Rose Revolution Research Articles

Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. By Jonathan Wheatley. Post-Soviet Politics. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005. ix, 252 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. Maps. $99.95, hard bound.

Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. By Jonathan Wheatley. Post-Soviet Politics. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005. ix, 252 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. Maps. $99.95, hard bound. - Volume 66 Issue 3

Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awaking to Rose Revolution

Il y a tres peu de monographies consacrees a la Georgie postsovietique. Cet ouvrage vient donc combler une lacune evidente, d’autant plus qu’axe sur les questions de politique interieure, il tranche avec les quelques etudes existantes generalement orientees vers les questions de securite. Un premier chapitre introductif fixe les objectifs et le cadre theorique : en s’appuyant sur les theories de la transition et de la democratisation, il s’agit d’evaluer le changement de regime dans ce qui es...

Budgeting in Georgia

Following the Rose Revolution of November 2003, the government of Georgia has undertaken large reform initiatives in the area of fiscal policy. These efforts have focused on taxation, tax administration, and the budget process, including cash and debt management. A new budget system law became effective in January 2004, establishing a comprehensive framework for the functions and responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and the spending agencies via a two-stage prioritisation process guided by the annual Basic Data and Directions document.

THE ABKHAZIAN–GEORGIAN CONFLICT AND THE ISSUE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

In November 2003, mass protests against electoral fraud toppled Eduard Shevardnadze's government in Georgia leading to the inauguration of a new generation of politicians, most having little memory of the Soviet past and a Western education. International mass media transmitted the images of victorious masses in this bloodless coup known as the ‘Rose Revolution’. The future president of Georgia, 36-year-old Mikheil Saakashvili, announced the arrival of a new era in Georgian history, pledging to establish the rule of law, boost the country's democratic credentials, and restore Georgia's sovereignty over the country's entire territory. The population showed euphoric confidence in his ability to fulfil these promises. Coups and the ousting of a government was not a new phenomenon for the South Caucasian republic. Power succession in Georgia usually involved turbulence, unlike the peaceful pattern found in neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia. Still, this ‘revolution’ was considered to be something very special, and many expectations, locally and internationally, were connected to it. Evidently, it was not the format of change that was so important, but rather the symbolic meaning ascribed to it, and the indication that a new revolutionary wave had evolved that would drastically change the geopolitical map of Eurasia. The Caucasus and Georgia have become the most dynamic and contentious areas, where many seeds of the future regional order have taken root. Ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts played and continue to play a decisive role in this process. Since the end of the 1980s, ethno-territorial conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become the most conspicuous aspect of Georgia's new political reality, damaging stability, developmental prospects and economic self-sufficiency. A particularly sensitive issue is that of Abkhazia, due mainly to an immense number of forced migrants, ethnic Georgians who greatly outnumbered the Abkhazians prior to the conflict but are now displaced, living with the hope of returning to their homes in Abkhazia. However, the constellation of a number of factors makes it less probable that this conflict will be resolved any time soon.

Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution

Success for Georgia's nascent democracy would be a major success for the democracy-promotion efforts of the United States, which has hailed the democratization there since the Rose Revolution as a success even as concerns have been voiced by some observers regarding the pace and direction of this effort. The U.S. policy of unconditional support for Georgia's government and its disinterest in drawing attention to the new government's democratization shortcomings call into question how serious the United States is about democracy-promotion, particularly in countries that have a semi-democratic but pro-American government. A U.S. approach to Georgia that recognizes the challenges there and seeks to help it solve these problems will demonstrate that America is sincere in its desire to promote democracy, not just to support friendly governments.

The Political Economy of Georgia's Rose Revolution

The Rose Revolution opened a new chapter in the history of modern Georgia. The post-revolution government achieved a number of successes in areas such as dramatically increasing state budget revenues, fighting corruption, and setting up effective cooperative relationships with the international financial institutions. But it made some mistakes, too, in building a democratic state in general and in its economic policy in particular. Its relationship with Russia and its excessive exposure to Russian investments is particularly troubling. The country's policies need to be fine-tuned in order to protect its democracy and promote further economic growth.

Book Note: Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution

Book Note: Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution

The Role of Georgia’s Media—and Western Aid—in the Rose Revolution

The Role of Georgia’s Media—and Western Aid—in the Rose Revolution

The Rose Revolution: A Revolution without Revolutionaries?

In this investigation of the sources of the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003 and presentation of the challenges the new leadership faces, the author argues that there are four contexts to the Georgian revolutionary events of 2003: first, a popular and romantic yearning among Georgians for union with Europe; second, the dismal failings of the Shevardnadze regime; third, the combined impact of global economic models and Westernisation in Georgia; and, fourth, the Soviet legacy. The role of civil society organisations, though important, was not vital to the success of the Rose Revolution. The manner in which the new leadership has tackled state-building challenges suggests the pro-Western revolution is still in a radical phase, with the imperative of state consolidation often overriding Western models of due process and democratic governance. The direction of the revolution – toward greater liberalism or radical populism – will have a major impact on regional politics and on the policies of both the US and the EU in the region.

“Democratic Revolution in Colors”: Ukraine through the Prism the 2006 Parliamentary Election

This article analyzed the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The “Orange Revolution” is widely understood by the western media and countries as a part of political, democratic changes in the former Soviet Union, and also very often called or mentioned as a “Democratic Revolution.” The author has a different opinion and a strong feeling of uneasiness to call it as a “Democratic Revolution.”However it is rather difficult to explain those changes such as The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgys (2005), as simply a coincidental happening. There should be some explanation of similarities and should be a comparative analysis.From this point of view the author picked up the general election in Ukraine which was held in March, 2006, and made an analysis of political changes in Ukraine as a whole.The result of the analysis showed the following: 1) The most of the people in Ukraine have now a feeling of the disillusion by the “Orange Revolution.” 2) The political confrontation in the “Orange Revolution” were based on the geopolitical different direction of the West and the East. This confrontational pattern has not changed so much before and after the revolution. 3) The direction of the West and the East are completely opposite, and almost impossible to compromise. The Ukrainian society is divided by the West and the East, and the power balance is very narrow and full of the tension. 4) However the new element of political changes is now emerging within the Ukrainian society. Especially the economical changes based on the development of the market economy are now becoming more important for the Ukrainian politics, and should not be ignored.After the election in March, 2006, the former “Orange Revolution” coalition forces tried to establish a new government, but failed. Instead, the opposition pro-Russian forces with the leader of Mr. Jankovich, have succeeded to form a new government. This outcome can be also explained by the economical changes in Ukraine.After the collapse of Soviet Union the so-called socialism system were broken down one by one, but all the former socialist countries had same (or similar) problems and difficulties. Behind those problems and difficulties you can find out always the friction among the society because of the introduction of market economy. In this context it may be possible to find out the logics and rules of political changes in postsocialist countries based on the analysis of the economic developments. The author has a hypothesis that behind the “Color-Democratic” revolution the economic factor, especially the development of market economy has played a very important role.

Georgia as a Laboratory for Democracy

For a country of such modest size, Georgia has recently been at the center of considerable international attention. One major reason for this is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a project initiated in the 1990s during the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze. This pipeline is essentially complete and will soon transport a million barrels of oil per day to the West without going through Russia, Iran, or the Bosporus Straits. It is so important for the region that analysts assert that it reconfigures the mental map with which political observers and decision-makers look at the world.1Equally important for the future of Georgia, however, is the Rose Revolution of 2003 and the events that have unfolded in its wake. The revolution was an important step in creating one of the most important laboratories for democracy in the world today, and it provides a context in which political, cultural, and economic issues have played out over the past year and a half.The effects of the BTC pipeline and Rose Revolution have been interpreted in different ways, and part of this article is devoted to presenting the different perspectives involved. In particular, American and Russian views often stand in sharp contrast to each other, providing a continuing source of friction between the two countries. The upshot for Georgia is that it will continue to receive considerable international attention for the foreseeable future.As many events in the former Soviet Union have shown, predicting the future in a place such as Georgia is a high-risk venture; therefore, I shall not attempt to do so in this article. It is possible, however, to identify some core issues around which the future will be worked out. These issues will be my focus. The three issues I discuss are: (1) economic development, (2) territory, and (3) the development of a strong, well-functioning state. The first case concerns the economic viability of the country, the second involves the extent and organization of Georgia's territory, and the third deals with whether the country can develop the norms required of a modern state.These three issues are interrelated, but they tend to show up in different discussions conducted by different policy and academic communities. One thing they have in common, however, is that they are playing out against the backdrop of the Rose Revolution, so I shall begin with a brief review of this event.The Rose Revolution as BackdropThe Rose Revolution was an extraordinary event that put Georgia on the international stage for several days in November 2003. It brought Mikheil Saakashvili, a young populist critic of Shevardnadze's corrupt government, to power and initiated the region's most important experiment in democracy. The ramifications of this revolution extend well beyond Georgia's borders. It has made democratic movements thinkable in places such as Ukraine, a country where Georgian flags sprouted in the rallies of the Orange Revolution last winter. It is also brought up in discussions about potential democratic transitions in other places, including Russia.A few basic forces at work prior to the Rose Revolution provide insight into why it took place. The first was the civil society that was struggling to emerge at the time. Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had been active in Georgia for years, and they clearly had an impact on government and society by the time of the parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003. Some of these NGOs had actively defended the rights of religious and ethnic groups, which helped create a new kind of public discourse. Opinion differs as to just how important NGOs were in the revolution, but observers generally agree that they at least played a role in laying the groundwork for the event. This view is supported by the fact that after the Rose Revolution, leaders of countries such as Uzbekistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, where such upheaval is viewed with trepidation, have restricted or simply closed down several NGOs. …

Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus

Preempting Democracy:The Case of Belarus Vitali Silitski (bio) In 2001, ten years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the prospects for democracy in its successor states (outside the Baltic) seemed increasingly bleak. Even countries that had begun their independence from the USSR in relatively promising fashion seemed to be sliding back toward autocracy. But then things suddenly seemed to change. A series of dramatic events—Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution, Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, and the Tulip Revolution that ousted Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev following rigged February 2005 parliamentary elections—created a very different set of expectations. Many thought that this new wave of change would spread democratic impulses throughout the region, leading to the ouster of autocrats in other countries. In reaction to the events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, politics is indeed changing in postcommunist Eurasia—but in many places it is changing for the worse. Several of the region's surviving autocracies have tightened the reins: Kazakhstan recently outlawed its major opposition party; Tajikistan introduced new regulations restricting contact between foreign diplomats and local civil society groups; Azerbaijan's opposition groups and independent press face a new round of attacks in advance of the November 2005 parliamentary elections; in Uzbekistan, a May 2005 rebellion against President Islam Karimov was violently suppressed; and Russian president Vladimir Putin recently announced an upcoming ban on civil society assistance from abroad and implemented an electoral reform that makes it impossible for parties independent of the presidential administration to win representation in parliament. Although not all of these actions are directly related to the aforementioned [End Page 83] revolutions, they demonstrate how far authoritarian incumbents are willing to go to protect their power. Veteran leaders of former Soviet republics have openly vowed to avert democratic revolutions in their own countries. They directly attribute the downfall of their Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz counterparts not only to activities orchestrated by the international democracy-promotion community, but also to the inherent weaknesses of unconsolidated authoritarian regimes. As many surviving autocratic leaders see it, the great mistake of their fallen colleagues was to tolerate social and even political pluralism, believing that it would furnish them with a respectable democratic façade without endangering the stability of their regimes. The lesson drawn by the autocratic survivors is simple: They must step up repression. In the post-Soviet countries that have recently experienced democratic breakthroughs, incumbents did try to crack down on political rights and civil liberties, but they were unable to foreclose change. For opposition political and social forces, which had developed earlier in the relatively liberal environment of competitive authoritarianism,1 were able to withstand the pressure. In contrast, hard-line authoritarian regimes ensure their continued stability and survival not just by sporadic reactions to already existing political and social challenges, but by preemptive attacks that eliminate threats before they arise. Preemption aims at political parties and players that are still weak. It removes from the political arena even those opposition leaders who are unlikely to pose a serious challenge in the next election. It attacks the independent press even if it reaches only small segments of the population. It destroys civil society organizations even when these are concentrated in a relatively circumscribed urban subculture. Last but not least, it violates the electoral rules even when the incumbent would be likely to win in a fair balloting. Although these actions may destroy the regime's democratic image abroad, the public at home may still perceive its leaders to be duly, if not fully democratically, elected. By uprooting political and social alternatives well before they develop into threats, incumbents can win elections long before the start of the campaign. And the validity of their victory is less likely to be contested when the strongest challengers have already been denied entry into the race by disqualification or other more nefarious means. Preemption has an enormous psychological impact on both the political and social opposition; such systematized repression instills in them a sense of hopelessness and imposes the perception that political change is far beyond reach. Perfecting the Policy of Preemption One Eurasian country in particular has brought the policy of preemption to perfection—Belarus. President...

After the ‘revolution’: civil society and the challenges of consolidating democracy in Georgia

As a result of the November 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ Georgia experienced its second revolutionary regime change since independence in 1991. Yet in contrast to the coup in 1992 that ousted President S...

The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition

Why the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan MattersThe collapse of the Soviet Union created fifteen independent states with distinct trajectories of political development. Although early observers hoped that the Soviet Union's demise equaled a victory for democracy, many of these states-perhaps most notably the Central Asian republics-have failed to live up to vaunted Western ideals. In fact, the absence of significant challenges to the authoritarian status quo by viable democratic opposition movements is the defining characteristic of the political climate in Central Asia. Numerous social, historical, and structural factors have been cited to explain the political continuities during the region's postcommunist transition, including the hegemony of informal clan politics, endurance of Soviet legacies, and lack of prior experience with either statehood or democracy, among others. Yet, inspired by the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the sudden collapse of the Akaev regime in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, political activists in Central Asia hope that political change can be affected in even the least politically reformed and most authoritarian of the former Soviet states.Given the renewed sense of hope on the part of Central Asia's political opposition, the questions guiding this article are: What is the most plausible force for genuine democratization in the region? What segment of society, if any, is capable of mounting a viable democratic challenge to the ruling authoritarian regimes? Using Kazakhstan as a case study, we contend that intraelite cleavages fueled by the fragmenting economic interests of the newly minted national bourgeoisie represent the most promising source of pressure for meaningful systemic reform. President Nazarbaev's greatest achievement-Kazakhstan's ambitious economic liberalization carried out since independence-appears to have had an unintended side effect. Under conditions of rapid economic transformation, the tried and true Soviet solution to maintaining the political status quo-the monolithic national elite-began to shatter as the elite actors' economic interests diversified and ultimately came into conflict.The hope for democracy in Central Asia is not that the masses will revolt, nor is it that the heads of government will come to view democracy as good in itself. Neither will democracy simply arise once these countries reach some specified level of economic development. Rather, with economic liberalization, escalating competition among elites for their share of the economic pie and their growing instrumental commitment to the rule of law seem to be the source of genuine political change. As the basis for this interpretation of events, we analyzed the emergence in fall 2001 of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK; in Russian: Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana, or DVK; in Kazakh: Kazakstan Demokratiyalyk Tangdauy, or KDT), which represented a dramatic departure from the predominant pattern of political life in Central Asia. The DCK exemplified a new stage in the evolution of post-Soviet Central Asian opposition movements brought on by the emergence of a new economic cleavage within the country's previously homogenous elite. In an unprecedented move, the who's who of Kazakhstan's business and economic elite issued a joint statement announcing their commitment to the rule of law and democratization and declaring that Kazakhstan's stalled political reforms represented the most significant threat to the future of the country, economic development, and national security.The DCK is a new form of political opposition that has not yet been witnessed in the other Central Asian republics. The unexpected fall of the Kyrgyz government, itself a shock to the leaders of the country's opposition, was an outcome of the actions of impoverished rural citizens rather than the product of coordinated political strategy. The extensive looting that ensued and the relative inability of the opposition to control it, as well as the opposition leaders' jockeying for position in the immediate aftermath, revealed that they rode, rather than led, the wave of mass frustration. …

Georgia's Rose Revolution

The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but for democracy globally. [It] & demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic kleptocracy.

Georgia's Rose Revolution

The reign of strongman presidents and the routine use of electoral fraud and manipulation have produced widespread apathy, resignation, and cynicism about the prospects for democracy in the Caucasus. In the fall of 2003, these trends dominated the presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the parliamentary elections in Georgia. But shortly after the elections, a brief and nonviolent series of mass protests in Tbilisi—the so-called Revolution of the Roses—forced Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and his Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG) to resign, and paved the way for democratic reform under Mikhail Saakashvili of the New National Movement. The inspiring events in Georgia hold a number of lessons for students of democratization and prodemocracy activists alike, and should make us reconsider the methods by which fragile openings to democracy may be sustained and widened.

The presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua, 2001

The opposition Georgian Dream coalition's upset victory in Georgia's October 2012 parliamentary elections displaced the then-ruling United National Movement as well as the “competitive authoritarian” model it had instituted. While the future of Georgian democracy remains an open question, the elections may offer transferrable lessons for democracy promotion in other competitive authoritarian systems. In particular, Georgian Dream was able to successfully use leadership, messaging, and international engagement to pose the first meaningful challenge to the ruling party since the 2003 Rose Revolution. Georgia's recent experience also highlights the need for better-tailored policies to address the hybrid nature of the competitive authoritarian model.

Medical Pluralism and Health Services in Ladakh

This article describes the political activities and political situation of Georgia after the collapse of Soviet Union; the article analyses the following issues: Why Georgia is willing to join European Union; why this prominent organization attracts the attention of most developed countries. The article researches the mutual interests of EU and Georgia. It emphasizes the importance of political reforms and goals that the new government of Georgia carried out after the Rose Revolution and how EU supported the new reforms in the country; The article displays European Union's political position and support of Georgia during 2008 August war; it analyses the reasons of different reactions and political viewpoints by the countries of EU related to the War. The article, also, examines the main points and principles of Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon Treaty Copenhagen Criteria. Obviously, almost every European country is willing to become the part of Union. The special requirements are offered by EU to the candidate countries to be satisfied. Here are discussed main criteria of joining European Union, how Georgia satisfies these criteria and whether Georgia is near to the EU integration or the goal of joining EU is still quite far away.