Russian Revisionism Research Articles

NATO's new front: deterrence moves eastward

Abstract Why has NATO taken so long in adapting its deterrence strategy to Russian revisionism and extending its military presence to the eastern allies? The setting up of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland and the Baltic states offers a critical case for examining the changing understandings of allied deterrence in the post-post-Cold War era. eFP is a story of negotiating the political acceptability and military credibility of NATO's modern extended deterrence strategy in the exposed eastern flank, and the navigation of the alliance security dilemma in relation to Russia while buttressing the eastern allies' physical and NATO's ontological security. This article traces NATO's extended conventional deterrence posture in the eastern flank from the adoption of the tripwire model shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea to the commitment to defend ‘every inch of Allied territory’ via embracing the forward defence stance in 2022. Mapping the evolutionary curve of NATO's post-enlargement politics of deterrence through documentary analysis and interviews with diplomats and military representatives in NATO headquarters and national capitals, the article makes two contributions. Conceptually, it dissects the political rationalities and historical analogies underpinning contemporary allied deterrence strategy and posture in NATO's eastern frontline. Empirically, the study illustrates how allied deterrence is made to matter on the ground, and why this matters for deterrence credibility.

The war in Ukraine and the Dawn of Russian Revisionism: An English School Approach

Since Russian president Vladimir Putin's 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, followed by his country's invasion of neighbouring Georgia the ensuing year, Russia has been one of the most powerful and visible challengers of a West-centric conception of international order. This has led to assertions that Russia is a revisionist state. However, such assertions largely gloss over the “intermediate” stages that Russia has occupied between the two extremes of status quo and revisionist power throughout the post–Cold War era. They also reveal an understanding of international order that is mostly uniform. Employing an English School framework, this paper shows how Russia only became a fully revisionist state in the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. And using a theoretical model which outlines the impact of contestation on international society, it outlines the consequences of Russia's recent descent into revisionism for the so-called rules-based international order.

RUSSIAN REVISIONISM AS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The article is devoted to highlighting geopolitical ambitions of Russian revisionism to build a multipolar world, which should replace the modern liberal international order of the Western model. The focus is on revealing ideological foundations of the foreign policy doctrine of Russian revisionism. The historical and political conditions of formation and the main parameters of modern Russian revisionism – geopolitical, spiritual-moral, historical-mythological – have been clarified and are considered against the background of Russia's historical aspiration for hegemony in Eurasia. The research is based on content analysis of public speeches and publications of Russian statesmen, ideologists and supporters of the Putin regime, which allows to determine the ideological basis of the revisionist course of the Kremlin, to establish declared and hidden motives of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the liberal international order. It is argued that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an integral part of the strategy of building a multipolar world order, which involves establishing Russia as a civilizational pole, where the Kremlin projects power within the Russian sphere of influence. It is concluded that Russian revisionism poses an existential threat not only to Ukrainian independence and the countries of the post-Soviet space, but also to democratic institutions and values that define the liberal international order. Keywords: Russian revisionism. International order. Geopolitics. War in Ukraine. Post-Soviet space. European security.

Tackling Strategic Simultaneity: What NATO Could Do to Adapt to the New Multitude of Threats

NATO is facing an unprecedented geostrategic environment characterized by simultaneous threats: Russian revisionism, the rise of China, the related problem of coping with threats in the cyber domain, and persistent challenges emanating from the southern flank. This article applies insights from the literature on organizational ambidexterity to provide a fresh perspective on how NATO could adapt to strategic simultaneity. Exisiting organizational ambidexterity literature focuses on the corporate challenge of striking a balance between exploiting existing markets and technologies, and exploring new ones altogether. In essence, strategic simultaneity demands that NATO do the same. NATO must cope with well-known and less-known threats and strike the right balance between effectiveness in handling known problems and innovation in coping with new ones. The article extracts three key categories from the strategic ambidexterity research: unified senior leadership; separate organizational units for exploitation and innovation; and a strategic approach to pursuing innovation through external partnerships. Applying these to NATO, it argues that, in order to become more ambidextrous, the organization’s major countries must unite around a vision that both places simultaneity at the center and is conducive to a balanced investment in tackling all four major challenges. While Allied Command Transformation (ACT) must be maintained as a distinct organizational unit, much stronger bridges must be built between ACT and the other commands. Further, NATO Centers of Excellence and external partnerships must be used in a more targeted way as sources of innovation and new ideas.

Military exercises as a part of NATO deterrence strategy

The main aim of the article is to contribute to the better understanding of the role of military exercises for the deterrence strategy of NATO, in particular by proving the premise that military exercise is one of the most effective instrument of the military capabilities demonstration and political persuasion. Against the backdrop of the Russian revisionism and its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, NATO and its member states have substantially reinforced their deterrence capabilities. An increased number of military exercises, their geography and scale are intended to demonstrate the Alliance’s capacity and commitment to respond to potential aggression.

The Politics of Russian Revisionism: Diplomacy of a Worldview, 2011–14

Abstract Russia’s use of force in Ukraine has been described as a challenge to the rule of international law and an event of unilateral intervention. This paper provides a reinterpretation of this standard history of Russian revisionism. Our new history places this practice in a global governance context through an analysis of the politics concerning the international legal norm of ‘non-intervention’ and its legitimate/illegitimate exceptions for collective intervention. This analysis discloses a practice of Russian diplomacy that emerges out of resistance to humanitarian interventions advocated for by Western states. This practice justifies its own state-bound humanitarian intervention as the legitimate exception to the foundation of international order, which Russian diplomacy had previously sought to restore. We argue the political discourse of the worldview of ‘state civilization’ explains these events of Russian revisionism. We conclude with an analysis of the international paradoxes of peace and conflict contingent on this Russian worldview.

Between Pastiche and Sampling: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to Russian Revisionism

The essay assesses NATO’s reaction to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Building on a synthesis of recent advances in strategic studies and works looking at institutional adaptation of security organisations, it presents an analytical framework for assessing strategic adaptation based on innovativeness, scope and cohesiveness. It takes inspiration from two techniques established in the visual arts and music, applying the concepts of pastiche and sampling to the analysis. The analysis concludes that, despite some problems and remaining challenges, NATO’s readjustment to Russian revisionism can be characterised as a moderately successful strategic sampling.

Russian Revisionism, Legal Discourse and the ‘Rules-Based’ International Order

Russia has been accused of revisionism in its foreign policy, understood as an effort to undermine a ‘rules-based’ international order. This essay analyses the normative dimension of such revisionism. It examines Russian legal discourse in the period 2014–2019, based on case studies of Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria. It finds little evidence of sustained Russian legal revisionism—an effort to modify international law—despite Russian assertion of legal exceptionalism in the CIS region. It confirms previous research that Russia has deployed legal rhetoric strategically and instrumentally. Moscow understands it cannot easily gain international support for new rules, yet still seems to aspire to revise the structure of regional power relations.

DYNAMICS OF UKRAINIAN-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CHANGES IN GERMAN POLITICS

The article analyzes the current foreign policy of Germany and how it is influenced by domestic political developments as well as changes in the international arena. Germany, as a key player in Europe, remains declaratively consistent in its support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russian revisionism. However, a deeper analysis of the geopolitical and domestic position of Germany demonstrates certain risks to the stability of Ukraine-Germany relations.Attention is given to the dependence of Ukraine-Germany relations of Russia-Germany relations. Traditionally active economic ties between Berlin and Moscow have been increasing despite European and American sanctions against Russia. This leads to the strengthening of the pro-Russian lobby in German political circles. It is highlighted that the planned completion of the construction of Nord Stream-2, the dependence of Germany on the supplies of Russian hydrocarbons and the augmentation of net direct investments of German companies in Russian economy illustrates German endeavor, primarily in its geopolitical interests, to normalize relations with Russian Federation. Moreover, the article emphasizes the crisis of German political leadership which is connected with the end of the 4th mandate of the chancellor Angela Merkel in 2021 and the rise of anti-system and populist movements in Germany that may shatter political support of Ukraine. The changes in the Euro-Atlantic region are mentioned separately, namely the issue of defence spending of Germany in the framework of NATO and the consequences of Brexit.In the context of the mentioned elements of German politics, several challenges for Ukraine, that may significantly weaken its position in the international arena, are determined. A complex foreign and domestic situation can remove Ukrainian issue from the agenda and encourage Berlin to take quick «comfortable» measures in the context of the war in the East of Ukraine. On this basis, the article suggests recommendations on ways of reacting to the current developments in Germany from the side of Ukraine as well as on adjusting foreign policy towards this state with due regard to the mentioned tendencies.

Russian revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria

AbstractThis paper seeks to develop a new typology of revisionism based on the nature of the aims (territorial/normative/hierarchy of prestige), the means employed (peaceful/violent), and the level of action (regional/global). This will then be used to explain the escalation of Russia's foreign policy from regional to global claims with reference to its military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and to identify the type of revisionism involved in each of the three Russian military interventions undertaken both inside (Georgia and Ukraine) and outside (Syria) the post-soviet space. The paper is divided into three parts. The first examines the concept of revisionism and suggests a new classification of six types in relation to the means, nature, and level of the claims put forward byrevisionist powers. The second discusses the interventions carried out by Russia within its regional area (in Georgia and Ukraine). The third analyses the intervention in Syria and highlights the escalation of Russian claims from the regional to the global level.

Is Europe Ready for Power Politics ?

Among the misunderstandings that are constantly fueling the debate on Europe, is its collective inability to shape the global game. And this at the moment when it faces American nationalism, Russian revisionism and China’s rise. To explain this lack of European reactivity there is a simple and common interpretation: European states are cruelly divided on all subjects and struggle to act collectively. But, this explanation confuses causes and consequences. The bottom line is that the European project born in 1957 was built against the idea of power. The whole question, is then to assess the capacity of Europe to reverse that trend and play power politics in taking into consideration the feeling of strategic loneliness in a less and less Kantian world (I) and the sense of danger in a more and more Hobbesian world (II).This is what we call a gaullian moment for Europe.

ZPŮSOBY STRATEGICKÉ ADAPTACE: NATO a EU pod tlakem revizionismu

How to assess the strategic adjustment of international organisations? The article combines recent advances in the study of grand strategy and studies in institutional adaptation to explain NATO's and European Union's responses to current Russian revisionism. Selecting specific cases of NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and EU's East StratCom Task Force, it analyses the innovativeness, scope and cohesiveness of these measures in the context of broader strategic readjustments. The conclusions pit the Alliance's gradual but more robust strategic renovation against the Union's more radical but limited and possibly fractious strategic breakthrough.

Russia and the question of world order

ABSTRACTThere is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.

Contemporary Russian revisionism: understanding the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare and the strategic and tactical deployment of disinformation

In this policy brief, after an account of the historical-political context of Russia’s recent aggressive actions, I examine the objectives, strategy, and tactics of Russia’s information warfare, particularly as concerns eastern Europe and Syria, although also against selected western European states and the USA. Of special interest is the notion that Russia’s disinformation is potent because it does not necessarily establish falsehoods as true, but rather pollutes political discourse such that news information consumers are led to doubt the very concepts of truth and objective political facts. I conclude by (a) discussing the impact this strategy has had—and will continue to have—on Europe’s domestic politics, as well as on the global liberal order, and then (b) broaching policy ideas for countering Russian disinformation.

Introduction

ABSTRACTThe new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues.

Balancing Priorities in America's European Strategy

ABSTRACT: This article examines how regional and global priorities challenge America's evolving European strategy. The need to reassure Eastern and Central European allies in the face of Russian assertiveness calls for greater US strategic engagement in Europe. Conversely, defense-budgetary pressures, the Asia rebalance, and the willingness to avoid excessive escalation with Russia constitute ongoing limitations to a significant US military engagement in and around Europe. That is the essence of America's European dilemma--how to invest sufficient resources in Europe as toensure credible while keeping enough military and diplomatic bandwidth to pursue other global geopolitical objectives ********** Russian revisionism compels the United States to up its game in Europe. However, current discussions about US strategy and force posture on that continent cannot be isolated from broader geopolitical considerations. After all, Washington remains intent on rebalancing its strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific, and the demand signal for US military engagement in the Middle East is unlikely to recede any time soon. In an increasingly constrained resource environment, the United States must grapple with the ever-relevant question of how to prioritize different regions, competitors, and challenges--a question that often boils down to striking an appropriate balance between Europe, East Asia and the Middle East. Coming up with a satisfactory way to address that question is more complex than it already sounds, not least as there is an important degree of geopolitical crossover amongst those three vital regions. During the Cold War, Washington understood the preservation of a balance of power in the Middle East was essential to ensuring the supply of oil for key allies in Europe and East Asia--and to the security and thriving of a US-led order in those vital regions. Today, the high dependence of China, Japan, and South Korea on Middle Eastern oil means US influence in the Middle East can constitute an important source of strategic leverage in the Asia-Pacific. In turn, Europe remains an important base of operations and source of diplomatic and operational support to America's initiatives in the Middle East. While US strategy in Europe will no doubt be largely driven by the evolving regional threat environment, it is nonetheless important to take heed of some of the ways in which global geopolitical considerations may affect or constrain America's strategic picture in Europe. This article examines how regional and global priorities may intersect in the context of Washington's evolving European strategy. On the one hand, the need to reassure Eastern and Central European allies in light of Russian revisionism constitutes a strong pressure for greater US strategic engagement in Europe. On the other hand, that pressure has been tempered by defense-budgetary constrains, the commitment to rebalance to Asia and a willingness to avoid excessive escalation with Russia. So far, these competing pressures have coalesced around a strategy of through readiness, through an improvement of United States and NATO rapid-reaction capabilities and an enhanced pattern of rotational deployments, training, and exercises in Central and Eastern Europe. This has allowed Washington to address the concerns of its frontline allies while avoiding devoting too many resources to the European theatre of operations. Russia's impending military modernization and its improving military-strategic position in north-eastern and south-eastern Europe beg the question of whether a readiness-only approach is likely to create lasting security in Europe. This is a question that appears to be gaining traction in US and NATO circles. Indeed, as the Alliance approaches its July 2016 Summit in Warsaw, the narrative shift from reassurance to deterrence signals a progressive hardening of US policy in Europe, and the intent to go beyond readiness and to emphasize the need for more presence. …

Energy Security and Germany's Response to Russian Revisionism: The Dangers of Civilian Power

This article examines the impact of German dependence on Russian gas supplies for Europe's ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia. It demonstrates that by focusing on the environmental dimensions of energy policy and a policy of rapprochement with Russia, Germany has neglected the security of supply implications of its dependence on Russian gas. The article argues that Germany's excessive energy dependence on Russia has limited the ability of the EU to challenge Russian revisionism by targeting its energy sector through sanctions. The article makes a number of energy policy recommendations which will be essential for Germany to avoid undue Russian influence on its foreign and security policies. The article concludes by exploring the utility of Neoclassical Realism in understanding Germany's approach to energy security. In doing so it highlights the dangers of allowing ideology to cloud a sober assessment of the imperatives of the balance of theat.

Britain, the European Union and the Future of Europe: A Geostrategic Perspective

Any discussion of a potential ‘Brexit’ should be set against the backdrop of an increasingly convulsive European landscape. The merits and shortcomings of the European Union should be judged not in isolation, but through the lens of their implications upon a broader postwar European order that Britain has helped to build and sustain for nearly seven decades. US strategic retrenchment, Germany's economic and political pre-eminence within the EU, and Russia's attempts to recreate a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe are likely to disrupt the European balance. Luis Simón argues that ‘Brexit’ could exacerbate each of these disruptive trends – with negative ramifications for UK national security. Conversely, he contends, by leveraging its membership of and influence within the EU, Britain could help revitalise the transatlantic relationship, mitigate the spectre of a German-dominated EU, and check Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe.

After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus

The Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 and Russia's ensuing recognition of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence have generated a new context in relations between the EU, the US and Russia. The crisis created new sources of instability in the entire post-Soviet space, highlighting a new form of Russian revisionism and revealing the limitations of Western policies in what the Kremlin views as its sphere of influence. Caucasian-Central Asian states now wonder whether it is worth complicating their relations with Moscow for the sake of limited or uncertain support from the West. Even if the long-term repercussions of the Russian-Georgian crisis remains unpredictable, one thing is clear: the EU and the US should engage with the region more intensively. In the long run, only economic development in the region, genuine democratisation and real prospects of becoming anchored in Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside effective confidence-building measures between the parties, will be able to induce the secessionist regions to rethink their future.

Victim of a "War of Ideologies"

The five-day war between Russia and Georgia dramatically changed the political situation in the South Caucasus. Although Azerbaijan was not directly involved in the conflict, the war nevertheless forced Baku to reevaluate its foreign and domestic policies. Moscow's successful military intervention in Georgia forced Azerbaijan to distance itself from the United States to avoid antagonizing a belligerent Russia. Meanwhile, the inability of the Western countries-the United States in particular-to adequately respond to Russia led to large-scale public disappointment among Azerbaijanis. The crisis also generated new sources of instability for the entire post-Soviet space, not only because it highlighted a new form of Russian revisionism but also because it brought to the fore the limits of Western policies in what Kremlin views as its sphere of influence.1 Moscow clearly showed its claims over the South Caucasus and demonstrated its readiness to embark on military confrontation to achieve its goals. The postwar situation indicated that Azerbaijan could become the next site where U.S.-Russian rivalry will arise. The Russian government's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia has led Azerbaijan to fear that Moscow would try to give similar support to the ethnic Armenian population in the region of Karabakh if Azerbaijan aligns itself too closely to the West.Much has been written about the Russia-Georgia War's impact on foreign policy, energy projects, and the clash of geopolitical interests. However, scholars and researchers have generally overlooked the influence of the war on domestic policy, political development, and changes in public perception. One of the assumptions of realist theory, which shapes the paradigm that underlies much of the theoretical understanding of political science, is that states are unitary actors and that domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy.2 Unfortunately, the complexity of the problem in Azerbaijan has made it difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign politics. The absence of any visible developments in domestic politics, the silence of political scientists and public figures, and an inactive and docile public have coalesced to limit research on the problem.In this article, I aim to analyze the domestic development in Azerbaijan and establish causality between certain events and the Russia-Georgia crisis. I look at the Azerbaijani public's changes in perception to see whether any changes occurred because of the conflict. I then examine the domestic security issues facing Azerbaijan and the government's reaction to these events. Finally, I examine political development in Azerbaijan after the war.Public Opinions, Changing Perceptions, and ExpectationsThe war put Baku in a very delicate position. Refusing to support an important ally would have negatively affected Azerbaijan's image both abroad and in the eyes of a public that was clearly on the side of neighboring Georgia. The Azerbaijani government, however, tread lightly, not wanting to say or do anything that might provoke Russia or lead to a deterioration of relations with Moscow. Azerbaijan instead chose a strategy of soft support for Georgia while refraining from making harsh statements against Russia. On the day following the Georgian operation in South Ossetia, Khazar Ibrahim, the press secretary for Azerbaijan's foreign ministry, stated only that Azerbaijan favored a solution to the South Ossetia conflict based on the territorial integrity of Georgia and Georgian adherence to international law.3 Azerbaijan's support for Georgia in this conflict is understandable. After the Soviet Union's demise, the relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia have been consistently cordial. Both countries shared similar problems, such as ethnic separatism, an aggressive Russian policy in the southern Caucasus, and a common goal of integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). …