T HE VOLUMINOUS LITERATURE on Sino-Soviet relations that has appeared in recent years reflects many diverse interpretations of the origins and the root causes of conflict.* Some analysts point to allegedly deep-seated clashes of national interests that revolve around unresolved territorial issues. Some stress ideological factors such as different Russian and Chinese interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Others point to conflicts of power and ambition within the international communist movement and the Third World. Finally there are interpretations that stress the role and personalities of particular Russian and Chinese leaders. Undoubtedly all of these interpretations, and others, have some value. There is no one single cause of any great historical event. Moreover, one has to distinguish between long and short-range elements in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the former category, for example, one would have to place high priority on the intensity of Chinese nationalism in the 20th century, a nationalism that has reacted against the humiliation of China by the great powers in the i9th century. Viewed in this perspective, any Chinese government of whatever ideological bent would have been a prickly ally for any European power, especially Russia which actively participated in the expansion that took place at China's expense. Among the more proximate causes of conflict, the most important would probably be Mao's dissatisfaction in I958-59 with a wide range of Khrushchevian policies on such key issues as nuclear sharing, aid to China, and detente with the United States. Moreover, it seems likely that once the Chinese Communists came to power in I949, their own interests and those of the Russians were bound to come into some degree of conflict. In the late I950s and early i96os, for example, Moscow and Peking were bound to differ on such crucial questions as the desirability of nuclear proliferation and the degree of risk to run in confronting American power. Some degree of conflict was also likely over spheres of influence within the international communist movement and the Third World. But while elements of conflict were inevitable, the crucial question was whether the two governments could agree to disagree on some issues while retaining an effective alliance.