Role Of Institutional Investors Research Articles

A Rose has its Thorn: The role of institutional investors in SEO firms’ reporting behavior

This study investigates whether monitoring by institutional investors mitigates or facilitates earnings management around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We also explore how the capital market reacts to the (monitoring/self-serving) effect of institutional investors on earnings management. Results suggest that active, rather than inactive, institutions effectively reduce real earnings manipulation around SEOs. However, when SEO firms with high active institutional ownership engage in real earnings management, the capital market adversely reacts to this monitoring malfunction. Results remain robust after considering endogeneity, corporate governance, and financial crises.

The Role of Institutional Investors in International Corporate Governance: Contemporary Paradigms and Perspectives

No abstract is available for this article.

Executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and enterprise innovation

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation, and to further explore in depth the impact of executive shareholding on corporate innovation under different industries.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample to empirically study the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation based on multiple linear regression models and panel fixed effects.FindingsThe research shows that: on the whole, the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation presents an inverted “U” shape; institutional investors will negatively regulate the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation; the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation will show obvious industry differences in different industries.Research limitations/implicationsThe empirical results not only enrich the research on the effects of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice, but also provide targeted experience for promoting enterprise innovation. Due to the limitations of innovation indicators and industry sample selection, it is necessary to be cautious when extending the results to other fields.Practical implicationsEnterprises should fully consider the impact of executive shareholding on innovation and formulate a scientific executive incentive system according to the differences of their industries. The government should be aware of the important role of institutional investors in enterprises, improve the channels and ways for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, and improve the basic system of capital markets.Originality/valueOn the one hand, this paper empirically tests the regulatory role of institutional investors' shareholding and the relationship between executive shareholding and enterprise innovation, which enriches the research on the effect of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice. On the other hand, the research by industry is more targeted to provide experience for promoting enterprise innovation.

The Role of Institutional Investors in International Corporate Governance: Contemporary Paradigms and Perspectives

No abstract is available for this article.

Open Innovation of Institutional Investors and Higher Education System in Creating Open Approach for SDG-4 Quality Education: A Conceptual Review

The introduction of sustainable development goals has made sustainability a top priority for most nations. This has raised the investment into the educational system for potential growth and for creating an innovation culture in any country; the role of institutional investors in the development of financing clean energy infrastructure, entrepreneurial development, poverty reduction, and driving corporate social responsibility and firm development has been found significant. An intensive literature search of Scopus and the web of science database was explored with different relevant sets of keywords “Institutional investors AND Education”, “Institutional investors” AND “Higher education”, which drew 29 final articles between 2010–2021. This scoping review draws a new open approach for creating alternative sustainable funding for the higher education system and investment opportunities for institutional investors with government intervention. This research becomes the first that shows the road map to the higher education system in creating alternative funding through the proposed Institutional Investor & Sustainable University Funding Governance Code, which will make the higher education system independent and ease the burden on the government, as well as create a huge market opportunity for both players. This research model will scope the collaborative approach towards sustainable development goal 4—Quality education.

The Role of Institutional Investors in International Corporate Governance: Contemporary Paradigms and Perspectives

No abstract is available for this article.

The Role of Institutional Investors in Financial Distress Resolution

The Role of Institutional Investors in Financial Distress Resolution

Macroprudential Policy and the Role of Institutional Investors in Housing Markets

Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the presence of institutional investors in housing markets has steadily increased over time. Real estate funds (REIFs) and other housing investment firms leverage large-scale buy-to-rent investments in real estate assets that enable them to set prices in rental housing markets. A significant fraction of this funding is being provided in the form of non-bank lending (i.e., lending that is not subject to regulatory LTV limits). I develop a quantitative two-sector DSGE model that incorporates the main features of the real estate fund industry in the current context to study the effectiveness of dynamic LTV ratios as a macroprudential tool. Despite the comparatively low fraction of total property and debt held by REIFs, optimized LTV rules limiting the borrowing capacity of such funds are more effective in smoothing property prices, credit and business cycles than those affecting (indebted) households – borrowing limit. This finding is remarkably robust across alternative calibrations (of key parameters) and specifications of the model. The underlying reason behind such an important and unexpectedly robust finding relates to the strong interconnectedness of REIFs with various sectors of the economy. JEL Classification: E44, G23, G28

Macroprudential Policy and the Role of Institutional Investors in Housing Markets

Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the presence of institutional investors in housing markets has steadily increased over time. Real estate funds (REIFs) and other housing investment firms leverage large-scale buy-to-rent investments in real estate assets that enable them to set prices in rental housing markets. A significant fraction of this funding is being provided in the form of non-bank lending (i.e., lending that is not subject to regulatory LTV limits). I develop a quantitative two-sector DSGE model that incorporates the main features of the real estate fund industry in the current context to study the effectiveness of dynamic LTV ratios as a macroprudential tool. Despite the comparatively low fraction of total property and debt held by REIFs, optimized LTV rules limiting the borrowing capacity of such funds are more effective in smoothing property prices, credit and business cycles than those affecting (indebted) households – borrowing limit. This finding is remarkably robust across alternative calibrations (of key parameters) and specifications of the model. The underlying reason behind such an important and unexpectedly robust finding relates to the strong interconnectedness of REIFs with various sectors of the economy.

The Role of Institutional Investors in International Corporate Governance: Contemporary Paradigms and Perspectives

No abstract is available for this article.

ESG-факторы как инструмент формирования деловой репутации

The article focuses on the ESG factors determining the activities of most companies in recent years. The relationship between ESG principles and the business reputation of a modern company has been indicated. Business reputation is found to be formed under the influence of a number of factors, among which a responsible attitude to the environment, social responsibility and the quality of corporate governance have come out in the first place in recent years. The analysis proved that the ESG principles are firmly entrenched abroad, the number of companies with an ESG rating is growing exponentially, and their profitability is increasing. It has been stated that the Russian business has not yet included ESG principles as mandatory parameters of active investment strategies. The emphasis is put on the relationship with stakeholders, since it is the stakeholders who evaluate the company's activities from the standpoint of the degree of satisfaction of their needs. The conducted analysis has proved that an assessment includes not only profit maximization and dividend growth, but also the results of social and environmentally responsible practices of companies. It has been inferred that there is a relationship between the sustainable development of the company, its business reputation, the creation of ethical values and taking into account the interests of stakeholders in the company's strategy. It is emphasized that ESGs become an instrument of active investment strategies and a tool that determines the business reputation of the company. The practice of responsible ESG investment has been illustrated, the role of institutional investors in the dissemination of this practice has been highlighted.

The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance of Their Portfolio Companies – The Case of Croatia

The goal of this research is to examine the involvement of institutional investors in the corporate governance of companies in their portfolio by analyzing characteristics of institutional investors with respect to the type of investment, investment time horizon, and degree of involvement in the process of managing a company. The paper will outline the attitudes of managers on the level of investors’ involvement in the governance process in order to identify determinants of investment decisions, decisions to take corrective actions to enhance corporate governance, or decisions to leave the ownership structure. A qualitative approach was chosen, consisting of a series of structural interviews with 25 fund managers of different types of institutional investors. The results indicate that institutional investors are involved in the corporate governance of their portfolio companies, and that control mechanisms they use include voting rights, direct communication with the management with the aim of discussing strategies for future development, and collaboration with other institutional investors in the ownership structure.

Underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing: The role of institutional investors in the Chinese growth enterprise market

This paper investigates the effects of underwriter reputation on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market, in light of the conflicting evidence in the literature on IPO underpricing. Using data during the post global financial crisis period, we find that IPO firms with prestigious underwriters have lower market-adjusted initial returns on average. We further find that prestigious underwriters reduce IPO underpricing by minimizing the time gap between the offering and listing, choosing high-quality firms to underwrite, and reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors. In the presence of institutional investors, however, we find that more underpricing occurs, as these investors tend to obtain access to IPO shares at a higher price discount via private placements. This new finding suggests that the institutional investors have a role to play in the case of high under-pricing, which partly gets corrected via underwriter reputation.

Shareholder coordination, investment horizon and hedge fund activism

ABSTRACT I examine the role of institutional investors in hedge fund activists’ target selection. I argue that the coordination power and the investment horizon of institutional investors are important factors in explaining target selection. I find that hedge fund activism is higher in firms that institutional investors with long-term horizons invest as well as firms where coordination ability among existing shareholders is less pre-intervention. However, coordination ability increases after the intervention. Furthermore, hedge fund demands and success rates differ with the coordination ability and investment horizon of investors. Firms with investors that have long-term investment horizons and increased coordination ability are more likely to receive demands on board representation, value maximization and corporate governance improvements. Firm performance improvements are the most visible where institutional investors have a long horizon and where coordination among existing institutional investors increases. Overall, the results suggest that coordination ability and investment horizon of existing institutional shareholders are important factors in explaining target selection and strategies explored by hedge fund activists as well as their effects on firm value. The findings support the notion of coordination and collaborative monitoring role of long-term institutional investors with and hedge fund activists.

Institutional ownership and firm performance: the case of Morocco

ABSTRACT Purpose Extant literature, which mostly focused on the context of developed economies, provides competing evidence on the role of institutional investors in the capital market. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. Design/methodology/approach Employing 396 firm-year observations, we conduct multiple panel data regressions to test our hypotheses on the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance. Specifically, we test whether the effect of institutional ownership differs between governmental and privately held institutions. Findings Our results show that, overall, institutional ownership has a negative impact on firm performance. This result remains intact regardless of the governmental affiliation of the institutional owners. Interestingly, the negative impact of institutional ownership on firm performance is economically stronger for privately held institutions. Research Limitations and Implications Our findings overall highlight the urgent need for improved regulatory framework in emerging economies to reduce exploitation by major shareholders which impairs firm performance. Originality/Value We claim that issues such as communication, information transparency, regulatory framework, and corporate governance ought to be improved to attract foreign investors, whose involvement in the Moroccan market decreased since 2016.

Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management

Despite the growing importance of institutional investors in global capital markets and the link between bank earnings management and financial crash risk, little is known about the role of institutional investors in mitigating bank earnings management. We conduct the first international analysis of this issue using a broad sample of banks and institutional investors. We find a negative relation between institutional ownership and bank earnings management, after controlling for the stringency of a country's bank regulations and other relevant bank and country characteristics. Additionally, institutional ownership is more negatively related to earnings management in countries with more-stringent bank disclosure requirements or when ownership is held by domestic rather than foreign institutional investors. Institutional ownership is also more negatively related to earnings management in countries in which insiders extract more private benefits or when ownership is held by institutional blockholders. Our findings have important policy implications regarding institutional investors' engagement with banks.

Value Judgments at the Heart of Green Transformation: The Leverage of Pension Fund Investors

Abstract As the urgency for green transformation grows, the question of whether finance capital can be harnessed to promote green transformation has been raised. Public pension funds are of particular interest since they are publicly governed, have long-term interest, and are growing in proportion to the global investment capital. However, transformative change demands a reprioritization of fundamental values in terms of trade-offs among economic, environmental, and social ends. This article identifies shifts in value judgments in public pension fund investments and particularly focuses on the institutional constraints by which value (re)priorities are resisted by investigating Swedish public pension funds. While there are signs of environmental embedding of the economy, I also note neutralization of the role and investment strategies of the funds, which has a stabilizing rather than a transformative function. The neutralization constrains deep green transformation, which demands politicization of the role of institutional investors.

Institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity

We investigate the relation between institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity and whether this relation differs across country-level institutional and information environments. Using a comprehensive dataset for firms across 40 countries for the period between 2000 and 2016, we find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with stock liquidity commonality. In addition, a firm’s information environment plays the moderating role in the relation between institutional ownership and commonality in stock liquidity. Importantly, we document that the negative association between institutional ownership and liquidity commonality is stronger for firms in countries with weak institutional characteristics or less transparent information environments. Our findings provide additional insights into the role of institutional investors as a demand-side factor of liquidity commonality in international financial markets.

Institutional investors as environmental activists

ABSTRACT Climate change mitigation has presented a serious problem for global regulators. An area that is emerging from a collection of legislative initiatives of the European Commission is the role of institutional investors in holding companies accountable for decisions that have a climate change impact. These legislative initiatives are the Revised Shareholder Rights Directive, Disclosures Regulation, Taxonomy Regulation and Revised Benchmarks Regulation. The article analyses each piece of legislation critically and seeks to describe their cumulative effect in terms of what is required of institutional investors. This article argues that these legislative initiatives will, together, create a normative expectation that institutional investors adopt, to a greater extent than has been previously observed, the role of activist with respect to the climate change impacts of investee companies. The article then describes the possibility of enforcement of this normative expectation by non-State actors.

Role of Institutional Investors: Evidence from the Foreign Rule-144A Debt Market

We examine the unique role played by institutional investors in the private corporate debt market for Rule 144A debt. We use the recent global financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to study how qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) facilitated funding to the foreign debt issuers in U.S. Using an exhaustive sample of foreign bond issuances in the U.S. from over 65 countries between 1990 and 2013, we examine (a) corporate decisions involving debt choice and market timing, and (b) determination of offer spreads. Our findings collectively support the notion that QIBs enabled funding in the foreign 144A debt market despite the financial crisis.