Russian Elite Research Articles

Russian Politics in Times of Change: Internal and External Factors of Transformation

The first few months of 2014 brought an unprecedented collapse of the Russian Federation's image on the world stage, the worst since the end of the Cold War. The events in Ukraine and the reaction to them by a significant number of countries in the international community, quickly demoted Russia to that group of countries whose foreign policy provokes harsh condemnation. For the first time in decades, international sanctions have been put in place against Russia, adopted by a large number of the world's largest countries, de facto downgrading Russia to the rank of a rogue state; these sanctions are intended to exert pressure on the elite, who are responsible for implementing certain foreign policy decisions. For many experts, the events are associated with a new and sudden sea-change in Russia's foreign policy. However, it appears to us that the current stage of cooling relations with the West is a logical consequence of the way in which the Russian state was constructed in recent years; in fact, a different scenario could hardly have been anticipated. This article presents the author's view of the mechanisms and logic that shaped Russia's foreign policy course, which has evolved through several iterations in the last three years. The below analysis could facilitate a fuller understanding of Russian motives in international relations, and help find opportunities and mechanisms for dialogue between Russia and the West.Vladimir Putin's new presidential term, which began in 2012, was typified by a significant transformation of Russia's foreign policy, both with respect to neighboring states, and world politics in general. The majority of pundits tend to link this transformation with domestic, social processes in Russia itself, an increasingly active public and a qualitative transformation of the Russian elite. However, we consider that Russia's current foreign policy concept is a complex combination of three factors, which are both foreign and domestic:A. The evolution of the political system, which took place as a result of competition between different groups within the Russian elite, over the past 3-5 years. As a result of these processes, Russia's political spectrum has a complex structure, which includes liberal-economic, conservative-political and oligarchic elements. Competition between these groups is a major factor behind the complex character of Russia's current foreign policy.B. The Eurasian economic and political integration project which, in the mindset of Russian leaders, is the key to Russian development in the 21st century. Success or failure in implementing the giant steps required to re-integrate post-So- viet space is seen as the main indicator of the effectiveness of the Russian political system today, and its foreign-policy strategies.C. The international security situation, which features a wide range of uncertainties and threats in the Middle and Far East, as well as Central Asia and Afghanistan.We consider it important to analyze how much the above factors influence current Russian foreign policy, and then ascertain how much each factor can influence policies. This analysis will offer answers to key issues about the dominant factors in foreign policy decision-making in today's Russia, e.g. whether policy-making is reactive or proactive, and what transformations the next few years will bring.The Russian EliteTo answer the questions raised, we must first determine the structure of the Russian elite today. This stratum can nominally be divided into two, deeply inter-connected segments. The first is a hierarchy: the distribution of economic and financial influence and interests within a ruling class that took shape during the first presidential terms of President Putin. The second is the values of the members of the elite who occupy the country's political governance system.The Russian elite, taken in general, are fairly well understood. Between 2000 and 2010, four main groups of influence emerged in Russia. …

ИМЭМО–АНПОКЭН: новая встреча российских и японских экспертов

The publication presents major points of the discussion held by Russian and Japanese experts at the joint symposium organized by IMEMO and Tokyo-based Council on National Security Problems (ANPOKEN) in March, 2013. More than 30 specialists from the two sides exchanged views on security and business relations between Russia and Japan against the background of the present situation in Northeast Asia. The discussion covered major issues of domestic and foreign policy of the two countries as well as problems and prospects of their economies in the context of the growing role of external factors. The participants discussed reaction of political and business elites in Russia and Japan to external and domestic challenges as well as their perception of political, economic and economic situation in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Imperiale und lokale Loyalitäten im Konflikt: Der Einzug Russlands in die Ostseeprovinzen in den 1840er Jahren

Imperial and Local Loyalties in Conflict: Russia’s Coming to the Baltic Provinces in the 1840s The paper focuses on the issue of imperial representation in a non-Russian and non-Orthodox “European” environment in a time when these categories gradually became more important. In this respect, the 1840s marked a watershed for the mutual relationship between the imperial centre and the Baltic periphery. The traditional estate-based loyalty between local German elites and St Peters - burg officials was challenged by two factors: First, the conversion movement that affected around 100,000 Estonian and Latvian peasants who converted to the “Tsar’s faith” in order to express social protest against the local agrarian order - much to the surprise not only to German landlords but even more so to imperial officials. This was seen first and foremost as disloyalty to the protestant German agrarian upper-class, but in challenging the provincial Status quo conversion challenged imperial order as well. Second, the emerging vision of a national empire (Mark Bassin) questioned not only German local domination but also the government’s estate-based relationship with the strategically and economically vital Baltic provinces. Nicholas I ordered his officials in the region to square the circle - to guarantee peace and order and to make sure that Orthodoxy was protected without encouraging conversion. Nevertheless, in 1845 he appointed an Orthodox Russian as Governor-General to Riga, a position previously held most often by non-Russians of predominantly local German origins. However, Governor-General E. A. Golovin, a well-served soldier, had to face another representative of the imperial order - suffragan bishop Filaret who did all he could to support the converts. After Golovin was dismissed in 1848, Nicholas sent another Russian officer to Riga, A. A. Suvorov, who represented the European vision of the Empire. Suvorov served in Riga for more than 20 years despite a sharp conflict with Filaret right from the start. Only after Filaret was transferred to another church province, Suvorov displayed a pro-Orthodox agenda as well, without, however, insulting the Baltic Germans. First, he supported the initiative to make Riga and Mitau an independent diocese (erected in 1850). Second, he vigorously discriminated the Old-Believers in the Baltic provinces in order to bring them back home to the Orthodox Church. Thus, under Suvorov “Russification” began with forcefully integrating local Russians. It was precisely this traditional way of administering the Baltic provinces based on estate solidar - ity that provoked harsh criticism from another Russian key figure who happened to be a witness of the Baltic conversion movement. Iurii Samarin created a national Russian vision of the empire to be displayed in the Baltic provinces. However, in claiming Russian ethnos and religion to be the main objects of loyalty for every non-Russian subject, Samarin went too far not only for the Baltic German elite, but also for the Emperor who had him arrested accusing him of disobedience and creating ethnic hatred. The 1840s thus were a watershed precisely because of the estrangement of German and Russian elites, as outlined in the paper, caused by the issue of Estonian and Latvian converts.

Российские элиты в федеральном и региональном аспектах

Российские элиты в федеральном и региональном аспектах

Russian Modernization: Between the Need for New Players and the Fear of Losing Control of Rent Sources

This paper considers current contradictions in state–business relations in Russia. On one hand, the Russian political elite needs economic growth to keep social stability in the country and to limit mass protesting in big cities. Economic growth is impossible without investment, which explains Russian leaders’ increased interest in improving Russia's business climate. On the other hand, influential interest groups (represented first of all by security and law enforcement agencies) try to expand their control on rent sources in the economy. These groups of interests could strengthen their positions due to fear of political protests. This strong conflict among different groups in the Russian elite creates additional uncertainty for investors and the business community, and can lead to economic recession independent of the level of oil prices and dynamics of global markets. Reversing these negative trends in economic development will be possible only with collective actions of different economic and political actors (including technocrats in federal and regional governments, representatives of large and successful middle-sized business and top-managers of public sector organizations) in the search for pragmatic solutions to the challenges faced by Russian economy and society.

Electronic Resources and the Study of Political Elites in Russia

Developments in the information society in Russia have led to the creation of an abundance of online primary texts by political actors and institutions. This article surveys a large selection of official electronic texts with the aim of encouraging more extensive use of online sources and easing researchers' navigation of Russian politicians' use of the internet. While the authors do not claim that online data can replace the insights gained from elite interviews, the article suggests that online texts could be used more extensively as a valuable addition to existing methods applied to the study of Russian political elites.

Russian Vision of the EU in its Interactions with the Neighbourhood

Abstract This article analyses images of the European Union (EU) existing in the discourse of the Russian news media, the general public and the Russian elites. The EU’s actions in the countries of Russia’s “near neighbourhood” and “far neighbourhood” were among the leading topics, showing high interest in the intensive Russia-EU political relations. The data of this paper comes from a year of monitoring of three daily newspapers, face-to-face interviews with political, business, media and civil society representatives and a public opinion survey. This analysis observed that both partnership and competition exist in Russia-EU political relations.

MANIFESTATIONS OF ARCHAIZATION IN MODERN RUSSIAN POLITICAL REALITY

This article is devoted to up-to-date issue of archaization in modern political life. The author claims that “perestroika” has not changed the principles of society’s organization and has not facilitated formation of channels to provide participation of different social circles in political life, has not established real pluralism of opinions. During Reign of Putin course oriented to reinforcement of state control was implemented – over all spheres of social life. Availability of traditional values in consciousness of the Russians provides for keeping non-modern forms of political processes. The idea is emphasized that provincial town life conditions facilitated preservation of traditional society foundations. Another key reason of this phenomenon – merger of power, court system and law enforcement bodies on local and regional level. Subject of return to the past is, in the author’s opinion, Russian elite. One of characteristics of archaization is its imitational character. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12731/2218-7405-2013-10-2

Engaging the Russian Elite: Approaches, Methods and Ethics

This article discusses the strategies and country-specific challenges of conducting elite interviews overseas. Drawing on examples from fieldwork undertaken in the Russian Federation, it explores the ways in which the knowledge produced from such interviews is contingent on the analytical approaches selected; the researcher's time-specific entry into the field; issues of ethics; the contemporary political environment; and notions of insider/outsider. Undertaking elite interviews overseas places the researcher in a particularly intense and unique set of power relations with his or her research subjects. This provides both opportunities and challenges, which ultimately have the potential to elicit insights into the personal convictions and beliefs of the political and intellectual elite, as well as the contexts within which they operate.

A Trotskyist's Tale

Trotskyism has rarely achieved significant influence in labour movements: Bolivia, France, Sri Lanka, Vietnam are limited but typically ephemeral exceptions. Since it emerged from the Communist Party (CPGB) in 1932 Trotskyism has remained marginal to British politics. In the 1930s tiny, persecuted, mutually hostile groups of Trotskyists provided compelling critiques of Stalinism. Centred on revolutionary opposition to the ideology and practice of ‘socialism in one country’ and the consolidation of a ruling elite in Russia, such critiques were accessible to few and palatable to fewer on the British left, given the CPGB’s resources, its monopoly of Soviet Communism and its patent on ‘anti-fascism’. At the end of World War Two the unified Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) promised greater influence. By 1949 it had collapsed. It was only from the 1960s that British Trotskyism re-emerged in the context of the youth radicalization, trade-union militancy and, later, Labour Party entrism. Its brief florescence was facilitated by the weakness of Maoism and of autonomism, the belief that workers could force change through direct action without resorting to trade unions or political parties, which blossomed in other countries. Trotskyism became a small but visible and voluble aspect of the left in the shape of the Socialist Labour League/Workers Revolutionary Party; (SLL/WRP); the International Socialists/Socialist Workers’ Party (IS/SWP); the Revolutionary Socialist League/Militant; and more briefly, the International Marxist Group. The leaders of the biggest groups, Gerry Healy, Tony Cliff and Ted Grant, were veterans of the RCP and irreconcilably antagonistic. At their zenith none of these organizations enrolled more than 5,000 active members, and the numerous splinter groups considerably less. Prominence was purchased by hyperactivism; influence in the labour movement has always been restricted.

Putin’s Elite and the Legacies of Soviet Quasi-Modernisation in Contemporary Russia

In spite of its rich energy resources and strategic location, and in spite of the declared commitment to further liberal reforms by politi-cal leaders, Russia seems to be experiencing some transition and de-velopmental problems. Economic growth is uneven and relatively slow (compared with other BRICS and oil/gas exporters). The Russian state remains centralistic, controlling, corrupt and inert. Russian politics is undergoing a retrogressive ‘authoritarian turn’ accompanied by a tightening of control over the media. The political competition for the top political offices is so skewed, the opposition so restricted, and the mass media so constrained, that the Freedom House no longer classi-fies Russia as ‘free’ and ‘democratic’. State patronage, protectionism and the taxation burden remain high, corruption is endemic, access to financing is limited – all constraining Russia’s development and pre-venting the advanced modernisation of the state, economy and society. These developments in contemporary Russia are analysed and ex-plained as correlates of the outlooks, strategic goals and power inter-ests of the new Russian elite – Putin’s siloviki. The developmental problems of contemporary Russia are linked to the ‘Soviet legacies’ of socialist ‘quasi-modernisation’ revived by Putin’s siloviki in their at-tempt to consolidate power and stabilise politics by ‘restoring’ Rus-sia’s power and influence.

The regional approach in the policy of the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Estonia

This author uses regionalism as a theoretical framework for analyzing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Estonia. Regionalism is interpreted as a situation, when a political leader’s beliefs change depending on what region of the world is considered. Leaders of great powers often assume that, for example, small European countries are subject to a treatment different from that of small Middle Eastern countries. The method of operational coding is employed to identify the impact of the regional approach on the beliefs of political leaders. The author comes to the conclusion that Russia’s policy towards Estonia largely depends on Russia’s policy towards the regions which the Russian elite relate Estonia to — the Baltic States, Northern Europe, and Europe as a whole. The results of the study can further the understanding of Russia’s policy towards Estonia both in Russia and abroad. Lack of understanding sometimes results in sharing the views of radical Estonian politicians who claim that Russia’s policy towards Estonia is unpredictable and thus poses a threat to security and stability in Europe.

Региональный подход в политике Российской Федерации в отношении Эстонской Республики

This author uses regionalism as a theoretical framework for analyzing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Estonia. Regionalism is interpreted as a situation, when a political leader’s beliefs change depending on what region of the world is considered. Leaders of great powers often assume that, for example, small European countries are subject to a treatment different from that of small Middle Eastern countries. The method of operational coding is employed to identify the impact of the regional approach on the beliefs of political leaders. The author comes to the conclusion that Russia’s policy towards Estonia largely depends on Russia’s policy towards the regions which the Russian elite relate Estonia to — the Baltic States, Northern Europe, and Europe as a whole. The results of the study can further the understanding of Russia’s policy towards Estonia both in Russia and abroad. Lack of understanding sometimes results in sharing the views of radical Estonian politicians who claim that Russia’s policy towards Estonia is unpredictable and thus poses a threat to security and stability in Europe.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN TRADITION OF STATE POWER

ABSTRACTThe first part of this evolutionary study of the persistence of the autocratic/oligarchic variety of personal rule in Russia provides a historical overview, followed by two theories explaining why it persisted, interrupted by brief “times of troubles,” for over 500 years. Edward Keenan, on the one hand, hypothesizes successful long‐term adaptation to a demanding environment. Richard Hellie, on the other hand, develops a theory of service‐class revolutions and a cyclical pattern based on the methods of Russian elites for overcoming relative backwardness. Neither theory takes a neo‐Darwinian approach.The second part examines neo‐Darwinian evolutionary approaches. In the cosmic perspective of Big History, the human species in its relatively brief existence has had an accelerating impact on other species and the earth's environment. Biologists modeling complex systems come to a similar conclusion. Agent‐driven history, as modeled by demographer Noël Bonneuil, raises questions about the adequacy of the historian's traditional single‐trajectory narrative approach to “the time of human history” and also critiques the biases built into the mathematical models of many evolutionary thinkers. An evolutionary approach to human history does not restrict itself to organic replication, but takes into account populations of evolving human skills and also group projects that act as evolutionary forces as well as units of selection, and outlive generations of organic populations.The third part applies this approach to the Russian tradition of state power by showing how group projects operate as evolutionary forces in a variety of modern power systems. The “parable of the tribes” avers that the aggressive agent in any given power system—ideological, economic, social, military, or political—dictates the dynamics of the system. The “braided stream” approach shows, however sketchily here, how agent‐driven modern power systems interact, coevolve, and produce hybrid forms. The Russian tradition is highlighted in this evolutionary context.

Human Capital and the Post-Capitalist Ideology

The article analyzes the reasons for the lack of a coherent system of views with the Russian elite and society in the development of the country and its place in the modern international relations, the role of LFO in the socio-economic and political transformation of the country, the main features of the ideology that is capable of justify the strategy of Russia's entry into the globalized world.

Russian brain drain: Myths v. reality

The paper analyzes the scale and dynamics of the Russian brain drain, one of the most politicized and hotly debated aspects of the post-Soviet migration. The major issues under consideration include the durability of the intellectual migration flow, its structural characteristics, and territorial orientation.Relying on the Russian State Committee on Statistics data, the research indicates that the real scale of intellectual migration is significantly smaller than is usually expected, even though in some regions and particular fields of Basic Sciences, including Mathematics, Physics, Biology, and Chemistry, and a limited number of research centers, brain drain has indeed acquired a magnitude threatening the existence of the established academic schools. At the same time, huge disparities in terms of the ability of specialists from different branches of science to find adequate jobs abroad are evident. Many academic subfields, including Humanities and Social Sciences, and most of the Russian regions show extremely low levels of intellectual migration and engagement in the international academic exchanges. The result is the practical exclusion of many branches of science and the majority of the Russian regions from the international academic system.Hence the goal of the Russian policy should be not limiting the intellectual migration, but rather capitalizing on such of its positive aspects as the establishment of long term international academic contacts and the formation of the Russian elite diasporas abroad, actively engaged in cooperation with the RF academic institutions. Of special interest for the authors are the recent attempts by the RF leadership to encourage the return of the Russian academics. The authors conclude that a more effective policy could be based on the use of diverse forms of cooperation with the Russian academics abroad, both with or without their permanent relocation to the country, providing for the inclusion of the Russian science into the international academic networks.

The Representation of Ethnic Muslims in Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies

This article uses the data of the 2002 national census and a comprehensive dataset of the December 2003–March 2008 regional legislative elections in Russia to assess the levels of the representation of ethnic Muslims in the regional legislative assemblies. The study reveals that the overall pattern of the representation of ethnic Muslims in Russia's regional legislative assemblies is not monotonous. Ethnic Muslims are significantly overrepresented in those republics where they are ‘titular’ nationalities; they tend to be underrepresented in a group of regions with significant ethnic Muslim minorities; but as their share in the overall population goes down, the picture becomes more balanced, so that it would be fair to say that small Muslim minorities are quite well represented. The article explains the observed patterns with reference to the logic of non-politicization of cleavages shared by all types of regions. For the ruling elites of Muslim-majority republics, the preferred mode of operation is to keep the overrepresentation of Muslims as a characteristic of all political groups who can realistically claim access to power. For the predominantly Russian elites of regions with significant ethnic Muslim minorities, the non-politicization of cleavages is a way to make electoral appeals to wider general population. In the regions with small ethnic Muslim minorities, their entry into political arenas is conditional on individual or group alliances with locally dominant elite groups, without any articulation of ethnicity/religion cleavages whatsoever.

Discourse on democratisation by Russian and Chinese political elites

This article seeks to examine and compare the parameters of discourse of contemporary Russian and Chinese political elites regarding democracy. It focuses on the question of the extent to which Russian and Chinese political elites have acknowledged the validity of constructs of Western liberal democracy. I argue that democracy is conceived instrumentally as a means to economic modernisation. The central dilemma facing both leaderships has been how to adapt elements of the liberal democratic model, while ensuring the maintenance of vertical political controls.

Lack and jouissance in hegemonic discourse of identification with the state

This article shows how hegemonic discourses are sustained through the play of lack and jouissance. Lack refers to the symbolic limits of discourse and is both the condition of possibility and of impossibility of hegemony: while it vitiates the realization of a full identity, it at the same time keeps spurring the search for it. Jouissance describes the paradoxical satisfaction in dissatisfaction that subjects procure from this lack, from the failure to attain the enjoyment that hegemonic discourse promises. Looking at how organizations become enmeshed with the formation of state subjects, the article considers identification with the discourse of a strong Russia at a Russian elite university as an empirical illustration. This discourse becomes hegemonic in students’ identification not only because it proposes a comprehensive project that unifies a range of diverse signifiers and promises enjoyment, but also because it fails to provide a full symbolic suture and subjects are unable to obtain the promised enjoyment. This constant lack forms the basis for repeated acts of identification that strive to overcome it and provides a jouissance that keeps subjects attached to the illusory quest for real enjoyment—and thus to identification with a strong Russia.

Is Russia Out of Step with European Norms? Assessing Russia's Relationship to European Identity, Values and Norms Through the Issue of Self-Determination

This article examines the question of European identity in Russian foreign policy through the notion of European norms. By considering attitudes towards the death penalty, it identifies different strands of thought in the Russian elite, and argues that an assertive Europeanism is now dominant as Russia seeks to be an equal participant in the development of common norms. However, there is a tendency for Russia's ‘Europeanness’ to be questioned because of behaviour that is considered out of step with European Union standards. I argue that even in an area of significant controversy between Russia and other European states, self-determination for national minorities, there is potential for the delineation of common principles, but only as an inclusive process on the basis of consensus.