Russian Embassy Research Articles

Legal status of Russian refugees in Bulgaria in the 1920s – early 1930s

The position of Russian refuges in the 1920s in Bulgaria is analyzed in the article drawing on a large factual material. The reasons for the country’s policy of «open doors», the numerical dynamics of emigrants, the peculiarities of their social composition and adaptation are revealed. It is shown that the legal status of Russians was regulated at the national level, taking into account the interests of emigration in Bulgaria and the situation in other countries, as well as in close connection with the decisions of the League of Nations. Gradually, a unified legal context of refugee existence was created. The Russian diplomatic mission headed by A. M. Petryaev, who since 1923 handed over his duties to the former adviser of the Russian Embassy in Bulgaria S. G. Bogoyavlensky, the Committee on Russian Refugees in Bulgaria, the representation of the High Commissioner for Refugees in Bulgaria, provided institutional assistance. The relationship between various institutions and personalities in solving the refugee issue is revealed. The legal status of Russians is examined from the standpoint of structural integration: inclusion in the host society through the national labor market, taxation, social sphere, realization of inheritance rights, access to the court, through the structures of the Russian Orthodox Church, the institution of citizenship. Russian refugees in Bulgaria formally obeyed the general laws on foreigners on an equal basis with other foreigners. There was no special law regulating the rights of Russians, but they were in a different position compared to other foreigners because of the number of legislative and administrative reservations. The special attitude towards the veterans of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878 was characteristic: they were granted the right to a lifetime monthly allowance. The role of Nansen passports, established for Russians, and the difficulties of their application by ordinary migrants are revealed. It is concluded that the economic crisis of the late 1920s — early 1930s stimulated the integration of Russians due to the activation of naturalization. The confessional and linguistic affinity of the peoples played a role.

Sergey Lomonosov — Russian Diplomat in Brazil (1835—1848)

The article analyzes the life of Sergey Grigoryevich Lomonosov (1799—1857), brilliant Lyceum student, friend of A. S. Pushkin, A. M. Gorchakov, famous Russian diplomat, privy councilor, who did a lot in his professional field to increase the prestige of the Russian Empire abroad. In 1817, S. G. Lomonosov was appointed to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in 1818 was sent to the Russian embassy in Washington. Then he served in Madrid, Copenhagen, London, in 1835 he was appointed Charge d’affaires in Brazil, and from 1843 received the status of Minister plenipotentiary. It was in Brazil where S. G. Lomonosov's diplomatic talent was fully realized. For over 12 years of work, he has done a lot to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties between Russia and Latin America. Then there was diplomatic service in Portugal, and at the end of his career — the rank of privy councilor (1850) and the post of Minister plenipotentiary at the Dutch court.

Борьба сербов в Австрии против унии в XVIII веке

The author examines the position of the Serbian people and the Orthodox Church under Austrian rule since the end of the Holy League war with Turkey from the end of the 17th century to the era of Josephism. After having settled in Austria, the Serbs were exposed to the assimilation policy of the authorities, the main instrument of which was the union with the Roman Catholic Church imposed on the Serbs. The sources for the study were normative and administrative acts of authorities at various levels, decisions of the Serbian people's church councils, official and private correspondence, as well as previously unpublished diplomatic documents from the fund of the Russian embassy in Vienna. The article identifies the main directions of the state policy and the Roman Catholic Church towards the Serbs and analyzes Serbian response. It is concluded that the inhabitants of the cities greatly resisted the union while, while the Orthodox bishops showed a tendency to compromise with the authorities. In the struggle against the union, the Serbs tried to apply for the support of the largest Orthodox power. Russia, for its part, provided assistance to the Serbs, and its volume was largely determined by the position and personal views on the "Serbian issue" of the Russian am­bas­sadors in Vienna. In conclusion, it is emphasized that thanks to the active position of the Ser­bian urban class and patronage from Russia, the Austrian Serbs managed to maintain their adherence to the faith of their ancestors and the independence of their church throughout the 18th century. This became the key to preserving their national and cultural identity in an alien, foreign environment.

Blinding the Bear: Israeli Double Agents and Russian Intelligence

The Israeli General Security Services, commonly known as the Shabak, is responsible for counterintelligence inside Israel. In the 1960s, the Shabak was struggling to counter the operations of Russian intelligence in Israel. Committee for State Security (KGB) case officers, working under diplomatic cover from the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv, recruited and ran agents in Israel. The Shabak was able to turn some of those recruited by the KGB into double agents. These double agents were used to learn about KGB tradecraft, identify Russian intelligence operatives, and feed the Soviets harmless or false information, known as “chickenfeed.” This article examines the recruitment and running of two Shabak double agents, their value for the KGB, and unique aspects of Israeli double agent tradecraft. It concludes that Israeli double agents were good for tactical purposes, learning about enemy intelligence personnel and practices, but were not of high value when used as part of strategic deceptions.

Work of the Russian Embassy in London With British Veterans of the World War II Arctic Convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk

Work of the Russian Embassy in London With British Veterans of the World War II Arctic Convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk

Work of the Russian Embassy in London With British Veterans of the World War II Arctic Convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk

Work of the Russian Embassy in London With British Veterans of the World War II Arctic Convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk

Promising Relationship between Bangladesh and Russia

This study analysis to what extent Russia supported Bangladesh. Russia is a true friend of Bangladesh. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union on 25 January 1972. Bangladesh has maintained bilateral relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a Russian embassy in Dhaka, and a consulate-general in Chittagong. Bangladesh has an embassy in Moscow, with the two countries enjoying close military, economic and political relations. This relationship is contributing to the development of Asian regional politics, economy, and culture. Bangladesh’s relations with Russia are historic. It would have been difficult for Bangladesh to achieve independence without the cooperation of the Soviet Union, and this continues to be recognized today.

Imperial National Conscience as International Recognition

In the second half of the 17th century and under the conditions of the Westphalian system based on the principles of national state sovereignty, the relations between the empires existing since Middle Ages and Russia, that came to the imperial development scenario only in the New times, entered a new stage. The most morbid reaction to Russian imperial ambitions was demonstrated by the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire. The most important task of Moscow tsars and their diplomats became the task to obtain the Roman Empire’s recognition of the equal status of its rulers and that of the Russian sovereigns. The present article describes how Moscow solved that problem. Special attention is paid to the issue of the Russian tsars titles; to the nuances of diplomatic etiquette related to the work of Russian embassies in the Holy Empire, as well as the reception of the imperial authorized representatives in Russia. In Russian domestic practice the titling of Russian tsars as emperors started with the Latin translation in the official documents addressed to the tsars of the Full Royal title. The specific problem in the relations of the two states remained their affiliation with different confessions. The article describes the attempts of the Holy Roman Empire to recognize the higher international status of Russian tsars in exchange for the permission to hold Catholic services in Russian territory without difficulty.

Wilhelm II and the resignation of Otto von Bismarck

The article focuses on the turning point in the history of the German Empire in 1871–1918, associated with the circumstances of the resignation of the first Imperial Chancellor and Minister-President of Prussia Otto von Bismarck in March 1890 and the transition to the so-called Wilhelmian period in the history of the country. The subject has been well studied in German historiography, yet it is still a matter for discussion among historians. Drawing on studies already undertaken, the author supplements them with information from the correspondence between the Russian Embassy in Berlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire in January–April 1890, which is largely unknown to the general public. The author focuses on the character and personality of Emperor Wilhelm II, the principal stages in his biography up to 1890 which influenced the emergence and course of the resignation crisis; the political differences between the Emperor and the Chancellor which became the catalyst for their break-up; the consequences of Bismarck's resignation and the impact of these events on the subsequent development of Germany. As a result of this research, the author concludes that, firstly, the main reason was psychology, the psychological disposition of the monarch. By firing the chancellor, he wanted to get a sense of freedom. A man who had been emotionally very dependent on his 'mentors' his whole life was trying to break free from the tutelage of the chief of them, Bismarck. Secondly, the German Empire was in no way inferior to the British Empire, whose reigning house he had a whole gamut of love-hate feelings towards. In such a situation, Bismarck, who had resisted state colonial policy and domestic transformation in every way, was not at all suited to be the main pillar of the new monarch, who had such far-reaching, albeit very vague, plans. His notion of the ability to single-handedly determine the entire policy of a country such as Germany at the end of the nineteenth century was inherently doomed to failure. Removing a constraining and guiding factor such as Bismarck from the system made it even more unstable. But there was no other way out of the conflict, the Bismarcks could not in any circumstances replace the Hohenzollerns.

“Security trap” as a challenge for Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction

The present article is dedicated to comprehensive analysis of business-risks in Syria in the security sphere (the author named it as “security trap”). Among them are the seats of combat activities between the government forces and the opposition, contradictions between the central government and local elite, rise in criminality among former combatants, traumatized by war, “urban” terrorism, stepped up activity on the part of ISIS militants in desert areas and not in the last measure the conflicts of interests among external actors. This topic seems to be quite new for scientific research in Russia and abroad since most analytical work has been previously focused on impacts of security in military political and social spheres rather than in the economic one. Such approach would allow us to make a conclusion that business risks alongside other difficulties such as territorial fragmentation, economy lying in ruins, sanctions, crisis in neighboring Lebanon, COVID-19 pandemic are hampering the revival of businesslike life. This is important and useful for constructing hierarchy of external and internal challenges for Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction, including the stabilizing role of Russia. The author has used empirical materials gathered during the term of his diplomatic service at the Russian Embassy in Damascus (in 2014–2017) along with his subsequent regular visits to Syria.

The XII Duke of Osuna, between aristocratic spirit and Dandy. The Russian embassy as a matter of honor

Russia and Spain re-established relations in 1856 after a two-decade diplomatic crisis caused by disagreements over Carlism. The appointment of Mariano Téllez-Girón, XII Duke of Osuna, as the plenipotentiary minister in the Russian court signaled a friendly reconciliation between the two countries. However, it meant above all the reaffirmation of the Spanish nobleman, who left his mark on the Russian royal and public sphere. The Duke of Osuna knew how to gain the Tsar’s trust and displayed his sense of honor, imbued with the aristocratic spirit and the European dandy. This work provides a portrait of the Duke of Osuna during his embassy in Saint Petersburg, against the backdrop of the ideal of Spanish liberalism, and of the dandy as a new archetype of bourgeois honor. The Letters from Russia, by Juan Valera, secretary of that embassy, help to understand the controversial image displayed by Osuna in the Court of Alexander II. The Duke not only adapted to the Russian noble and autocratic customs, but also presented a very particular way of understanding the figure of the nobleman, which allowed him to refute the existing stereotypes around Spain, as well as reinforce the prestige of Queen Elizabeth, formally recognized not only by Russia, but by the rest of the powers.

Siberian Bukharans in Russian mission: gathering intelligence in Russia’s south-eastern borderlands, 17th-18th centuries

Siberian Bukharans were one of the most agile group of the native population of Western Siberia and the Urals in the 17th and 18th centuries. This paper analyzes information about the border activities of Bukharans, characterizes their participation in the implementation of Russian foreign policy. The author considers the phenomenon of intelligence and the intermediary and diplomatic role of the Bukharans through the study of various aspects of Russian policy on the southeastern borderlands. The result shows that Bukharans were involved in intelligence activities in several forms. The Russian authorities could interview Bukharans who came to trade; they could include Bukharans in Russian embassies; or they could send them into the steppe as independent agents. The geography of their missions in the 17th and 18th centuries included the Kuchum lands, the Kazakh khanates, the Oirat and Dzungar lands, as well as the Qing Empire. Bukharans participated in the negotiations as interpreters and they were sometimes allowed to participate in diplomatic ceremonies such as gift exchange. The intelligence activities of some Bukharans could go hand in hand with their trade operations. Recruiting Bukharans for intelligence gathering tsks allowed the Siberian and Orenburg authorities to conduct a more effective policy in the steppe borderlands, based on the knowledge of local realities. The Russian authorities used information provided by the Bukharans for purposes such as drawing up maps, informing the voivodes of the borderlands about military dangers, the movement of troops, and diplomatic negotiations.

Behind the Curtains of the Czech-Russian Diplomatic Conflict

As a result of the Czech-Russian political conflict that began on April 17-18, 2021, there appeared trends in the relations between Russia and Central European countries that are capable of rolling them back to the period of "velvet revolutions”. The conflict started with diplomatic withdrawals on the Czech side and then on the Russian, gradually had been enriched by the new and new accusations thus transforming it into a general political conflict, the unprecedented escalation of tension between Moscow and Central Europe since transformational revolutions here. At the same time, it revealed the intentions of the sides to seek recognition of their rightness at any cost. The history of this largest confrontation between Prague and Moscow since 19G8 is based on the unsettled nature of many issues of post-Soviet coexistence, such as the parity of diplomatic representation, as a result of which the Russian embassy in Prague turned into the second largest after London. In addition, there was a lack of political reform of in the Czech-Russian relations, taking into account the Czech Republic's membership in the new Euro-Atlantic structures against the background of clearly progressing economic cooperation. Meanwhile, as the author of the article states,the issues that have appeared on the surface of these relations require an immediate solution, which will be difficult – especially for Moscow in the light of the recently progressive confrontational nature of relations between Russia and both some individual states and Euro-Atlantic structures as a whole.

The Embassy of Pyotr Potemkin to Spain, 1667–1668: Some Features of Mutual Perception and Dialogue of Two Diplomacies

The Russian diplomacy of the 17th century had some specific features in comparison with the Western European diplomacy of the same time. The purpose of this article is to identify these features and analyze the perception of Russian ambassadors by European diplomats. The research is based on both Russian and Spanish documentation of the embassy of Piotr Potemkin (1667–1668), the first Russian embassy in Spain. Since there were no instances of diplomatic contacts between the two countries in the past, the diplomatic ceremonial was of crucial importance for P. Potemkin’s mission. Since no contact between the diplomats and the Ambassadorial Chancellery in Moscow was not possible due to the long distance between Russia and Spain, the detailed instructions (nakaz) given to P. Potemkin in Moscow acquired a special significance. Therefore the article aims to determine the extent and nature of the dependence of the diplomats’ actions on their instructions. A comparative analysis of the nakaz and the final report (stateinyi spisok) in the part related to the stay of the embassy in Madrid and the negotiation process shows that the ambassadors scrupulously observed the nakaz, taking initiative only in those cases that were not covered by it. All of its requirements had a logical explanation: not to harm the interests of Russia, not to lower the honour of the envoys of a great power, not to create a bad precedent in the diplomatic ceremonial. The Spanish side, not sufficiently aware of the specifics of the nakaz, sometimes did not understand the behaviour of the ambassadors, attributing it to their vanity, pettiness, and bad temper. At the same time, although the Russian embassy took Spanish diplomats wholly by surprise, the latter managed, within a limited time, to collect a variety of information about the Russians and take it into account, showing flexibility in organizing audiences and during negotiations. Although there were differences between Spanish and Russian diplomats, both sides adhered to European diplomatic practice. The absence of contradictions between the two states and their interest in establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral trade determined the success of P. Potemkin’s embassy.

“Syrian case of Vasily Akkarsky”: nationalist anti-Russian demarche(four letters of 1909 from the Russian embassy in Constantinople,Archive of the Russian Empire Foreign Policy)

“Syrian case of Vasily Akkarsky”: nationalist anti-Russian demarche(four letters of 1909 from the Russian embassy in Constantinople,Archive of the Russian Empire Foreign Policy)

The Russian Ambassador in Turkey A.P. Butenev

Apollinary Petrovich Butenev was at the head of the Russian embassy in Constantinople from 1830 till 1843. These were the years of the most stable Turkish-Russian relations in the first half of the 19th century. As the envoy to Constantinople, A. Butenev was one of the most significant Russian representatives abroad, while the position in Constantinople was one of the most important postings in the Russian Foreign Ministry service since the city was a kind of international political centre that had a huge impact on the life of the whole of Europe. A. Butenev’s diplomatic endeavours never generated a lot of interest among Russian historians, even though many scholars thoroughly analyzed the period of the Russian-Turkish relations during his service in Constantinople multiple times. The 1830s and 1840s are marked by several important events in foreign policy in which the Russian envoy was directly involved. First of all, А. Butenev played a decisive role in the drafting of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi that was signed in 1833. The Bosphorus expedition of 1833 was a unique military and political operation of its time, unparalleled in the history of Russian diplomacy. Usually, the success of the expedition is associated with the names of A.F. Orlov and N.N. Muravyov, while the chance to conclude this treaty that was extremely beneficial for Russia belongs to A. Butenev. This is indicated by numerous internal memoranda and reports he sent to St. Petersburg. With his experience in diplomatic affairs, political weight in the international circles, and the ability to make independent decisions, Apollinary Petrovich Butenev adequately and successfully represented the interests of his homeland in the crucial period when the Russian Empire formulated and implemented its concept of the Eastern policy.

A French diplomat in the Russian Service. Missions of the Count d'Antraigues in Venice (1795–1797)

The article deals with the history of secret diplomacy of the time of the French Revolution. It aims to show unknown aspects of the French émigré сount d'Antraigue's activities as a councillor to the Russian embassy in Venice and as a personal representative of Louis XVIII in 1795–1797. Unpublished documents from the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire and the memoirs of contemporaries form the source base of the research. The practice of appointing French royalists “under Russian protection” as employees of Russian diplomatic missions was proposed by the Russian court in 1794. The case of d’Antraigues, therefore, was not unique. D'Antraigues' duties in this post were related to the search for information on revolutionary France, the French army in Italy, the politics of the Italian states. His contacts with Swedish agents, French royalists, and French army officers were the most fruitful. At the same time, he was associated with British diplomats. Bonaparte used the errors of the diplomat to his advantage: сount d'Antraigues’s notes served as a pretext for the coup d'état of 18 Fructidor, Year V. Although he сount lost credibility in the eyes of the royalists yet, thanks to the support of A.K. Razumovsky, he continued his service as correspondent and honorary “pensionnaire” of the Russian court. It was after 1797 that a “black legend” developed around the name of the count, thanks, in particular, to former secret agents of the Directory and Napoleon Bonaparte, depicting him as an opportunist.

Great Britain in 1801: before the Signing of the Peace of Amiens (According to Reports of the Priest of the Russian Embassy in London, Yakov Smirnov)

In the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) reports are stored of the priest of the Russian Embassy in London Ya. I. Smirnov (1754—1840) in the State Collegium of Foreign Affairs (GKID) during the first half of 1801, giving new information to learn not only activities of the British government in a specified period of time and the formulation of Cabinet policy towards Russia and other countries, but the peculiarities of domestic life, and the circumstances of the stay there left during the break in relations in the years 1800—1801 Russian subjects, both civilians and military sailors. Smirnov’s reports to St. Petersburg proved to the representatives of the highest authorities that neither Russia nor any other country would be able to talk to Great Britain from a position of strength. It would be better for continental monarchies if it were their ally. But in this case, if we keep in mind the stable nature of the Anglo-French antagonism of the late 18th — early 19th centuries, London would require entry into the war on its side. Understanding this and relying on information received including from Smirnov, Alexander I in 1804 he proposed to Prime-Minister William Pitt the Younger an Alliance based not on immediate benefits, but on the principles of re-establishing (on a new basis) a “balance of power” in post-war Europe that guarantees peace and stability for all States, large and small. As for the peculiarities of the development of Anglo-Russian relations in the first half of 1801, it is worth paying attention to the fact that Smirnov in November 1800 reported to St. Petersburg about the existence of a “General plan” of the British to counteract the countries that signed the Convention on armed neutrality (“Northern League”). Subsequently, he informed the Russian authorities in detail and accurately about all the movements of the British squadrons. Knowing this, we can correct the established statement in Russian historiography that the measures taken by the British in relation to the ships of the countries participating in the hostile coalition were absolutely treacherous and unexpected for them. On the other hand, the priest insisted on showing his high-ranking recipients that during the most difficult period of the Anglo-Russian breakup, Russian goods are traded on the London stock exchange, even without raising the price. This was to prove that the British were interested in maintaining mutually beneficial trade and would never break with Russia themselves. Economic relations will become a solid basis for the political union of the two countries during the reign of Alexander I.

Entry of the Russian Embassy to Isfahan and Diplomatic Receptions in the Safavid State (according to the Memoirs of John Bell)

The article is devoted to the ceremonial ritual diplomatic practices adopted at the Persian Safavid court during the reign of Shah Sultan Hussein (1694-1722), described by the Scottish physician John Bell, who was a member of the Russian embassy of Artemy Volynsky in Isfahan (1717). It is noted that John Bell, with varying degrees of detail, captured the order of entry of foreign diplomatic missions to Isfahan, the movement along the streets of the capital and the consistent structure of the entry of the Russian embassy. The fact that there was an elaborate ceremony and etiquette for receiving foreign embassies in Safavid Persia is shown in the article. The author believes that the capital of Isfahan itself, its suburbs, the main Shah’s residence Talar-i Tawila, and the Shah’s country residences acted as the ceremonial space. It has been proven that the Safavid ceremony involved a magnificent meeting of the embassy at the entrance to the capital, her escort to the place of accommodation, a solemn entry into the capital, a reception with the Shah with the presentation of credentials and a meal. A comparative analysis of the receptions of the shah and high-ranking officials, differing in their degree of representativeness, led to the conclusion that the shah’s receptions were exclusively ceremonial, while important political issues could be discussed at receptions of high-ranking officials. It is noted that the receptions of senior officials could surpass the receptions of the shah with pomp.

The Russians are Laughing! The Russians are Laughing! How Russian Diplomats Employ Humour in Online Public Diplomacy

ABSTRACT In recent years, diplomats have increasingly employed humour online. This study sought to understand why diplomats use humour on Twitter and to investigate whether humour can serve as a public diplomacy resource. The study adopted the prism of “the digitalisation of public diplomacy”, which asserts that the norms and logics of the digital society have altered diplomats’ working routines. Employing advertising humour typologies, the study analysed humorous tweets published by the Russian Embassy to the United Kingdom. Results suggest that by adopting a humorous and abrasive tone, and resonating with populist narratives, the Embassy was able to craft a unique iBrand online. This iBrand also depicted Russia as a confident world leader whose diplomacy is blunt and understandable to “common” people. Humour also enabled the Embassy to summon the attention of social media users, set the media agenda and identify the values that underscore Russia’s image.