Rival Theories Research Articles

Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction

The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties.

Neo-Kantian theories of self-determination: a critique

AbstractNeo-Kantian political theories, such as those developed by Jeremy Waldron and Anna Stilz, aim to provide an account of state legitimacy and territorial boundaries that avoids the problems faced by rival nationalist theories. Immanuel Kant’s own theory of the state appears to be biased towards the status quo, and therefore has difficulty in explaining what is wrong with rights-respecting colonialism or the annexation of one state by another. Two possible ways forward are explored. One involves making state legitimacy conditional on meeting more stringent standards of distributive justice. The other involves appealing to the idea of a self-determining ‘people’. However the latter must avoid collapsing into either a version of nationalism (if the ‘people’ are identified in cultural terms) or a form of voluntarism (if the ‘people’ are required subjectively to ‘affirm’ the regime that governs them). Thus neo-Kantian theories cannot deliver a plausible account of self-determination without, like Kant himself, tacitly invoking political identities of the kind that they seek to repudiate.

Alexander Pope: Unlocking the Key

This article discusses the image and function of the key in Alexander Pope’s works, and its involvement in various attempts to understand and explain him. As a device for encrypting or decrypting a code, a ‘key’ permits either the further concealment or revelation of meaning, and sometimes both: a sense which enters the language with Francis Bacon in 1605, but which is not fully realized as a satirical opportunity until the early eighteenth century. The subgenre of the ‘key’ may be a small part of the unwholesome trade of deciphering, but it raises vital questions about originality, authority, cooperation, competition, and group identity. Keys to Pope’s, Swift’s, and Gay’s works suggest some fruitful ways in which to track rival theories about their own writing and its reception; at its ornate Scriblerian best, the key is a riddling device, furthering the obscurity rather than breaching the mysterious specificity of the original.

Aesthetic creation theory and landscape architecture

In recent decades the landscape architectural discourse has tended to eschew ideas of aesthetics while focusing instead on notions of functional and sustainable design. We offer the view that Aesthetic Creation Theory, whose principal exponent is the philosopher Nick Zangwill, has the potential to redress this imbalance by interpreting landscape architecture as ‘art’. Zangwill's account of ‘art’ differs, however, from many other definitions found in philosophical aesthetics: it holds that works of art have aesthetic functions that are essential to them, but also allows that they have other, non-aesthetic functions, for example practical or ecological ones. It thus removes the strict distinction between fine art and the useful arts. After introducing Zangwill's theory, we discuss some rival theories of art and then explore the virtues of Aesthetic Creation Theory for the theory, practice, and pedagogy of landscape architecture.

Interactions of Internal and External R&D: An Empirical Test of Two Rival Theories

This paper is an empirical test of two rival theories of interactions between firms’ internal and external research and development (R&D). According to the theory of absorptive capacity, firms shou...

Stumbling Blocks in Empirical Legal Research: Case Study Research

This article examines the main assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of case study method in legal studies. It considers the importance of research design, including the crucial roles of the academic literature review, the research question and the use of rival theories to develop hypotheses and the practice of identifying the observable implications of those hypotheses. It considers the selection of data sources and modes of analysis to allow for valid analytical inferences to be drawn in respect of them. In doing so it considers, in brief, the importance of case study selection and variations such as single or multi case approaches. Finally it provides thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses associated with undertaking socio-legal and comparative legal research via a case study method, addressing frequent stumbling blocks encountered by legal researchers, as well as ways to militate them. It is written with those new to the method in mind.

Puritans, Godly Diversity, and Religious Liberty in Civil War England

Religious liberty has an assured place among the pantheon of radical ideas to emerge during the English Civil Wars. Notwithstanding their many disagreements, historians have generally viewed conflict as the default mode of interaction among the Puritans engaged with the issue, and justifiably so. Yet during the early 1640s, many Puritan MPs, peers, and divines made large concessions to each other on matters of religious principle, magnifying the areas of agreement and indulging presumed faults. This flexible stance had the effect of lowering the invisible barriers erected by theological differences, which thus enabled a greater commerce of ideas. The principle of debating religious issues before hammering out a settlement and the idea of a spiritual brotherhood reinforcing that principle together served as a prism through which the disruptive effects of rival theories of religious liberty could be refracted.

Personal Identity, Consciousness, and Joints in Nature

Many philosophers have thought that the problem of personal identity over time is not metaphysically deep. Perhaps the debate between the rival theories is somehow empty or is a ‘merely verbal dispute’. Perhaps questions about personal identity are ‘nonsubstantive’ and fit more for conceptual analysis and close attention to usage than for theorizing in the style of serious metaphysics, theorizing guided by considerations of systematicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and aiming for knowledge about the objective structure of the world. I discuss a thesis about consciousness according to which there are perfectly natural phenomenal properties. Although I do not argue for this thesis, I believe that it is plausible, whether or not physicalism is true. Given the thesis, there are deep, substantive questions about which individuals or pluralities instantiate the relevant phenomenal properties. Equally substantive questions can then be asked about the duration and other spatiotemporal characteristics of those individuals or pluralities, both in actual cases and in hypothetical puzzle cases adapted from the personal identity literature. I suggest that, at least prima facie, these questions interact with our future-directed egoistic concern in much the same way that the personal identity question is often thought to. As a slogan: “you give me substantive, determinate facts about consciousness; I give you substantive, determinate facts about personal identity”.

Presentism and the Triviality Objection

Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is obviously false if read as saying that everything that has existed, exits or will exist is present. If eternalism is taken as the negation of presentism, it is also either trivially false or obviously true. In this paper, I try to respond to the triviality objection on behalf of presentism. In second section, I will examine how the argument proceeds. In third section, I will reflect on three possible ways to respond but will argue that none of them succeeds in giving a satisfactory solution. I will then try to clarify the core idea of presentism and to suggest that if we characterise presentism accurately, the problem will disappear. In fourth section, I will offer a plausible definition of presentism and will show how it can avoid the triviality objection and demonstrate why it is advantageous to accept the version of presentism I offer.

Novel Small Molecule Inhibitors of Cancer Stem Cell Signaling Pathways.

The main aim of oncologists worldwide is to understand and then intervene in the primary tumor initiation and propagation mechanisms. This is essential to allow targeted elimination of cancer cells without altering normal mitotic cells. Currently, there are two main rival theories describing the process of tumorigenesis. According to the Stochastic Model, potentially any cell, once defunct, is capable of initiating carcinogenesis. Alternatively the Cancer Stem Cell (CSC) Model posits that only a small fraction of undifferentiated tumor cells are capable of triggering carcinogenesis. Like healthy stem cells, CSCs are also characterized by a capacity for self-renewal and the ability to generate differentiated progeny, possibly mediating treatment resistance, thus leading to tumor recurrence and metastasis. Moreover, molecular signaling profiles are similar between CSCs and normal stem cells, including Wnt, Notch and Hedgehog pathways. Therefore, development of novel chemotherapeutic agents and proteins (e.g., enzymes and antibodies) specifically targeting CSCs are attractive pharmaceutical candidates. This article describes small molecule inhibitors of stem cell pathways Wnt, Notch and Hedgehog, and their recent chemotherapy clinical trials.

Mental Causation is Not Just Downward Causation

AbstractAccording to a popular model of mental causation, an irreducible mental cause M1 brings about an irreducible mental effect M2 by bringing about M2's supervenience base (ground, realizer, etc.), P2. Call this ‘the Downward Causation View’. This paper raises doubts about the Downward Causation View on grounds that M1 does not cause M2 immediately and there is no causal chain from M1 to M2. Prima facie, then, M1 does not cause M2 on this view. But a theory of mental causation ought to account for how some mental phenomena cause other mental phenomena; so rival theories are to be preferred. After setting out the problem, I consider replies; all fail.

Theories of persistence

The debate over persistence is often cast as a disagreement between two rival theories—the perdurantist theory that objects persist through time by having different temporal parts at different times, and the endurantist theory that objects persist through time by being wholly present at different times. This way of framing the debate over persistence involves both an important insight and an important error. Unfortunately, the error is often embraced and the insight is often ignored. This paper aims to correct both of these mistakes, and thus clarify the debate over persistence.

Perception, Aspects and Explanation: Some Remarks on Moderate Partisanship

Modifying a contrast introduced by Dixon, Stephen Mumford distinguishes between ‘partisan’ and ‘purist’ ways of watching sport. Recognising that the extreme partisan and extreme purist positions do not explain the nature of sports spectatorship, Mumford follows Dixon in adopting the idea of moderate partisanship (any spectator who is neither all-partisan nor all-purist). He outlines three theories of spectatorship designed to address the issue of the relationship between the partisan and the purist ways of viewing sport. The true perception theory regards the moderate fan as able to see the event as it really is, rather than concentrating on an aspect (as the extreme purist and extreme partisan do). The mixture theory is the view that ‘the moderate partisan has both partisan and purist perceptions of sport in some mixed way’. The oscillation theory, which Mumford favours, holds that the moderate sports fan switches or oscillates between competitive (partisan) and aesthetic (purist) ways of watching sport. This paper does not offer an alternative theory to Mumford’s account. Instead, it explores the possibility of dissolving the problem. Mumford is troubled by the distinction, and feels that he requires a theory to solve the problem he thinks it raises (and thereby explain the relationship between partisan and purist ways of viewing sport). The idea that purist and partisan ways of viewing sport are the only two options is explored, and a number of other possibilities are outlined. The paper considers the picture that appears to have motivated the idea that there is a problem here in need of a solution. One alternative picture is offered by means of a discussion of the phenomenon of aspect-perception, which, it is argued, is not a helpful model for thinking about football (soccer) spectatorship. This alternative picture is not a rival theory, but one possible example designed to show that there are other ways of thinking about football spectatorship that dissolve the problem with which Mumford is concerned.

Not knowing you know: a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge

Foley (2012: 93�98) and Turri (2012: 215�19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these. What might be called the early defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge may be formulated as follows. You know that p just in case you have a justified true belief that p and there is no defeater D of your justification for believing that p where This theory deals nicely with Gettier cases such Lamborghini, offered recently by Turri (2012: 215) and adapted as follows. Wishing to impress you, your student tells you that he owns a Lamborghini and affords you excellent evidence that does (he gives you a ride, tells you about the purchase, parks it in his garage and so on). Reasoning that he behaves just like a Lamborghini-owner, you believe on that basis that he owns one. Unbeknownst to you, he has promised to take care of his cousin�s Lamborghini while she is on a trip. But unbeknownst to you and him, she has died just after this promise, leaving him the Lamborghini in an unopened will.Most would agree that you have a justified belief that your student owns a Lamborghini that is luckily true and thus does not amount to knowledge. Because you justify that belief by inducing it from the truth that he behaves just like �

Rival Versions of Corporate Governance as Rival Theories of Agency

Trends in corporate governance to minimize employee participation and to promote shareholder rights, in both the EU and US contexts, evidence the practical efficacy of the separation thesis and the dominance of models of corporate governance founded upon decision theory. Giving expression to a vision of human agency in terms of instrumental rationality, such models of corporate governance, presuppose clearly defined objectives. Drawing on the work of Talbot Brewer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Robert Brandom, this paper offers an alternative practice-based model of corporate governance that emphasizes the role of socially and historically embodied forms of reasoning in promoting a better understanding of the aims or objectives of the corporation, particularly with respect to the social, environmental, and economic context of the firm. After reviewing recent empirical literature concerning employee participation, criteria are offered concerning effective employee participation programs, as a means of implementing a practice-based model of corporate governance.

EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, TRANSITIVITY, AND SCREENING-OFF

AbstractIs evidential support transitive? The answer is negative when evidential support is understood as confirmation so that X evidentially supports Y if and only if p(Y | X) > p(Y). I call evidential support so understood “support” (for short) and set out three alternative ways of understanding evidential support: support-t (support plus a sufficiently high probability), support-t* (support plus a substantial degree of support), and support-tt* (support plus both a sufficiently high probability and a substantial degree of support). I also set out two screening-off conditions (under which support is transitive): SOC1 and SOC2. It has already been shown that support-t is non-transitive in the general case (where it is not required that SOC1 holds and it is not required that SOC2 holds), in the special case where SOC1 holds, and in the special case where SOC2 holds. I introduce two rather weak adequacy conditions on support measures and argue that on any support measure meeting those conditions it follows that neither support-t* nor support-tt* is transitive in the general case, in the special case where SOC1 holds, or in the special case where SOC2 holds. I then relate some of the results to Douven’s evidential support theory of conditionals along with a few rival theories.

Biomarkers and signaling pathways of colorectal cancer stem cells.

The progression of colorectal cancer is commonly characterized by accumulation of genetic or epigenetic abnormalities, altering regulation of gene expression as well as normal protein structures and functions. Nonetheless, there are some questions that remain to be elucidated, such as the origin of cancer cells and populations of cells initiating and propagating tumor development. Currently, there are two rival theories describing the process of carcinogenesis. One is the stochastic model, arguing that any cell is capable of initiating and triggering the development of cancer. Meanwhile, the cancer stem cell model hypothesizes that only a small fraction of stem cells possesses cancer-promoting properties. Typically, colorectal cancer stem cells (CSCs) share the same molecular signaling profiles with normal stem cells or embryonic stem cells, such as Wnt, Notch, TGF-β, and Hedgehog. Nevertheless, CSCs differ from normal stem cells and the bulk of tumor cells in their tumorigenic potential and susceptibility to chemotherapeutic drugs. This may be a possible explanation of the high percentage of cancer recurrence in patients who underwent chemotherapeutic treatment and surgery. This review article focuses on the colorectal cancer stem cell biomarkers and the role of upregulated signaling pathways implicated in the initiation and progression of colorectal cancer.

The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning

central debate in contemporary constitutional theory is the clash between originalists and living constitutionalists. Originalism is the view that the original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain or bind constitutional practice — paradigmatically, the decision of constitutional cases by the United States Supreme Court. Living constitutionalists contend that the content of constitutional law should evolve over time in response to changing values and circumstances. One of the central questions in this debate is over the question whether the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed or changeable. This essay makes the case for the Fixation — the claim that the linguistic meaning (or communicative content) of the constitutional text was fixed when each provision was framed and ratified. Although the Fixation is a basic assumption of almost every version of originalism or textualism, it has never been the explicit focus of an extended examination and defense. This essay remedies that lacuna by providing a precise formulation of the fixation thesis, making the affirmative case for fixation, and answering potential objections. most important claim made by the essay is that the Fixation is entailed by our common sense understanding of how communication works. Communicative content is created by using conventional semantic meanings (fixed by linguistic practices at the time words are used) and context (which is fixed by the understanding of author and reader at the time a writing is created).The essay proceeds in five steps. Part One clarifies the Fixation by situating it in the content of contemporary debates about originalism. Part Two states the affirmative case for the fixation thesis and articulates several versions of the argument corresponding to different members of the originalist family of constitutional theories. Part Three provides additional clarification and answers objections. Part Four examines rival theories of constitutional meaning that deny fixation. Part Five explores two examples, “cruel and unusual punishment” and “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”This is the final published version of the The Fixation Thesis and it replaces the earlier versions previously available at this location.

Transatlantic revolutions and the war of ideas

The study of the history of political ideas has been greatly enhanced in recent decades by the work of scholars who emphasise the importance of ‘context’. This approach has promoted more sophisticated analysis from anyone who hopes to enter the field, as well as drawing attention to previously neglected texts which are worthy of serious attention. However, texts can be read in a multiplicity of contexts, and it can be argued that the complex relationship between ideas, individuals and political practice merits further investigation. The books under review are all welcome contributions to this endeavour, showing that important progress can be made as well as suggesting that further methodological refinements are possible. In particular, these books demonstrate that careful scholarship can be undermined if the results are presented without an obvious attempt to show a sympathetic understanding of rival theories (and of their proponents as individual human beings). This might be particularly challenging in respect of the controversies surrounding the American and French Revolutions, but that only makes it more important to present these debates without betraying an overt preference for one side over another.

Globalisation vs. fragmentation of space

The author does not argue in the present paper with rival theories; instead he links them in a rhizomatic fashion provoking thereby a cartography of the landscape we are facing while the Cartesian tradition of reduction of complexities to simples is shifting towards the irreducible fold (Deleuze). The virtual and the real is not discernible. Entities isolated in the past are now part and parcel of the hybrid and rhizomatic network expanding and flowing throughout the intensive space. They form the hybrid spatium which includes everything: social networks, media, fora, wars, the national and the supranational, global and local, marginal and trivial. Disseminating itself, it invades social spaces, and finally encompasses the whole horizon. Fluidity (Bauman) is another expression for emptied social spaces and the shift to the societies of control anticipated by Michel Foucault. Through constant reiteration of the difference, the fold shifts to its alternative - envolution. This very frontier has constantly evaded us, in spite of the effort to overcome it. It is conceived, not according to the linear model, but as an 'intensity' (Deleuze) and matrix which constantly reproduces itself and becomes, by the same token, the fate of the postmodern civilization, his own trademark and destiny.