Risky Choice Framing Research Articles

Speaker–listener incompatibility: Joint and separate processing in risky choice framing

Framing effects are considered in a conversational framework using the well-known Asian Disease problem [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458]. Speakers’ preferred message framing is examined and its corresponding persuasiveness is assessed using listeners’ responses. The results show that speakers exhibit a marked and consistent preference for positive over negative framing (Experiment 1). Judged from listeners’ responses, this preference is effective for promoting riskless, but not risky options. The incompatibility between speakers and listeners may be resolved by noting that speakers can jointly (i.e., comparatively) assess the information and the persuasive qualities of alternative frames. In contrast, listeners are exposed only to one of these frames and, consequently, can only assess the information separately (i.e., non-comparatively). Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that no incompatibility exists when both speakers and listeners are either in separate, or in joint evaluation mode. Differences between risky choice and attribute framing [Levin, I.P., Schneider, S.L., & Gaeth, G.J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: a typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 149–188] are briefly discussed.

Emotions within reason: Resolving conflicts in risk preference

This research focused on differential effects of emotional and rational preferences in decision making and how people resolve conflicting risk preferences caused by inconsistency between their emotional reactions to and rational assessment of a risk problem. In addition, effects of the framing of choice outcomes on emotional, rational, and overall risk preferences were examined. Adopting a within-subjects design, Study 1 showed that the emotional choice preference was often the opposite of the rational choice preference and was more risk-seeking than the rational preference. The overall favourability rating for a chosen option was significantly higher when the emotional choice and rational choice were the same than when they were opposed. Emotional preferences were significantly more susceptible than rational preferences to the hedonic tone of risky choice framing. The overall preference was a compromise of the conflicting emotional and rational preferences in some risk domains, and resembled either the emotional preference or the rational preference in other risk domains. Study 2, using a between-subjects manipulation, further confirmed that emotional preference and rational preference had differential effects on risky choice.

The role of personality in positively and negatively framed risky health decisions

Two hundred and forty research participants of varying ages completed a two-part procedure in which framing experiments were conducted and personality factors were assessed. We operationally defined information framing according to the attribute-, goal-, and risky choice-framing paradigms and made our tasks as similar as possible to everyday risky health decisions. Individual difference variables were measured by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised, the Carver’s BIS–BAS scales, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, the Multidimensional Health Questionnaire, and Coronary Heart Disease specific items. Framing valence effects were in keeping with the literature, with more risk-taking in the negative risky choice framing valence condition and more negative health status evaluation in the negative attribute-framing valence condition. Respondents’ personality, in particular Impulsiveness, Anxiety, Health Involvement and Health Negative Affect, correlated with message effectiveness in the goal-framing task and with the observed risk attitude in the risky choice task. These findings expand the literature on personality and risk-taking by demonstrating the joint role of personality factors and situational factors on decisions to promote good health or prevent bad health.

The role of personality in positively and negatively framed risky health decisions

Two hundred and forty research participants of varying ages completed a two-part procedure in which framing experiments were conducted and personality factors were assessed. We operationally defined information framing according to the attribute-, goal-, and risky choice-framing paradigms and made our tasks as similar as possible to everyday risky health decisions. Individual difference variables were measured by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised, the Carver’s BIS–BAS scales, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, the Multidimensional Health Questionnaire, and Coronary Heart Disease specific items. Framing valence effects were in keeping with the literature, with more risk-taking in the negative risky choice framing valence condition and more negative health status evaluation in the negative attribute-framing valence condition. Respondents’ personality, in particular Impulsiveness, Anxiety, Health Involvement and Health Negative Affect, correlated with message effectiveness in the goal-framing task and with the observed risk attitude in the risky choice task. These findings expand the literature on personality and risk-taking by demonstrating the joint role of personality factors and situational factors on decisions to promote good health or prevent bad health.

Framing, gender and tax compliance

In the context of extensive social science research on framing, we discuss how framing objectively equivalent information can (but does not always) differentially affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. Many of these framing effects have been found in the health communications and marketing literatures. Using a typology of framing developed by Levin et al. [Organ. Behav. Hum. Dec. Proc. 76 (1998) 149], we are able to classify prior tax compliance research, much of it reported in the Journal of Economic Psychology, that suggests decision frames influence tax reporting behavior. This prior research is now known as risky choice framing. Our study differs from this prior literature as, using goal framing, we manipulate two objectively equivalent messages (one positively framed, one negatively framed) that are communicated to adult taxpayers. We find no evidence of a main effect for framing objectively equivalent information. However, in line with prior research, a significant frame by gender interaction effect was documented. We discuss our results in the light of prior framing and tax compliance research and suggest policy implications. A further contribution of this study is that goal framing effects are demonstrated to extend beyond health and consumer behavior settings.

A New Look at Framing Effects: Distribution of Effect Sizes, Individual Differences, and Independence of Types of Effects

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) identified three distinct types of framing effects in the literature: attribute framing effects, goal framing effects, risky choice framing effects. While most previous framing studies used between-subjects manipulations of frame, the present study used two sessions, spaced one week apart, to give each of 102 participants both framing conditions and all three types of framing. Using the difference between the score for the positive framing condition and the negative framing condition as the unit of analysis for each type of framing effect, the following were found: (1) reliable framing effects for attribute framing and risky choice framing, but not for goal framing; (2) distributions of individual framing effects showing that the aggregate-level effects were representative of individuals even though some individuals showed no framing effects; (3) no significant interdependencies between the three categories of framing effects; (4) individual differences in reaction to the task scenarios related to various of the “Big Five” personality traits as well as the Faith in Intuition scale. The use of within-subject designs to assess individual differences in decision-making phenomena such as framing effects and other biases and heuristics is recommended for future research.

How positive and negative frames influence the decisions of persons in the United States and Australia

Cites the existence of information framing effects as an interesting phenomenon in the area of human judgements and decision‐making. Uses three distinct types of framing effect and the hypothesis identified by Leven et al (1998). Studies the reliability of these effects across samples of subjects in the USA and Australia. Shows that, for two of the three types, attribute framing and risky choice framing, the effects were strong and almost identical in the two samples. Highlights a significant effect for the US sample, but not the Australian sample, for the third type, goal framing. Discusses results in terms of the reliability of the effects and their potential for revealing cross‐cultural differences in values.

All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects

Accentuate the positive or accentuate the negative? The literature has been mixed as to how the alternative framing of information in positive or negative terms affects judgments and decisions. We argue that this is because different studies have employed different operational definitions of framing and thus have tapped different underlying processes. We develop a typology to distinguish between three different kinds of valence framing effects. First we discuss the standard risky choice framing effect introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to illustrate how valence affects willingness to take a risk. Then we discuss attribute framing, which affects the evaluation of object or event characteristics, and goal framing, which affects the persuasiveness of a communication. We describe the distinctions, provide a number of examples of each type, and discuss likely theoretical mechanisms underlying each type of framing effect. Our typology helps explain and resolve apparent confusions in the literature, ties together studies with common underlying mechanisms, and serves as a guide to future research and theory development. We conclude that a broader perspective, focused on the cognitive and motivational consequences of valence-based encoding, opens the door to a deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of framing effects.