Russian Intervention Research Articles

ДЖИХАД В УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ СУСПІЛЬСТВІ: ПРАКТИКА, ЗДОБУТТЯ ПЕРЕМОГИ ТА НАЛАГОДЖЕННЯ МИРУ

A general study of the problem has been presented. Amongst others, there has been considered the concept and practice of jihad as an important factor of the practical life at the background of Russia's large-scale Russia's intervention into Ukraine on 24 February 2022 р., preceded by the temporary occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and Donbas Area of Ukraine. Causes of the initiated war have been identified, as well as the tries of the practical implementation of the "Russian World" concept, which resulted in occupation of a part of Ukraine's territory that is recognized by the whole civilised world. An actual problem is the practice of jihad in conditions of the above said war in the Ukrainian society, and particularly ‒ the actual application of certain obtained knowledge and skills as one of the essential factors of the participation of Moslems in the national- liberating struggle of the Ukrainians against the Russian aggression, so as Ukraine's victory and making peace between the respective countries. The study of the formulated problem includes the objective interpretation of the term jihad, which means various ways of struggling, most notably the participation of Moslems in military actions. We stated that there are a great number of Moslems in the Armed Forces of Ukraine who heroically defend the Ukrainian lands rubbing shoulders with Ukrainian comrades-in-arm and representatives of other peoples and religions. In this context, they take part in a just war that is they direct their actions in the right way in accordance with the requirements of religious postulates of their belief. The methodology of the carried-out study is based on observing the principles of providing the academic objectivity, as well as on the basis of interdisciplinarity and on the rules of identification of adequate and informationally important materials for the implementation of the given study, while also paying attention to the point how it is essential to assess in the right way interpretations of the terms having been used.

Russian Policy Toward Turkey Since the 2010s

ABSTRACT: Historically, the Ottoman Empire and Russia have had recurrent conflicting relations since the eighteenth century and, particularly, from the beginning of the "Eastern Question". Indeed, almost all the wars to which the Ottoman Empire was a party had Russia as an opponent. However, Russia's relations with the Republic of Turkey have been evolving. Indeed, the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognise the young Republic of Turkey. Then, during the Cold War, Turkey, which joined the Transatlantic Alliance in 1952, played a strategic role as NATO's Middle Eastern bulwark against the USSR. After the break-up of the USSR, the return of Russian regional dominance in the first decade of the twenty-first century led to competitive relations between Russia and Turkey. However, they have intensified and diversified since the 2010s. We will consider the evolution of Russian policy towards Turkey since the 2010 decade by analysing its stakes and the highlights of a complex strategic alliance. Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015 generated developments in its relationship with Turkey. From 2017, a turning point in the relations between Russia and Turkey has been the issue of the war exit and the future of Syria. In addition, in order to diversify its military logistical arms purchases and move away from a relationship of dependence on NATO, in 2017 Turkey intensified its rapprochement with Russia. Indeed, Russia procured S-400 air defence system missiles for Turkey and negotiated a nuclear energy agreement. This rapprochement between Russia and Turkey irritates the US and NATO, generating collateral effects.

Rusija, sukob u Ukrajini i novi prostorni i geopolitički poredak

The conflict in Ukraine is the subject of contradictory narratives in the communication war, but also reflects the rival historical and geopolitical representations between the different actors of this conflict. According to the geopolitical angle, the main issue of the crisis in Ukraine is the rivalry between the great powers for world power and the distribution of geopolitical spaces. The geopolitical angle thus makes it possible to take into account the numerous stakes linked to this crisis on different scales, which go well beyond the purely geostrategic and military aspects. The main hypothesis of this article is to determine to what extent Russia, with its special military operation in Ukraine, is pushing for the emergence of a new geopolitical configuration on a European and global scale. Indeed, Moscow is provoking a redefinition of alliances at the regional and global levels. At the Eurasian level, NATO will probably no longer be able to pursue a policy of expansion in the Russian near abroad (countries of the former USSR), the enlargement of NATO to Ukraine being a casus belli, as the Russian intervention has shown. On a global scale, Russia's membership in the UN Security Council now prevents any unilateral interpretation of international law by the collective West. Moreover, economic sanctions by EU and NATO member states are not being followed by other states in Eurasia, South America and Africa, challenging the unipolar project of the West under the leadership of the United States. The European Union is increasingly aligned with the geopolitical priorities of NATO and the United States, with little room for manoeuvre. Russia's special operation in Ukraine is definitely moving the world towards a multicentric and multipolar geopolitical configuration, with no possibility of returning to the pre-conflict situation. In this analysis, geopolitical cartography will be used to illustrate the problematics but also to emphasize the spatial angle as an analytical tool.

Nova geopolitička Perestrojka

After Chernenko's demise and Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985, the period known as perestroika began in the Soviet Union. Realignment led to an ostensible end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thanks to Yeltsin's declaration of sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). As a consequence, former Soviet socialist republics, including Ukraine, became independent states. The United States of America declared victory in the Cold War and a new world order was established with the United States as the great hegemon. In this paper, our aim is to show that the ongoing conflict in the territory of Ukraine did not start either in 2022 or in 2014 (when the conflict became armed). Instead, the conflict was kick-started with the independent state of Ukraine being established in 1991, on historically Russian lands, the purpose of this exercise being to create a new Ukrainian nation. The thirty-year history of the Ukrainian state bears witness to its non-Russian and anti-Russian character, as well as to the undisguised influence of the United States of America, which was particularly evident in the so-called colour revolutions and the armed coup of 2014, which led to the overthrow of the legally elected president of this country, Viktor Yanukovych. Russian intervention in 2022, which has a global geopolitical character, shows that a new perestroika is in full play. Denazification and demilitarisation of Ukraine, declared as the main goals of the Russian Federation, are the fundamental measures of the new perestroika. If the Russian Federation succeeds in this endeavour, this would undoubtedly mark the end of U.S. hegemony, while a new multicentric world would be created. If Russian intervention turns out to be a failure, U.S. hegemony will be reconfirmed so that the interests of the Russian Federation would most likely be faced with a threat of further disintegration. Thus, this is not primarily a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a decisive battle between Russia and the collective West led by the United States. This is the reason why the West is putting in a strenuous effort, and suffering substantial economic damage, to win this war. It defends Ukraine for its own sake, not for the sake of Ukraine itself. Not by their own choice, Ukrainians are in a tragic position in which their nation is used for the achievement of Western interests.

Ukrajinski rat i rusofobija "druge Srbije"

In the first part of the article, the theoretical framework of the analysis is given and the basic terms are explained. The second part presents examples of Russophobia in the texts of some members of the media and cultural elite in Serbia even before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The third part describes the escalation of Russophobia among that part of the elite after the Russian intervention in Ukraine (2022). The fourth part provides an overview of seven surveys of public opinion in Serbia (2022-2023). All these surveys show a high proportion of Serbian citizens (about 80%) who do not agree with the introduction of sanctions against Russia. An overview of attempts to ignore these findings by a part of the Russophobic elite in Serbia is also given. In the fifth part, the further escalation of Russophobia among the elite is described, and in the sixth part, an explanation of this phenomenon is presented from the perspective of the world system theory

Intervensi Politik dan Militer Rusia Terhadap Ukraina Sebagai Wujud Penerapan Strategi Deterens

This study aims to determine the background of Russia's intervention in Ukraine through the approach of the concept of deterrence. To reveal this, this study uses a qualitative-explanatory method aimed at presenting a depth of analysis with the context of testing the hypothesis and the relevance of two variables. The results of the study reveal that the background of Russia's intervention in Ukraine is to respond to threats from the expansion of NATO's membership wing in Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine. In addition, Russia is also driven by the existence of Russian national interests in the territory of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula to secure its influence in Ukraine and reject the influence of the United States in Eastern Europe. Russia's intervention in Ukraine is seen as an effort to prevent Ukraine from joining the European Union. Russia is considered not to respect Ukraine's sovereignty over the act of annexing the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The limitation of this research is that the data used is still limited to the type of secondary data, namely journals containing data on Russia's intervention against Ukraine.

REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE. IS THERE A CASE FOR STRATEGIC ENGINEERED DISPLACEMENT?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for analyzing the current refugee flow from Ukraine in a manner that goes beyond statistics or humanitarian law towards intentionality and strategic games. The author will use Kelly M. Greenhill’s model of strategic engineered migration to investigate the case of refugees from Ukraine in order to assess the potential intention of Russia to use large masses of displaced people, caused by the illegal and unprovoked war, to achieve some hidden goals apart from the stated ones. The paper is built, first of all, on analyzing the theoretical framework focused on the types of strategic engineered migration, the evolution of the refugee flow, the humanitarian crisis and the implications for transit and destination countries. Also, there will be comparisons with the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war and the case of the crisis caused by Belarus on its borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as illustrative for the use of refugees and migrants by a state actor in order to achieve specific political goals. In the last section, the author will investigate the opportunity to translate the case of war refugees into the model initially dedicated to the broader issue of migration, and, finally, will use it to the present case of refugees from Ukraine.

Ukraine in the Integration Security System

The process of the security system formation in the integrated European space has been continuing for more than seven decades, but its final objective has not been attained yet. The relevance of this topic is the need to study the process of destruction of the established world, the collapse of the system of international relations, lack of understanding and complete disregard by the aggressor of all humanitarian levers in a situation of war and armed confrontation. Every subsequent turn in development of international relations in 20th and 21st centuries and new emerging threats seem to bring countries closer to unity and addressing the security problem, but…
 In 2014 Russia, ignoring the principles of the international law, basic treaties with Ukraine, commitments to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine, started a war. On 24 February 2022, a new escalation took place when Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring the state of war. What was the reason? The answer could be found in the Ukrainian history that is not a simple one. Russian rulers want to rebuild the Russian empire returning to the borders of the 19th century. This is a threat to Ukraine that is a sovereign European state founded on the bases of European values, peace and international cooperation.
 Russia has been trying to eliminate Ukrainian statehood, language, and culture starting from the Kozak times of the 16th century. Thus, this process is at least 500-year old. In the 21st century, Russia attempted to occupy Ukraine by means of the anti-Ukrainian government, but the attempt failed. As a consequence, the Russian president decided to eliminate Ukraine by military means. When the aggression started in 2014, the EU deeply dependent on Russian energy sources, did not react fully to the Russian intervention. Ukraine could not defend its territorial integrity because of the lack of military capacities in the absence of the international military support. But in 2022, the situation is radically different: at the time of Russian invasion, Ukrainian people raise to the defense of their country, and the Ukrainian army thanks to the strong international military and political support continues to defend the existence of the Ukrainian state despite the dominance of the Russian military machine.

The Meddling American Voter? How Norms, Interests, and Great Power Rivalries Affect U.S. Public Support for Partisan Electoral Interventions Abroad

Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries’ elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public’s views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.

Hybrid Warfare. The Russian Intervention in Crimea in 2014 and the Lessons We Learned for the Current Military Context

Abstract In this paper we will throw a close look on the recent and contemporary military and hybrid phenomenons that curently shape both European and world security structure. In terms of security, seeing through the lens of intellingence and, at the same time, having a deep empirical and epistemological knowledge about the military events that occured near the European border, the world has had serious concerns regarding the russian foreign policy and its geostrategic plans. We will analyze the premises of the Russian military intervention, the hybrid methods used and most importantly what conclusions and valuble lessons Europe, NATO and the West had learned for the future. Moreover, we will see what policies led to these consequences and which strategies will be intended to support decisions and governance regarding the current threats. Systematically, we will try to reveal an efficient physiognomy of the risks, dangers, and threats and what could have been done to stop the current Russian military operation. Conclusively, we should ask ourselves if the current strategies implemented are working at its best. Furthermore, another important question to be raised is how risk indicators are constructed, and further translated into our every-day lives?

Reasons for NATO’s and Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis; comparative analysis of realist and humanitarian perspectives

The Syrian crisis, which has been often described as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, has lasted for more than 10 years with no visible sign of an end. Most scholars explain the reasons behind NATO’s and Russian intervention with realistic motives. However, there are cases difficult to explain only from a realist perspective. For example, great power diplomatic efforts to remove chemical weapons and adopt sanctions at the cost of energy interests. These actions can be viewed as humanitarian involvement. The study argues that great powers’ motivation cannot be judged uniformly, but their actions should be evaluated separately, as some actions might be realist and some humanitarian, and some a mixture of both. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons behind great powers’ involvement in the Syrian crisis by examining key decisions each power took during the war, from both aspects: realist and humanitarian. The study begins by outlining the theoretical background behind both perspectives and establishing criteria for judging a decision as realist/ humanitarian. This has been applied in reviewing the context behind five key decisions NATO (the US and European allies) and Russia made during the crisis. The study finds that one time all parties acted in a realist fashion, which produced no significant outcome. Contrary to this, one time all parties acted on humanitarian motives, which resulted in a favorable outcome. In the case when two parties, the US and Russia, acted as a realist, and the EU as humanitarian power, the EU’s efforts were insufficient to produce a favorable outcome. In other cases, when two parties, the EU and the US, pursued humanitarian motives, and Russia realist, the result depended on whether Russia pursued them actively or non-actively. In the former case, the result was ineffective to prevent further atrocities, whereas in the latter favorable outcome was still possible.

Strategic Communications: From a Reactive Fight Against Disinformation Towards Comprehensive Use in Support of National Security and Defence

The concept of strategic communications rose to prominence especially with the events linked to the Crimea annexation and Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine. As such it has been mostly related to the reactive fight against disinformation and propaganda or other elements of the hybrid campaign. This paper aims to point to the much broader potential for the tool of strategic communications in support of goals in the realm of national security and defence, while it is understood as proactive efforts and specific mindset using the information effect to advance national interests. Based on the literature review, benefits of strategic communications beyond hybrid campaigns are identified also in the fields of foreign military operations, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, deterrence and crisis management. It describes the informational, particularly, the cognitive, dimensions of these security threats as well as of the measures to counter them.

2022 RUSSIAN INTERVENTION OF UKRAINE: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

In 2022, the Ukraine-Russia conflict resulted in Russia intervening in the territory of Ukraine. The Russian intervention has been a topic of global discussion ever since, raising several international legal issues. The wide range of issues arising under international law, although distinct, are intertwined. Ukraine has already brought this matter before Ukrainian national courts alleging war crimes and the International Court of Justice alleging genocide. But the inevitable violation of human rights arising out of large-scale casualties has not been an issue of discussion before either forum. This article analyses the implications of such intervention broadly under international human rights law. The significance of this article lies in exploring the nuances associated with these legal issues through a viewpoint methodology with a critical approach, which could help national, regional, and international actors understand the interconnectedness among these issues, and act expeditiously to effectively address the crisis having geo-political impacts.

SUBCONCEPT OF “WAR IN UKRAINE” IN LINGUISTIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF UKRAINIANS AND RUSSIANS VIA THE ASSOCIATIVE EXPERIMENT

Recent studies have shown that the concept of “War” has changed its content structure [1]. The most active changes were caused by Russian intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, which modified the notional, figurative and value components of the concept. For instance, the notional component of the concept of “War” was supplemented by newly-formed “postmodern subconcepts” [2], such as the Syrian civil war, the Russo-Georgian War, the Russo-Ukrainian War, as well as the proxy war, the hybrid war, the battle of narratives, and the diffused war. Taking into account that “both mental and conceptual spaces are essences of the same level” [3], the study of the newly coined subconcepts can shed light on what people in Ukraine and Russia think about Russia’s War in Ukraine.

Recalibrating EU Foreign Policy Vis-à-vis Central Asia: Towards Principled Pragmatism and Resilience

ABSTRACT With China and Russia acting more assertively vis-à-vis Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have gradually moved to the core of contemporary Eurasian geopolitics – albeit to varying degrees. The European Union (EU) has purposefully sought to promote its norms and values in the region for quite some time in the past. However, considering the ongoing Western “polycrisis” exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic most recently, our paper investigates how the EU has been recalibrating its relationship towards Central Asia – within the timespan of its two EU Central Asia Strategies, dating from 2007 and 2019, respectively. We argue that the reformulation of EU policy towards Central Asia is pragmatically taking its lead from the growing constraints of EU foreign policy as well as Chinese and Russian intervention in the region; it is, in the end, geographical proximity that continues to shape geopolitics in Central Asia.

Kebijakan Rusia untuk Bertahan Menghadapi Sanksi Ekonomi Uni-Eropa di Tahun 2016-2020 Melalui Strategi Import Substitution

In the dynamics of Russia's relations with the European Union, at the beginning of the administration of President Vladimir Putin, Russia tried to approach the European Union as a trading partner. However, after Russia's intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea and the imposition of economic sanctions by the European Union on Russia in 2014, relations between the two entities became strained. Both parties impose sanctions on each other. Russia and the EU are two entities that have not much different influence and power. Therefore, this theme is important as an analysis of Russia's defense stance against the European Union Economic sanctions in 2016-2020 through the Import Substitution strategy. The author uses a national interest approach to analyze this problem. In this paper the author argues that the Import Substitution strategy is a form of policy to survive the economic sanctions of the European Union and as Russia's national interest over economic sovereignty.

Political and legal regulators of the Entente intervention in the Russian North

The authors consider of political and legal regulators of the intervention of Entente states in Russia. The focus of the work is on the role of Britain in this process. The authors believe that one of the reasons of the failure of the Entente countries’ intervention in Russia was the late formation of a legal mechanism for interaction between Western democracies and white regimes. The military actions of the Entente powers were not supported by sufficient legal grounds, so the military support of the Whites in Russia from the Entente was limited.

Information Confrontation during the Years of Foreign Armed Intervention in Russia in 1918-1922

Information Confrontation during the Years of Foreign Armed Intervention in Russia in 1918-1922

Эмиссия чеков Владивостокским отделением Государственного банка в 1920 году

The paper analyzes the issue of the Vladivostok branch of the State Bank of checks with a face value of 1000 rubles in January 1920, which became an attempt to replenish the stocks of banknotes to overcome the financial crisis that arose as a result of the Civil War and military intervention in the Russian Far East. The purpose of the work is to analyze known and, introducing into scientific circulation, identified historical sources that clarify and reveal certain issues when making a decision and organizing the issuance of checks by the Vladivostok branch of the State Bank. The theoretical basis of the study is a systematic approach and a comparative historical method. The author comes to the conclusion about the failure of issuance measures at the issuance stage, due to the intervention of counterfeiters. The failure of the checks increased the influence of foreign exchange in the region. The publication is addressed to researchers of financial policy during the Civil War and intervention in Russia.

Україна в процесах міжнародної трудової міграції

The purpose of the article is to study modern migration challenges for Ukraine and the problems of re-immigration of Ukrainians in the post-war period. The processes of globalization and integration of the world economy have their share in the growth of the dynamism of the international labor movement. International labor migration helps to overcome cultural, ethnic and traditional borders, but simultaneously creates risks regarding the development of the economies of recipient countries. In the history of migration processes in Ukraine in the twentieth century and up to the present one may allocate six stages of external labor migration. The current period includes two waves of forced migration: as a result of obtaining a visa-free regime with the EU and the russian invasion of Ukraine (2014 and 2022), as well as a wave of decline in the number of migrant workers due to pandemic restrictions during 2020–2021. The problem of labor migration existed in Ukraine even before the start of a full-scale russian intervention, because of the unregulated and imperfect legislation, low wages, and the lack of a policy of re-immigration of Ukrainian workers. The growth of external labor migration of Ukrainians can lead to an outflow of labor force, which is especially risky in the context of a demographic crisis. A higher level of wages in European countries creates a risk of Ukrainians losing their desire to work in Ukraine. This is true of both the recipients of remittances on our territory and those who have decided to change their country of residence forever, which may become an obstacle to the post-war recovery of the national economy. Therefore, already now, even in the conditions of wartime, the government should begin to implement measures for the re-immigration of Ukrainian labor. The implementation of the experience of other countries in similar situations in full is impractical due to the outdated approaches, other location, behavior of the authorities, reputation of forced migrants, etc. Thus, Ukraine should develop its own re-immigration policy with the involvement of European countries, international organizations and its own migrants.