Russian Domination Research Articles

Russians in Kazakhstan and demographic change: imperial legacy and the Kazakh way of nation building

Today it can surely be said that the Kazakh government has come a long way in developing and supporting the Kazakh national identity, culture and language. These were suppressed and damaged during more than two centuries of Russian domination over the Kazakhs. Since independence, the ‘Russian problem’ in Kazakhstan has certainly defined Kazakh foreign and domestic policies. The cautious and astute policy of the Kazakh government is worthy of investigation, a task this paper takes up. After providing the historical background, the paper examines certain social, legal and demographic aspects of independent state‐ and nation‐building policies in Kazakhstan. In presenting and analysing the Kazakh national policy, this paper also examines the attitudes and criticisms of various Russian groups inside and outside Kazakhstan, both official and unofficial.

Vtoraia Kamchatskaia ekspeditsiia: Dokumenty, 1730-1733. Chast' 1: Morskie otriady by Natal'ia Okhotina-Lind Peter Ulf Møller (review)

Io8 SEER, 82, I, 2004 essentially from the standpoint of Moscow and St Petersburg.His previous work, especially his study of Russian-Kalmyk relations, equips him well for the task,and he has produced an outstandinglyclearand persuasivepictureof the changing relationshipsbetween the two sides. While Russian statehood, military power and ideological assertiveness evolved steadily through the Muscovite period, the tsarshad neverthelessto play a careful economic and diplomaticgame with theirsteppe counterparts.These were a rangeof groups and leaders for whom mobility, transhumance, raiding and internecine feuding were essential features of life, and who would ally with any local power (Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, Crimea, the Ottomans, the Cossacks, each other) according to convenience, clan dynamics or the quality of 'gifts' offered: often a matter of protection-racketeering raised to the level of diplomacy. Nor were steppe rulersalwayswilling or able to control theirown subjects.Muscovite policy-makersproved equally adroit and opportunisticin pursuing their own goals, within the constraints imposed by resource limitation, the changing local balance of power, and the size and topography of the region. Even in the eighteenth century, when Russian pre-eminence was unquestioned, Kalmyk, Kazakh or Nogai relations remained a major problem of policy for the Imperial government, posing questions of religion, settlement,bordersecurity,resourcedistributionand economic development. Khodarkovskyprovides a detailed chronological narrative(chapters3 and 4) of Russia's steppe relations, which conveys brilliantlythe depth of Mloscow's engagement in the world of steppe politics and the extent to which the Muscovite state well into the seventeenth century remained a steppe power. This is counterbalanced by insightful thematic discussion of the perennial issues involved: the 'sociology' of the frontier,the conflicting ideological and social assumptionsof thevariousparties,and the conceptualbasesand making of Russian policy once Russian dominance had been established in the Imperial period. His conclusion emphasizes the huge cost to Russia over the centuriesof defendingand controllingitsvolatile southernand easternfringes: not merely in direct terms of manpower and resource outlay, but also less directly through population loss (death, and abduction by slave-raiders), disruptionof tradeand agriculturalproduction, and settlementand economic growth foregone. It offers too a succinct summary of the nature of Russian borderexpansion and a briefcomparisonwith othercasesof empire-building. Altogether, this is an excellent studyof a vital dimension of Russia'shistorical evolution. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies ROGER BARTLETT University College London Okhotina-Lind, Natal'ia and Moller, Peter Ulf (eds). Vtoraia Kamchatskaia ekspeditsiia. Dokumenty, I730-I733. Chast' i. Morskie otriady. Istochnikipo istorii Sibiri i Aliaski iz rossiiskikh arkhivov, tom 4, i. Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, Moscow, 2001. 640 pp. Illustrations. Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Glossary.Indexes. Priceunknown. ONE of the most positive 'peace dividends'following the end of the Cold War has been enhanced scholarly collaboration between citizens of formerly REVIEWS o09 antagonisticstates.A remarkableinstance of this isprovidedby the ambitious publication project of which the volume under review forms part. A team of historians from Bonn, Halle, Leipzig, Aarhus, Moscow, St Petersburgand Novosibirsk under the general supervision of Wieland Hintzsche are publishing a huge range of archival materials from the Second Kamchatka Expedition. The books are issued both in Russian and in German. Previous volumes in the set (and I refer only to the German versions) include: W. Hintzsche, et al. (eds), GeorgWilhelmSteller.BriefeundDokumente, 1740 (Halle, 2000); W. Hintzsche (ed.), GeorgWilhelm Steller,StepanKraseninnikov, Johann Eberhard Fischer. Reisetagebuicher, 1735 bis1743 (Halle, 2000), andWieland Hintzsche, et al. (eds) GeorgWilhelm Steller.BriefeundDokumente, I739 (Halle, 2001). Hintzsche is based in the Franckesche Stiftungen zu Halle, previously associatedwith the Pietistwing of Lutheranism,whose risingfromthe ashesof the GDR was demonstratedby an importantinternationalconference held in I996 commemorating the 25oth anniversary of Steller's death. Steller had been a student at Halle between 173I and 1734. A lavishly illustrated publication produced on this occasion (Die Grosse Nordische Expedition. Georg 'ilhelmSteller(1709-I746).- Ein Lutheraner erforscht Sibirien undAlaksa,Gotha, I 996) provides a thorough and, I would say, indispensable background to the documentary series. The text of this large format 347-page volume is sprinkled with innumerable coloured illustrations initially concerning Steller's life in Halle and St Petersburg, but mainly depicting landscape paintings, maps, artefacts, facsimiles of travel journals, modern photographs of peoples, flora and fauna encountered during the Great Kamchatka Expedition. As a stand-alone item this would constitute a tremendous addition...

The Teaching of Foreign Languages in Cambodia: A Historical Perspective

The teaching of foreign languages in Cambodia is examined in the light of its recent history. The paper describes the French colonial period, beginning in 1863, the emergence of the independent state under King Sihanouk (1953–70), the Khmer Republic (1970–75) and Democratic Kampuchea (1975–79), during which the infamous mass killings took place, the period of Vietnamese and Russian dominance (1979–89), the new transitional State of Cambodia (1989–93), and the contemporary period. The status of foreign language teaching in Cambodia is described at each point in time. It has been useful to take a historical perspective in the first instance because Cambodians have great difficulty finding out about their past. In fact the compilation of a short written account of language teaching such as this, based on the remaining documents, can be very informative, given the destruction of documents that occurred in the reign of the Communist Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot and the execution of the educated classes. Given our interest in the teaching of foreign languages, it is essential to take a historical perspective in any case, since the causes of problems which are now faced by Cambodian teachers of English are so clearly rooted in the events of the recent past.

ALLEN J. FRANK, Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910, Islamic History and Civilization, Studies and Texts, 35 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001). Pp. 351. 110.00 cloth.

The historiography of Muslim communities under Russian domination, whether czarist Russian or Soviet Russian, has until now been presented with a strongly modernist and nationalist focus. The social context created by Islamic belief and the institutions to which it gave rise have rarely been studied except as a foil for the promotion of nationalist, Russocentric, or “modernist” ideologies. The present work is therefore an important corrective. It is a richly detailed analysis of several distinct yet connected communities located just to the east of the Volga River. The book focuses on an agricultural region marked by two north–south river basins, about twenty to thirty miles apart, and roughly parallel to the Volga, about 100 miles to the west. In particular, the work focuses on a group of villages along a major tributary (the Altata River) of one of the rivers, the Bol'shoi Uzen. In this area, Muslims were a distinct minority in the period covered by the study. The principal source for the study is a local history of these communities, the Tawārīkh-i Ālṭī Ātā, written in 1909 and 1910. Its authors were father and son, Muhammad Fatih and Muhammad al-Ilmini. Ilmin was a village in the township of Osinov Gai (also known as Iske Uzen) where the Altata River emptied into the Bol'shoi Uzen. Although the focus of the Tawārīkh-i Ālṭī Ātā is the township and four other villages in it, the al-Ilminis range over the whole watershed of the twin Bol'shoi and Malyi Uzen Rivers, thus including communities in three large administrative districts (uezdy)—Novouzensk, the Ural Cossack Horde, and the Kazakh Inner Horde—in all, an area of about 28,000 square miles located today in far western Kazakhstan.

U.S. Policy Toward the Caspian and Black Sea Region

The story of U.S. policy toward the countries on the Black and Caspian Seas is a brief one. Like other Soviet republics whose independent histories were interrupted by Russian (later Soviet) domination, the countries in the former Soviet south only regained their independence in the 1990s. During the Soviet era, Moscow’s control over its vast, eleven time-zone-sized territory was so complete that Washington’s Soviet policy barely acknowledged the diverse ethnic, cultural, political, and religious traditions of Caucasus and Central Asia, which are vastly different from those of Russia. Nor did the region’s mineral riches garner much U.S. interest, squeezed as they were under the thumb of Russian control, with a hostile Iran and an unstable Afghanistan to the south. The messy and abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union left behind a number of newly independent states with different political traditions. Some—like Armenia or Georgia—had proud histories dating back to the time of Christ. When they emerged from ruins of the old USSR, they already possessed all the attributes that make a territory a country: a history, folklore, intelligentsia and, in some cases, ready-made governments waiting in exile. Across the Caspian Sea, however, the picture was very different. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or Kyrgyzstan did not exist until being invented by Russian or Soviet planners. Unlike Central Europe or the western reaches of the former Soviet empire, no tradition of independent nationstates, at least along current borders, existed in Central Asia until the Russian arrival. The region’s proud city-states like Bukhara or Samarkand, which were centers of power, culture, and education in pre-Russian times, have been either destroyed or relegated to obscurity. The new borders drawn up by Russia’s imperial bureaucracy and later by Soviet planners were designed to divide more than unite. Entire ethnic groups were resettled or carved apart by borders and new ones were created, all in an attempt to create areas of permanent instability and thus guarantee the need for continued Russian or Soviet military and political presence. All this made creating a U.S. policy toward the former Soviet south a nightmarish task. Each state or group of states represented a bundle of different problems. The transition to independence was anything but smooth, with civil wars breaking out in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan. The United States not only faced the task of defining a coherent role for itself in the area, it also often struggled to simply keep up with the waves of violence that toppled governments

Postcolonial Transitions on the Southern Borders of the Former Soviet Union

As the Soviet Union dissolved into a new territorial reality, it released the doubly repressed histories of Tsarist and Soviet imperium. In the states to the south of the new Russian Federation, the post-soviet jostled with the postcolonial as nations were reinvented across a vast swathe from the Caucuses through Central Asia. In the process, the old Russian linguistic duality between Russki (the ethnic Russian) and Rossiiskii (the citizen of Russia) founds its echo in Russia itself — which encompasses over 20 million Muslims — and in the newly sovereign states — all with large Russian minorities and even larger Russian-speaking populations. For the Azeris, Uzbeks and Kazaks, the repositioning of nation against a recent past of Russian dominance was significantly more problematic. In Chechnya, formally in the Russian Federation, it has reached a cathartic war. The argument here uses international human rights instruments as a litmus test of this troubled recent history. The controversial concept of Eurasia — now resurgent in Russian politics — may not necessarily mean the reinscription of Russian domination, but seeks to offer an alternative to the Atlantic Empire.

Wessel's Complete Collection of the Compositions of Frederic Chopin: the history of a title-page

COPIES of Chopin's first editions were thought to be extremely rare until quite recently, but bibliographical research, particularly during the past 25 years, has encouraged a fundamental revision in our knowledge and understanding of these important sources. Although only a single copy of some prints has survived to this day, first editions of the vast majority of Chopin's compositions can readily be found in the collections of European and American libraries. It is well known that, in order to ensure maximum copyright protection, Chopin published his compositions simultaneously in France, England, and Germany or Austria. Before he settled in Paris in late 1831 some of his early works were published in Warsaw, which at that time was under Russian domination.

The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era

IN MARCH 2000 THE UKRAINIAN SECTION of the BBC broadcast a special programme devoted to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595-1657) and his historical legacy. A number of historians in Ukraine, Russia and Canada, as well as people on the streets of Kyiv, Moscow and Warsaw, were asked the same question: what did the name of Khmelnytsky mean to them? While in Warsaw the hetman's name was associated first and foremost with the Cossack rebellion of 1648, in Kyiv and Moscow his legacy was viewed almost exclusively through the prism of the 1654 Pereyaslav Agreement, which placed the Ukrainian Cossack state under the protection of the Muscovite tsar and initiated a long era of Russian domination in Ukraine.1 In Moscow Khmelnytsky was seen both by professional historians and by the 'man in the street' as the one who had brought Russia and Ukraine together by means of the Pereyaslav Agreement. A distinguished Russian historian, Gennadii Sanin, stated that he considered Khmelnytsky a great man, as he had not only united Russia and Ukraine but also conceived of a larger East European federation that would have included Moldavia, Wallachia and the Balkans as well.2 Khmelnytsky's Pereyaslav legacy was viewed from a different perspective in Kyiv. A woman interviewed by a BBC correspondent in the Ukrainian capital was not even sure whether Khmelnytsky could be considered a Ukrainian, as she believed that he was also claimed by the Russians. Other Kyivans interviewed for the programme strove to present the Pereyaslav episode in Khmelnytsky's career as an act forced upon him by unfavourable circumstances. One claimed that Khmelnytsky had been confronted with three choices-to accept the Turkish, Polish or Russian yoke-and had chosen the Russian one. The same opinion was expressed by another interviewee, who stated that Khmelnytsky's choice was the right one for his time. Similar ideas are to be encountered in the Ukrainian press, as well as in the writings of Ukrainian historians.3 Overall, despite a fair amount of sympathy for Khmelnytsky among these interviewees, his status as a national hero has been seriously shaken in independent Ukraine, first and foremost because of his role in bringing about the Russo-Ukrainian agreement at Pereyaslav. Why do scholars and ordinary people in Russia and Ukraine view the legacy of the Pereyaslav Agreement so differently? What accounts for these different approaches to

Change and stability with respect to attitudes and practices related to marriage in Ashkabat, Baku, and Ankara: Three Turkic cultures

Changes in practices and views related to marriage were investigated by conducting interviews with respondents of Turkic origin residing in the capitals of Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan: three Turkic cultures with different historical backgrounds. The results revealed that, with some exceptions, practices related to marriage demonstrated a trend toward modernity in all three samples. The most rapid and consistent pattern of transition was evidenced for the Ankara sample, the Ashkabat sample revealed both change and stability, whereas the Baku sample demonstrated the least amount of change with respect to practices related to marriage. Less change was evidenced for attitudes. The results were discussed with reference to historical events and value systems surrounding national identities of the respective cultures. It was argued that, in the case of Turkmenistan, symbols of the clan system were retained and changes were consistent with basic values of the Oguz family. In the case of Azerbaijan, relative gender equality and elaborate ceremonies involving the extended family were construed as attempts at preserving Turkish identity in the face of Russian domination. Lastly, it was argued that the official endorsement of Western‐style families, contact with the West, and rejection of Eastern ways for over a century in Turkey has resulted in the most consistent pattern of relationships between different indicators of the Western‐style family.

The sign of Babinski.

Dr Joseph Babinski. Illustration by Venita Jay, MD, FRCPC. F every student of medicine, the name Babinski immediately invokes the image of an upgoing toe. But the contributions of Joseph Francois Felix Babinski to neurology and neurosurgery were indeed more far-reaching—his legacy marked an exemplary chapter in Parisian medicine. Babinski was Jean Martin Charcot’s favorite pupil. While the turbulent political scene of the mid-19th century did not affect Charcot, who was busy establishing the world’s leading center of neurology in Paris, Babinski’s parents were violently uprooted from their native Poland when an uprising against the Russian domination failed. Babinski’s parents eventually settled in Paris, where they had 2 sons, Henri and Joseph. The brothers would remain inseparable to the end. Joseph Babinski (1857–1932) was brought up in modest circumstances in Paris. He studied medicine and graduated from the University of Paris in 1885. Prior to graduation, he was appointed an intern at the Hopitaux de Paris in 1879. Working under the famous neurologist Edme Vulpian aroused Babinski’s interest in neurology. He served as chef de clinique to Charcot at the Salpetriere. Babinski obtained his doctorate with a meticulous thesis on the topography of lesions and their correlation with symptomatology in multiple sclerosis. When Babinski appeared for the highly competitive examination of Professeur agrege, he was not deemed successful due to an unfortunate and regrettable estrangement between Charles Bouchard, who conducted the examinations, and Charcot. Bouchard passed one of his own students and eliminated Babinski, who was Charcot’s pupil. Thus Babinski, who was viewed by many as Charcot’s successor, could not take up an academic appointment at the university. Instead, he served as head of the neurological clinic of the Pitie hospital in Paris from 1890 to 1927. In one sense, being spared the burden of academia and hours of systematic teaching allowed Babinski to become one of Paris’ exemplary clinicians who could devote time to his 2 passions: clinical neurology and research. Before he devoted his life to neurology, Babinski excelled in general medicine. He made several noteworthy contributions in medicine, including work on typhoid fe-

The Sign of Babinski

Dr Joseph Babinski. Illustration by Venita Jay, MD, FRCPC. F every student of medicine, the name Babinski immediately invokes the image of an upgoing toe. But the contributions of Joseph Francois Felix Babinski to neurology and neurosurgery were indeed more far-reaching—his legacy marked an exemplary chapter in Parisian medicine. Babinski was Jean Martin Charcot’s favorite pupil. While the turbulent political scene of the mid-19th century did not affect Charcot, who was busy establishing the world’s leading center of neurology in Paris, Babinski’s parents were violently uprooted from their native Poland when an uprising against the Russian domination failed. Babinski’s parents eventually settled in Paris, where they had 2 sons, Henri and Joseph. The brothers would remain inseparable to the end. Joseph Babinski (1857–1932) was brought up in modest circumstances in Paris. He studied medicine and graduated from the University of Paris in 1885. Prior to graduation, he was appointed an intern at the Hopitaux de Paris in 1879. Working under the famous neurologist Edme Vulpian aroused Babinski’s interest in neurology. He served as chef de clinique to Charcot at the Salpetriere. Babinski obtained his doctorate with a meticulous thesis on the topography of lesions and their correlation with symptomatology in multiple sclerosis. When Babinski appeared for the highly competitive examination of Professeur agrege, he was not deemed successful due to an unfortunate and regrettable estrangement between Charles Bouchard, who conducted the examinations, and Charcot. Bouchard passed one of his own students and eliminated Babinski, who was Charcot’s pupil. Thus Babinski, who was viewed by many as Charcot’s successor, could not take up an academic appointment at the university. Instead, he served as head of the neurological clinic of the Pitie hospital in Paris from 1890 to 1927. In one sense, being spared the burden of academia and hours of systematic teaching allowed Babinski to become one of Paris’ exemplary clinicians who could devote time to his 2 passions: clinical neurology and research. Before he devoted his life to neurology, Babinski excelled in general medicine. He made several noteworthy contributions in medicine, including work on typhoid fe-

Armed Defiance and Biblical Appropriation: Assimilation and the Transformation of Mordvin Resistance, 1740–1810*

If until recently Western investigations of “the nationalities question” in Russia and the Soviet Union focused almost exclusively on the larger and more visible “nations” that enjoyed union-republic status in the Soviet period, scholars have now begun to devote more sustained collective attention to the history of smaller ethnic groups that received only “autonomous” units within the Russian republic itself. For many of these peoples, subjected to Russian imperial rule and cultural domination for the entirety of their modern history and endowed with fewer of the opportunities for national development available to titular nationalities in the union republics, the problem of maintaining their particularity and of articulating a vision of collective cohesion has been especially acute both historically and in more recent times. Yet the fact that some of these groups are now threatened with eventual disappearance as distinct linguistic and cultural communities should not blind us to the complex, contingent, and inherently messy nature of their assimilation. Indeed, close scrutiny reveals that the very processes of assimilation contain within themselves possibilities for the emergence of hybrid cultural configurations and the appropriation of dominant conceptions for the transformation of indigenous culture along new trajectories.

The Year 1905 and the Revival of Polish Culture Between the Neman and the Dnepr

1. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS: POLISH BORDERLANDS IN THE EAST AND THE POLICY OF RUSSIFICATION The revolution which in 1905 shook Russian Empire (including Polish territories under tsar's domination) has become today only a matter of historical interest. It refers almost exclusively to Congress Kingdom of Researchers rarely pay attention to events taking place in historical part of Poland which directly incorporated into Russia and has been called in traditional historiography Annexed Territories (Ziemie Zabrane). These are present territories of Lithuania, Belarus, most of Ukraine, some parts of Latvia, a small part of Poland and especially such towns as Wilno (Vilnius), Kyiv and also Minsk, Grodno (Hrodna), Kowno (Kaunas), Bialystok, Dyneburg (Daugavpils), Mohylow (Mahileu), and Vitebsk (Vitsebsk). Let us take no account of Kyiv, which seceded from Poland in seventeenth century, when Ukraine came entirely under Russian domination. Let us focus on territories of Lithuania and Belarus (the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in those days called Northwest Country (Severo-Zapadnyi Krai), which were annexed to Russia in three successive partitions of Poland in years 1772-1795. The awareness of their belonging to Poland still alive at beginning of twentieth century, not only amongst so-called enlightened groups. My elder friend..., Kazimierz Okulicz recollects, was riding a horse somewhere near Smolensk Gate in first decade of twentieth century. When they were going over a small bridge, coachman said, pointing his whip at stream running under bridge, vot tsiaper my praiikhali u Polshchu (Well, we've just arrived in Poland). Polshcha (Poland) a notion broader than Grand Duchy of Lithuania or Crown. In folk terminology, it meant Republic of Poland. Among ordinary people, remembrance of border between Russia and pre-partition Polish Republic* existed until twentieth century.1 Two hundred years ago area of Grand Duchy of Lithuania not on fringes of Poland. On contrary, it is here that geometrical centre of Polish Republic (rather, Polish-Lithuanian Republic), its centre of gravity, located. It is here that gentry made decisions concerning shape of Sarmatian culture, Lithuanian (and Ukrainian) literary movement that produced-as rebellion against Warsaw classicism-the greatest masterpieces of Polish Romanticism. It is not by accident that Adam Mickiewicz called Lithuania centrum polszczyzny (the centre of Polish culture). Yet, Grand Duchy of Lithuania played an active part in Polish culture much longer, until 1864, that is until failure of January 1861 Insurrection.2 Still, from 1834 to 1863 Vilnius fourth-ranked Polish publishing centre after Warsaw, Cracow and Lwow (L'viv).3 We don't have a full register of Russian repressions which after defeat of January Insurrection affected Lithuanian-Belarusian territory. Admittedly, tsarist authorities closed all Polish libraries during Insurrection (by order of 28 March 1863), and soon thereupon entirely banned Polish press, closing (21 March 1864) even Polish-Russian Kurier Wilenski (The Vilnius Daily Paper) and Polish theatres (27 October 1864), and forbade any Polish performances, including singing of Polish songs in public. A few months after final suppression of Insurrection, Investigating Commission of General Tsylov set up, which within fifteen months closed all Polish bookshops and publishing houses in Vilnius. Then on 22 December 1865 an order given which forbade purchase of land by the people of Polish origin in all five provinces (gubernii) on Lithuanian-Belarusian-Ukrainian territories (while Poles could purchase land freely in Russia). Finally, in February 1866 speaking Polish forbidden in public and soon information plates appeared with inscription govorit' po-pol'ski vospreshchaetsia (speaking Polish forbidden). …

Administration et politique en Finlande. D’une élite aristocratique à un réseau issu des classes moyennes

Bureaucracy and Politics in Finland : From an Aristocratic Elite to Middle Class Policy Network. Up until the end of the 19th century, the civil service was in the hands of an aristocratic elite. Russian domination, followed by independence, called the aristocratic privileges into question by introducing new criteria as regards qualifications for access to the civil service. This development has been characterised by the increase in overall cohesion of the civil service. Furthermore, the evolution of the economic climate has reduced politicians' margin for manoeuvre and the powers of bureaucracy have as a result been reinforced.

Conclusion: Does Nationalism matter?

Asking whether nationalism matters often strikes people in the real world as a typically academic quibble. Obviously, they feel, it does. It has not only outlasted communism; it helped to bring it down, insofar as resentment at Soviet (or, in fact, Russian) domination was one of the central motives for the rebellions that swept eastern and central Europe in the late 1980s. It continues to frustrate any tendency there might be in capitalism towards a truly world economy, as distinct from a system of interlinked national economies, one in which - moreover - the national interests of the richer countries tend to be aggressively in charge: 'globalisation' and 'internationalisation' arc not the same thing (Hirst and Thompson 1996). And nationalism of a particularly nasty sort continues to face minority peoples everywhere - Blacks and Asians in Britain, Turks in Germany, Hutus or Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi.

Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview. Edited by Edward Allworth. Durham, N.C. and London: Duke University Press, 1994. xiv, 647 pp. $68.50.

For centuries, been a leading civilization, an Islamic heartland, and a geographical link between West and East. After a long traditional history, it is now in a state of change. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, five newborn Asian states have emerged in place of the former Soviet and Afghanistan. Central Asia provides the most comprehensive survey of the history of the impact of Russian rule upon the political, economic, social, intellectual, and cultural life of this diverse region. Together, these essays convey a sense of the region's community as well as the divisive policies that have affected it for so long.Now in its third edition (it was first published in 1967 and revised in 1989), this new edition of Central has been updated to include a new preface, a revised and updated bibliography, and a final chapter that brings the book up to 1994 in considering the crucial problems that stem from a deprivation of sovereign, indigenous leadership over the past 130 years. This volume provides a broad and essential background for understanding what led up to the late twentieth-century configuration of Asia.

Transformational Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe and Schools of Public Administration

Two dimensions of changes in Central and Eastern European countries formerly dominated by the Soviet Union are considered here: (1) obstacles to transformations away from strong state domination and (2) contrasting approaches in public administration education to facilitate democratic development in these countries. Hungary, Moldova, and Poland are analyzed as examples. Varied images of the contemporary state are emerging among them, and their approaches to changes in public administration have differed. Old Obstacles to Successful Changes Four sets of obstacles to successful changes that stem from Communist-era and earlier theories and practices in Central and Eastern Europe constitute special challenges. These are (1) country/regional border strategies and multiculturalism, (2) smokestack/insulated organizational design as a control mechanism, (3) workplace connectedness and reciprocity, and (4) centralized control by the apparatus of a party elite. Country Border Strategies and Multiculturalism Following World War One, in efforts to cope with predatory state traditions, some nationalities were divided among political jurisdictions (newly aligned countries, not nations in a sense of nationality identifications). The breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the limitation of German power were among the principal purposes. Within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia used a similar strategy (along with population transfers) so that, if republics sought independence, each would be subject to its neighbors' territorial claims. Among Eastern Bloc countries after World War Two, this strategy also served Russian purposes. Throughout the region, it was reinforced by Marxist theory that nationalism was an ephemeral byproduct of capitalism. Today, each of the countries studied here is in search of a new definition as a state. All are more-or-less troubled by discrepant boundaries among political jurisdictions and nationalities living within and outside them. None presently experiences anything like the struggles that plague the former Yugoslavia, where combatants cling to old ethnic and strong-state ideologies. Two face major problems of nationalism and multiculturalism, however. Out of these challenges, different state images are emerging. Hungary and its neighbors are the more widely known examples. There, a successful search for a new image of the state was disclosed in 1995 movements toward ethnic comity with Slovakia and Romania. When Russian domination ended, countries neighboring Hungary expressed concerns that Magyar minorities (2 million in Romania, 400,000 in Serbia, and nearly 600,000 in Slovakia) wanted reannexation of the lands where they live back to Hungary, from which the Treaty of Trianon separated them in 1920. Hungary regularly disavowed ambitions for expansion of political boundaries, but it did assert some responsibility for Hungarian minorities in other countries, and it demonstrated interest in cultivating Magyar as well as broadly shared European cultures, along with regional economic and social development. In short, political boundaries became less important than culture and commerce, and Hungarian public administrators helped to facilitate these interests.(1) In Moldova, political and public administration challenges arising from boundary and multicultural/nationalist conflicts are more grave. Moldova announced its independence from the former Soviet Union and proclaimed its sovereignty on August 17, 1991. It also communicated intentions to pursue constitutional democracy, a market economy, and a Western international orientation. Moldova's location, surrounded on three sides by the Ukraine and on the west by Romania, gave it regional importance, but that became secondary to American decisions to support Russia and to deal with Moldova for assistance purposes as one minor part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), even though the new republic strongly resisted pressures to join the CIS. …

Toward an Explanation of Church Opposition to Authoritarian Regimes: Religio-Oppositional Subcultures in Poland and Catalonia

Drawing on data from Poland and Spanish Catalonia, this article introduces the concept of a subculture. This is a concept that responds to two unanswered questions in current theories of opposition and resistance. First, why is the church so active in opposition movements against authoritarian regimes? Second, how is it that after decades of state repression, certain oppositions demonstrate startling continuity with themes of the past? A religio-oppositional subculture refers specifically to the merger of oppositional sentiments with religious symbolism, practice and organization. Also typical is a strong nationalist orientation. The primary locus of these subcultures is in the family, where primary socialization passes these values to new generations. Socialization in the subculture is continued in schools and secondary organizations run by the church. I feel that this concept can be advantageously applied to the emergent national oppositions to Russian domination and to the presence of the long-repressed national churches in those movements.

The German Withdrawal from Greece in 1944 and British Naval "Inactivity"

>J The German Withdrawal from Greece in 1944 and British Naval "Inactivity Lars Baerentzen Introduction During the spring of 1944, when it became clear that the German occupation of south-east Europe would soon come to an end, the old struggle between Great Britain and Russia for influence in the Balkans again came to the surface. British fears that the German withdrawal would be followed by Soviet control over the whole of the Balkans were well-founded. Any major Anglo-American operation in this area had been ruled out, and the proximity of the Red Army was matched by the predominance of Communist influence among the guerrillas in both Yugoslavia and Greece. There were also signs of Russian determination to control events in Bulgaria and Rumania. In April and May 1944 the British Government decided that it would make every effort to retain British influence at least in Greece. The deal between Britain and Russia, which resulted after months of negotiations, is today well-known as the "Percentages Agreement." It gave Britain the predominant influence in Greece in return for a British acceptance of Russian dominance in the rest of the Balkans. This, however, was never a formal agreement, and in spite of Russian assurances that no Russian forces would be sent into Greece, the British Government continued to worry about Russian intentions, especially before the famous meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow on 9 October, when the "Percentages" were actually jotted down (Barker, 1976). This meeting took place a full six weeks after the German withdrawal from Greece had begun and a mere three days before the Germans left Athens. By this time, the elaborate British plans to ensure the return to Greece of a non-Communist Government were already being executed. 237 238 Lars Baerentzen It has been claimed, most authoritatively by Albert Speer in his memoirs from 1969, that the British, in their anxiety to forestall the Russians in Greece, made a secret deal with the Germans by which the Germans were allowed to withdraw their troops virtually unmolested from the Greek islands. Speer wrote that "in some cases, the German vessels passed within visual range of British naval units. As a quid pro quo, the German side had agreed to use these troops to hold Salonika against the Russians until the city could be taken over by British forces."1 This story is sometimes accepted at face value especially by historians eager to demonstrate the cynicism of British policy in Greece (Richter 1973: 485). Others have dismissed it as propaganda originating in a German attempt to drive a wedge between the Allies.1A It has been pointed out that "lenient treatment" of the German transports would have required specific orders to the British forces, and that no trace of such orders has ever been found (Woodhouse 1982a: 225-236). It is a fact, however, that for a brief period the German withdrawal was much more undisturbed than the Germans had dared to hope. It is also a fact that there were secret contacts between British and German agents in Greece in the period just before and during the German withdrawal. Reliable evidence shows that both sides for a time toyed with the idea of making some sort of deal, but it also shows that the two sides had very different objects in view: the Germans were hoping to extricate their forces more easily from Greece, and the British were interested in making them stay and surrender when the British arrived. It is not at all clear whether—or how— these secret contacts had anything to do with naval operations in the Aegean. In this paper I shall present an analysis of events in Greece during the German withdrawal and in particular of naval operations in the Aegean from mid-August to mid-September 1944. I shall argue that there is no evidence for deliberate lenient treatment of the Germans by the British forces at any time, and that some German officers ' possibly sincere belief in the existence of a secret agreement with the British was mistaken. But it is equally clear that the British military actions in Greece during this period were determined primarily by...

Federalism and Segmented Communication in the USSR

Federalism in Soviet state structure, granting nominal equality in political rights to major nationality groups residing in defined ethnoterritories, perserves to some extent, the cultural identity of communities defined by common national or religious heritage. Centralism in party ideological work seeks to integrate a heterogeneous population by inculcating loyalty to a transcendent Soviet identity and to prevent mobilization along nationality (or other) social cleavages. Party personnel policy gives mobility opportunities to national elites within, but rarely across, national republics, while reinforcing Moscow's domination of party and government relations with individual republics. All publicly disseminated information is subject to party ideological controls, but communications channels based in federal ethnoterritories, using native-language media, foreign radio broadcasts, and word-of-mouth channels tend to strengthen the identity of nationality and religious groups. Religious ties and contacts with members of the nationality abroad also counteract ideological centralization. However, segmented communication helps in turn to reinforce political centralism and Russian dominance.