclusion, nepotism, patron-client relations, rule by law and grand corruption would be the most infectious ailments that immediately affected the country. SPLM's failure to unite the country resulted in conflict on December 15th, 2013. A peace accord in 2015 brings back to Juba former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar as First Vice President. It took only two months into the implementation and fighting erupts again in the presidential palace when President Salva Kiir was meeting his two Vice Presidents. The aftermath of this conflict is a country more divided, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in numbers and a blurred vision of where the state of South Sudan is headed. Past dreams are replaced by personal, Big Man gains in terms of positions among the top leadership and greed has become the creed. The question on the lips of every South Sudanese is, how can the country be transformed from a proto-state that operates under neo-patrimonialism to a modern state with functional institutions?

Peacemaking and Peace Agreements in South Sudan: An Introduction

In 2011, South Sudan seceded from Sudan following a landmark referendum on self-determination. Yet fewer than three years after the historic vote for independence, the world’s newest country descended into a civil war that, since December 2013, has brought killing and bloodshed. In attempts to resolve the conflict and bring the civil war to an end, the warring factions have signed peace agreement after peace agreement. In September 2018, Salva Kiir, the president of South Sudan, and his major adversary, the former vice-president and rebel leader Riek Machar, signed yet another peace agreement in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. This is the 12th agreement between them. Most of these agreements have suffered from a fraught mediation context (at times, being very coercive), deficits in preparedness (with inadequate time to fully implement the agreements), consent, impartiality, inclusivity (given the proliferation of armed and unarmed oppositions), and lack of a broad political strategy to anchor the agreed-upon peace deal. How did this young country that attained her independence in 2011 amidst massive international fanfare degenerate into chaos so quickly? And why have the attempts to resolve the conflict faced such difficulties? The Zambakari Advisory is pleased to publish its First Special Issue on the subject: “Peace Making and Peace Agreements in South Sudan.” We asked scholars, activists, students, former government officials, and leading intellectuals to think about the theme for the issue and offer insights into it. We hope these analyses will provide new insights to both reflect on, and inform, the work of stakeholders engaged in brokering peace and/or the pending National Dialogue. This collection features 15 articles contributed by Douglas H. Johnson, Peter Adwok Nyaba, Rev. Elias Rinaldo Gamboriko, Joseph Madak Wuol, Nichola Mandil Ukeil, Asha Abdel Rahim, Mabior P. Mach, Abui John Garang, Samson S. Wassara, Mahmood Mamdani, Rita M. Lopidia, Luka Biong Deng Kuol, John Ashworth, Angelina Bazugba, and Malish John Peter on South Sudan’s experiences with peacemaking and peace agreements, providing both a social and historical context, as well as an analysis of the specific peace processes. These papers offer a critical evaluation of South Sudan’s political crises, its experience with peace deals, and offers innovative solutions for the bumpy road ahead as South Sudan seeks once more to implement an imperfect deal. The authors make it clear that the contemporary history of South Sudan has been that of conflict and civil wars (1955–1972, 1983–2005, 2013–Current) with the Republic of Sudan to the north and with itself after securing independence in 2011. This issue highlights lessons learned from The Wunlit Peace Process in 1999, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), and finally the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

"Lost Generation" in South Sudan: A Broader Approach Toward Peace Urgently Needed.

What began in 2013 as the eruption of a political struggle between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, a member of the Dinka ethnic group, and then-vice president Riek Machar, a Nuer, has splintered into a multifaction conflict. A dizzying array of armed groups have entered the fray, many unmotivated by political leverage that conventionally brings parties to a conflict to the negotiating table. Two years and tens of thousands of deaths after the 2015 signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, with no substantive progress toward meetings its terms, it is unrealistic to think that Intergovernmental Authority on Development's recently announced High-Level Revitalization Forum will be sufficient to address the drivers of this conflict. Current policy proposals are poorly designed to address escalating intercommunal conflict and cattle raiding, both devastating forms of violence. As measures at the international level continue to be pursued, the conflict resolution strategy should also include a more comprehensive approach incorporating local actors in order to build momentum toward long-term stability. In this article, we highlight gaps in the current dialogue around a political solution in South Sudan, as well as domains that must be part of the next push for peace. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:663-671).

Immaginare una nuova nazione: strategie politiche e costruzione dell'identità etnica in Sud Sudan

The African context is an avant-garde geopolitical laboratory, where the inherited state forms of the colonial period are reworked and transformed through political imaginary. The case of South Sudan is particularly interesting: its birth and its development followed a projectuality elaborated during half a century of civil conflict, in which a complex social imaginary was formed. In this article, we want to highlight two closely related aspects. The first is linked to the charismatic figure of John Garang, leader of the SPLA/M. At his death Garang was consecrated as a popular hero and founding figure, becoming a primary reference in the imaginary of the new nation. The second aspect concerns the political strategy of President Salva Kiir, which breaks with the previous nationalist project. In recent years, the formation of an ethnic imaginary transformed local communities into territorial identities, interpreting the socio-political clash through an ethnic category created by colonialism and reproduced during the Sudanese civil wars.

Conflict and impasse in South Sudan

President Salva Kiir and exiled first vice president Riek Machar, the two key political figures in South Sudan, remain at odds, and there is little sign of a political solution to the country's three-year-old civil war. There is some hope that the African Union will energise efforts to enforce the 2015 peace agreement and promote political dialogue.

Prospects for peace and the UN Regional Protection Force in South Sudan

ON 7 July 2016, A DEADLY CLASH between the guards of the president and vice-president of South Sudan sparked days of skirmishes, purges, looting and abuse of civilians across the capital city of Juba. At least 300 people were killed, including 2 Chinese UN soldiers,1 as soldiers under President Salva Kiir's command used combat helicopters, tanks and other heavy weaponry in the city suburbs.2 Next to a UN peacekeeping base, soldiers raped civilians; in a much-publicized attack on the Terrain Hotel, foreign humanitarian workers were gang raped and beaten.3 Overall, violence displaced about 36,000 people, many thousands of whom are still sheltering inside UN compounds. A contingent of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) that had arrived in April was killed or driven out of town, and Riek Machar, the first vice president, escaped over land to the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the days following, Uganda evacuated a large number of its citizens in military convoys. The fighting and atrocities in Juba triggered further retaliation and clashes in towns across the country.

The Political Crisis in South Sudan

KeyWords: South Sudan; SPLM/A; civil warThe political crisis in South Sudan is now more than a year old, with no immediate end in sight to the fighting between armed factions. What began as a power struggle within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), reignited factional fighting within the army, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), in December 2013. Both the political and military crises had their origins in unresolved tensions following the split in the SPLM/A in the 1990s and the incomplete integration of opposed factions into the army following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 (see Johnson 2014). Many South Sudanese expected that these tensions would eventually erupt in some form of conflict following independence in 2011, but the rapid escalation and intensity of fighting has still taken them by surprise.This commentary can give only the barest outline of a complex series of events motivated by a mixture of political disappointment, personal ambition, and ethnic rivalry. A more detailed reporting of various aspects of the crisis can be found in the updated reports of the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan and human rights reports by Amnesty International, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and the South Sudan Human Rights Commission (2014).1The CPA was constructed around the assumption that John Garang would remain the leader of the SPLM/A, the head of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and the first vice president in the power-sharing Government of National Unity (GNU) with the National Congress Party (NCP) throughout the six-year interim period leading up to the South Sudanese independence referendum in 2011. His death in July 2005, three weeks after his inauguration as first vice president, catapulted two men into unexpected positions of power: Salva Kiir Mayardit, Garang's deputy, assumed the leadership of the party and his two constitutional positions, while Riek Machar, occupying the third highest position in the party, became vice president in the GoSS. Had Garang lived, it is unlikely that either man would have remained in their initial positions, as Garang was adept at moving potential rivals around, preventing them from entrenching themselves in positions of power within the party or the army.Salva Kiir, a veteran guerrilla of the first civil war, was, along with Garang, the last surviving founder of the SPLM/A, all others having been killed in the fratricidal warfare that engulfed the SPLM/A during the 1990s (see Johnson 201 l:ch.7). His survival was due, in part, to having kept aloof from the internal politics of the movement, seeing himself as a soldier rather than a politician. Tensions had arisen between him and Garang at the end of 2004, just before the signing of the CPA, and his future in a Garang-led government was uncertain.Riek Machar had joined the movement from a civilian, rather than a military, background and broke with Garang in 1991 over personal and ideological differences. His attempt to lead a reformed movement failed, and in the end he was forced to fall back on the support of sections of his own Nuer people, a significant proportion of them coming from Khartoumbacked militias. Machar soon lost control over both the formal and informal armed bodies under his command. His rebellion disintegrated into internecine fighting among Nuer, with civilians being the main targets, a pattern that was to reemerge in his current rebellion (see Johnson 2009, 2011:ch.8). He reconciled with Garang in 2002, just as internationally brokered peace negotiations with Khartoum began, and was elevated to the number three spot in the movement's hierarchy.Salva Kiir faced many challenges in forming a government to administer southern Sudan during the interim period prior to the independence referendum. As leader of the army, the party, and the government, he first appointed persons closer to himself than to Garang, some with strong ties to Khartoum, leaving many of the SPLM stalwarts-Garang's Orphans- marginalized within the party and government (see Nyaba 2011 ). …

Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.

Peace in South Sudan critical to regional stability

Despite two ceasefires, thousands of lives lost and over a million and a half civilians displaced, fighting continues in South Sudan, pitting government troops against opposition forces. The latest ceasefire — the second since violence erupted in December last year — was signed in May between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar.

When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan

South Sudan obtained independence in July 2011 as a kleptocracy – a militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance. By the time of independence, the South Sudanese “political marketplace” was so expensive that the country’s comparatively copious revenue was consumed by the militarypolitical patronage system, with almost nothing left for public services, development or institution building. The efforts of national technocrats and foreign donors produced bubbles of institutional integrity but the system as a whole was entirely resistant to reform. The January 2012 shutdown of oil production bankrupted the system. Even an experienced and talented political business manager would have struggled, and President Salva Kiir did not display the required skills. No sooner had shots been fi red than the compact holding the SPLA together fell apart and civil war ensued. Drawing upon long-term observation of elite politics in South Sudan, this article explains both the roots of kleptocratic government and its dire consequences.

Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan

ON 16 DECEMBER 2013 THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, appeared on state television in military uniform to announce that he had successfully put down a coup attempt in the capital, Juba. The coup attempt was said to have been led by former Vice-President Riek Machar and several ex-cabinet ministers and officials of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), including Madame Rebecca Nyanding de Mabior, the widow of the SPLM’s first leader, John Garang. Eleven alleged coup plotters were arrested in their homes, but Riek Machar escaped from Juba, and, amid reports over the next few days of targeted killings of Nuer in Juba by men in uniform loyal to the President, the commanders of the 8th and 4th army divisions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jonglei and Unity states announced their defection to Riek Machar and seized control of the state capitals of Bor and Bentiu. In telephone interviews from secure places Riek Machar denied that he had been involved in a coup but then urged the army to overthrow Salva Kiir and announced his plans to march on Juba. Despite the fact that the arrested ministers came from a variety of communities across South Sudan, Western media reports cast the political struggle exclusively in tribal terms, of Salva Kiir’s Dinka against Riek Machar’s Nuer. The targeted killings in Juba and revenge killings of Dinka by Nuer in Akobo and Bor in Jonglei state seemed to bear this out. The coup was said to have begun with a fight between Nuer and Dinka soldiers in the presidential guard following a meeting of the SPLM’s National Liberation Council (NLC), which Riek Machar and the alleged plotters had boycotted, and in which Salva Kiir had denounced Riek in strident terms. Yet while the government of South Sudan has kept to this version of events, they have presented little concrete evidence to support their claim

South Sudan: Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy

This article addresses the social and political implications of wartime and post-war resource capture in South Sudan. It argues that predation by armed groups during the second civil war (1983–2005) initiated a process of dominant class formation, and demonstrates how, through various strategies of resource capture and kinship networks, commanders from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other factions formed a new aristocracy – a “dominant class” that thinks of itself as “the best”. Drawing on Marcel Mauss’s analysis of ‘gifts’, it describes how commanders, through gifts of bridewealth and wives to their subordinates, formed a lower stratum of followers that strengthened their position. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the military elite in power has maintained this lower stratum through the deployment of nepotistic and clientelist networks. The article discusses three modes through which the elite has sought to distinguish itself, showing how the elite has used the lower stratum to demonstrate its prestige and influence in the post-war period, and how the elite’s ostentation and widespread corruption have triggered popular resentment in which old ethnic enmities sometimes resurface. ON 15 DECEMBER 2013 THE GRAVEST POLITICAL CRISIS in the short history of the Republic of South Sudan erupted. Following a series of disagreements within the highest echelons of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, thirteen political figures were imprisoned, accused by President Salva Kiir of attempting a coup under the leadership of estranged Vice-President Riek Machar. Since then, Kiir – aided by the Ugandan army and supported by an increasingly embarrassed international community, as well as by the former northern Sudanese foe – has tried to

Uprooting the causes of conflicts

On 11 July 2011, when South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir and his 8.3 million compatriots celebrated the new country’s first independence, he was careful to remind everyone of the harsh realities on the horizon. “All the indices of human welfare put us at the bottom of all humanity,” he said, adding: “All citizens of this nation must therefore fully dedicate their energies and resources to the construction of a vibrant economy.” Not surprisingly, President Kiir’s note of caution was easily drowned in a sea of high expectations and hopes for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous nation.

Public address by General Salva Kiir Mayardit on the occasion of his return to Juba from an official visit to the United States of America

(2010). Public address by General Salva Kiir Mayardit on the occasion of his return to Juba from an official visit to the United States of America. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 306-312.

SUDAN: Salva Kiir Consolidates Power

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 44, Issue 7 p. 17167A-17168C SUDAN: Salva Kiir Consolidates Power First published: 20 August 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2007.01159.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume44, Issue7August 2007Pages 17167A-17168C RelatedInformation