Roman Jurists Research Articles

Multiple senses of law and the search for a focal meaning

As noções de analogia e de atribuição ad unum, desenvolvidas por Aristóteles e por pensadores medievais, referem-se a conceitos que, embora expressos pelos mesmos termos, são dotados de significados em parte iguais e em parte distintos. Essas noções podem ser empregadas para compreender os diversos significados da palavra "direito", identificando uma hierarquia entre eles. Segundo os juristas romanos, o significado originário de direito é o de ipsa res iusta, a própria coisa justa. Ou seja, o objeto de um ato de justiça, aquilo que é devido a uma parte em uma relação equilibrada de troca de bens. A partir dessa significação, derivaram-se outras duas fundamentais: a do direito como técnica, pela qual é descoberto o direito - a coisa justa - em um caso concreto; e a do direito como norma, porque esta é a razão e a medida do direito coisa justa. Vemos que se trata mesmo de atribuição ou predicação ad unum, porque os três conceitos são efetivamente "direito", porque têm um fundamento comum; ao mesmo tempo, são distintos entre si.

Requirements for an Arbitrator: A Comparative Historical Approach

The paper presents a comparative legal and comparative historical analysis of one of the aspects of the institution of the arbitration, namely, the election of an arbitrator. The contractual, non-state nature of arbitration leaves the disputing parties with a wide freedom of expression, including in determining the personality of a mediator or intermediaries in resolving a dispute. The paper focuses on identifying the key features that the disputing parties should pay attention to when choosing an arbitrator (judges). The Roman jurists established comprehensive and justified set of personality traits that an arbitrator should possess in order to maintain the general idea of the conclusiveness of judicial decisions. According to the norms of Roman law, an arbitrator must be a free person, physically healthy, with a developed intellect, with life experience, not tainted by immoral acts, not involved in illegal activities, not interested in a certain outcome of the case. In the Middle Ages, the system of mandatory requirements for a mediator in a dispute was reduced due to the simplification of public relations regulated by customary law, which was reflected in legislative documents. Priority was given to the high social stratum, ethnic and religious conformity of the judge to the disputing persons. In modern times, the freedom of litigants to choose arbitrators is almost absolute, taking into account the tendency to individualize the interests of the parties to the conflict and the inability to take into account all the particular circumstances of various disputes that could affect the choice of an arbitrator. Only when resolving economic disputes, the parties were guided by the judge’s special knowledge, which makes it possible to understand the essence of the property dispute and make a fair decision. The analysis made it possible to identify the continuity of the provisions of Roman law and the requirements imposed on the arbitration intermediary in the Middle Ages and Modern times. Historical comparison revealed a tendency to reduce the number of mandatory features of the candidate for arbitration, which determined the growing importance of the freedom of the disputing parties as the most significant feature of the arbitration court.

Virtual Origins of Public Law

The paper analyzes the main processes that gave rise to such a phenomenon as “public law”. The problem of public law is one of the fundamental problems of jurisprudence. A classical dichotomy of public and private law will never lose its significance, and the search for their harmonious interaction only heightens the interest of thinkers around the world in this issue. We should agree that addressing such issues is always secondto-none, as it gives grounds for the development of the best legal regulation acceptable for a particular society. The very notion of “publicness” has gone a long way to finally gaining a foothold in the political and legal lexicon. In the Digestas of Justinian, the famous Roman jurist Ulpian writes: “Public law, which (refers) to the position of the Roman state, private law, which (refers) to the benefit of individuals; there is the useful for the society and the useful for a private individual. Public law includes the sacreds (sacra), the ministry of priests, the position of magistrates” (D.1.1.1.2). Thus, from the ancient Roman forum through medieval corporations to the political parties of modern times, the public space was certainly controlled by the state in some way or another. It was the intervention of the state in the private sphere that determined the nature of “public” in general and public law in particular. These processes have defined both modern political landscapes and the system of public legal institutions. Although, to a large extent, the motivations that affected the formation of public law were dogmatic, formal and virtual, or imaginary in nature, their influence adopted quite real features and led to practical political and legal consequences.

HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTREME NECESSITY AS A CIRCUMSTANCE PRECLUDING THE CRIMINALITY OF AN ACT

The article presents an analysis of the historical development of extreme necessity as an institution of criminal law. The authors examines the peculiar views of Roman jurists on the possibility of exemption from criminal liability in connection with injury to the state of emergency, the specifics of medieval canon law, assessment of Russian lawyers of the institute of extreme necessity. Conclusions about the peculiarities of the evolution of the norms of extreme necessity in criminal legislation on the basis of a retrospective analysis of the sources of criminal law are made.

Grzegorz Blicharz, Commons – dobra wspólnie użytkowane. Prawnoporównawcze aspekty korzystania z zasobów wodnych. Bielsko-Biała: Wydawnictwo Od.Nowa, 2017, stron 195

Grzegorz Blicharz, Commons – Jointly-used Goods: Comparative Aspects of the Use of Water Resources. Bielsko-Biała: Od.Nowa, 2017, 195 Pages “Commons – Jointly-used Goods: Comparative Aspects of the Use of Water Resources” further develops the theory of governing the dwindling resources, based on Professor Elinor Ostrom’s economic theory of Commons, and expands on it on legal science. The monograph highlights the increased effectiveness of bottom-up norms in preventing the complete depletion of the endangered resources while simultaneously satisfying the needs of the local community, if the public authorities decide to respect them. The legal and functional characteristics of those norms aren’t uniform in different legal traditions, which is shown by examples from various legal systems provided by the author. The author also acknowledges that the issue of property and restricting it in the interests of other people was often mentioned in Roman law, especially in arguments between Roman jurists about water easements. The review describes basic theses and their argumentation contained in the monograph and evaluates its substance, form, and the universal character of the referenced problem.

Recenzja monografii Piotra Alexandrowicza Kanonistyczne uzasadnienie swobody umów w zachodniej tradycji prawnej. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2020, stron 333

Review of Piotr Alexandrowicz’s Book Canonistic Justification of Freedom of Contract in the Western Legal Tradition. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2020,333 Pages The inspiring monograph of Piotr Alexandrowicz entitled “Canonistic Justification of Freedom of Contract in the Western Legal Tradition” clearly shows that the true creators of freedom of contract were not ancient Roman jurists or emperors, but medieval canonists. Based on Christian moral theology, they built the unique doctrine of obligations without which it is quite difficult to imagine contemporary legal transactions. Their thought was subsequently taken up and further developed by modern thinkers.

The history of the emergence of ideas about the principle of reasonableness in the mechanism of interpretation of law

The issue of the history of the origin of ideas about the principle of reasonableness in law occupies a central place within the study of historical and legal aspects of the principles of law in general. The author proves that the ideas about the principles of law in general are marked by the historical duration of their formation and development, and today the legal doctrine is represented by a wide range: a) worldview and scientific ideas of thinkers of antiquity; b) various theoretical and practical ideas of philosophers of the medieval period; c) scientific works of the Modern Age and the Enlightenment; d) innovative concepts and theories put forward by modern philosophers, modern jurists, political scientists, philosophers and scientists (both representatives of legal sciences and other branches of scientific research). In addition, the paper analyzes the history of the origin of worldviews and scientific ideas about the principle of reasonableness in law, as well as identifies the factors that led to its separation as an object of scientific knowledge. It is substantiated that thinkers of the Antiquity period comprehend and reveal the ideas of reason in law (law) through a set of other concepts and categories that form a connection with this ideological principle, namely: the logos, which is defined as the eternal world order; law, legislative activity as a manifestation of the logos, the ability to formalize the logos; wisdom as a result of education and human experience, public interests and balancing the interests of various subjects of social relations; common sense, etc. Summarizes the position that in the views of thinkers arises and develops the worldview that law is a product of mental human activity, which should be educated, vitally wise, and therefore able to think, analyze the objective needs of society, distinguish between «good» and «evil». This idea became a component of sophistry, which later in the views of Roman jurists expanded and rethought in terms of lawmaking and law enforcement on the mental abilities of man, who invest in the content of laws rational ideas and able to understand and apply them with the mind. It is stated that despite the fact that in the legal teachings of antiquity the principle of reasonableness in law has not yet become an independent subject of worldview or scientific understanding, nor has it been singled out as a separate legal category, it should be noted the research interest of ancient thinkers in development and improvement law, its nature, essence and functional purpose, actions and effectiveness, which are understood, including through the prism of ideas about human wisdom (mind), rationality in law, features of the implementation of law in human consciousness and behavior. Keywords: law principles, functions law principles, principle of reasonableness in law, role of principle of reasonableness in law, system law principles.

Oświadczenie woli furiosus w orzecznictwie sądowo-administracyjnym

The subject of the article is the effectiveness of the furiosus declaration of will and the contemporary approach to this legal institution of civil and administrative courts. The aim of the article is to compare the contemporary understanding of the term furiosus with its understanding resulting from the works of Roman jurists. The article also shows the connection between the institutions of modern civil law and Roman legal culture. The basic conclusion, resulting from the scope of the article's content, is a wider range of meaning of the term furiosus used in modern jurisprudence in comparison with the understanding of this institution in Roman law.

Kilka uwag na temat niewolników i prawa karnego. Rozważania w oparciu o D. 48, 2, 12, 4

<p>The purpose of the article is to present the legal situation of a slave under Roman criminal law. The analysis conducted proves that the approach towards slaves changed along with the transformation of the government system of ancient Rome. In the Period of the Republic, criminal liability of slaves evolved in two directions. The <em>dominica potestas </em>was exercised by owners, as well as the collegial body – <em>tresviri capitales</em>. From the Principate period, Roman jurists were convinced that the legal status of a slave and a free person was identical under criminal law. The difference between these offenders was non-exercise of <em>leges criminales</em> with a penalty that would be inadequate for their legal status, or ruling and exercising of more severe penalties against slaves.</p>

Recta ratio

The article concerns the supposition that ratio naturalis has a pre-Stoic origin. The term ratio naturalis expresses the universal principle of rationality or mentalism. It was brought to light and included in Roman law for the first time probably by Gaius, and it was adopted by other Roman jurists.

The Discovery of the Fact ed. by Clifford Ando, William P. Sullivan

332 PHOENIX Charite in the Metamorphoses (whose fictional narrator, Lucius, claims to be related to Plutarch). Two chapters look at marriage, and its usefulness, in philosophical discourse. Geert Roskam, in “Epicurus on Marriage,” sees Epicurus as “a principled but open-minded opponent ” of marriage (120), who nevertheless understood that there were cases where even the philosopher will marry. Examples of such rare exceptions can be seen in Epicurus’ own will, where he enjoins his heirs to care for the sons of two of his followers and to provide for the daughter of one of them (which in the Greek world would have meant a good marriage). Alex Dressler’s “The Impossible Feminism of ‘Seneca, OnMarriage’ ” discusses the lost treatise on marriage of the Roman Stoic Seneca, known only through its later excerpting in Jerome’s vicious anti-marriage polemic Against Jovinian. Seneca/Jerome offers anecdotes illustrating the pudicitia (“female honor”) of Roman women such as Cato the Younger’s daughter “Marcia,” who used an elegant bon mot criticizing men who marry for wealth to justify her refusal to remarry, or the wife who did not realize her husband had terrible halitosis because she had no experience of any other man’s breath. Women who preferred a violent self-inflicted death to the dishonor of sexual defilement (like Lucretia or Polyxena in Seneca’s Trojan Women) are also lauded, but even Seneca’s praise of Lucretia’s pudicitia (“sexual modesty”) implies “precise limits to female agency,” which differentiate it from men’s greater agency (162). The volume closes with Silvia Montiglio’s “Erotic Desire and the Desire to Marry in the Ancient Greek Novels,” examining “the dynamics between the two poles” of erotic desire and the desire to marry (220). In the earlier novels, Chariton’s Chaereas and Callirhoe and Xenophon’s Ephesian Tale, dating probably from the first century b.c.e./c.e., the star-crossed lovers marry at the beginning of the story, only to undergo a long separation before finally enjoying marital happiness. In the later ones, Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe, Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon, and Heliodorus’ Ethiopian Story (second to fourth centuries c.e.), the couple do not wed until the end, after having undergone various vicissitudes. Not that there is always an expectation that erotic desire will lead to marriage: in Achilles Tatius and Longus, the idea of marriage only arises long after the couple have expressed and begun to act upon their erotic urges. Montiglio concludes that “Marriage is not a natural bond, and no novelist pretends it is” (238). This volume displays the same variety and breadth of treatment as Plutarch’s own works, and at the same time tells us much about the cultural and philosophical milieu of Plutarch and his contemporaries. Emory University Judith Evans Grubbs The Discovery of the Fact. Edited by Clifford Ando and William P. Sullivan. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 2020. Pp. vi, 207. The distinction between facts and law is well established today, especially in common law, where it is expected that juries decide facts and judges decide law. On closer analysis, however, the distinction often breaks down and the papers in this volume are intended to participate in “the wider field of debates on the fact/law distinction in modern legal theory, in addition to the historiography of the modern fact” (3). The discussions of facts and law in the Roman law chapters are generally helpful in elucidating BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS 333 the fact/law distinction and its history, but the Greek papers seem less relevant in this regard. I take the Roman papers first. Chapter Two by Nicolas Cornu Thénard brings the perspective of Continental jurisprudence to bear on “The Legal Construction of the Fact, between Rhetoric and Roman Law.” Cornu Thénard confines his study to the Roman jurists and rhetoricians. He begins with a general discussion of the jurists’ view of fact (factum) and law (ius) not as different conceptual categories, but as “two modes of reasoning, two types of argumentation that can be employed to resolve a dispute” (41). After noting Quintilian ’s discussion—laws are general, facts are unique to each case; law is finite...

The Zadar Fragment of the Collatio Legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum (or Lex Dei)

Abstract A fragment from the anonymous text known as the Collatio Legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum (The Collation of the Laws of Moses and of the Romans) or the Lex Dei (the Law of God) has recently been identified in the State Archives in Zadar, Croatia. The Collatio is a late antique collection of Old Testament strictures and passages from Roman jurists and Roman law which continues to be the subject of scholarly debate. Close examination of this new fragment in the context of the manuscript tradition of the work can give insight into the nature of the lost codex from which it came as well as shed light on the transmission of the Collatio in the Middle Ages.

D. 50,9,6 (Scaev. 1 dig): Auslegung eines statthalterisch veranlassten Stadtgesetzes?

Abstract D. 50,9,6 (Scaev. 1 dig): Interpretation of a Municipal Statute Induced by a Governor? The responsum D. 50,9,6 (Scaev. 1 dig) of Q. Cervidius Scaevola contains a municipal law in Greek, punishing anyone requiring justice by avoiding the ordinary legal proceedings before the synhedrion. The inquirer asks if he committed a punishable offence since he acted in ignorance against a decretum. Scaevola replies that only offenders acting intentionally will undergo punishment. Although repudiating his suspicions of interpolations, this paper supports the hypothesis of Staffhorst, who considers the statute not emanating from a municipium, but from a Greek Polis. Furthermore, the analysis confirms that the decretum contains an interdiction to take action within another court than the synhedrion. The ignorantia concerns neither the statute, nor the decision, but the unlawfulness of the behaviour itself (adversus decretum facere) and is a conventional criterion of the Roman jurists in order to exclude bad faith or fault. Finally, the statute could be regarded as a rule originating from the authority of a Roman governor concerning provincial procedural law and its promulgation might have been induced by the governor himself in order to reduce the number of provincial inquiries towards Roman officials. Inhalt: I. Einleitung; II. Zur Datierung der Responsen Scaevolas; III. Interpolationsvermutungen; IV. Zu ignorans adversus decretum facere und zur Auslegung der Strafnorm; V. Ergebnisse

Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die Europäische Rechtskultur, Bd. 6: Völkerrecht ed. by Orazio Condorelli, Franck Roumy and Mathias Schmoeckel

Reviewed by: Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die Europäische Rechtskultur, Bd. 6: Völkerrecht ed. by Orazio Condorelli, Franck Roumy and Mathias Schmoeckel Jessalynn Lea Bird Condorelli, Orazio, Franck Roumy, and Mathias Schmoeckel, edd. Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die Europäische Rechtskultur, Bd. 6: Völkerrecht. Norm und Struktur, Studien zum sozialen Wandel in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit 37/6. Wien: Bӧhlau Verlag, 2020. Pp. 392. €79.99. ISBN: 978-3-412-51891-2. One of a generation of medievalists who, in the aftermath of World War II, researched and held positions with equal facility on both sides of the Atlantic, Peter Landau (1935-2019) left a powerful legacy not only of critical editions, articles, monographs, and textbooks but of scholars trained in legal history. A prolific writer who engaged not only with the medieval legal tradition (civil, canon, and natural law) but Protestant and modern law and history, Professor Landau also played key roles in associations devoted to legal studies, including the Max Planck Institute for the European History of Law and the Stephan Kuttner Institute of Medieval Canon Law. The weighty collection of essays on canon law's impact on international law under review here (in a journal co-edited by Professor Landau for decades) is therefore fittingly dedicated to his memory. The modern world's globalized culture means that international law is more relevant than ever before, as increasingly international governance and alliances determine not merely war and peace but economies and environmental welfare. The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have thus far been dominated by the tension between residual national, ethnic, and religious loyalties and international collaboration, by Axes and Allies, the League of Nations, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, NAFTA, OPAC, the World Bank, RPEC, the European Union, and Brexit. In order to understand the expectations concerning international law which those cultures heavily shaped by European legal traditions brought and still bring to the bargaining table, a consideration of canon law's effect on medieval and early modern international law is essential. But what falls under the purview of international law and what are its bases? The Roman advocate and politician Cicero and [End Page 237] other Roman jurists viewed the ius gentium (literally: law of the peoples), as stemming from human consent, as equal in primacy to natural law, and as truly independent from civil law (ius civile), which applied only to individual countries. However, as the introduction (v-xxii) and Peter Landau's article (xxiii-xxv) explain, most pre-modern canon lawyers adopted their definition of international law from Isidore of Seville's vastly influential Etymologiae. As a bishop, Isidore hybridized Christian morality with the Roman legal tradition and concepts of universal human obligations. He defined the ius gentium as an universal collection of rules originating from human nature, not legislation; international law was used by nearly all peoples to limit strife and uncertainty and therefore dealt with occupation, construction of fortifications, weapons, warfare, prisoners, slavery, the right of return, peace treaties, armistices, the inviolability of ambassadors, and the prohibition of marriage between those of different origins. Isidore's definition was incorporated into the foundational textbook for medieval canon law, Gratian's Decretum. His list of topics therefore provided canonists with focal points for discussion and could well serve as the table of contents for this volume, which also compares medieval concepts of international law to those of other periods (vi-vii). Contracts Must Be Observed But Can Be Broken The volume proper begins with Franck Roumy's investigation of the canonical origins of the clausula rebus sic stantibus (the ability to cease observing or to revise a contract or treaty should the circumstances under which it was originally formulated change to the significant detriment of either party). As Roumy notes, James Muldoon and many others have elucidated the ways in which rules and principles established by medieval canon lawyers influenced modern international law. The particular clausula discussed here was adopted by the pioneering Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), who argued that juridical principles governing private contracts were transferable to [End Page 238] conventions between powerful sovereigns. After Gentili, common opinion decreed that the clausula applied to every accord...

Neposredno zastupanje u rimskom pravu s osvrtom na moderno pravo

The institute of direct representation is indispensable in contemporary law. The first modern civil codes acknowledged direct representation regulating power of attorney through a mandate contract. The second half of the 19th century saw a change in that perception. Starting with the German Civil Code, legal texts, including the Serbian Contract and Torts Act, prescribe power of attorney as a separate institute. The contemporary law principle of direct representation contrasts with the Roman law prohibition of direct representation contained in ancient Roman sources. Under the prevailing Pandectist view, it is due to this prohibition that Roman law did not permit direct representation. The article analyses the cases in which, courtesy of classical Roman jurists, direct representation was allowed despite formal prohibition. The absence of a direct representation concept definition and general prescribing does not justify the claim that it was not applied under Roman law.

Purposes and Functions of Public Punishment in Roman Law in the Perspective of Justinian's Codification

The objectives and functions of the punishment for a public offence (crimen) had already been discussed by M. Tullius Cicero, Seneca the Younger, or Aulus Gellius many centuries before Emperor Justinian. According to their statements, the Romans distinguished in principle all the types of punitive functions known today: deterrence (special and general prevention), reprisal (retaliation), elimination (protection of society against the perpetrator), and even the rehabilitation
 (educative) function. The emergence of the imperial judiciary extra ordinem in criminal matters could have been conducive to performance of various functions assigned to various penalties, along with the possibilities offered by the discretionary power of judicial decisions. However, when reading Emperor Justinian’s Constitutio Tanta and the numerous accounts from the Roman jurists included in his codification, contained in Book 48 of the Digest, one may be convinced that the function of paramount importance for the emperor was to deter potential perpetrators by means of severe penalties, including notably the death penalty. The educational function was rather marginal. The primary objective of the imperial criminal policy was the ruthlessly severe punishing for criminal offences (severitas, atrocitas) and the implementation of the postulate of inevitability of criminal responsibility.

Jus Gentium and the Primary Principles of International Law

Jus gentium is a system of rules of law that takes its origins even from the inter-ethnic Roman law, that contains the basic principles of regulation of both internal and international law. Thanks to the jus gentium the customary general principles of law and the general principles of international law have been transferred from the ancient law to the middle ages when they were established as well as. Most of the general principles of law of peoples have become today the imperative principles of international law, and the general principles, that were developed by the Roman jurists, foremost, it is the principles of equality, justice, and humanism, that were reciprocated by the law of European states, eventually transformed into the general principles of national law, and through them - the basic principles of international law. Jus gentium made a significant impact on the formation of the basic principles of international law on the European continent, and later on - universal international law. In the structure of Roman law, three main elements were distinguished: jus civile, jus naturale, jus gentium. The main source of international law is usually jus gentium, but today international law also accumulates the general principles of law (jus naturale) and universally recognized principles of domestic law (jus civile), which is confirmed by the norm of art. 38 of the Charter of the United Nations. In jus gentium, we find the origins of the principle of sovereignty, establishes the principle of bona fide compliance, the principle of mutual courtesy (comitas gentium), develops the principle of succession, there are first principles of territorial space, the principle of res judicata - the principle of binding for the parties to the court decision. Most procedural and technical principles have their source jus gentium.

¿Re obligamur, cum res ipsa intercedit? Sobre el así llamado contrato real en Modestino

This paper deals with the issue of the broad notion of re obligari included in the libri regularum of the Roman jurist Herennius Modestinus: re obligamur, cum res ipsa intercedit. From the terms used by Modestinus seems to stem a concept of real obligation that corresponds to any obligation acquired by the delivery of a thing; that is, a notion which would essentially correspond with the modern concept of a ‘real contract’. However, careful analysis of this jurist’s work shows that his notion of re obligari was restricted to mutuum, the only case of obligatio re contracta that existed in classical Roman law.

The Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine

The modern Public Trust Doctrine, one of the pillars of environmental law, originates in the efforts of Roman jurists to regulate the building of private villas alone the coast of Central Italy. The jurists begin by recognizing the seashore as public property and requiring public permission for private building; but this doctrine is eventually fortified by incorporating the widespread social construction of certain property as common to (communes omnibus) or even owned by (communes omnium). The result is the Roman creation of a sort of equitable trust in which the State owns property for the benefit of all of its citizens — broadly similar in concept to the modern Public Trust, although without the immediate environmental concern.

Periculum maris come il valore contrattuale nel diritto romano


 
 
 For persons who wanted to invest their resources in international commerce, the necessity of a sea voyage significantly increased the risk connected to this venture. Thus the contracts, which took into account the risk related to navigation, constituted under Roman law a special category of contracts, as they modified standard contracts such as a loan or a partnership contract. In the contract of maritime loan the fact that the creditor assumed the risk of losing money in case the condition si salva navis pervenerit was not fulfilled and in exchange could claim high interest to compensate him for such risk transforms this contract into an instrument used for the joint gain of profits. The classical scheme, in which all partners were obliged to share both profits and losses was modified by a partnership contract, in which a partner whose contribution involved exclusively undertaking risky sea voyages was exempt from bearing losses. This pactum made it possible to treat pecuniary contributions and in-kind contributions as equivalent in value. This prevented a situation in which the partner whose sole contribution involved services, in spite of due performance of his obligations, would be liable to repay a part of the loss to the partner who brought capital, if the activity of the partnership resulted in the loss. A typical example, referred to by jurists, of a situation in which services performed by a partner justified discharging him from participating in the loss, was the case in which one of the socii financed the purchase of goods to be subsequently sold with profit in another port, while the other one carried out this venture risking his life during the sea voyage. Therefore, undoubtedly, services entailing a dangerous sea voyage constituted a good example of a partnership, in which the value of a contribution of opera was even greater than the value of the capital invested, and this justified releasing one of the partners from participation in the loss. Therefore, the risk related to navigation, and more specifically the willingness to assume it, starts to be considered as having a certain economic and market value. This value constitutes a special periculi pretium, that is to be taken into consideration in a contract relationship. The acknowledgement by Roman jurists that the willingness to assume the risk connected with certain types of business constituted an economic value, means that the importance of such factors as the partner’s efficiency, resourcefulness, or willingness to embark on a risky activity (in most cases crucial for a success of an enterprise) – was fully appreciated.