Risk Of Terrorist Attacks Research Articles

County‐Level Correlates of Terrorist Attacks in the United States

Research SummaryWe develop a set of hypotheses informed by a social disorganization framework and test them using newly available data on nearly 600 terrorist attacks in U.S. counties from 1990 to 2011. Our results show that terrorist attacks were more common in counties characterized by greater language diversity, a larger proportion of foreign‐born residents, greater residential instability, and a higher percentage of urban residents. Contrary to the social disorganization perspective but in keeping with most prior research, terrorist attacks were less common in counties marked by high levels of concentrated disadvantage. More generally, we found steady declines in the number of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil from 1990 to 2011. We discuss the implications of the results for theory, future research, and policy.Policy ImplicationsTerrorism, like ordinary crime, is highly concentrated. Of the 3,144 counties in the United States, only 250 (7.95%) experienced a terrorist attack from 1990 to 2011; 5 counties (0.002% of total U.S. counties) accounted for 16% of all attacks. Moreover, counties at greatest risk of terrorist attack have identifying characteristics. Just as random preventive patrol policing has generally been replaced by more targeted strategies, efforts to counter terrorism might benefit from strategies that target certain counties: those with high population heterogeneity and great residential instability that are highly urban. And just as targeting particular neighborhoods raises equity concerns in policing, policies aimed at counties with particular characteristics pose a challenge for countering terrorist attacks. However, unlike the situation in policing ordinary crime, high‐terrorism‐risk counties are generally not characterized by economic disadvantage or a large proportion of racial and ethnic minorities.

The Waning Grand Strategy of Democratization: Why a Pivot to the Asia-Pacific Places the United States at Greater Risk of Terrorist Attack

 Our world is on a trajectory leading to a point where terrorists will eventually acquire a nuclear weapon.[1] It is only a matter of time.[2] After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States recognized the lack of

Conditions for Increasing the Viability of Critical Infrastructure Objects

Concept of increasing the protection capacity of key critical infrastructure objects in Bulgaria is developed. Methodology of planning and Model of Business Continuity Management System of critical infrastructure, which constitute the basis of their viability are proposed in the concept. In addition developing criteria and indicators for assessing the risk of terrorist attacks or methods of increasing security and protection of critical infrastructure including creation of a model of making a decision when modality terrorist attack are given.

Games, Risks, and Analytics: Several Illustrative Cases Involving National Security and Management Situations

This paper presents and compares four models of games and risk analyses designed to support strategic and policy decisions, three focusing on national security issues and one on project management. They share a common core of probability, linked decisions among the parties involved, and risks to a principal decision maker. Their structure is based on systems and decision analysis. Their level of complexity depends on the strategies, the environment, and assumptions of variation over time of probabilities, preferences, and options. They are part of the field of analytics and some of its real-life applications. The first model is based on a one-move game, in which the United States faces risks of terrorist attacks by several possible groups using various types of weapons. The result is a probabilistic ranking, at a given time, of the threat posed by these weapons. The second model is a dynamic simulation of counterterrorism scenarios in an alternate game between a government and a terrorist group. The objective is to compare the stabilizing effects of different short- and long-term government strategies. The third model is a dynamic evaluation of nuclear counterproliferation strategies involving an analysis of the weapon development program of a particular country with evolving intent and capabilities and of the effectiveness of different U.S. strategies to prevent or delay its success. The fourth model is a principal–agent representation of the development of an engineered system, in which an agent in charge of part of the project may consider meeting a deadline by cutting corners if he falls behind schedule, generally increasing the system failure probability. The goal is to support the decisions of the manager in setting constraints and incentives. This paper shows how a set of similar game and risk analysis models at different levels of complexity can provide valuable insights to decision makers, both in national security and management situations, and help them avoid mistakes such as excessive focus on the short term and underestimation of dependencies. It compares their capabilities, including the number of moves, dynamics of the underlying situation, possible changes of context, actors' preferences and strategic options, and risk characterization.

Dynamical nuclear safeguard investigations in nuclear materials using Analytic Pair Values

The operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been investigated from the view point of safeguard assessment. The risk of terrorist attack on NPPs is one of the critical points in the secure plant operations. The basic event of the related incidents is quantified by the random sampling using a Monte-Carlo method. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is developed leading to the maximum pair values with multiplications which are decided by reactor characteristics. The matrix form analysis is compared with five NPP types of interest. Using a life cycle of 60 years, the range of the secure operation is between 0.020628 and 0.0212986, as relative numbers. This means the highest value in the range of secure power operation is about 1.043 times larger than the lowest one in this study. The consistency has the highest consistent values in the 24th and 54th years, as represented by C. I. (Consistency Index) and C. R. (Consistency Ratio). Finally, a nuclear safeguard protocol (NSP) is successfully constructed for the safe operation.

Legislative response to international terrorism

This article presents a new dataset dubbed LeRIT which identifies the legislative response to international terrorism in 20 liberal Western democracies, 2001–08. The dataset distinguishes 30 regulations governments may implement with the intention of reducing the risk of terrorist attacks. LeRIT covers legislation dealing with, inter alia, the rights of the executive to intercept, collect and store communications for anti-terrorist purposes, changes in pre-charge detention for terror suspects and modifications of immigration regimes. I aggregate these distinct regulations into three composite indices, distinguishing according to the main target of regulations, citizens, suspects, and immigrants. This dataset contributes to the analysis of the consequences of international terrorism and provides a detailed account of the patterns in the legislative response to international terrorism from 2000 to 2008. I show that while all liberal Western democracies reinforced their counter-terrorist legislation, the scope of countries' regulatory response to terrorism differed largely. Some countries (i.e. the UK and the USA) implemented the full battery of regulatory responses while others (i.e. Scandinavian countries but also Canada and Switzerland) remained reluctant to cut deeply into the net of civil rights for citizens, suspects and immigrants alike. To further demonstrate the potential usefulness of the dataset, the article includes an example of analysis on the legislative response to international terrorism. The reported baseline model suggests that a combination of risk assessment and political factors influence governments' willingness to cut deep into the net of civil rights.

Europejska walka z islamskim terroryzmem

The world and also the United States of America are not any safer by undertaking countermeasures after the 9/11 attacks. Finding the adequate modus vivendi in the new situation is the priority of the European Union. What is the purpose and what is the consequence of the aggressive attitude of Islamic radicals toward the Western World? Does this aggression derive from the ideology of hatred against the Western World and its values or is it rather a result of previous actions of the USA and its allies before and after the attacks on America? What has been done in the military and social-economy level to improve the security of the European states in terms of terrorist attacks? And finally what actions should be undertaken to increase the safety level of the Europeans and to decline the risk of terrorist attacks? First section of this article is devoted to the reason for terrorist attacks beginning from early 1990’s until the tragic final in September 2001. It concentrates on reasons for the frustration of the Islamic radicals driving to acts of terror against military staff, institutions and civilians. Afterwards appears the American response – Bush’s doctrine with its fundamental pillars: unilateralism, fight against states supporting terrorism, right to the pre-emptive strike and the introduction of democracy there, where the aggressive regimes are present. The Europe follows the American path and must handle its effects. Consequently the Europeans marginalized the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Organization by participating in wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan under the auspices of Washington. The last chapter about the social and economic dimension of the European fight against terrorism describes stereotypes between Europeans and Muslims which show no tendency to decline. On the opposite the tendency shows the increasing feeling of mistrust. Concerning economy the lack of strong business bonds is the reason for the lack of further cooperation and might indirectly lead to the aggressive attitude and the rise of radical ideologies. Poverty and the lack of perspectives is the basis for fundamentalism.

Assessing security measures reducing terrorist risk: inverse ex post cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses of Norwegian airports and seaports

When the risks of unwanted events and the impacts of countermeasures are well-known, an economic assessment would compare the costs of the measures with the benefits of reduced risk. For evaluating countermeasures against terrorist attacks this is, however, not straight-forward. Both the baseline risk of terrorist attacks and the possible risk-reducing impacts of the security measures adopted are largely unknown. A possible approach to the economic assessment in such cases is to adopt inverse ex post economic analyses. Inverse ex post analysis in our case will be an assessment of already implemented security measures at Norwegian airports/seaports, trying to inversely estimate implicit benefits for estimated terror risks and risk changes due to the implemented measures. Such implicit benefits might be measured as implicit costs of lives saved or, more generally, as an implicit value of what is protected in airports and in seaports. Our analysis indicates that for justifying the costs of the implemented security measures, it implies huge cost per life saved and a quite enormous valuation of what the measures protect. A low estimated baseline risk of terror attacks explains to a large degree these findings. Nevertheless, even if fatalities represent a major societal cost of terrorist attacks, there are other potential costs regarding infrastructure, that to a large degree have been disregarded in our analyses. If all potential societal costs could be included, this would justify a higher level of security spending, but not necessarily the levels that our estimates indicate.

Safety‐first portfolio optimization after September 11, 2001

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to apply safety‐first portfolio principles in an environment where financial risk exists because of the probability of terrorist attacks, where the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 (911) are the focal point of the analysis.Design/methodology/approachSafety‐first portfolios of US equities bilaterally combined with 12 developed and emerging region global equity indices are obtained for 911. Extreme value theory and safety‐first principles are used to optimize these portfolios for US risk‐averse investors. The actual performances of all portfolios in the post‐911 period are compared to the optimal results. The robustness of the results is examined by replicating the analysis for the period following July 7, 2006, when no actual terrorist attacks occurred on US soil.FindingsOptimal ex ante (ex post) safety‐first portfolios on 911 have high (low) US weights, and on July 7, 2006 low US weights. The differences are attributed to changes in market projections and/or conditions. In all cases, wealth is preserved even without the ex post optimal portfolios.Practical implicationsSafety‐first portfolio optimization can protect wealth given financial risks of extreme events like terrorist attacks.Originality/valueThe paper shows that quantitative assessments of financial risk are feasible, even though uncertainty with experts' risk assessments of extreme events such as 911 exists because of limited historical data and low probability of occurrence. The results are useful to investors developing international diversification strategies to protect wealth given the risks of terrorist attacks.

Smallpox, Risks of Terrorist Attacks, and the Nash Equilibrium: An Introduction to Game Theory and an Examination of the Smallpox Vaccination Program

The smallpox vaccination emergency preparedness program has been unsuccessful in enrolling sufficient numbers of healthcare workers. The objective of this study was to use game theory to analyze a pre-event vaccination versus post-event vaccination program using the example of a terrorist considering an attack with smallpox or a hoax. A three-person game (normal and extensive form), and an in-person game are played for pre-event and post-event vaccinations of healthcare workers facing the possibility of a smallpox attack or hoax. Full pre-event vaccinations of all targeted healthcare workers are not necessary to deter a terrorist attack. In addition, coordinating vaccinations among healthcare workers, individual healthcare worker risk aversion, and the degree to which terrorists make the last move based on specific information on the status of pre-event vaccination all greatly impact strategy selection for both sides. A Nash Equilibrium of pre- and post-event vaccination strategies among a large number of healthcare professionals will tend to eliminate the advantage (of the terrorists) of a smallpox attack over a hoax, but may not eliminate some probability of a smallpox attack. Emergency preparedness would benefit from game theory analysis of the costs and payoffs of specific terrorism/counter-terrorism strategies.

Is the Department of Homeland Security an Intelligence Agency?

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies a variation of the intelligence cycle – the process of planning, collecting, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information characteristic of intelligence agencies – to mitigate the risk of terrorist attack and respond to national security breaches. The intelligence cycle helps DHS encourage voluntary security measures, serve its customers, and avoid economic disruption, but the Department's program setbacks and failures illustrate the difficulty of applying the intelligence model to the needs of homeland security. The Department's particular means of producing intelligence and information challenge the conventional conception and definitions of the intelligence cycle.

Introduction to the Special Issue on Disaster Risk Reduction in the Post 9-11 Security Environment

Disaster impacts are on the rise worldwide, including unanticipated catastrophes as well as moderate-scale repetitive events. The central objective of this special issue is to highlight how effective, efficient and transparent group and decision negotiation processes can reduce disaster risk, thereby saving lives, reducing property losses, enhancing security, and increasing global and community resilience. The impact, extent, and frequency of natural, health-related, and human-induced disasters have risen dramatically in every decade since reliable records began around 1960 (DFID 2004). In 2007, a total of 960 disasters caused about 82billion dollars in damage, affecting at least a quarter billion people, disproportionately affecting vulnerable communities in developing nations (Munich Re 2008). Natural disasters alone killed about 229,000 people in the first half of 2008, more than in all of 2004 when the December 26 Indian Ocean tsunami destroyed coastal communities in fourteen countries, from Somalia to Indonesia (Levy and Gopalakrishnan 2007). This special issue addresses, comprehensively and in-depth, complex, selforganizing and ill-structured group decision and negotiation processes for managing the unexpected and cascading impacts of disasters that cross policy domains, geographic, political, and sectoral boundaries. An all-hazard approach is employed, considering health-related emergencies, natural disasters, system failures and the risk of terrorist attacks. Since the group decision and negotiation field draws on a diverse range of paradigms and influences, the six disaster risk reduction papers found herein

Rebordering the City for New Security Challenges: From Counter-terrorism to Community Resilience

Since September 11, many cities have undergone significant changes in both morphology and management as a result of the greater perceived risk of terrorist attack. Such changes have often sought to territorialise the city through the redesign of space and the modernisation of management systems. More recently, such ‘resilience’ planning is becoming increasingly focused upon how the general public can assist this securitisation process by becoming better prepared and more responsible for their personal risk management. To illustrate these processes, a case study of Manchester, UK, between 1996 and 2006 will be used to indicate how these operational changes are having impacts on the rebordering of the city and upon broader issues of citizenship. The paper also questions how greater public acceptability can be achieved within urban security strategies.

Anti-apoptotic peptides protect against radiation-induced cell death

The risk of terrorist attacks utilizing either nuclear or radiological weapons has raised concerns about the current lack of effective radioprotectants. Here it is demonstrated that the BH4 peptide domain of the anti-apoptotic protein Bcl-xL can be delivered to cells by covalent attachment to the TAT peptide transduction domain (TAT-BH4) and provide protection in vitro and in vivo from radiation-induced apoptotic cell death. Isolated human lymphocytes treated with TAT-BH4 were protected against apoptosis following exposure to 15 Gy radiation. In mice exposed to 5 Gy radiation, TAT-BH4 treatment protected splenocytes and thymocytes from radiation-induced apoptotic cell death. Most importantly, in vivo radiation protection was observed in mice whether TAT-BH4 treatment was given prior to or after irradiation. Thus, by targeting steps within the apoptosis signaling pathway it is possible to develop post-exposure treatments to protect radio-sensitive tissues.

Risk Perception in Performance-Based Building Design and Applications to Terrorism-Resistant Design

As buildings have become larger and house more people, political and societal issues have become more complex, and risks associated with occupying buildings have changed. In particular, since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the anxiety levels and perceived risks of building occupants especially occupants of tall, high-profile buildings have increased. These perceived risks include risks of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, the possibility of bomb threats, and catastrophic fires. The public's perception of risk is already incorporated into building design codes and performance-based design PBD methods for such hazards as earthquakes and fires—explicitly in some cases, implicitly in others. Risk perception will clearly need to be addressed in the design of buildings, as trade-offs in acceptable risk versus cost must be made. As terrorism represents a constantly changing design challenge, and is a target-specific hazard, as opposed to a location-specific hazard, it seems unlikely that prescriptive code requirements will be entirely effective at addressing this hazard. PBD codes are a promising approach for design issues that deal with such cutting-edge concepts.

A National Survey of Terrorism Preparedness Training Among Pediatric, Family Practice, and Emergency Medicine Programs

Domestic terrorism is a real threat focusing on a need to engage in effective emergency preparedness planning and training. Front-line physicians are an important component of any emergency preparedness plan. Potential victims of an attack include children who have unique physiologic and psychological vulnerabilities in disasters. Front-line providers need to have adequate training to effectively participate in local planning initiatives and to recognize and treat casualties including children. The goal of the survey was to assess the current state of terrorism preparedness training, including child victims, by emergency medicine, family practice, and pediatric residency programs in the United States and to assess methods of training and barriers to establishing effective training. A survey was e-mailed to a comprehensive list of all US pediatric, family practice, and emergency medicine residency programs 3 times between September 2003 and January 2004. The survey measured the perceived risk of terrorist attack, level of training by type of attack, level of training regarding children, method of training, and barriers to training. Overall, 21% of programs responded (46 of 182 pediatric, 75 of 400 family practice, and 29 of 125 emergency medicine programs). Across all of the event types, emergency medicine programs were more likely to report adequate/comprehensive training. However, < 50% of emergency medicine programs report adequate training for children. Didactic classroom-based lectures were the most commonly used method of training. Emergency medicine programs were more likely to use scenario-based exercises. Among programs that use scenario exercises, 93% report that they never (40%) or only sometimes (53%) incorporate child victims into the scenarios. Time, funding, access to subject matter experts, and availability of training material are the most important barriers to effective training. Children are a precious national resource and a vulnerable population in disasters. Despite the availability of terrorism preparedness funding, these data suggest that we are failing to provide adequate training to front-line providers who may care for children in a catastrophic domestic terrorist event.

The Consequences of Terrorism for Financial Markets: What Do We Know?

The objective of this article is to outline what we, as researchers, know and, more importantly, what we do not yet know about the consequences of terrorism for financial markets. I argue that a number of the efforts used to assess quantitatively the risk of terrorist attacks are limited in scope and are hampered by the limits of the databases used to operationalize such models. I also describe some of the most recent research that has sought to measure the magnitude of the impact of terrorist attacks on financial markets. Most of them have focused on the events surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks, though a few have broadened the perspective over time and for countries beyond the U.S.

Dosing cards for treatment of children exposed to weapons of mass destruction

During winter 2003, officers from a U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Office of Force Readiness and Deployment, formerly the Commissioned Corps Readiness Force, were deployed to the Washington, D.C., and New York City metropolitan areas in response to President Bush raising the Homeland Security Advisory System alert level to orange.1 An orange, or high-risk, condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks.1,2 PHS officers were deployed to Washington, D.C., and New York City as a precautionary measure to provide ancillary medical support in case the local medical response system was compromised or overwhelmed as a result of a terrorist action. Intelligence reports did not elaborate or provide specific details regarding the type of threats involved.2 Consequently, the PHS officers had to prepare themselves for a variety of medical crises, including those caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) emergency preparedness and response Web site provides a list of man-made and natural medical threats.3 The threat list describes many potential bioterrorism, chemical, and radiation emergencies. PHS officers were deployed with ample supplies of antidotes and treatments for the most likely potential WMD events, including formulations appropriate for both adult and pediatric use.

Can Chemical Plants be Protected Against Terrorist Attacks?

The protection of chemical plants against terrorist attacks became a new challenge after 11 September 2001. In a recent guideline the German Major Hazard Commission describes a “security analysis” to assess the risk of terrorist attacks on chemical plants. Whereas a complete protection never will be possible, a number of well known security and process safety measures are available to reduce the risk, thus making chemical plants to a less attractive target for terrorists. However, conflicts have to be solved between a possible need not to disclose safety information for security reasons and the public's right to know.

Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector

Countering the risks of terrorism imposes enormous costs. While it is impossible to remove completely the risk of terrorist attacks in the transport sector, measures designed to counter terrorism can add certainty and stability to the global economy, raise investor confidence and facilitate trade. Modelling suggests productivity losses associated with the increasing threat of terrorism can be more than offset by the positive effects of enhanced security. Nations have much to gain from cooperating to reduce the risk of terrorism.