Russian Intelligence Research Articles

Підготова оборони Галичини у другій половині ХІХ – на початку ХХ ст.: фортеця Миколаїв

The article covers the problems of preparation of defense in Galicia in the second half of 19th – at the beginning 20th century by the example of the fortress of Mykolaiv near the Dnister river. The ideas of defensive construction, fundamental changes of fortifications in the specified period (shooting from closed positions and use of high-explosive fires) and location, types and features of strengthening the fortress of Mykolaiv at different stages of construction are revealed in the article. It shows the discussions concerning the principles of defense, the creation of new infrastructure with a network of railways, paved roads, railways and highways, the changes in political conditions (especially in Austro-Russian relations), and Russian intelligence activity. Particular attention is paid to the events around the fortress during the Battle of Galicia in 1914 and the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919, in particular to the activities of generals Konrad von Getzendorf, Bema-Ermoli, Brusilov, Kornilov, Denikin, Kurmanovich and Grekov. Episodes of the capture of the fortress by Russian army and the battles around it are covered by author. Mykolaiv Fortress is one of the best preserved fortifications monuments of the First World War and the territory of Ukraine. But nowadays, there are attempts to destroy the remains of the fortress and deploy quarries on its territory to extract sand.

Cold War Cooperation: The KGB and Poland’s Security Service in Operation Kaskada and Operation Kama

The increasing tension in international politics during the Cold War increased the importance of intelligence services throughout the world. Security services on both sides of the Iron Curtain were an important tool for gathering information on the enemy and for destroying political opponents. Moscow and its allies readily used their secret services for their purposes, both international and domestic. During the Cold War, the State Committee for Security (KGB) tightened its links to intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Soviet Bloc (SB) countries. One example of such cooperation is the joint operation of the KGB and the SB—Security Service of the Polish People’s Republic—in the 1970s and 1980s, called Operation Kaskada, and its subset, Operation Kama. The KGB and SB actions focused on compromising expat activists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and on finding their allies in the USSR and Poland. The strategies used by both intelligence services led to closing a courier route from the West into the USSR and to seizing a contingent of documents that Moscow then used expertly for its propaganda and political ends. Given its efficacy, the operative model used by the Soviet intelligence agents is in all probability still used by Russian intelligence and counterintelligence services.

Wykorzystanie radzieckich emigrantów doby détente w praktyce działań 1. Zarządu Głównego KGB i współczesne reminiscencje tego zjawiska. Casus Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki

The article – on the basis of American official and court documents (relating to four documented cases of espionage between 1975 and 1991) and using empirical, quantitative and comparative methods – for the first time comprehensively analyses the activities carried out for the benefit of the KGB foreign intelligence service by emigrants from the USSR who arrived in the United States between 1971 and 1984. In addition to describing the scale and peculiarities of the aforementioned migration wave, the four main directions of their operational work are presented, as well as the development of new forms of interaction between Russian emigrants and the new Russian intelligence services after 1991.

A Librarian’s Perspective on Sci-Hub’s Impact on Users and the Library

ABSTRACT On December 19, 2019, The Washington Post reported that the U.S. Justice Department is investigating the founder and operator of Sci-Hub Alexandra Elbakyan on suspicion of working with Russian intelligence to steal U.S. military secrets from defense contractors. The article further discusses Sci-Hub’s methods for acquiring the login credentials of university students and faculty “to pilfer vast amounts of academic literature.” This has long been public knowledge. But the confirmation of Sci-Hub potentially working with Russian intelligence was major news. Both fronts of the Sci-Hub assault on stealing intellectual property are concerning. Since many academic researchers and their employers routinely receive defense contracts to perform sensitive research, the article helped posit that offering free access to academic research articles is perhaps a Trojan Horse strategy for Sci-Hub. To add to The Washington Post’s report, we sought out individuals at universities with a vantage point on Sci-Hub’s activities to see if there is independent evidence to support the report. We spoke to Dr. Jason Ensor who at the time of this interview was Manager, Engagement Strategy and Scholarly Communication, Library Systems at Western Sydney University Library in Australia. Ensor holds four degrees in related critical thinking fields and is an experienced business professional in software development, data scholarship and print publishing. He is also a distinguished speaker on digital humanities and linked fields, presenting regularly in national and international forums.

Forged Examples as Disinformation: The Biasing Effects of Political Astroturfing Comments on Public Opinion Perceptions and How to Prevent Them

Online astroturfing is a novel form of disinformation that relies on the imitation of citizen voices to create the false impression that a particular view or idea has widespread support in society. In this study, we test if political online astroturfing messages (i.e., forged user comments beneath digital news items) can influence perceptions of public opinion on three issues: the poisoning of the former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, the use of toxic gas by Russia's close ally Syria, and the manipulation of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. We further examine the immunizing effects of three inoculation strategies to prevent the distorting effects of online astroturfing comments. Our results indicate that only a few astroturfing comments can bias readers' perceptions of public opinion in the intended direction. Moreover, prior inoculation only provides limited protection against this effect. Only one inoculation strategy (refutational‐same) proved to be effective, but even this effect is only short‐term. Our findings indicate that recent fears about the potentially negative effects of this novel form of disinformation on political discourse are justified and underscore the difficulties of responding to this challenge.

Russian hybrid warfare: A framework

Abstract As Montenegro sough to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2015, an attempted coup erupted within the country in October of that year. The Telegraph's Ben Farmer reported that, ‘An officer with Russia's GRU military intelligence service, is accused of running a web of Serbian and Russian nationalists and paramilitaries who plotted to assassinate the Montenegrin prime minister.’ Farmer, B. (2017, February 26). Montenegro to Indict Russian Spy Behind Coup Plot. The Telegraph. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/26/montenegro-indict-russian-spy-behind-coup-plot/. [accessed 5 March, 2017]. The failed coup and attempted assassination were conducted by Russian intelligence in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin's vision for a modern Eurasia in which NATO discontinues encroaching on Russia's sphere of influence and in which Russia ascends to regional hegemony. Knezevic, G. (2017, January 2). Montenegro's NATO-Russia Chess Match. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-russia-chess-match/28210094.html. [accessed 5 March, 2017]. Although unsuccessful, this covert operation—conducted by Russian intelligence working in conjunction with disaffected Russian partisans within Montenegro—to stymie NATO's expansion captures the essence of modern Russian hybrid warfare. Nevertheless, Montenegro is not unique, but instead is one of many recent hybrid conflicts propagated by the Russian government. Speaking on the spectre of Russian operations in Eastern Europe, American general Michael Williamson commented, ‘In terms of state-based challenges, Russia's purported annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine demonstrated a sophisticated combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to achieve objectives below a threshold that the Russian leadership believe would elicit a concerted NATO response.’ Lt. Gen. Michael Williamson, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, and Lt. Gen. John Murray, statement to the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on Army Modernization in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017, Second Session, 114th Congress, 5 April 2016. Since 2008, Russia's operations throughout Europe, its Near Abroad and Syria signal an evolved approach to the conduct of war. Many terms and phrases have been attributed to Russia's evolved model of war to include Grey Zone conflict and new generation warfare. However, hybrid war or hybrid warfare is quite useful, despite the contention the term generates. The term hybrid warfare is useful because it speaks of the bundling of capabilities, technology and ideas in a coherent, purposeful manner to accomplish tactical, operational and strategic objectives on behalf of policymakers and strategists. The work starting position is that the Russian hybrid warfare is in fact an applied way of war. Despite many arguments to the contrary, Russia's applied way of war introduces important nuances to the conduct of war. Resultantly, the purpose of this work is to clarify the concept of Russian hybrid warfare and to identify the characteristics that make it worthy of examination. Two basic methods exist to explain an observable way of war. The first is to paraphrase existing primary source information on the subject. This method requires access to primary source information and the physical ability to read that material. That method is not employed in this work because access to Russian strategic and tactical doctrine is not readily available to the layperson. Furthermore, in many cases doctrine is a preferred way of war-fighting, a narrative and tied to procurement strategies, and thus, not an applied method. Therefore, merely relying on doctrine or policy statements can mislead the researcher about the true character of a given way of war. That notwithstanding, the second method is to observe the phenomenon in multiple situations over a period of time. In doing so, the observer seeks to identify trends, inconsistencies, rules, relationships, reactions and boundaries that surface and recur therein and then generate an over-arching assessment about that phenomenon's boundaries and inner workings. That is the technique employed here.

The legacy of Agent no. 25

The paper examines, with the analysis of the attached documents and letters, that the Austro-Hungarian head of military intelligence Alfred Redl was really a Russian agent just before the beginning of the First World War and what information he sent within the Russian intelligence community. According to the author’s research, it can only be assumed with a reasonable probability that Agent no. 25 was Alfred Redl.

How to respond to a crime scene contaminated with radioactive material?

Radioactive materials have become a marked target for criminal and terrorist organizations in recent years, as they can be effective tools for generating panic and serious economic damage when used in a variety of weapons (e.g. explosive devices capable of dispersing radioactive material). In addition, radioactive material has been used in several cases to commit crimes such as poisoning or radiation exposure of potential target persons. The most famous matter is the so-called ‘Litvinenko case’, in which a Russian intelligence officer was poisoned with polonium in 2006. In addition to the international cases, however, radioactive materials are also found in Hungary from time to time during home searches. Even the detection of these materials can be challenging in the absence of appropriate detection equipment. Their exact identification, collection and specific examination requires specialized expertise. If the crime scene personnel do not detect the presence of radioactivity at the scene in a timely manner (e. g. because it cannot be detected without measuring equipment), the persons working there may subsequently suffer serious damage to health, as well as large areas and objects can be contaminated by dispersed radioactive material. It can also cause serious economic damage. This article describes an operating procedure for the professional respond to crime scenes contaminated with radioactive material, developed by experts of the Hungarian National Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Forensics Department and radiologists at the Centre for Energy Research in the frame of a project supported by the Home Affairs Security Fund.

ADZHIDERE / HADZHIDERE: TO THE QUESTION ON THE OTTOMAN NAME OF THE VILLAGE OF OVIDIOPOL

The purpose of this article is to study the use of the Ottoman name of the modern village of Ovidiopol from the first mention of the settlement to its final renaming by the Russian government (1756 - 1794). The examples show the designation of the settlement in Ottoman-Turkish sources and the transformation of the name when translated into other languages and in particular into Russian. One of the first known written mentions of the name of Adzhidere can be found in Ottoman-Turkish sources of the middle of the XVIII century. from the Government Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. In particular, the oldest designation of the settlement on the site of the modern village of Ovidiopol is in an extract from the port log / defter, which contains information on loading and dispatching merchant ships from Adzhidere Pier to Istanbul's harbor Kapan-i Dakik - the coastal quarter in Golden Horn Bay. The annotation to this document states that the port log / defter is the register of loading and dispatch of grain from the port of Adzhidere since the beginning of the month of Muharram in 1170 AH, which corresponds to the date from September 26, 1756. In the report of the Russian intelligence of 1758 Ovidiopol is already mentioned as Gadzhidere. In particular, it is reported about the purchase of wheat and rye by Turks, Crimean Tatars, Nogai, Greeks and Wallachians, and its transportation to “different cities such as Ochakov, Belgorod and Hadzhidere, Bender, Kiliya, Smailov (Izmail) and the Wallachian city Iasi” The next source, with the designation Adzhidere, are the Ottoman-Turkish documents of the Governmental Ottoman Archive in Istanbul from the collection “State Administration”, dated 1765. The documents contain several different texts from public institutions and resolutions to be implemented. A number of sources of the next period of 1780-90s indicate the Ottoman name of modern Ovidiopol both Adzhidere and Hadzhidere. Thus, in the travel description of the French engineer Lafitte-Clave, who worked for the military department of the Ottoman Empire in 1784-87, “Hadzhi Dere” was mentioned. In the description of the Ochakov land made by the Russian engineer De Volan in 1791, it is said about Adzhidere after the Russo-Turkish wars. Such double names of settlements are sometimes found in Ottoman documents due to the ignorance of the Ottoman bureaucracy of toponyms of remote regions of the Ottoman state. Such a document is the Ottoman map of 1790, as evidenced by the content of inscriptions and explanations to the settlements. A new source has been put into scientific circulation - a cartographic image of the Dniester estuary with marked key settlements on its shores and defined areas of navigation through the estuary straits with the Black Sea.

Repeating History: Soviet Offensive Counterintelligence Active Measures

: Drawing on the formerly classified in-house journal KGB Collection, this article argues that active measures, commonly known as Soviet foreign influence operations, were the concept and practice in which offensive counterintelligence encroached on foreign intelligence functions. In the 1960s, KGB counterintelligence officers were urged to implement active measures, instead of passive surveillance, by cultivating and recruiting foreign visitors and Soviet citizens with the aim of using them to penetrate Western institutions and collect sensitive intelligence. The counterintelligence directorate occasionally supervised foreign operations to implement offensive tactics. Given the parallels between the Soviet and Russian intelligence services, the expansion of the counterintelligence agency (the Federal Security Service) in post-Soviet Russia can be interpreted as its increased interest in and capabilities for active measures abroad.

Russian Sources of the Qur’anic Ethnography I. Sergei Syromyatnikov Mission in the Gulf in 1900

The Qur’anic ethnography as self‑contained research area is based on the results of specialized studies of previous years and is closely related to the studies of the Qur’anic language and the language milieu of Arabia in the time of the Prophet, to the ethnographical field studies in Arabia as well as the Qur’anic archaeology. Researchers of Arabia are very well familiar with the phenomenon of the long preservation of elements of traditional material culture and economic activity here. This phenomenon is mostly based on the specific natural and climatic conditions, which brought about a set of elements of material culture, that have proved to be highly viable throughout many centuries. In this connection we regard the itineraries and works of European travellers to Arabia in the second half of the 18th century — first third of the 20th century as a serious source for our research. Whereas the names and papers of the Western travellers are well‑known and have been often referred to in various research projects devoted to Arabia, the works of Russian diplomats, intelligence officers, naval officers, scholars and travellers are still waiting for their turn. Meanwhile, the works of Russian travellers contain no less interesting information than the works of their Western contemporaries. The article is dedicated to the works of Sergey N. Syromyatnikov (1864—1933). His status while travelling to the Gulf Area in 1900 is quite difficult to determine. Was he a journalist or a spy, or special envoy?

How to respond a crime scene contaminated with radioactive material?

Radioactive materials have become an explicit target for criminal and terrorist organizations in recent years, as they can be effective tools for panic and serious economic damage generation when used in a variety of weapons (e.g. explosive devices capable of dispersing radioactive material). In addition, radioactive material has been used in several cases to commit crimes such as poisoning or radiation exposure to potential target persons. The most famous is the so-called ‘Litvinenko case’, in which a Russian intelligence officer was poisoned with polonium in 2006. In addition to the international cases, however, radioactive material is also found in Hungary time-to-time during home searches. Even the detection of these materials can be challenging in the absence of appropriate detection equipment. Their exact identification, collection and specific examination requires specialized expertise. If the crime scene personnel does not detect the presence of radioactivity at the scene in a timely manner (e.g, because it cannot be detected without measuring equipment), the persons working there may subsequently suffer serious damage to health, as well as large areas and objects can be contaminated by dispersed radioactive material. It can also cause serious economic damage. This article describes an operating procedure for the professional respond of crime scenes contaminated with radioactive material, developed by experts of the Hungarian National Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Forensics Department and radiologists at the Centre for Energy Research in the frame of a project supported by the Home Affairs Security Fund.

Intelligence Operations of the Russian Federation Against Poland

ABSTRACT The information gathered as a result of Russian intelligence activities against Poland serves to discredit Poland as a state co-shaping the Eastern policy of the European Union and NATO. The aim is to reduce Poland’s influence on this policy. The priorities of Russian intelligence in Poland include the energy sector, the armed forces, and allied forces stationed on its territory. Since the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Polish counterintelligence has noted a significant increase in the activity of Russian intelligence. In addition to classic intelligence activities, the Russians conduct covert actions. Their goal is to exacerbate historical controversies and create the image of Poland as a Russophobic state that is a firm opponent of the improvement of Russia’s relations with the West.

Russia: still a riddle wrapped in a mystery?

Russia: still a riddle wrapped in a mystery?

Death to traitors? The pursuit of intelligence defectors from the Soviet Union to the Putin era

ABSTRACTThis article argues that Russia’s use of lethal violence against intelligence defectors has to be understood as a public spectacle in which Russian leaders and intelligence officials never intended to hide their role. This “theatrical murder” functions primarily as a political signaling tool for a reasserting Russia to communicate to distinct domestic and foreign audiences. We historicize the phenomenon by outlining and explaining the KGB’s approach towards defectors during the Cold War and show that “theatrical murder” is a unique feature of Russia under Putin’s rule. The empirical findings are used to significantly advance theorizing on signaling through covert action.

“Pure Nonsense!” War Minister A. N. Kuropatkin about the Proceedings of Japanese Nationalists

This article based on a large body of unpublished documents from the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RSMHA). The author analyzes the history of the acquaintance Russian Minister of War A. N. Kuropatkin with publications by the Japanese ultra-nationalist society Kokuryūkai in 1901. Despite weaknesses of Russian intelligence in the Far East before the Russo-Japanese War, the service was been able to obtain a highly valued materials, such as the second volume of Bulletin of Amur River Society. An analysis of this publication reveals that the authors and the journals founder, Uchida Ryōhei, had a high level of knowledge about Russian society. The Japanese discovered all the weak spots of Imperial governance, finance, economy, educational system, and domestic and foreign policies of the Russian Empire. The article shows how the Minister of War read a translation of Japanese edition and noted the authors’ conclusions. We conclude that the Japanese state was able to organize these investigations of Russia using materials from nationalist organizations that sometimes took different positions from those of the Russian government, in Russian. In contrast, Russian officials were not able to do a normal analysis of observations from official channels, And Kuropatkin often did not understand the value of such materials that were passed on to him.

Барга (Хулунбуир) под контролем монгольских повстанцев в 1917 г.

The work aims at the study of a little-known period in the history of Barga (Hulunbuir) in 1917 when a large part of this region, including its capital town, came under the control of Mongolian guerrillas for a short time. Materials. For this purpose, Russian intelligence and diplomatic documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (Rus. AVPRI) and Russian State Archive of Military History (Rus. RGVIA),as compared to earlier published data, were studied. Results. The paper describes the character of governance practices in Barga during that period, internal situation, relations of the guerrillas and Barga’s new authorities with Russian officials on the Hailar Railway Station, Japanese military, authorities of the Manchurian provinces bordering Barga and authorities of Outer Mongolia, as well as reaction of the guerrillas and Barga’sauthorities to the short-term restoration of the Qing monarchy. After Hailar was captured by the Mongolian guerrillas, the Russian Foreign Ministry sought to restore tranquility in Barga as soon as possible and prevent clashes that could threaten security of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the autonomy of Barga fixed by the 1915 Russian-Chinese Agreement. At the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry allowed a temporary entry of Chinese troops into Barga to remove the guerrillas, with their subsequent withdrawal and preservation of the autonomy of the region, although the priority was a peaceful conciliation. Mongolian guerrillas were monarchists who stood for the restoration of the Manchu Dynasty’spower. The government of Barga, created under their influence, had no real authority and was engaged mainly in the supply of food for the guerrillas and solving current issues. Although they maintained intensive contacts with the Japanese in the Old Hailar, it is not correct to accuse them in Japonophilia. They maintained mostly good relations with the Russian population of Barga, but a significant part of the Barga people and all Daurs fled to neighboring regions. Southern part of Barga, a part of Inner Mongolia and eastern Outer Mongolia were devastated by the guerrillas. A part of the latter was ready to join Chinese provincial troops but it was delayed.

REVIEW: Riveting National Press Club tales of espionage

Bureau of Spies: The secret connections between espionage and journalism in Washington, by Steven T. Usdin. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 2018. 360pp. ISBN 9781633884762.DON’T be fooled by Bureau of Spies’ provocative title. Steven Usdin’s careful and considered account of how foreign and domestic agitators have manipulated the American media and subverted that country’s democracy is thoroughly researched and extremely well written. It contains riveting descriptions of America First’s Nazi propaganda efforts as well as the extent of Russian intelligence’s attempts to hoodwink US delegates and voters. However, the setting for these seismic events is in the 20th Century rather than the 21st.

Русофобия Запада, построенная на современных событиях: когда идеологемы противостоят реальности

<p>В статье анализируются современные обвинения западных стран в отношении России. Среди них убеждение во влиянии российских спецслужб на выборы в США, вина России за отравление Скрипалей и т. д. Автор скрупулезно рассматривает внутреннее содержание этих обвинений, их логику и фактологическую основу и доказывает абсурдность и необоснованность русофобии. Продемонстрировано, как на основе одних недоказанных обвинений строится целая цепочка других необоснованных обвинительных актов. Также раскрываются основные причины возобновившейся информационной атаки в отношении России со стороны Запада.</p>

Unforgiven: Russian intelligence vengeance as political theater and strategic messaging

ABSTRACT The poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer and MI6 agent Sergei Skripal highlights the enduring Russian ardor for poisoning enemies of the state as a warning to others who contemplate disloyalty. Beyond treating the event itself, we explore Russian conceptions of theatrical murder as a peculiar element of state power. We historicize this development and inquire whether assassination as political theater and strategic messaging is a tool embraced in particular by Vladimir Putin or rather emblematic of the Russian state. We explore why and how Putin opted to strike at the moment he did to seek vengeance against Skripal, concluding that a confluence of structural and human factors at the intersection of British government policies with Russian domestic politics led Putin to his decision. We conclude with the implications of these findings for western governments.