<p>There are two conceptual terms that this paper will try to expose. The first is analogy (<em>qiyâs</em>) and the second is <em>istihsân</em>, an analogy—like method of extrapolating jurisprudential rules. The paper will try to speak of their relationship in the light of al-Sarakhsî’s rationality. In the field of Islamic jurisprudence, the two concepts are often seen as contradicting to one another. The Shafi’ite jurists are even of belief that using <em>istihsân </em>is legally forbidden for that would contradict the general rules of Islamic law. The paper assumes that despite general view of the jurists that <em>istihsân </em>is an equivocal method it can nonetheless be fitted into <em>qiyâs. </em>To show that however, the paper would inevitably re-define both <em>qiyâs </em>and <em>istihsân </em>as proposed by al-Sarakhsî. By exploiting the ideas of al-Sarakhsî, the paper hopes that new lights may be shed as far as the richness of Islamic method in</p>jurisprudence is concerned.
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