Russian Intelligence Research Articles

The Significance of the Prisoner Exchange with Russia

The 1 August 2024 prisoner exchange between Russia and the West shows that, for all his ruthlessness, Russian President Vladimir Putin can act rationally. The negative view is that Putin successfully held hostages for ransom, will have concluded that ‘prisoner diplomacy’ works and will simply instrumentalise it again. But the analogy with mere hostage-taking is flawed insofar as Russia got nothing immediately or directly useful out of the deal. For Putin, it turned on fulfilling what he considers a moral commitment to secure the return of Russian intelligence officers. He was willing to make concessions to achieve a goal that he valued highly. Conversely, through firmness, patience and unity, Western negotiators were able to induce Putin to compromise. An implicit lesson is that the West can support Ukraine more consistently, without undue fear of escalation, and take a firmer, more proactive approach to defining the terms of mutual restraint.

The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service: How Russian Intelligence secured Vladimir Putin’s Regime after failing him in Ukraine

The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service: How Russian Intelligence secured Vladimir Putin’s Regime after failing him in Ukraine

The Americans and “Sleeper Cells” of Russian Intelligence in America

Abstract In June of 2010, a Canadian couple, Donald Heathfield and Tracey Lee Ann Foley, was arrested in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as the KGB “sleeper agents.” These KGB agents (Andrei Bezrukov and Elena Vavilova) lived in Canada since 1992, and in the United States since 1999, working for the Russian intelligence as “a sleeper cell” of the Russian spies. This story became an inspiration for the American TV show The Americans (2013–2018). Using the reviews of this TV show from the United States and Russia, the interviews with the real participants of the events of 2010 and with the retired KGB officers, the KGB documents from the SBU Archive in Kyiv, Ukraine, this article is an attempt to study how the special KGB/FSB operations in the USA, portrayed in one American TV series became an object of fascination and “fictionalization” on the both—American and Russian—sides of the geo-political conflict.

The failures of Russian Aerospace Forces in the Russia–Ukraine war and the future of air power

ABSTRACT In the prelude to the 2022 Russia–Ukraine War, American intelligence had concluded the invasion ‘might take a few days longer’ than Russians expected, but not much longer. The Russian Aerospace Forces was expected to eliminate Ukraine’s air defense and pave the way for Russian troops. What explains the failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces to acquire air superiority? I explore three causal factors to understand these failures – Russian military history and its impact on Russia’s air doctrine, Russian intelligence failures, and Ukrainian resolve and innovativeness. I also highlight the causal role played by the United States in sharing critical intelligence.

Counterintelligence and escalation from hybrid to total war in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict 2014–2024

ABSTRACT This article examines certain counterintelligence (CI) aspects of the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 in terms of key problems in current western CI concepts, doctrine and processes. It examines not only the CI threat to Ukraine during the Donbas ‘frozen war’ and 2022 invasion from the traditional CI triad of espionage, sabotage and subversion but also from Russian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and activities supporting both irregular and regular combatants. The article concludes that a UK and allied approach to CI shaped by a two-decade security focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency may not be fit for purpose in a contemporary strategic environment characterized by a persistent and escalating threat from strategic peers engaged in state-supported hybrid conflict.

The Russian Empire’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services – General Considerations

The Russian Empire was based, since the early years of the nineteenth century, mainly on military force, in the composition of which an important role was played by the accumulation of information on opponents and the fight against foreign espionage inside the country. Despite the central role attributed to these secret services, the Russian Empire did not have a specialized body in the field of military espionage. In this context, based on a vast and new Russian historiographical material, accumulated as a result of research by the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova, the author presents, by the method of analysis of historical documents, a perspective of the genesis, activity and results obtained by the Russian intelligence and counter-espionage services of the tsarist period.

Serviciile de spionaj și contraspionaj ale Imperiului Rus – de la origini până la Primul Război Mondial. Aspecte generale

The Russian Empire was based, since the early years of the nineteenth century, mainly on military force, in the composition of which an important role was played by the accumulation of information on opponents and the fight against foreign espionage inside the country. Despite the central role attributed to these secret services, the Russian Empire did not have a specialized body in the field of military espionage. In this context, based on a vast and new Russian historiographical material, accumulated as a result of research by the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova, the author presents, by the method of analysis of historical documents, a perspective of the genesis, activity and results obtained by the Russian intelligence and counter-espionage services of the tsarist period.

The Ukraine war and the shift in Russian intelligence priorities

ABSTRACT The war in Ukraine has transformed Russian intelligence activities. It has drawn the bulk of Russian intelligence collection resources, both inside Ukraine and further afield, to focus on war-related, often low-level operational/tactical targets. Even strategic collection is related to the war, especially directed toward bolstering Russia’s global reputation. However, the war has also led to the dismantling of a large portion of Russia’s intelligence apparatus, including both human and signals intelligence, especially in Europe, just when it is needed the most. It has prompted greater scrutiny and international counterintelligence cooperation against Russian intelligence activities than has been seen since the 1980s. Russia’s own actions have drawn those reactions. Nevertheless, Russian intelligence services are resilient and persistent. They learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circumstances.

Vladimir Petrov: A Reappraisal

During the Cold War, defectors from the Russian Intelligence Services to the West were of critical importance. They exposed and neutralised hundreds of Soviet agents who had penetrated government departments and democratic institutions. Stretching from Anatoli Granovsky in 1946 to Oleg Gordievsky in 1985, these Soviet defectors were highly prized for the intelligence they provided to security services. Ranked amongst the most valuable at the time was Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, who defected in Sydney in 1954. Yet he, almost alone, has overwhelmingly been cast by commentators and historians as lazy, inefficient, and incompetent. This article will offer an alternative interpretation of Petrov. My argument has three prongs. First, Petrov's contact with Russian individuals and pro‐Soviet political organisations in Australia was far more extensive than generally assumed. Second, contrary to the historiographical consensus, he withheld intelligence about his contacts and informants from his security service debriefers. Third, rather than Petrov seeing espionage as too dangerous, as suggested, he was a committed and active Soviet intelligence cadre. By reappraising Petrov, the article seeks to provide a fresh understanding of this key episode, the Petrov Affair, in Australia's Cold War history.

Hezbollah and Russian intelligence collaboration: a complex nexus

This paper delves into the intricate relationship between Hezbollah, the Shiite militant organization based in Lebanon, and Russian Intelligence Agencies (RIA). The collaboration between Hezbollah and RIA represents a complex interplay of geopolitical interests, regional dynamics, and strategic objectives. The paper examines the historical context of their relationship, the motivations behind their cooperation, the nature of their interactions, and the implications for regional and global security. Drawing upon a multidisciplinary approach that combines insights from Political Science, International Relations, Intelligence studies, and Middle Eastern studies, provides a comprehensive analysis of this collaboration. It also explores the broader implications for the Middle East, Russia's role in the region, and the challenges it poses to international efforts to counter terrorism and promote stability.

The “Blurriness” of Boundaries between Activity Spheres of Intelligence Agencies as an Amplifier of Power in Russia

This article examines the foreign intelligence activities of three Russian spy agencies. Using open sources, it studies the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Fifth Service of the Federal Security Service. It considers to what extent their respective roles are clearly delineated in legal terms and concludes that these roles overlap to a considerable degree. The “blurriness” of Russian intelligence is an indicator of bureaucratic concentration and amplification of power.

The Russian invasion and its failure in the first days

ABSTRACT In February 2022, Russia launched a large-scale military operation to take full control of the Ukrainian state. The invasion achieved virtually none of Russia's originally stated goals and instead of demonstrating Russian military power and effectiveness, it showed the exact opposite. Ambitious goals that were supposed to be achieved within a few days, turned out to be completely unrealistic. The war has become a long-term conflict of high intensity, instead of a flash military operation. The author argues that the cause of the Russian failure was not only the erroneous intelligence evaluation of the adversary by the Russian intelligence services and numerous mistakes of Russian units at the tactical and operational level. Rather, failure has also been due the structural weaknesses and shortcomings of the Russian army as institution. These long-term shortcomings were identified during the previous combat deployment of Russian forces in local conflicts and have never been resolved.

State security of Israel: international and national legal aspects

The object of the study is Israeli international and national legal relations to ensure the defense of the country and the security of the state, the subject is normative legal acts establishing the regime of protection of Israel from internal and external threats. The article discusses the international treaties of the State of Israel concerning weapons of mass destruction and the fight against terrorism, as well as Israeli documents on defense and security management. The authors pay attention to the genesis and evolution of the Israeli armed forces and special services, the peculiarities of their functioning. The institute of military duty and conscription for military service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), current problems of the activities of the Mossad and AMAN intelligence services, as well as the general security service - Shin Bet (SHABAK) are considered in detail. The above practice of military administration in the State of Israel is relevant in the conditions of modern militarism. The researchers propose to use the Israeli experience of legislative regulation in the field of national defense and state security in the current Russian historical conditions. The scientific novelty of the work consists in presenting the reader with original information on the subject of the article, relevant conclusions and suggestions. The main ones are the conclusions about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Israel, its deliberate postponement of the application of international legal acts on weapons of mass destruction in order to develop them and deter opponents. It is proposed, by analogy with Israeli legislation, to deprive Russian citizenship for crimes against the foundations of the constitutional order and security of the Russian Federation, extremism and terrorism. The article substantiates the introduction of universal military duty for Russian citizens using, by analogy, the Israeli system of deferrals from military service. It is proposed to train ordinary and non-commissioned personnel of the domestic armed forces in working professions, as in Israel, and the official granting of unlimited powers to Russian intelligence abroad.

Russian Front Organizations and Western Academia

This article examines the activities of two Russian front organizations targeting Western academia and broader international audiences. These activities are part of contemporary Russian information warfare and are fundamentally entrenched in Soviet intelligence traditions, aiming to reinforce Russian official historical narratives and propaganda. The objectives of these organizations include undermining Western scholars’ critical perspectives and shaping public opinion favorable to the Russian Federation’s foreign policy and its methods of governing. Backed by the Russian secret services and the presidential administration, these organizations engage in using and coopting academics who help them disseminate Russian historical myths and propaganda that demonize the West in general and Ukraine in particular. An analysis of selected cases of Russian influence on Western academia and public opinion present a sample of the wide range of Russian intelligence practices symptomatic of the Russian anti-Western information campaign.

Dezintegracja struktur wywiadowczych Związku Sowieckiego po 1991 roku – ujęcie historyczne i ocena skutków tego zjawiska

The end of the Cold War marked a period of substantial changes in the global political system, but also a moment of transformation of the Russian Federation and CIS states’ intelligence. This article identifies the key elements that have influenced the evolution of Russian intelligence structures and doctrinessince 1991. It delves into the fundamental aspects of these changes: the principles governing intelligence institutions, organizational dimensions, and the scope of operational and analytical activities, encompassing the adoption of new methods, techniques, and tools.

Russian Sources of Qur’ānic Ethnography. III: Hajj from Russia in Russian intelligence Reports (Late 19th — Early 20th Centuries)

Archival material related to the activities of Russian intelligence in the late 19th — early 20th centuries that aimed at suppressing the spread of pan–Islamic and pan–Turkish propaganda within the Russian Empire and tracking hajji road networks continues to be of serious academic importance. Being the little–studied primary source to the history of Russian Islam they allow us to see the true goals of official St. Petersburg in its policy towards the world of Islam both within the empire and beyond its borders. The article is based on materials related to a series of trips of Russian intelligence officers to the Middle East (Staff Captain ‘Abd al–‘Aziz Davletshin (Istanbul, Jeddah, Mecca, Medina, 1898), Captain Boris Shelkovnikov (Baghdad, Mosul and Basra vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, 1902—1903), Captain Nikolay Terletsky (the Hejaz railway, 1904, 1910), Staff Captain Ilyas Chanyshev (Turkey, Afghanistan and India, 1909—1910), Panteleimon Antaki (Istanbul and Cairo, 1911). The title of the article may seem misleading, but at this stage our task is to present the possible sources of Qur’anic ethnography in all their completeness and originality. Specialists in Arabian ethnography are well aware of the phenomenon of long–term preservation of deeply archaic elements of material culture and economic activities in the region. In this regard, the material of those trips often turns out to be important for Qur’ānic ethnography as well. The commented publication of such material will be the second part of our work. Such British sources are very well known, and their texts are cited, among other things, for historical and ethnographic purposes. Meanwhile, the Russian sources in question remain virtually unknown.The results of Chanyshev and Antaki's trips go beyond the scope of the Qur’anic ethnography proper, but they are important for understanding the problems associated with the hajj from Russia in their entirety.

Former FBI Chief of Counterespionage Peter Strzok on Russian Intelligence in the United States

Former FBI Chief of Counterespionage Peter Strzok on Russian Intelligence in the United States Anoushka Ramesh and Peter Strzok (bio) In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as recent Russian intelligence and foreign influence operations in the United States, the world is debating the effects of Russian interference on U.S. security. Peter Strzok, former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Chief of Counterespionage and head of the Bureau's investigation into the Kremlin's interference in the 2016 presidential election, joins GJIA to analyze the consequences of Russian operations in America. GJIA: Some news outlets report that Vladimir Putin is irate about how long the invasion of Ukraine is taking and blames the FSB (Federal Security Service) for inadequate intelligence, jailing the head of the FSB's 5th Department and dismissing many of his spies. To what extent do you believe that misleading information was truly the reason for the invasion's prolongation, and why was the FSB, and not the GRU (Chief Intelligence Office) or the SVR (External Intelligence Service), given the lead intel role? PS: That is a great question. First, Putin came out of the intelligence services. He was a KGB, a then-Soviet officer stationed in Germany, and came up in the Russian government through the intelligence services. So he certainly is a practitioner. He understands what the capabilities are, what the limitations are, and the dynamics between the different services. Certainly, what is interesting about the Ukraine conflict is that what traditionally might have been a larger role for the GRU—Russian military intelligence—in the invasion was given to, as you noted, the fifth department within the FSB. There are probably a lot of speculative reasons for that. But if you are anticipating that you are going to annex Ukraine, and it becomes part of Russia, that is going to be a domestic entity that your domestic security service would want a leading role in. I think Russian intelligence services are certainly not immune to the types of corruption and problems we have seen across the board within the Russian government. Certainly, that has been on display with the Russian military in terms of their ability to maintain equipment, whether that is vehicle motors, engines, and tires, and planning and coordinating complex activities. There is some indication that the failures on the military side are a result of money that should have been spent for maintenance or other types of operations being skimmed off the top. I think it is a reasonable question to ask whether the same sorts of things were going on with the intelligence services. It is a government based on kleptocracy, and there is no reason that that sense of what constitutes appropriate behavior is diluted all the way down. So yes, within the high levels of the Russian government—within the oligarchs—there is a great deal of personal skimming going on. There is no doubt in my mind [End Page 221] that lower-level intelligence officers and military commanders are doing the same sort of thing. And there was some indication that Putin was frustrated about the lack of accurate intelligence or assessments that he received from his intelligence services. There is also some indication that Sergey Beseda, who was the head of the fifth department, was initially under house arrest and has now been moved to imprisonment. It might have been different if there had been, within the FSB, a great deal of money and resources put into developing intelligence about Ukraine and paying sources rather than being funneled into everybody's pockets. And the last factor to think about is that Putin's information is increasingly limited, both in terms of the people that he allows into his orbit that can speak to him, and him not liking information being presented to him that is either contrary to what he wants to hear or what he wants to do. So you have a shrinking universe of people who can bring information to him who are terrified about angering the boss by telling him something he does not want to hear. It is a complicated question. I do think there is a...

Blinding the Bear: Israeli Double Agents and Russian Intelligence

The Israeli General Security Services, commonly known as the Shabak, is responsible for counterintelligence inside Israel. In the 1960s, the Shabak was struggling to counter the operations of Russian intelligence in Israel. Committee for State Security (KGB) case officers, working under diplomatic cover from the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv, recruited and ran agents in Israel. The Shabak was able to turn some of those recruited by the KGB into double agents. These double agents were used to learn about KGB tradecraft, identify Russian intelligence operatives, and feed the Soviets harmless or false information, known as “chickenfeed.” This article examines the recruitment and running of two Shabak double agents, their value for the KGB, and unique aspects of Israeli double agent tradecraft. It concludes that Israeli double agents were good for tactical purposes, learning about enemy intelligence personnel and practices, but were not of high value when used as part of strategic deceptions.

Military-Political Confrontations In The Khanates Of The South Caucasus In 1768-1774 And Erekle II

In 1768, Fatali Khan of Quba together with Hussein Khan of Shaki took Shamakhi. Soon, however, the former also tried to subdue the Shaki Khanate. For this purpose, Fatali offered King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti and Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to campaign against the Shaki Khanate. But failed to get their consent. For his part, the Khan of Shaki asked Erekle II for help. The King demanded that Fatali Khan reconcile with the Khan of Shaki and threatened to provide military assistance to Hussein Khan.Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of Fatali Khan’s aggression. Thus, an alliance between Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan against Fatali Khan was formed. The allies aimed to restore the rule of Aghasi Khan in Shamakhi, even on the condition of vassalage to Fatali Khan. In case of refusal, they intended to return the Quba Khanate to its former borders.The Russian government tried to limit the activity of Erekle II in the ongoing confrontation between the South Caucasian Khans. Nevertheless, in 1770, Erekle II sent an army to Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to repel the attack of Fatali Khan. As a result, Fatali Khan’s campaign in Karabakh ended in failure. In November-December 1773, the Avar Khan Muhammad-Nutsal IV, along with Hussein Khan and Aghasi Khan, campaigned to Shamakhi. King Erekle helped the Avars militarily. Erekle II sent a detachment of Muslim Borchaly Kazakhs against Fatali Khan, in order to make the participation of his subordinates less noticeable. But this did not go unnoticed by Russian intelligence. At the same time, it is incorrect to name Erekle II as an ally of the Dagestani leaders united against Fatali Khan in the subsequent campaign of 1774. The King’s participation in the hostilities during this campaign is not confirmed by any source.

Post-KGB Lives: Is There Such a Thing as a Former Chekist?

This article analyzes the postservice lives of Soviet and Russian intelligence and state security officers to explore the meanings behind the phrase, “There is no such thing as a former chekist” (“Бывших чекистов не бывает”). The article analyzes four possible scenarios in which a Soviet/Russian intelligence or state security officer might be considered “former,” organized around the concepts of legitimate and illegitimate ways of leaving the service, as well as genuine and deceptive reasons. Those two concept pairs create a matrix of possibilities for Soviet intelligence and state security personnel who consider leaving the service: legitimate/genuine, made up of officers who leave with no negative ramifications; legitimate/deceptive, made up of officers who claim to leave the service but remain connected; illegitimate/genuine, made up of defectors and arrested officers; and illegitimate/deceptive, made up of false defectors. Whether the statement “there is no such thing as a former chekist” is true depends on whom one asks: those who claim to have genuinely left the service would refute the statement, while those who are still in a Russian intelligence or state security service, as well as those whose departure is not genuine, hold firmly to it.