Russian Thought Research Articles

A History of Russian Thought, ed. by William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, Cambridge UP., 2010, First paperback ed., 2012, xviii+444pp.

A History of Russian Thought, ed. by William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, Cambridge UP., 2010, First paperback ed., 2012, xviii+444pp.

Russia and the Persian Gulf: Trade, Energy, and Interdependence

This article examines changes in Russia's diplomatic, trade, and energy rela- tions in the Persian Gulf over time. Our data suggest that Russia's profile in the Persian Gulf is rising in the post-Cold War period. While Russian-Gulf state trade has not reached high levels, trade and energy cooperation have increased significantly. These changes do not mean that Russia has jettisoned strategic in- terests in the Middle East writ large - as its support of Syria, or to some extent Iran, may indicate - or that it no longer seeks to balance against Washington. But it appears that in the mix of its foreign policy motivations, trade and com- merce with Arab Gulf states matter much more now than they did in the past. Should such ties continue to strengthen, they may give Russia greater reason to cooperate with Arab Gulf states on contentious regional issues.Russia has experienced a difficult transition in the post-Cold War period, and the nature and course of this transition remains critical to world politics. During this transi- tion, Russia's global foreign policy appears to be shifting more toward meeting eco- nomic goals. In particular, our data suggest that such a shift is in play regarding Rus- sia's foreign policy position in the Persian Gulf. While Russian trade with the Gulf states has not reached high levels, trade is on an upward trajectory and energy coopera- tion is increasing. In toto, this suggests increasing Russian economic interdependence with regional states and an enhanced Russian economic position in the region.These changes do not mean that Russia has jettisoned strategic interests in the region - as its support of Bashar al-Asad's regime in Syria may indicate - or that it no longer seeks to act as a balance against Washington. Rather, in the mix of Rus- sia's foreign policy motivations, it appears that trade and commerce have increased significantly in importance.Although Russia also has serious economic interests in Iran, the case is nonethe- less unpredictable given the Iranian nuclear crisis with global powers. At the same time, Russia's growing commercial interests with GCC states and Iraq may give it some reason to hedge its support of Iran in order to better protect future potential with the Gulf Arab states that strongly oppose Iran's nuclear aspirations. Concurrently, Russia's political interests in Syria may produce the opposite effect and hurt Mos- cow's relations with key Arab states.In this article, we first discuss some signs of a shift in Russian thinking. We then focus our attention on sketching changes in Russia's diplomatic, trade, and energy rela- tions in the Persian Gulf, and conclude by elaborating upon what these changes mean for regional and global relations and stabilityRUSSIA'S SHIFTING MIX OF MOTIVATIONSWhile this article does not focus on Russia's global foreign policy, signs of change amid continuity appear to be afoot. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted in 2011, Archaic perceptions from a bygone era about the struggle for spheres of influ- ence, about reliance upon the power factor in politics and about the imposition of one's own standards on others still hold sway. We continue to strongly resist such tendencies.1Statements by Russian leaders have been laced increasingly with ideas about the importance of globalization, joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), economic development, and even pursuing soft power. Vladimir Putin set a goal of doubling gross domestic product (GDP) within a decade when he first became president in 2000.2 (The goal was not met). In his view, It is not only quantitative economic parameters which are important for Russia now, but also qualitative ones, and a sustainable economic development.3 In former president Dmitry Medvedev's view, Russia's modernization was not proceeding fast enough given that there was absolutely no alternative to mod- ernization of the economic or political system. …

New Developments in Russian Regulation of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route

The regime of navigation on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is still largely based on legislation adopted by the Soviet Union, and features certain deviations in the way Russia’s international legal rights and obligations are implemented. In recent years the Russian Federation has demonstrated interest in revising NSR legislation with the preparation of one single comprehensive Federal Act on the NSR, and also a Federal Act to introduce amendments to pre-existing legislation. The latter option has gained the support of legislators, as the newly promulgated Federal Law on the NSR, dated July 28th 2012, No. 132 FZ, established grounds for further specific regulatory acts to have effect on commercial navigation on the waters of the route. The primary purpose of this article is to discuss the processes leading up to this long-awaited decision, as well as the implications of the new legislation for navigation on the NSR. The creative legal ambiguity of the Russian domestic legislation has historically allowed for divergent arguments, voiced by Russian scholars, in respect to the assumed legal basis for the Russian extended authority to regulate navigation on the NSR and the limitations thereof. Alternative views have provided grounds for different legislative proposals and for heated discussions leading to the adoption of the most recent law. This article will trace the development of the legal thinking in Russia with respect to the allocation of jurisdiction on the NSR.Keywords: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and legislation, new NSR law, NSR navigation, Article 234 of UNCLOS, Russian law, Russian ArcticCitation: Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 4, 1/2013 pp. 90–119. ISSN 1891-6252

William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, eds, A History of Russian Thought

William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, eds, <i>A History of Russian Thought</i>

Religious Toleration in Russian Thought, 1520-1825

Religious Toleration in Russian Thought, 1520-1825 G. M. Hamburg (bio) In his landmark essay On Liberty (1859), John Stuart Mill described religious freedom as the foundation of liberty of thought, opinion, and sentiment and as "practically inseparable" from freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He asserted, "No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government."1 Like so many other 19th-century thinkers, Mill regarded religious freedom as the virtually exclusive product of Western civilization, even though he had the honesty to admit that intolerance "is so natural to mankind ... that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves."2 Mill's position on the foundational importance of religious toleration to the wider practice of civil liberties deserves careful consideration, as does his caveat about the "tacit reserves" often attached to toleration. But Mill's assumption that religious toleration should be associated primarily with Western societies is almost certainly a major historical blunder. As Amartya Sen has contended in his essay The Argumentative Indian, religious toleration in South Asia has roots in the 3rd century BCE and took modern form in the 16th century under Emperor Akbar.3 Thus the South Asian record of tolerating, even celebrating, religious and intellectual diversity rivals or exceeds [End Page 515] that of the West. Moreover, no historian can be insensible to the fact that in 20th-century Europe, the supposed "home" of religious toleration, powerful political regimes committed themselves to the destruction of religious pluralism. Clearly, given the stakes for human liberty posed by religious toleration and the elementary misunderstandings surrounding the history of the phenomenon, it is urgent for scholars to analyze the development of toleration in Europe and elsewhere. This essay analyzes Russian thinking about religious toleration from the first quarter of the 16th century to 1825. The essay is divided into seven parts: a brief survey of recent historiography on religious toleration in early modern Europe; a short analysis of Russian terms connoting toleration; a multipart analysis of tolerationist thinking from the early 16th century to 1825; and an examination of the patterns of Russian tolerationist thinking with special reference to the European Enlightenment. The chief goal of the essay is to juxtapose Russian toleration, in theory and practice, with the early modern and modern record in Western Europe: in this context, the impact of the European Enlightenment on Russian toleration will receive special attention. Since this essay is a speculative piece designed to provoke informed discussion and further research, the reader should not expect monographic depth or strict proportionality in the treatment of subjects under scrutiny. At the outset, the reader should note that, in both Western Europe and Russia, the concept of religious toleration applied chiefly to groups rather than to individuals. It usually connoted freedom of religious practice for a religious minority or set of minorities, but not necessarily for all minorities in a polity. Toleration did not generally entail freedom of preaching to members of other denominations, particularly to members of the established Church, nor did it generally imply freedom of the press for the tolerated group. By definition, freedom of conscience denoted an individual right of religious belief and practice: it was therefore a more sweeping right than anything connected with toleration. In historical literature, religious toleration has sometimes been associated with the phenomenon of secularism, itself a multivalent concept. In certain contexts, the adjective secular has been used by historians to distinguish any political measures not directly bearing on religion: the trouble with this usage, especially for pre-Petrine Russia, is that the Russian worldview was thoroughly religious, so for a Muscovite to imagine an act of state devoid of religious significance was difficult. Sometimes it has been said that Peter the Great secularized Russia, this description usually meaning that Peter bureaucratically subordinated the Church to the state or that he confiscated monastic lands, [End...

IF WAR COMES TOMORROW: THE CONTOURS OF FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT

The concept of future war and the controversial concept of a revolution in military affairs represent concepts and an evolving debate that could easily be perceived to be a pure American concept. The fact however is that Russian thinking on military theory and practice contains a strong line of thinking and concurrent ideas on this issue. The Russians have traditionally held strong and original thoughts on military theory and practice of which the deep operations theory and their views on building their maritime power are but two examples. In this publication much of their future thinking is being articulated and expressed by general Gareev. As the author, his experiences and visions originate from a military career spanning more than fifty years. His views, theories and future perspectives are placed into context by Jacob Kipp who relates the future contours constructed by Gareev to national and international security before presentation of the original ideas of Gareev. The first chapter is a thorough introduction by the editor into the world of Russian thinking and in particular that of general Gareev. In his efforts to familiarise the reader with the author, the issues as well as the concept of a revolution in military affairs and the Russian response, Kipp sets the stage for Gareev's more abstract thoughts on future war. As a publication translated from Russian on a topic not generally well known, this introductory chapter is of much value.

A Meeting of fides and ratio in Old Russian Thought

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Sculpture at the “Last Futurist Exhibition of Paintings ‘0.10’ (Zero-Ten)”

Abstract This article explores the “Last Futurist Exhibition of Paintings ‘0.10’” (1915) as a key moment when Russian painters began to work seriously in three dimensions, exploring the nature of materials, questioning the relationship between art and reality, and ultimately laying the foundation for the subsequent emergence of the Constructivist movement. The exhibition revealed an important strand in Russian creative thinking and practice concerning sculpture and the nature of artistic materials.

Leatherbarrow, William and Offord, Derek (eds). A History of Russian Thought (review)

Leatherbarrow, William and Offord, Derek (eds). A History of Russian Thought (review)

Statism in Russia: The Implications for US-Russian Relations

This article seeks to identify and assess the general shift in Russian foreign policy thinking during Vladimir Putin's presidency. The main thesis of this article is that a general shift in Russian foreign policy had occurred during Putin's presidency owing to the rise in Statist thinking. To substantiate the thesis, the author uses the State of the Nation addresses of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin to make a comparative analysis of the presidents' foreign policy approaches. As will be demonstrated in the article, the Russian foreign policy had experienced a dramatic influence of state power during Vladimir Putin's presidency, which resulted in the relative quantitative and qualitative reduction of cooperative initiatives between the United States and Russia.

A History of Russian Thought

A History of Russian Thought

Recent studies on Russian thought in Poland

The scope of Russian studies in Poland has grown considerably since 1989. Many texts in this field published in the present decade are pioneer works on such writers as V. Solov’ev and K. Leont’ev, others present synthetic results of recent and current research, such as A History of Russian Thought from Enlightenment to Marxism, Russian Religious-Philosophical Renaissance. An Attempt at a Synthesis. Research centers publish regular series: “Jagiellonskie studia z filozofii rosyjskiej,” “Almanach myśli rosyjskiej,” “Idee w Rosji”. A multi-volume Russian–Polish–English dictionary “Idee w Rosji,” fruit of research by Polish scholars has enjoyed considerable interest.

The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law, norms and political calculation

The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has raised significant questions about Russian thinking and practice on the legitimate use of military force abroad, especially in relation to neighbour states. The arguments advanced by Russia to justify this campaign show how Russian interpretations of customary international law as well as norms related to the use of force have served as an instrument of state policy, rather than being rooted in any broader international consensus. The Russian discourse in this context about sovereignty, self-determination and the legitimacy of recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states appears similarly to be strongly influenced by political self-interest and Russian views about its entitlement within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Among Russian claims, Moscow's commitment to support its ‘citizens’ abroad has been particularly controversial. This article examines these issues and also the possibility that, through its justifications for waging war against Georgia, Russia is more broadly contesting the interpretation of certain international norms, that it regards as essentially constructed by Western states. Some potential implications of these legal and normative arguments for future Russian policy in the CIS region, including Ukraine, are also examined.

What Do Russians Think about Transition?

We use data from the 2006 round of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to describe perceptions of the Russian population about the transition process and the role of the state compared to that of free markets. We find that about one half of Russian population is disappointed with transition and a large majority is in favor of high state regulation and state provision of goods and services. High demand for government regulation and increased state intervention coexists with a low level of trust in government institutions and recognition of high and rising levels of corruption. The findings are consistent with the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009). In an environment with poor social capital, private business imposes negative externalities on the society and society chooses to demand more state regulation and tolerate corruption in order to reduce these externalities. We also find that individual perceptions of social capital and corruption co-vary with the demand for regulation, as predicted by the theory.

From Genealogy to Generation: The Birth of Cohort Thinking in Russia

The keywords in my title refer to two distinct ways in which members a society may think about their location in time. One way--genealogy--takes its bearings from lines family descent. The other--generation--finds its units measurement in cohorts people born at approximately the same time. These two approaches have something in common: they both use biological relationships as a way thinking about social relationships. But the differences between them are equally clear. Genealogy provides a sense belonging that defines the people the present in terms their ancestors. Generation is horizontal: it constructs a community coevals. Genealogy concentrates on succession, whereas generation emphasizes simultaneity. Genealogy attaches importance to kin connection; generation potentially transcends kin. Two commonsensical things might be said about this pair concepts with respect to prerevolutionary Russia. First, we might expect Russia to be more genealogically minded than most European societies. This was a place where power was notoriously personalistic; where a group noble families, tightly woven together in their lineage, held sway; and where kin connections mattered far more than merit or rule law or non-kin allegiance. Second, with regard to generation, it is well known that Russia had one the most acute recorded cases generational rebellion--a youth subculture the 1860s that has frequently been cited as the first its kind anywhere in Europe. My primary task in this paper is to account for this apparent discrepancy. How to explain the shift from ancien regime to vanguard? How did Russia move from a vertical to a sense generation: from long chains succession within an overarching kin structure to a sense belonging with one's coevals (cohort thinking). I look at generation not in social-science terms--as a cohort empirically extractable from history--but as an idea. For my purposes, the crucial question is: when does it become important for people to identify themselves in generational rather than in some other terms? This question has a commonsensical kind answer, which may be expressed in one word as modernization. The historiography modern Europe places the birth cohort thinking in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Certain groups in society (in the first instance, young, well-off, well-educated males) were stimulated by new institutions (universities, bureaucracies), places (notably cities), and events (notably the French Revolution) to find a sense solidarity with their coevals that might override previous loyalties such as those within a family, clan, or social estate. Of course, the awareness generational difference was not an invention 1789: generation is discussed as a mechanism political change even in Plato. But the idea usually advanced by scholars is that the revolutionary period brought awareness broad horizontal allegiances, not just difference from the older generation, and that it made generational consciousness a historical phenomenon. Young men were now not simply the sons their fathers but a uniquely situated historical cohort. Following on from this, it would appear that generational issues are articulated with particular vehemence at moments when societies are facing fundamental choices about the allocation collective resources and the redistribution political authority. Prominent examples include countries suffering the teething troubles modernization: France in the few decades following 1789; Germany and Italy in the middle the 19th century; and course, Russia in the late tsarist era. This, broadly speaking, was the line interpretation taken by many distinguished commentators when the academic study generations took off in the postwar era. Lewis S. Feuer, author perhaps the most impressive the many studies generations that were inspired by the protest movements the 1960s, found in Russian history evidence generational conflict of unparalleled intensity resulting from special social circumstances. …

Metropolitan Sergi Stragorodsky: The case of the representative individual*

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgement I should like to express my gratitude to Keston Institute, Oxford, and in particular to Malcolm Walker, Keston's archivist and librarian, for invaluable help in preparing this paper. Notes 1 See Dixon, 2004 Dixon, S. 2004. Sergii (Stragorodskii) in the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Finland: apostasy and mixed marriages 1905–1917. The Slavonic and East European Review, 82(1) January: 50–73. [Google Scholar], for an in-depth study of Sergi's views and administrative policies in the years preceding the 1917 Revolution. 2 On the Religious-Philosophical Meetings see: Pyman, 1984 Pyman, A. 1984. “The church and the intelligentsia with special reference to the religious-philosophical meetings in St Petersburg 1901–1903”. In Russian Thought and Society 1800–1917: Essays in Honour of Eugene Lampert, Edited by: Bartlett, R. 181–219. Keele: University of Keele. [Google Scholar]; Dixon, 2004 Dixon, S. 2004. Sergii (Stragorodskii) in the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Finland: apostasy and mixed marriages 1905–1917. The Slavonic and East European Review, 82(1) January: 50–73. [Google Scholar], p. 54. 3 Firsov lists the 20 sessions, lasting over a year and a half, as: the church and the intelligentsia (I–II), Lev Tolstoy and the Russian church (III–IV), freedom of conscience (VII–IX), spirit and flesh (X–XI), marriage (XII–XVI), and the development of dogma (XVIII–XX) (Firsov, 2002 Firsov, S. 2002. Russkaya Tserkov' nakanune peremen (konets 1890-kh – 1918 gg.), Moscow: Krugly stol po religioznomu obrazovaniyu i diakonii. [Google Scholar], p. 110). 4 On Sergi's administration of the archdiocese of Finland and Vyborg, see the essential study by Dixon (Dixon, 2004 Dixon, S. 2004. Sergii (Stragorodskii) in the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Finland: apostasy and mixed marriages 1905–1917. The Slavonic and East European Review, 82(1) January: 50–73. [Google Scholar], pp. 50–73). 5 On Bishop Sergi's talents and his work as an original theologian, see Mitrofanov, 2002 Mitrofanov, G. prot. 2002. Istoriya russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi 1900–1927, St Petersburg: Satis. [Google Scholar], pp. 376–80. 6 Firsov, 1999 Firsov, S. 1999. Vremya v sud'be, St Petersburg: St Petersburg University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 46–47, quoting from an archival source. 7 Vostryshev does not give a source for this passage. On the complexities of this situation, the interrelationships between Sergi and the others, and the role of Metropolitan Petr, see: Stratonov, 1995 Stratonov, I. 1995. “Russkaya tserkovnaya smuta 1921–1931 gg”. In Iz istorii khristianskoi tserkvi na rodine i za rubezhom v xx stoletii: sbornik (materialy po istorii tserkvi 5), 29–172. Moscow: Krutitskoye Patriarsheye Podvor'ye. (originally Berlin, 1932) [Google Scholar]; Yelevferi, 1995. On the fate of Metropolitan Petr, see Corley, 1996 Corley, F. 1996. Religion in the Soviet Union: an Archival Reader, London: Macmillan. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], pp. 108–12. 8 Following the execution of Metropolitan Petr in 1937 Sergi became officially locum tenens. 9 The text, dated 16/29 July 1927 and signed by Metropolitan Sergi and eight members of the Temporary Patriarchal Holy Synod, is published in Patriarkh, 1949, pp. 59–63. On the draft of the Declaration, which the authorities did not accept, see Mitrofanov, 2002 Mitrofanov, G. prot. 2002. Istoriya russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi 1900–1927, St Petersburg: Satis. [Google Scholar], pp. 383–87. 10 A point lost in translation is that the ‘joys, successes and failures’ refer to the ‘Motherland’ (rodina) and not to the Soviet Union. 11 On the state organs of control over the church, see the important article by T.A. Chumachenko (2003 Chumachenko, T. A. 2003. “Sovet po delam Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi pri SNK (SM) SSSR v 1943–1947 gg.: osobennosti formirovaniya i deyatel'nosti apparata”. In Murashko and Odintsov, 2003 69–98. [Google Scholar]). 12 According to a letter received by Metropolitan Yevlogi, Sergi had been given the text of the announcement and then kept in solitary confinement. ‘He was faced with the dilemma of either saying that the church was persecuted, in which case all the Tikhonite bishops would be arrested – that is, the whole church organisation would be destroyed – or of saying that there was no persecution and being shamed as a liar’ (Yevlogi, 1994 Yevlogi mitrop. (Georgiyevsky). 1994. Put' moyei zhizni: vospominaniya mitropolita Yevlogiya (Georgiyevskogo) izlozhennyye po ego rasskazam T. Manukhinoi, Moscow: Moskovsky rabochi. [Google Scholar], pp. 568–69). 13 The full text of Karpov's notes on the meeting has now been published: Zapiska, 2003. 14 Pospielovsky debates this issue: Pospielovsky, 1997 Pospielovsky, D. 1997. The “best years” of Stalin's church policy (1942–1948) in the light of archival documents. Religion, State & Society, 25(2): 139–162. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], pp. 140–41. 15 The Synod had not met since 1935 because virtually all its members had been arrested. 16 Of the whole list only one, Bishop Nikolai Mogilevsky, was in fact released.

Chinese Europe: Alexander Herzen and the Russian Image of China

Chinese Europe: Alexander Herzen and the Russian Image of China Susanna Soojung Lim W H E AT O N C O L L E G E , M A S S A C H U S E T T S Alexander Herzen (1812-70), aleading nineteenth-century Russian thinker, memoirist, journalist, and novelist, spent the majority of his active professional life in exile in Europe, primarily England. Portrayed to genera¬ tions of Russians as the “father of Russian socialism,” Herzen is also known for his astute observations of the European scene and his reflections on Rus¬ sia’s relationship to the West. On the significance of Europe for Russia, he once declared, “We need Europe as an ideal, areproach, agood example; if she were not these things it would be necessary to invent her” (11:66). Yet Herzen’s thoughts on the West also lead us to an unexpected, reverse, direction: to the Far East and China. The present study examines the idea of China in the writings of the Russian thinker, in particular its sig¬ nificance as the source of adistinctive Russian discourse on China and Japan, one in which these Far Eastern nations figure not as clear signifiers of the exotic “Orient,” but rather as potent metaphors for considering Russia’s own place in history and its relation to the West.^ The first part discusses some specifics of Russian perceptions of China leading up to Herzen, fol¬ lowed by an analysis of his original contribution to the predominant nine¬ teenth-century idea of China. It then concludes with an examination of Herzen’s influence on Fyodor Dostoevsky and the Russian Symbolists. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the image of China in Russian thought and literature functioned as adual metaphor. On the one hand, it representedstagnationandconservatism,servingasastand-infortheRuss¬ ian self, in the way European thinkers used it to criticize their own societies. Ontheotherhand,beginninginthe1840s,Chinaalsobecameasymbolfor the other, the West. This counterintuitive conflation of China and Western Europewasshapedbywriters’awarenessofRussia’speculiarstatusbetween E a s t a n d W e s t . Thepasttwodecadeshaveseenagrowingnumberofstudiesdevotedto the question of Russia and the East in the theoretical context of postcolo¬ nialism and Orientalism. These studies have focused on the ways the Russian state and its intellectuals, writers, and artists have understood and described the empire’s eastern and southern peripheries.The need to readjust Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism when considering the Russian experience of the East has been noted by several critics.According to Mark Bassin, Russia’s ambivalent position is characterized by “a sort of existential indeterminacy between East and West, averitable geo-schizophrenia” (1998, 58); IntertextSy Vol. 10, No. 12006 ©Texas Tech University Press 5 2 I N T E R T E X T S Nathaniel Knight, in questioning the direct applicability of Said’s theory to Russia, writes that “when Russian scholars turned to the East it was often with asharp awareness of their own supposed backwardness and inferiority in the face of the grand civilization of Britain, France and Germany.” (77) This national insecurity has shaped Russian orientalist discourse: schol¬ arship on the treatment of the Caucasus in nineteenth-century Russian liter¬ ature, for instance, has shown how the creation of the south as Russia’s own Orient was significantly motivated by the desire to underscore Russians’ sim¬ ilarity to Europeans as colonizers and orientalizers.^ Like the use of the Cau¬ casus, the use of China reveals Russian perceptions of its “own supposed backwardness and inferiority in the face of the grand civilization” of Western Europe, but in adecidedly different manner. China in the writings to be examined below functions as astand-in not for an exotic or Romantic other that satisfied Russian imperial needs, but as afamiliar and contemptible Western other, and consequently as aweapon for critiquing the evils of Western modernity and stressing Russia’s distance from Europe. Russian thinking on China, then, becomes acomplex interaction among three ideas: Orientalism, Occidentalism^, and Russia. From Kitaishchina to “Chinese Europe” Although Russia was the first “western” nation to sign aformal treaty with China in 1689 (Treaty of Nerchinsk), its engagement with the Middle King¬ dom as atopic of cultural and intellectual life developed in the eighteenth century and simulated...

Perspectives on the Potential of Russian Oil

A prominent American specialist on the economy of the former USSR comments on Russian oil in light of a preceding paper on the subject. Noting the congruence of Russia's economic growth with world oil prices, the author points out that the country's growth is endangered by sharp declines in those prices. He also recalls how an oil windfall shaped Russian thinking in the 1970s, questions how long Russia can pump oil at its maximum level by invoking the American experience from 1859 through the peak in 1970 until the present, analyzes the two corporate models in the Russian oil sector, and briefly outlines Putin's new approach to foreign investment in the sector. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L71, O13, O18. 3 figures, 8 references.

Der Kritiker als integrativer Sprecher: Überlegungen zur Mittlerfunktion des Kritikers im Rahmen der ersten russischen Emigration in Frankreich am Beispiel Boris de Schloezers (1881-1969)

Article Der Kritiker als integrativer Sprecher: Überlegungen zur Mittlerfunktion des Kritikers im Rahmen der ersten russischen Emigration in Frankreich am Beispiel Boris de Schloezers (1881-1969) was published on June 1, 2004 in the journal Zeitschrift für Slawistik (volume 49, issue 2).

Flight from Freedom: What Russians Think and Want

Flight from Freedom: What Russians Think and Want