Russian Flag Research Articles

EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN MARINE AREAS: DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN LEGISLATION IN THE LIGHT OF CHANGES IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Legal regulation of exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in marine areas, which are subject to the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, is of great practical importance for our country, Russian legal entities and individuals. This is confirmed by the Strategy for the Development of Maritime Activities in the Russian Federation until 2030, the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2035 and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which were adopted in 2019 - 2022. These issues are no less important for foreign entities in connection with their participation in oil and gas marine projects in these territories.The scientific significance of the study is related to the development of International Energy Law, a significant amount of the rules of which are applicable to oil and gas activities in marine areas. The purpose of the study is to comprehensively analyze the development of legal norms of the Russian Federation governing the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in marine areas, which are subject to the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, in the period 2014 - 2023, as well as identifying trends in their development in connection with measures taken by unfriendly states against Russia, Russian legal entities and individuals. The objectives of the study include identifying and analyzing trends in the development of legislation of the Russian Federation governing the exploration, exploitation and transportation of oil and gas resources in the specified marine areas, the interconnection of legislative innovations with changes in world politics and international legal problems that arose during this period.The methodological basis of the study is comparative legal and formal legal. The article identifies and analyzes certain trends in the development of legislation of the Russian Federation related to the restriction of the rights of foreign entities in the implementation of subsoil use in offshore subsoil areas of federal significance, the regulation of artificial islands, installations and structures, as well as support for the Russian flag and the domestic manufacturer of sea vessels within the framework of oil and gas activities in the specified marine areas. The author concludes that it is necessary to take timely legislative measures and an integrated approach to the legislative regulation of the issues under consideration.

Russian International Register of Vessels as a Development Factor country's economy

For Russia, the return of the fleet under the national flag is of strategic importance. In the early 2000s, the reduction in the number of ships registered under the Russian flag became threatening to the transport and economic security of the state. The Russian maritime transport fleet, for the most part, operated under foreign flags. At the same time, relatively new vessels were taken offshore, and inefficient age-old vessels remained under the Russian flag. Under these conditions, foreign charterers intercepted a significant part of the transportation of Russian cargo, thereby displacing the Russian fleet. It became possible to change the situation in shipping and return the fleet under the Russian flag as a result of the regulation of monetary relations, customs and tax legislation. The features and reasons for the popularity of "convenient" flags are considered. Measures of state support for shipbuilding and shipping are analyzed, which contribute to the return of Russian shipowners to the national flag in the context of the functioning of the Russian International Register of Ships (RMRS). The analysis of the structure of the fleet in the Register and the trends in its change was carried out. The effectiveness of state support measures for domestic shipping and shipbuilding has been determined.

ОСНОВНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ МОРСКОГО ЛОГИСТИЧЕСКОГО БИЗНЕСА РФ И ОБЗОР ДОСТУПНЫХ РЕШЕНИЙ

The authors study the problems of the maritime logistics business in Russia in the context of sanctions restrictions on the import of many types of products, on the entry of ships under the Russian flag into international ports, etc. Based on the results of the study, the main barriers hindering the development of Russia’s maritime logistics business were identified, namely: reorientation from Western markets to the markets of the Asia-Pacific region; low availability of ships and sea containers; infrastructural constraints, staffing constraints. In addition, the authors propose directions for the development of the logistics business, which would partially or completely neutralize the impact of sanctions and economic restrictions. The authors analyzed Russia’s plans for the development of shipbuilding and maritime logistics infrastructure. It was noted that these plans are quite ambitious, and in the long term will strengthen Russia’s place in international trade. Summing up, the authors conclude that at the moment the Russian maritime transportation industry is in a rather vulnerable position for a number of reasons, which can be aggregated into one: the Russian maritime logistics business was not fully prepared for the sanctions pressure from Western countries. Nevertheless, there is no critical situation, and there has been no bankruptcy of large operators, which indicates a high margin of safety for Russian companies. However, a more sustainable situation requires significant investment in infrastructure, shipbuilding and container production, as well as diversification of markets and import destinations. Scientific publications of Russian and foreign authors, articles in industry journals, as well as customs data were used as a source of information.

“Отмена” России: последствия для культурной дипломатии

After February 24th, 2022, the Western society, mainly the U.S. and European countries, demonstrated a general trend that can be considered “canceling” Russia in response to its special military operation in Ukraine (western companies leaving Russia, athletes under Russian flag being excluded from international sportive events, Netflix suspending its services to Russian clients, etc.). Among other examples, “canceling” Russian culture in terms of high culture (classical music, literature, theatre, ballet, art exhibitions) presents a special case. This article examines “canceling” Russian culture in relation to cultural diplomacy in the framework of wider political confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, since influencing of international public opinion, among other things, through cultural diplomacy remains one the frontlines of the mentioned confrontation. First, the authors analyze the nature and the evolution of “cancel culture” per se, concluding that as a social phenomenon it has been politicized rapidly: from an instrument of stigmatizing perpetrators whose wrongdoings were bordering with actual crime (harassment, racism) “canceling” quickly became a tool to penalize any celebrity for expressing social and political views that do not agree with the mainstream agenda. The case of D. Trump being denied access to social media platforms in January 2021 in accordance with the same logic, while technically remaining the head of the state, was a turning point when “canceling” lost any chance to remain considered as an apolitical practice. However, the attempt to extend the “canceling” to the whole independent state – Russia – in 2022 over the matter of international politics (the conflict in Ukraine) was a new high which made it clear that “cancel culture” evolves into a tool of international political manipulation. In addition, the article examines critical differences in Russian and American approaches to cultural diplomacy. Russia, in terms of influencing international public opinion and promoting its positive image abroad via cultural diplomacy, relies mostly on high culture, which can become an easy target for “cancel culture”. The U. S. in its approach to cultural diplomacy have historically relied more on popular culture that allows them, for example, with the use of movies, not only to construct their own positive image for the international public opinion, but also to promote negative stereotypes about other countries and regions. Thus, cultural diplomacies of two countries are likely to produce two conflicting narratives with completely different instruments. Because of that, even partial and temporary “canceling” of Russian high culture internationally gives a competitive advantage for American cultural diplomacy, especially since the first and foremost aim of every such activity is to create an image, a view, a stereotype afresh, not to change the already existing ones. Thus, permanent interaction of state’s cultural diplomacy with the international public opinion is crucial for efficacy. Bearing in mind the current situation in international relations in general and tensions in Russian-American relations in particular, the article concludes that application of “cancel culture” in such a manner and the consequent disbalance in capabilities of Russian and American cultural diplomacies are likely to further destabilize the international situation and to increase the risk of more conflicts emerging and escalating.

The Spectacle of Flags: The Russian and American Flags as Global Spectacles of National Identities

This paper explores through perspectives of rhetorical criticism the stories of two rivals planting their national flags in unexplored territories. While the American flag on the Moon proved the American technological superiority over the USSR, the Russian flag in the Arctic can be seen as a political move by President Putin to recreate the lost grandeur of the Soviet Union and reenact the Cold War to revive his political support at home. By doing so and recording their exploits, the two actors created national narratives that go beyond the simple performance of erecting a flag; these images construct an affectual nationalist identity through elites’ performance of flag planting, and mass media’s staging of these political events as a “spectacle.”

The Capture of the Ship Ayios Ioannis Theologos in the Summer of 1825: An Investigation of Limits

The Greek Revolution detached a part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire and structured a newly founded state, which rearranged the balance among and the roles of the people and reshaped the boundaries between legal and illegal in international transactions, social relations and financial endeavours. This article describes an incident that took place in 1825 in the Aegean concerning the capture and the plundering of a commercial ship sailing under a Russian flag by raiders from Psara. It explores the boundaries in the actions, function and role of the protagonists of this episode. The following groups are examined as examples of people, groups and statuses: the raiders who operated on the borderline of piracy and privateering (corso); the shipowner, who was at the same time a captain and entrepreneur; the crew of the ship, who were seamen and traders; the Greek local authorities, who maintained a balance between national interest, local interest and self-interest; and the consuls, who were experiencing their twilight before the essential end of the role they enjoyed in the context of the Ottoman Empire.

ФЛАГ КОРАБЛЯ «ОРЕЛ» В КОНТЕКСТЕ ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ СИМВОЛИКИ

The article considers the issue of designing the flag for the first Russian ship “Eagle/Oryol”, built by decree of Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich from 1667. The designing of that flag is in the context of the formation of new state symbols and visual representation of power at the end of the War with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It took place in the late 1660s and early 1670s. At the period, a new version of the state coat of arms, a new coat of arms banner, and then new versions of the title coats of arms were created. An image of a double-headed eagle on the ship “Eagle” ensign (warship flag), perceived as the national flag of Russia, was the most important identifying feature of the ship’s ensign. The color scheme of the flag was not so important and it was determined in 1668. It consisted of three colors – red, white and blue. In historiography, the opinion took hold that the above first Russian flag consisted of four parts formed by a straight cross. However, such a version is not sufficiently confirmed by sources. On the contrary, it can be assumed that the flag of the ship “Eagle” was similar to the Dutch one. Whether they managed to sew the image of a double-headed eagle on its cloth is an open question.

Russian foreign policy: From ‘new thinking’ to multidirectional strategy

This article is devoted to the description and analysis of the Russian foreign policy as it has evolved from a more pro-Western line after 1991-1992 to a more balanced and nationalistic version by the mid-1990s. In addition, as a part of this article certain projections are made for the future of Russian relations with the West. The author argues that in many ways the foreign policy of the new Russia during the early 1990s was continuation of the Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking.’ Gorbachev had hoped to put the Soviet Union on the path of partnership with the Western alliance through clearing away the military and political baggage of Stalinism-Brezhnevism. This strategy enjoyed full support of the pro-western democratic movement headed by Yeltsin. The Russian democrats saw Western nations as their chief ideological and political allies, and a possible source of economic aid and a model for Russia’s economic development. However, over time, a number of internal and external factors started to influence the original Yeltsin’s strategy. Internally, the failure of ‘shock therapy’ led to the weakening of democrats and strengthening of the communists and nationalists. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s foreign policy became the target of intense criticism. Moreover, as a result of the internal and external influences and specifically the national debates, Russia’s foreign policy was gradually modified. Russia again puts an emphasis on security, and on the strength of its armed forces, and forging strategic partnerships in various parts of the world. In addition, nationalism would be expressed through the protection of the Russian diaspora, the glorification of Russia’s imperial past, and the scaling down the policy of repentance for the misdeeds of the Communist regime. Russia’s great power ambitions could be observed through Russia’s attempt to play pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, and a desire to show the Russian flag across the world. Moreover, ideology does not influence Kremlin’s relations with other states anymore, instead economic interests encourage Moscow to restore cooperation with many Third World nations. It can be expected that Russia will continue to compete for predominance with the West in the post-soviet republics and in the field of security and at the same time Russia will promote its partnership with China and other non-Western actors. However, despite these shifts, a multidirectional strategy will likely be preserved.

The Prospects of Investment in the Maritime Industry of Russian Far East

The article considers the current state of the merchant and fishing fleet of the Russian Federation carrying out domestic cargo transportation and fishery operations in the Eastern sector of the Arctic and the adjacent seas of the Far East. Taking into account the high degree of physical and moral wear of the greater part of vessels under Russian flag as well as the necessity to accomplish the goals set by Maritime Strategy of Russia, a mechanism for radical fleet modernization has been proposed. The leasing of merchant and fishing vessels from the Republic of Korea and the introduction of cooperative arrangements between shipbuilding enterprises of the two countries represent two possible options for this modernization program. Regional authorities in the Far East of Russia may act as the guarantees for the foreign investments utilizing recent changes in domestic legislation.

The Russian Navy and the Development of Alaska: The Military Dimension1

ABSTRACTThe Russian Navy played a decisive role in the opening of Alaska, though later relatively few of its ships appeared in the region, passing the baton to ships of private merchant companies and then to the Russian-American Company, which governed Alaska until its sale to the United States in 1867. Most of the company’s ships had rather limited military capabilities. Although the navy played a significant role in the development of Alaska, the military dimension to this process manifested itself relatively weakly. The ships under the Russian flag primarily carried out transport and convoy functions, shielding flotillas of company hunting baidarki [skin boats] from the attacks of hostile Indians, and later conducted formal patrols for watching foreign whaling ships. Almost the only episodes in which Russian ships were used in battle were the participation of the sloop Neva in a fight with the Tlingit Indians in 1804 and the raids of two Russian-American Company ships in 1806–1807 on Japanese villages on Sakhalin Island and the southern Kurile Islands.

Russia and the Greek Revolution

Russia and the Greek Revolution Yanni Kotsonis Lucien J. Frary, Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1844–1844 304 New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN-13 978-0198733775. $100.00. We do not have an obvious need for studies of Russian involvement in Greece in the decades surrounding the Greek Revolution of 1821. What became the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 was a small territory on the southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula, while Russia had strategic interests spanning three continents. The existing works of Grigorii Arsh, Norman Saul, I. M. Smilianskaia, Olga Petrunina, and Avgusta Stanislavskaia are careful and good. Together they cover the geostrategic, cultural, and institutional-religious importance of the region in this period, roughly 1770 to the 1840s. Russia became a Black Sea naval power under Catherine II and acted intermittently to extend that power in the Mediterranean. Russian armed forces intervened in the Morea (Peloponnese), where they stimulated the Orlov Rebellion of 1770–71; in the Ionian Islands in 1799–1807, where they evicted the French Republic and established the Septinsular Republic; and in different parts of Italy from the 1790s on, where they sparred with revolutionary and imperial France.1 We need a reason for further engagement. [End Page 661] Things do become interesting when we consider that Greek speakers at the time were extremely active in multiple regions of the world, pertained to flows and loci sooner than states and nations, and had very little respect for borders. The examples are myriad, from the Italian states to which Greek speakers and Orthodox migrated to study, soldier, and trade to France after 1789, where they joined the army and commanded forces in the Caribbean, at Waterloo, in Algeria, and later still in the Franco-Prussian War. In the Ottoman Empire after Greek independence Greeks owned most of the merchant marine, and the Greek-speaking, Orthodox Phanariotes continued to manage major aspects of the state, its moneys, and its foreign relations. They manned the fleets and irregular forces that defended the Porte against foreign attack, rebellions, and revolutions, Greek ones included.2 Russia, too, was a powerful magnet and had been since the time of Ivan III. A generation of scholars trained by the estimable Theofanis Stavrou have been documenting these movements with an emphasis on the 18th and 19th centuries. Lucien Frary is one of those scholars, and his book goes far in tracing networks of Greeks in connection with Russia from the time of the Greek Revolution to the 1840s. Most of Russia's Mediterranean diplomatic missions were manned by Greeks. Greek merchants were based as often in Odessa and Azov as in Cephalonia, Syros, or Piraeus, and behind references to Russian shipping were often Greek captains (and their Albanian crews) from all around the eastern Mediterranean.3 The Russian navy and the corsairs sponsored by Russia were stacked with Greek commanders. Lambros Katsonis was the most famous of the corsairs, and the military leader of the Greek Revolution in the 1820s, Theodoros Kolokotronis, had a spell as a pirate under the Russian flag before 1810. The regular army also attracted hundreds of Greek soldiers and officers like the Ypsilantis brothers, who later organized the Greek uprising of 1821—to the chagrin of Nicholas I.4 Greek theologians populated Russian seminaries and went on regular missions to St. Petersburg. Presumably the Russian emperors valued their language skills and trusted their Orthodox religion, while for a time their oath to the tsar trumped fears of nationalist parochialism. [End Page 662] What to call these people was not at all obvious and the multiple labels invite query. In Russia the terminology still includes greki (the catchall), pontiitsy (from the Black Sea region), ellintsy (from the country, Greece), and in earlier centuries grechane, with further subcategories for certain spaces in today's Caucasus region and Ukraine. In the Ottoman Empire, they called themselves Romans (Romioi), as many Greeks do today, while Turkish-speakers called them Rum, all in reference to the Eastern Roman Empire and the Orthodox Church it spawned. It was the category under which the Ottomans organized the Orthodox millet, no matter what language they spoke. Greeks arriving in the Balkans...

“The Prostitution of the Russian Flag”: Privateers in Russian Admiralty Courts, 1787–98

In 1794, the Russian Empire convened the first high admiralty court for appeals to review petitions of merchants and privateers embroiled in the second Russian–Ottoman war of Catherine II's reign (1787–91). The Commission for Archipelago Affairs, as this admiralty court was called, decided more than 170 cases on the basis of Russian maritime law and its interpretation of the law of nations concerning commercial navigation and privateers. A year into its work, the commission determined that one case sat at the center of most disputes that pitted merchants against Russian-flagged privateers: the affair of Lambros Katsonis. The commission's decisions for most of the cases on its docket rested on its determination of Katsonis's standing in the Russian Empire. Once decided, the outcome of the matter went on to define the distinction between Russian privateers and naval officers in Russian law: precedents that shaped Russian naval practices for the next 50 years.

Desecuritization as Displacement of Controversy: geopolitics, law and sovereign rights in the Arctic

By signing the Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008, the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean pre-emptively desecuritized potential geopolitical controversies in the Arctic Ocean by confirming that international law and geo-science are the defining factors underlying the future delimitation. This happened in response to a rising securitization discourse fueled by commentators and the media in the wake of the 2007 Russian flag planting on the geographical North Pole seabed, which also triggered harder interstate rhetoric and dramatic headlines. This case, however, challenges some established conventions within securitization theory. It was state elites that initiated desecuritization and they did so by shifting issues in danger of being securitized from security to other techniques of government. Contrary to the democratic ethos of the theory, these shifts do not necessarily represent more democratic procedures. Instead, each of these techniques are populated by their own experts and technocrats operating according to logics of right (law) and accuracy (science). While shifting techniques of government might diminish the danger of securitized relations between states, the shift generates a displacement of controversy. Within international law we have seen controversy over its ontological foundations and within science we have seen controversy over standards of science. Each of these are amplified and take a particularly political significance when an issue is securitized via relocation to another technique. While the Ilulissat Declaration has been successful in minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states it has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other.

Map Room: Borders on Top of the World

Map Room: Borders on Top of the World

Pax Russica: Russia’s Role in the Race for the Arctic

I his essay for this issue, “The Ilulissat Declaration,” Klaus Dodds critiques the claim that the Arctic is in the grip of a sea “scramble.” Rather than resembling a “new Great Game,” a term used to describe fierce competition for resources and strategic access in a region, Dodds argues that the decision-making process governing the Arctic demonstrates the maturity of the global strategic order. Countries that were previously at loggerheads have diplomatically resolved their disagreements, Dodds notes. In contrast, Jon Carlson’s “Scramble for the Arctic” focuses upon the many claims to sovereignty in the Arctic, and the lengths to which littoral states may go to secure their own economic, security, and political ambitions in the region. Chief among these states is Russia, which lays claim to the largest portion of the Arctic. Yet both Carlson and Dodds arrive at a similar conclusion: the Arctic is a beacon of international cooperation. While Russia has cooperated with the Arctic Council and the “Arctic Five,” Russia’s increased presence in the Arctic—along with its use of nationalist language and imagery—indicates that Russia’s intentions in the region may reflect more self-interest than Dodds and Carlson suggest. Though other countries have engaged in military and economic build-up in the region, Russia is unique in its implementation—notably, its clever use of nationalism and fortified demonstrations of military power. Dodds begins his essay with a reference to the planting of a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed by a Duma deputy chairman in the summer of 2007. The flag, tethered to a rust-proof titanium pole at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, was placed on the disputed Lomonosov Ridge, a point of ter-

The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and Arctic Ocean

Two competing conceptions of the Arctic Ocean have circulated since the infamous planting of a Russian flag on the bottom of the seabed in 2007. Ideas of a “scramble for territory” depended on accepting that the Arctic Ocean was a terra nullius, or belonging to no one. The Danish-sponsored Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008 was an explicit rejection of that Arctic vision. Using the Law of the Sea, it outlined the sovereign rights of the five coastal states. This essay argues that the Declaration was an important pre-emptive strike against growing global interest in the Arctic, and a determination to re-territorialize the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Council, as the leading inter-governmental organization, remains critical in helping to politically mediate the interests of Arctic and non-Arctic parties.

Introduction ‐ The Governance of the Global Commons: Much Unfinished Business?

AbstractThe planting of a Russian flag at the bottom of the central Arctic Ocean in the summer of 2007 drew attention, in dramatic fashion, to a subterranean space beyond national jurisdiction. While the region was a permanent feature in Cold War strategic planning, the flag planting incident was rapidly framed as indicative of a different kind of struggle –‘a scramble for territory and resources’. Notwithstanding the media led hyperbole, one question to emerge was an apparently straightforward one – did any one state or group of states possess sovereign rights in the central Arctic Ocean? More generally, how do issues of access, control, property rights and resource use continue to affect the governance of the global commons? This special section explores those questions.

The Actions of the Arctic States Respecting the Continental Shelf: A Reflective Essay

The rapidly changing Arctic has received much media attention in recent years. The planting of a Russian flag underneath the North Pole in August 2007 raised concerns about the future of the region, with some even predicting military confrontation. Some scholars suggest that there is a race on to see who can stake the biggest claim to the continental shelf—and exploit the plentiful hydrocarbon resources under the seabed. For most international lawyers, such an explanation seems far-fetched given that the coastal states have behaved in keeping with the international law of the sea. Contrasting descriptions such as these call for a more nuanced understanding of what is unfolding in the region. This reflective article presents three scenarios describing the types of development that may ensue as coastal states proceed to draw the outer limits of their continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean.

Is Russia an Arctic Status Quo Power?

Russian foreign policy in the increasingly important Arctic region reflects an ambiguous combination of assertiveness and cooperation in accordance with international law. Against this background, the existing literature on the Arctic tends to polarise around revisionist and status quo interpretations of Russian foreign policy in the region. The present paper contrasts the divergent interpretations through case studies of the Russian flag planting on the North Pole seabed in 2007 and Russia’s participation at the Ilulissat Summit in 2008 which can be seen as ‘crucial’ cases for the competing interpretations. Overall, the case studies provide support for a modidied version of the status quo interpretation which incorporates insights from the revisionist interpretation.

Russia in the Arctic

There are a number of elements of Russian Arctic foreign policy that have raised concerns among many experts: a highly publicized scientific expedition planted the Russian flag in Arctic waters near the north pole as if it were meant to establish rights to sovereignty in this area; the Russian muitary has resumed regular flights that sometimes pass overly close to the borders of neighbouring circumpolar countries; and Russian fishermen often clash with their Norwegian peers in the so-caUed grey zones in the Barents Sea and near Greenland. All these actions have taken place in the context of a growing rivalry over increasingly accessible resources in the Arctic, as weU as over important sea routes in the area. It should also be noted that the Arctic is a border region, which makes security a touchy issue for aU concerned. Moreover, the existing legal framework dealing with the partition of the seabed in this area is not only highly complex and sophisticated but also leaves many questions unanswered.These considerations at times generate nightmare scenarios for all interested actors as weU as for the entire world. Thus, it becomes relevant to assess Russia's actual interests and goals in the Arctic - beyond its frequently projected scary and assertive image - and to consider what avauable means it has to reach them.THE PATTERN OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYFirst of all, it is important to mention that Russian Arctic policy is a coherent part of the overall pattern of Russian foreign policy. After a period of economic weakness and difficult decisions, Russia is using its newly acquired wealth to regain great power status, at least at a regional level. Moscow is very concerned about an excessive western, and especially American, presence near Russia's borders, which it most often considers a threat. I argue that Russia's reaction to these threats should be understood as a soft-balancing strategy. In contrast to the classical concept of balance of power, which is meant to depict the state of the international system, or the traditional strategy of hard balancing, which includes the open buildup of military capacities and formal alliances, soft balancing - as introduced to international relations and foreign policy analysis by TV. Paul and his coauthors - is a limited military buildup and security understanding among actors, combined with preventive strategies as well as nonmilitary tools, to discourage, delay, or dismantle unilateral aggressive polides by another great power.1 The ultimate goal of this type of foreign policy strategy is to build the vital economic and military capacities necessary to protect and reinforce national sovereignty. The economy is crucially important for the strategy of soft balancing as it is considered a warranty of the state's security. This is the reason that elements of soft balancing are to be found in vital domains of the national economy.In Russia's case, one of these this vital domains is the energy sector. Indeed, Russia owes a great part of its assertiveness and renewed material capacities to oil and gas revenues. Thus, it is not suprising that it is seen as crucial to protect this source of wealth from any threat, and especially from the US. Vladimir Putin has explicitly called the economy a synonym of security.2 This vision is reflected in the doctrine of national security of the Russian Federation, which states:[The] national interest of the State is to preserve the fundamental stability of the constitutional institutions, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political, economic and social stability... to develop equitable and mutuaUy beneficial international cooperation. The implementation of Russia's national interest is only possible on the basis of sustainable economic development. That's why our interests in this domain are crucial.3It is very important to add that soft-balancing strategies are guided by zero-sum game logic. As such, they exclude the option of absolute gains and of long-term cooperation in a vital domain. …