Safeguard Investigations Research Articles

Current issues of anti-dumping and safeguard investigations during martial law

The article is devoted to the issues of conducting anti-dumping and safeguard investigations in Ukraine under martial law. The author analyses the current practice of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine in conducting trade investigations in terms of determining the time limits for procedural stages of investigations within the competence of the authority, which demonstrates that the investigating authority violates the rights of the parties concerned in trade investigations, some of which are still unresolved.The purpose of the article is to study the legality of the actions of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine with regard to postponement of deadlines within investigations and compliance with the World Trade Organization Agreements governing certain types of trade investigations, and to prepare recommendations for further actions of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine within its competence.
 It is concluded that the Ministry of Economy and the Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade have discretionary powers to determine certain terms of investigations and make decisions based on their results. The author concludes that determining the time limits for procedural stages of investigations remains within the discretionary powers of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine as long as the time limits for conducting trade investigations set out in Ukrainian legislation are not violated. The author also examines the legal consequences of violation of these deadlines.The author has prepared conclusions and recommendations on conducting trade investigations and making decisions based on their results in case of violation of the time limits established by the legislation of Ukraine, the key of which is that further conduct of an anti-dumping or safeguard investigation after such violation is illegal, therefore, the Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade, upon the submission of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, should terminate the investigation without taking any measures.

Safeguard measures and fresh produce trade: The case of US blueberry imports

Abstract Safeguard measures are used to limit excessive import growth and protect domestic producers from unfair import competition. The global safeguard investigation for blueberries highlights these concerns and raises questions about the relationship between imports, prices, and the well-being of US producers. Although the US International Trade Commission (USITC) ruled that imports have not caused serious injury to US blueberry producers, it was important to further examine this issue. In this study, we employ an inverse demand model and dynamic vector autoregressive procedure linking source-specific fresh blueberry imports from countries like Mexico and Chile to US blueberry prices. Our results mostly support the USITC ruling. Results indicate that declines in US prices are small when compared to the level of import growth. Impulse response functions indicate that import price shocks are not long-lasting.

UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENT AS A DEVICE TO ASSESS SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION

Unforeseen Development requirement is indeed essential for the World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries to make safeguard investigations in their own country, this study has analysed the affecting unforeseen development requirement in safeguard investigations. Additionally, this study examined how an unforeseen development affects safeguard investigations in Indonesia. The method of this study is qualitative research, and descriptive research is to analyze the data by using case analyses. The author presents major findings by subject on unforeseen development covers increased imports, the stages of an investigation, and determination of safeguard measures. The results further confirm that this study shows policy implications to elaborate the effect of unforeseen developments for safeguard investigations and after a measure taken. Also, this study shows policy recommendations as added value on this study to improving standard quality. For addition, this study provides a new theory that calls three fresh arguments (Zhou and Fang 2022). The reader would be get the fruitful discussions and recommendations on safeguard basis especially to the unforeseen developments requirements under safeguard investigations.

India’s Response to Increases in Imports from Countries Subject to Preferential Tariffs Under FTAs: Bilateral Safeguard Investigations?

India has entered into several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that provide for the possibility of imposition of bilateral safeguard measures when increase in imports causes injury to the domestic industry in India. The bilateral safeguard measure can be in the form of temporary suspension of further reduction or withdrawal of tariff preferences; some also contain provisions relating to preliminary safeguard duty, transition period, duration of safeguard measure, liberalization of safeguard duty, among others. Provisional bilateral safeguard measures were imposed in case of Refined Palm Oil from Malaysia and in case of Phthalic Anhydride & Polybutadiene Rubber from Korea. Bilateral safeguard measures are an effective tool in protecting the domestic industry from a sudden increase in imports, and also help in reversing trade deficits. Free Trade Agreements, India, Bilateral Safeguards, ASEAN, Korea, Malaysia, trade deficit, imports, customs duty, Rules, investigation

인도네시아 세이프가드 제도에 관한 연구 - 갈바륨 세이프가드 조치 사건을 중심으로 -

There are two main characteristics in Indonesia Safeguard Regulations. First, the WTO Safeguard Agreement directly applies to the Komite Pengamanan Perdagangan Indonesia(KPPI)"s decision. In addition, the Indonesia Safeguard Regulations can be advantageously applied to the exporting country ; the applicant must submit the evidence when applying for the Safeguard Investigation, the KPPI must notify for interesting parties to initiate the Safeguard Investigation, the KPPI has discretion whether to trigger the Safeguard Measures and the Review should be started within three years of the Safeguard Measures.<BR> In the Galvalume Safeguard Measures, KPPI did not adequately prove the Unforeseen Development, and in the Review, it did not meet the Safeguard requirements under the WTO Safeguard Agreement. In order to deal with the Safeguard Measures, WTO members should bring the case to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to challenge the KPPI’s decision. In addition, it is necessary to actively argue that the Safeguard Measures can adversely affect the national economy during the Safeguard Investigation. This argument should be delivered to the KPPI in connection with domestic importers as third-parties. This paper provides the legal basis for the strategy to be implemented consistently with WTO Safeguard Agreement and Indonesia Safeguard Regulations.

Advances in fission-track detection and analysis for nuclear forensics and safeguards investigations

Advances in fission-track detection and analysis for nuclear forensics and safeguards investigations

EU Safeguard Law and Practice: 1995–2018

The EU, like other developed country WTO members, thus far has used safeguard measures only sporadically. Where they have been used, they have been applied in a relatively liberal manner. However, safeguard measures, including those of the EU, are by nature very blunt, particularly if they are applied on a global, first come-first served basis. Furthermore, the application of safeguard measures by the EU tends to have a snowball effect, as happened in 2002 and is now starting to happen again. It is therefore to be hoped that the EU will continue to apply safeguard measures only exceptionally and, when it does so, in a liberal manner. The two – at the moment of writing – ongoing safeguard investigations will provide an indication of the EU’s future trade policy in this regard.

Safeguard Measures in Jordan

The paper examines safeguard measures as applied in Jordan according to its domestic law and the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. The paper provides analysis of safeguard investigation and injury analysis.

Inference for econometric modeling in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard investigations – Erratum

Inference for econometric modeling in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard investigations – Erratum

Inference for Econometric Modeling in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Investigations

This paper examines the importance of taking into account standard errors when making inferences from econometric models prepared for antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations. This is important since even a properly specified econometric model is only as useful as the inferences that can be made from its results. Analysis of these models typically entail testing whether point estimates are significantly different from zero and then drawing inferences from these point estimates without accounting for their distribution. This paper suggests taking the distribution of the estimates into account by drawing inferences from confidence intervals at various levels of significance and accounting for the impact of sample size and collinearity between imports subject to an investigation and other possible factors that may be affecting the domestic industry. Accounting for the distribution of the estimates provides much more compelling inferences regarding the impact of imports, although these inferences are often more nuanced than those made solely from point estimates.

Inference for econometric modeling in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard investigations

AbstractThis paper examines how to make inferences from econometric models prepared for antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations. Analysis of these models has typically entailed drawing inferences from point estimates that are significantly different from zero at a fixed level of confidence. This paper suggests a more flexible approach of drawing inferences using confidence intervals at various significance levels and reporting p-values for the relevant test of injury. Use of confidence intervals and p-values to identify insights and data patterns would have more impact on USITC trade remedy determinations than definitive conclusions about injury based on whether estimates are statistically significant.

Causal Link, Non Attribution and Contingent Protection in the WTO

In several recent cases brought before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, several WTO Members have been taken to task for supposedly failing to comply with their obligations on establishing that a existed between imports and injury caused to a domestic industry while at the same time failing to not attribute injury caused by other factors to injury caused by imports. Under WTO law, an investigating authority conducting, say, an antidumping investigation, must demonstrate that the harm suffered by a domestic industry is caused by the dumped imports. It must specifically not attribute injury caused by other factors to the dumped imports. (GATT VI [1] and VI [6] [a], as well as Articles 3.4, 3.5 of The WTO Antidumping Agreement).Similar obligations exist for domestic authorities conducting countervailing duty investigations with regard to subsidized imports and safeguards investigations with regard to an increase in imports due to unforeseen developments in the wake of trade liberalization.From the cases that have been brought before the WTO over the last several years, where a violation to demonstrate a or a non-attribution violation has been alleged, the panels established to hear these cases and the Appellate Body asked to review the respective panels' finding have had a difficult time laying out clear and practicable criteria or standards that would provide domestic authorities with the kind of guidance they might need in order to be able to act in compliance with their WTO obligations. The result is a certain amount of confusion and dissatisfaction among all concerned.The paper will examine the rules and case-law on antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards under the WTO Uruguay Round agreements and attempt to examine what is meant by a causal link between imports and injury to a domestic industry. This analysis will include an examination of the obligations which ensue from the non-attribution language contained in the relevant WTO agreements.

ONE LUMP OR TWO: UNITARY VERSUS BIFURCATED MEASURES OF INJURY AT THE USITC

I. INTRODUCTION Firms that face competition frequently have a number of legal avenues to limit such competition. When such competition comes from overseas competitors, they might avail themselves of laws to limit imports. In the major industrialized countries, laws to limit competition from imports fall into two broad categories: safeguards and laws against unfairly traded imports. Safeguards, also known as escape clause procedures, allow a World Trade Organization (WTO) member state to temporarily restrict imports when a product is imported to its territory in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to competing domestic producers. These temporary restrictions (quotas or tariffs) can either allow the domestic industry to become more competitive or allow an orderly transfer of resources from the industry. Unfairly traded imports are imports that are subsidized and/or dumped, that is, sold at less than fair value. Fair value can be the price that the imports are sold for in their home market, the price that the imports are sold for in a third country, or the estimated cost of production including a profit. In accordance with international agreements, U.S. law requires that remedial duties (antidumping duties or countervailing duties) can only be imposed on unfairly traded imports if these imports have caused (or threaten to cause) material injury to competing domestic producers. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) is responsible for investigating and determining whether unfairly traded imports have caused material injury to a domestic industry. The USITC is also responsible for investigating and determining whether a domestic industry that petitions for relief in a safeguard proceeding has suffered serious injury because of increased imports. USITC commissioners have adopted a variety of approaches to determining whether dumped or subsidized imports have caused material injury to competing domestic producers. An important one that has been used by several commissioners is the unitary approach. This approach uses production and prices for the unfairly traded imports, the domestic industry, and fairly traded imports (if any), estimates of demand and supply elasticities, and dumping or subsidy margins to calculate what the performance of the domestic industry would have been had it not had to compete with unfairly traded imports. An alternative approach that has been adopted by more commissioners is the bifurcated approach. This approach first asks if the domestic industry has suffered material injury and then asks whether unfairly traded imports contributed to this injury. By separating the injury determination into two separate questions, the presence of injury and the causation of injury, the bifurcated approach is similar to the sort of inquiry that the USITC conducts in its safeguards investigations. Commissioners who used the unitary approach relied on an explicit economic model to compare actual domestic industry performance with what the performance would have been absent competition from unfairly traded imports. In contrast, commissioners who used the bifurcated approach rejected formal economic analysis; in fact, many of them were openly hostile to the use of economic analysis. Because of these different attitudes toward quantitative economics, the unitary approach has also been called the economic approach. We adapt an economic model developed to measure the causes of injury in USITC safeguard investigations to measure the effect of unfairly traded imports to domestic industry performance, that is, the second question under the bifurcated approach. We apply this methodology to all USITC unfairly traded import investigations for a time period between two major changes in the law; during this period there were commissioners who used the unitary approach and commissioners who used the bifurcated approach. …

A Legal Analysis of Safeguard Measures in the European Community

In 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures.” In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in thIn 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures.” In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in the European Community comply with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In conclusion, based on the analysis of safeguard measures in the European Community's legal system and their practice in actual cases, it apparent that the European Community is making a serious effort to comply with the standards of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. In certain respects, the European Community has a comparatively higher level of standards than the WTO. Nevertheless, there continue to be challenges to WTO-compatibility in the European Community's safeguards, especially in terms of non-parallelism, the simultaneous imposition of a provisional safeguard measure at the initiation of a safeguard investigation, the vague meaning of regional safeguards, and so on.

(A Legal Analysis of Safeguards Measures in the European Community)

Korean Abstract: 2002년 유럽공동체는 WTO 설립 이후의 첫 세이프가드조치인 특정 철강제품에 대한 세이프가드조치를 발동하였으며 2003년에는 대중국 특별세이프가드조치규칙, 이중규제방지규칙을 공포, 시행하였다. 본 논문의 목적은 유럽공동체 세이프가드제도의 실체적, 절차적 요건에 대해 WTO 세이프가드조치협정과의 비교를 통하여 자세히 살펴보고 이번 특정 철강제품에 대한 세이프가드조치의 판정내용과 WTO 차원에서의 적법성 여부에 대해 고찰해보고자 함이다. 결론적으로 유럽공동체의 세이프가드제도 관련 법령 및 운영사례를 통해서 알 수 있는 바와 같이, 유럽공동체는 나름대로 WTO 세이프가드조치협정의 기준에 맞추고자 노력하고 있으며 또한 WTO 세이프가드조치협정에 비해 더욱 엄격한 기준을 설정하고 있는 것으로 평가된다. 하지만 실제 사례의 운영에서 볼 수 있듯이 유럽공동체의 세이프가드제도 역시 다음과 같은 문제점들을 안고 있다. 첫째, 유럽공동체는 조사개시에서는 배제하지 않은 상황에서 일부 국가를 세이프가드조치 부과시에는 배제시킴으로써 병행성문제가 발생하고 둘째, 세이프가드조치 조사개시와 잠정조치를 동시에 부과한 점에서도 문제가 되며 셋째, 지역적 세이프가드조치 부과와 관련하여 국가보다 작은 단위내에서 세이프가드조치를 부과할 수 있다고 해석하는 것도 문제시된다. English Abstract: In 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures.” In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in the European Community comply with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In conclusion, based on the analysis of safeguard measures in the European Community's legal system and their practice in actual cases, it apparent that the European Community is making a serious effort to comply with the standards of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. In certain respects, the European Community has a comparatively higher level of standards than the WTO. Nevertheless, there continue to be challenges to WTO-compatability in the European Community's safeguards, especially in terms of non-parallelism, the simultaneous imposition of a provisional safeguard measure at the initiation of a safeguard investigation, the vague meaning of regional safeguards, and so on.

Why are Safeguards Needed in a Trade Agreement?

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the use of safeguards in a trade agreement. It then analyzes the available data on the use of safeguards by WTO members to examine two hypotheses in the economics literature, that safeguards improve welfare by facilitating tariff reductions and that safeguards improve welfare by providing insurance against adverse economic shocks. I find that countries which undertook larger tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round conducted more safeguards investigations after the WTO was established. However, this result is not robust across all specifications of the model and should not be regarded as definitive. I find no evidence to support the hypothesis that safeguards improve welfare by providing insurance. The empirical analysis rejects the hypothesis of a relationship between safeguards and aggregate uncertainty.

Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective

This paper analyzes the steel safeguards implemented and subsequently removed during 2001-2003. Our results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies, safeguards generated positive returns of approximately 6%; and the cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of -5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. violated WTO law. The results here are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Downstream consumers in transportation equipment and electrical equipment showed the clearest negative reaction to the safeguards. Moreover, steel firms that received larger cash disbursements under the Byrd amendment received additional wealth gains when the safeguard duties were imposed. Finally, empirical results indicate that U.S. downstreamconsuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with the initiation of the safeguard investigation and the imposition of the safeguard duties.

United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea Not for Attribution

This dispute concerns the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure by the United States on imports of circular welded carbon quality line pipe (“line pipe”) from Korea (WTO DOC. WTO/DS 202/AB/R). The measure was imposed following an investigation conducted by the US International Trade Commission (USITC). The USITC determined in a safeguard investigation initiated on 29 July 1999 that “circular welded carbon quality line pipe . . . is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat of serious injury.” In its investigation, the USITC identified a number of factors apart from increased imports that might have caused serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic line pipe industry. The Commission concluded that increased imports were “a cause which is important and not less than any other cause” and that, therefore, the statutory requirement of “substantial cause” had been met.

THE PUZZLE OF WTO SAFEGUARDS AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

So far WTO jurisprudence has not resolved the puzzle of how WTO Members that are part also of a regional trade agreement (such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR) should conduct safeguard investigations and apply eventual safeguards in line with WTO rules. Can or must they exclude regional imports from the injury determination? Can or must they apply the eventual safeguard only to third parties, or are they under an obligation rather to apply all safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis? Those are the questions examined in this paper. The paper refocuses some of the attention to GATT Article XIX and criticizes the Appellate Body’s requirement of parallelism as well as its jurisprudence under GATT Article XXIV. It also offers an alternative way forward and ends with a list of options for WTO safeguards by members of customs unions or free trade areas.

US – Lamb United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia: what should be required of a safeguard investigation?

The United States (US) imposed, in July 1999, a safeguard on lamb meat, in the form of tariff rate import quotas, which were to be applied for a period of three years. The measure was based on findings by the US International Trade Commission that increased imports of lamb meat were a substantial cause of threat of serious injury to the US industry producing the like product. Following complaints by New Zealand and Australia that the measure was inconsistent with Articles I, II and XIX of GATT 1994, and several provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body established, in November 1999, a panel to review the consistency of the US measure with the mentioned WTO rules.