Russian Cyber Research Articles

Ukraine's Strategy to Counter Russian Cyber Threats in the Russo–Ukrainian War

This study investigates the cyber threats that Russia poses to Ukraine and examines the strategies that Ukraine employs in response. The Russian cyber operations are believed to have started covertly before the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022. These operations peaked when Russia targeted the Kyiv Post news agency and the KA-SAT satellite, resulting in significant communication disruptions and power outages within Ukraine, which affected both the government and society. The research utilizes theories of security strategy, cyber threats, and cybersecurity strategy to analyze the cyber tactics used during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Employing qualitative methods and case study models, the study describes Russia's cyber operations that threaten Ukraine’s security, as well as Ukraine's responses to these threats. The operations included information manipulation and attacks on critical infrastructure. Findings reveal that the Ukrainian government implemented several effective strategies, such as establishing legal frameworks, creating cybersecurity agencies, and collaborating with the United States. These measures have proven successful in countering Russian cyber-attacks. Through its partnership with the U.S., Ukraine’s rapid response team (CERT) was able to recover systems that had been targeted, thereby enhancing Ukraine’s cyber resilience against Russian threats.

Russian Cyber Onslaught Was Blunted by Ukrainian Cyber Resilience, Not Merely Security

Russian Cyber Onslaught Was Blunted by Ukrainian Cyber Resilience, Not Merely Security

The Role of Russian Cyber Operations in The Russian–Ukraine War in Achieving Russia's Strategic Objectives

The Role of Russian Cyber Operations in The Russian–Ukraine War in Achieving Russia's Strategic Objectives

Offensive Cyber Operations and State Power: Lessons from Russia in Ukraine

Offensive cyber operations are an increasingly important tool of authoritarian statecraft, used in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives and functioning as an expression of state power. Our article informs Canadian cybersecurity policy by pulling lessons from Russia's use of cyber aggression against Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. Our analysis explores the nexus between Russian cyber operations and foreign and domestic policy, the relationship between private and public cybersecurity organizations, and the purported intent and effectiveness of Russian cyber operations.

Aircraft vulnerability to politically motivated Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) in Eastern Europe

Countries in Europe have experienced radio frequency interference from Russian electronic warfare units, affecting navigation systems without discrimination. Interference has been identified as coming from the Russian mainland, Kaliningrad, and in the areas where it is engaged in conflicts abroad, creating serious hazards for aircraft. Previous research has identified the technical vulnerabilities to aviation from radio frequency interference, but it has yet to be contextualised in light of the ongoing geopolitical tensions. Using literature review analysis, the aim of the article is to place the jamming and spoofing threat in the context of ongoing political tensions between Russia and the region and to establish worse-case scenarios based on the former’s motives. Focusing on the threats to aircraft, it finds that the likely motivations are to (1) complement political narratives of Western aggression; (2) to deny service for intimidation, harassment, economic loss, and to portray a dominant Russian cyber influence; and (3) to use spoofing to enable hostage diplomacy via the seizure of people and assets. It argues that reporting mechanisms for aviation risks assumes geographical staticism, which does not correspond adequately to the threat. It also creates arbitrary “predictability” in otherwise unpredictable environments, which could ultimately affect vigilance and due diligence in the areas not considered problematic.

АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ РАЗВИТИЯ КИБЕРБЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ

The article examines the issues of cyber security and its growing importance both in the world and in Russia. Based on cross-country ratings and indices, Russia’s international position is determined and the country’s limitations in the field of cyber security are specified. The key indicators are analyzed to identify the prospects and weaknesses in the development of the Russian cyber security market. Special attention is paid to the dual role of digital technologies in ensuring cyber security.

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict from 2014 to 2023 and the Significance of a Strategic Victory in Cyberspace

The article explores Russian engagement in cyberspace during the conflict with Ukraine. Many experts have been surprised not only by the lack of coordination between offensive military operations in cyberspace and other domains, but also by the absence of significant cyberattacks. The central argument revolves around the perceived inadequacy of Russian capabilities. However, the authors contend that such an assessment is flawed and stems from the imposition of Western expectations onto a non-Western actor. They argue that the Russians’ employment of cyberspace not only aligns with their strategic culture but also represents a continuation of their utilisation of cyber as a tool for disinformation, which was previously observed during the war with Georgia in 2008 and the initial phase of the conflict with Ukraine in 2014. The aim of the article is threefold. Firstly, it discusses the Western strategic discourse regarding the potential use of cyberspace in warfare. In contrast to the position of Western experts, the second part of the article presents the Russian approach. The third section describes how the application of Russian cyber warfare concepts has played out in practice during the conflict in Ukraine.

Russian Active Measures in Cyberspace through the Lens of Security Sectors

This article examines Russian active measures in cyberspace, focusing on the implications for across security sectors. Initially, the study contextualizes the increasing reliance on cyberspace for conducting subversive activities that target military, political, societal, and economic structures, particularly after the Ukrainian Euromaidan in 2013. Utilizing a qualitative analysis of open-source data, the research identifies the diverse tactics employed by Russian actors, including sophisticated use of code and content to manipulate public perception and governmental processes. Key findings reveal that while activities in the military and political sectors are characterized by a high degree of technological sophistication, societal sectors predominantly face threats from disinformation campaigns. Notably, no significant cyber active measures were detected within the environmental sector. The study concludes that Russian cyber tactics are deeply embedded in their broader geopolitical strategy, necessitating robust countermeasures. Enhanced cybersecurity policies and international cooperation are recommended to bolster resilience against such foreign malign influences.

Spreading Lies Through the Cyber Domain

The expansion of Information Operations (IO) over the past ten years has allowed individuals and groups to increase their sphere of influence on a global scale. Nation-state cyber threat actors have increased their presence on social media, building out false personas to influence large populations. This type of activity is difficult to stop due to the availability of social networks on the internet and the ease of creating false personas that can’t be directly attributed to the actor. IO activity has been observed with the Russian cyber activity during the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections and from Russian social media campaigns provoking extremist groups and attempting to cause physical harm, such as the 2017 campaign on Facebook to start a rally and a simultaneous counter rally in front of the Islamic Da’wah Centre of Houston. Although Russia has been observed leveraging this capability, they are not the only global actor in the cyber domain taking advantage of IO. Global threat actors have leveraged social media platforms and blogs to influence the global population and spread propaganda. This type of activity has been seen within traditional warfare using propaganda techniques. With the introduction of the cyber domain into warfare, there is an increased ability to communicate not only to one population but to the global community with the intent to manipulate the masses using IO. This paper examines the Cybersecurity Operations (CO) that have been observed utilizing IO and the psychological impacts they have had in successful campaigns against the United States. This paper argues that with increased influence capabilities in the cyber domain, individuals and groups will continue using IO to support tactical and strategic objectives. Through the available literature, this paper examines the impacts that IO has had on the United States through attempts to manipulate elections and create divides in the nation over the last ten years. This paper leverages the psychology of group processes to analyze the literature involving social media campaigns and the influencing of groups through the lens of social identity theory to provide new insight into mitigating and countering IO.

Russia’s Hybrid Interference Campaigns in France, Germany and the UK: A Challenge against Trust in Liberal Democracies?

ABSTRACT This article examines the Russian government’s use of the cyber and information domains as arenas to challenge liberal democracies. Previous studies have examined the technical or military-strategic aspects of Russian cyber activity or (dis)information. This article builds on these efforts and extends the scope of analysis to examine the socio-political challenges of Russian ‘hybrid interference’ for liberal Western democracies such as France, Germany and the UK. Our case studies highlight Russia’s growing use of cyber operations combined with (dis)information to foment or exacerbate tensions between government and society and/or among different societal groups. Our findings suggest that while Russia utilises hybrid interference to create or augment inter-societal turbulence in the short-term, the longer-term effect might serve to erode horizontal and vertical trust in such societies.

The threat from Russia continues to loom large

As the threat from cyber attacks originating from Russia continues to grow, every nation must remain vigilant and learn to adapt and respond quickly to the evolving strategies of Russian cyber attackers.

Russian cyber operations: coding the boundaries of conflict

Russian cyber operations: coding the boundaries of conflict

Looking Back at the Gouzenko Defection

A historical perspective aids our understanding of the present and capacity to anticipate the future. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but particularly its brutality and policy of “constructive destruction,” was shocking and unexpected, but faced with Russia’s relegation from superpower status, it was always a possibility that Putin would emulate Stalin’s determination to maintain Russian influence in the world and challenge the West’s dominance. The risk of recurrent totalitarianism borne of the fear, distrust, and mutual demonization which characterized the ideological rivalry of the early Cold War years has led to a search for historical analogies of relevance to the growing East/West tensions of today that threaten to bring about a second Cold War or limited nuclear conflict. The motivating ideology for Russian expansionism is no longer Communism, but a mythical narrative that promotes Russian nationalism, patriotism, and exceptionalism. Putin’s authoritarian state with its concentration of power and recourse to propaganda, disinformation, and lies is daily looking more Stalinesque and the Cold War question—how to contain Russian ambition—remains to be answered. While the focus has so far been on Stalin’s geopolitical strategy regarding Russia’s near neighbors, two books about the first post–World War II defection in 1945 merit re-visiting for the in-depth analysis and insights they provide into the period and the mindset of participants caught up in that affair. The defector, Igor Gouzenko, a Russian cyber clerk, insisted that Russia was preparing for a Third World War. His revelations precipitated the start of the Cold War.

Model for State Cyber Power: Case Study of Russian Behaviour

The emerging cyber environment with new information channels provides a novel avenue for states to project their powers to govern their residents and fulfil their international ambitions. The recent manipulation of elections, coercing companies, blackmailing citizens, and suppressing essential infrastructure services reflects an increased activity and development both by state and non-state entities in the cyber environment. Several models for inter-state power projection are created in studies of international relationships, military strategy, and, recently, hybrid warfare. Do these models recognise the foundational transformation in international power projection? Do they explain the current national cyber strategies? Can they help foresee the possible developments of power projection in international confrontations? The paper seeks a bigger picture from other power strategies in fulfilling the state’s political ambitions. Furthermore, the paper explores the evolution of the cyber environment and its possible emerging features for international power projection. A constructive research method builds a multiple domain power projection model by combining systems thinking with various models from international relationships, military strategies, business strategies to classical decision making. Finally, the feasibility of the model is tested in a case study of Russian cyber strategies and actions between 2007-2020 from a positivistic approach. As a result, the model seems to help explain the past cyber power-wielding and provide insights into current national cyber policies. Further testing is required to evaluate the model’s feasibility in creating a foresight. Nevertheless, the proposed state-level cyber power projection model extends the existing models with a system dynamics viewpoint. Additionally, it adds the dimension of evolution to consider the future changes of international power projections in the information realm. Hence, the model improves the ability of national defence planners to study cyber strategies and estimate the lines of operation and impact of cyber operations.

Geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine War and Russian Cyber Attacks on Ukraine-Georgia and Expected Threats

Article Open Access by Alika Guchua1, Thornike Zedelashvili2 and Gela Giorgadze3 1 Caucasus International University (Tbilisi, Georgia) 2 Caucasus International University (Tbilisi, Georgia) 3 Caucasus International University (Tbilisi, Georgia) DOI: https://doi.org/10.29202/up/10/4 Received: 03 May 2022 / Accepted: 19 May 2022 / Published: 20 June 2022 View Full-Text Review Reports Cite This Paper Abstract The Russia-Ukraine … Читать далее Geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine War and Russian Cyber Attacks on Ukraine-Georgia and Expected Threats

RUSSIA: THE CYBER GLOBAL PROTAGONIST

Russia has discovered by trial and error one of the most economical ways to assert foreign policy goals, conduct espionage, inflict economic loss, and conduct destabilization through disinformation on its rival powers. Although western and European cyber efforts in this regard are more covert and protected by legislation such as Official Secrets Act’s, it’s apparent that Russia has – more than any other nation – publicly engaged in cyber operations in direct support of military operations. For the Russians, cyber is a Hammer (& Sickle) and everything standing in Russia’s way is a “Nail”. The transformation of traditional Russian organized crime into sophisticated cyber-criminal gangs and their subsequent rapid accumulation of wealth deeply illustrated the potential of political and later in the evolution military cyber operations. In a very real way this set the stage for the Russians to invest, explore and trial cyber at a political and then military level over the past two decades. Due to a “cosy” relationship between Russian politicians, Oligarchs, and some - but not all - cyber-criminal groups there was a large talent pool of offensive cyber skills to leverage in Russia. Russian military and political cyber operations are both overt and covert and are very intertwined. They include some of the most sophisticated espionage campaigns ever discovered to globally destructive cyber-attacks. More recently, the information security research community has observed precision and persistent capabilities unleashed on unsuspecting organizations. This paper charts a course of Russian cyber capability development and explores the application of those cyber capabilities in both a strategic policy level to application on a tactical battlefield.

In the vanguard of Russian cyber diplomacy

In the vanguard of Russian cyber diplomacy

استخدام روسيا للقوة السيبرانية في إدارة تفاعلاتها الدولية

القوة السيبرانية | روسيا | الثورة التكنولوجية | الفضاء السيبرانى | هجمات إلكترونية | الإستراتيجية الروسية السيبرانية | Cyber Power | Russia | Technological Revolution | Cyberspace| Cyber Attacks | Russian Cyber Strategy

Book Review [The Shadow War: Inside Russia’s and China’s Secret Operations to Defeat America

This is a book review of the book by Jim Sciutto (2019), Inside Russia’s and China’s Secret Operations to Defeat America, Harper Published by - Harper (2019) Format - Paperback ISBN - 978-0-06-285366-0. 320 pages Reviewed by John Battersby This book includes chapters on the Russian cyber attack on Estonia in 2007, Chinese HUMINT operations in the US which extracted key intelligence on US military hardware, Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine, China’s construction of island bases in the South China Sea and the use of military and non-military intimidation tactics to assert effective sovereignty over territory and sea space other countries claim, the weaponisation of space, the 2016 US election hacks as well as submarine operations involving the US, Russia and China. The book concludes with a summary of the author’s views on the state of the ‘shadow war’, and what the US (and the West) need to do about it.

Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict

Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict