Rise In Support Research Articles

Populist orientations of Ukrainians during a full-scale war

The article analyzes the populist attitudes in a society that has experienced full-scale external aggression under the conditions of populist rule and the “rally around the flag” effect. Typically, in countries where populists are in power, there is a decline in anti-elitist sentiment and a rise in support for anti-democratic orientations. However, after the landslide victory of populists in Ukraine in 2019 and even during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, citizens demonstrated an increased level of support for populist ideas. In particular, most Ukrainians agree with populist ideas of people-centrism. Public opinion is still dominated by anti-establishment and anti-elitist orientations, despite national unity during the war and support for the current government. On the other hand, while advocating the absolute primacy of popular sovereignty, citizens are divided on whether they want to be represented in politics by an ordinary citizen rather than an experienced politician. Moreover, most Ukrainians do not agree with the expediency of violating the law to achieve a political result. Support for populism in Ukraine is concentrated primarily among economically disadvantaged people living in small towns, less educated, older people, and those with financial problems. At the same time, the populist orientations of Ukrainians during the war were not determined by regional or ethnolinguistic distinctions.

Politics, the Constitution and the Independence Movement in Scotland since Devolution

AbstractThis article explores the course of Scottish politics since the establishment of the devolved parliament in 1999. It begins by considering the political roots of devolution before assessing the extent to which the electoral successes of the Scottish National Party (SNP) at the 2007 and 2011 devolved elections indicated a rise in support for Scottish independence. The focus then shifts to the political consequences of the 2014 independence referendum, in particular the relationship between the ‘Yes’ campaign and the SNP, as well as the changing social composition of the SNP's electoral support. The article concludes by examining the attempts of the SNP, and the wider independence movement, to secure a second independence referendum before reviewing recent political developments in Scotland.

Pandemic Populism: Explaining Support for the People's Party of Canada in the 2021 Federal Election

AbstractThe COVID-19 pandemic has seen opponents of public health mandates deploy a range of populist and anti-elite arguments. The 2021 Canadian federal election was an exceptional “pandemic election” in which the COVID-19 health crisis took centre stage. But the election campaign also saw the populist People's Party of Canada (PPC) rise to prominence by opposing pandemic-related public health restrictions. While the party failed to win a seat, it did manage to triple its vote share (1.6 per cent to 4.9 per cent). It is unclear, however, what factors led to the rise in support for the PPC. To explore this issue, we draw on an original post-election survey (n = 18,950) and focus on populist attitudes and opposition to COVID-19-related public health restrictions. Results from regression models and structural equation models (SEMs) indicate that opposition to public health restrictions was a much stronger factor than populism in shaping support for the PPC.

Turnout in European parliament elections 1979–2019

ABSTRACT The European Parliament (EP) has seen a gradual increase in its powers since the introduction of direct elections in 1979. Scholars have focused on both individual-level and aggregate factors to explain turnout rates in EP elections over time, including increased levels of EU politicization and the rise in support for Eurosceptic parties. However, one strand of analysis seems to partially have been overlooked: Some earlier research on EP election turnout claimed that absolute turnout rates across the EU should be used with care, as a number of ‘structural factors’ influences these shares and with this, affects estimates of actual voter turnout. Are such structural variables still relevant in a time where European politics are becoming increasingly salient among the wider public, pro- and anti-EU sentiments may increase citizens’ inclination to vote and trust in EU institutions may be getting increasingly important? Based on various estimates, we find that structural factors can still be characterized as determinants in EP elections, but that the power of structural factors to explain turnout at the EU level, compared to non-structural factors, has decreased. Nonetheless, EU-wide (average) EP turnout rates, as widely reported, are not likely to be good reflections of actual trends in EP turnout over time.

Corruption and partisan polarization: evidence from the European Union

Recent work documents that even though partisan polarization may have detrimental economic and social outcomes, polarized societies lead to better governance and less corruption. However, the effect of corruption on partisan polarization has been mostly ignored by the literature. By using various measures of partisan polarization and corruption, this paper demonstrates that corrupt behaviours are associated with more partisan polarization in the European Union, indicating that a stronger presence of corruption leads to higher partisan polarization. The findings are robust to the use of different polarization measures, methodologies, and a battery of control variables. This paper’s main finding, increased corruption leading to increased partisan polarization, provides another important mechanism beyond the standard socio-economic factors that led to the current rise in support of parties opposing to European Union and rise of populist parties in European Union. Polarized societies tend to generate inefficient economic outcomes and the alleviation of corruption could improve economic outcomes by decreasing partisan polarization.

Donald Trump and the Lie

The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This “losers’ consent” allows the winners to govern, and when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede but also actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This article studies the evolution of public opinion about Donald Trump’s “big lie” using a rolling cross-sectional daily tracking survey, yielding 40 days of polls and more than 20,000 responses from US voters from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky: the number of Republicans and independents saying that they believe the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. Belief in the lie may have buoyed some of Trump supporters’ self-esteem. In reaction to the lie and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for violent political activism among Democrats, which only waned after efforts to overturn the election clearly failed. Even if these findings merely reflect partisan cheerleading, we nonetheless find significant and potentially long-term consequences of the lie. A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to continue to do so in the next electoral cycle. These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.

Desenvolvimento e Democracia: uma análise comparada do modelo Gerencial e modelo Societal

The central focus of this article is to analyze the relationship between development policies and democracy in Brazil, taking the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio da Silva as a historical basis in the period running from 1995 to 2010, which underwent both the implementation of the managerial public policy model during the first government term and the societal model, during the second. The article seeks to respond to the following research problem: did the different development policies experienced by Brazil under the FHC and Lula governments bear any relation to Brazilians’ support for democracy? The methodology applied is quantitative, in the form of a survey, based on an analysis of research results from the Latinobarómetro database, as well as the indicators of GDP, Gini, and HDI. The results obtained reveal that development and democracy policies bear a certain connection as the GDP and HDI increase while the Gini declines, with a rise in support and satisfaction with democracy in the country.

Do pandemics spawn extremism? Spanish flu deaths and the Ku Klux Klan.

Scholars and journalists connect pandemics to a rise in support for radical political movements. In this study, we draw on this insight to investigate the relationship between the 1918-1919 Spanish influenza pandemic and political extremism-here, the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan-in the United States. Specifically, we ask whether U.S. states and cities with higher death rates from the Spanish flu also had stronger Ku Klux Klan organizations in the early 1920s. Our results do not provide evidence of such a connection; in fact, the data suggest greater Klan membership where the pandemic was less severe. This provides initial evidence that pandemic severity, as measured by mortality, is not necessarily a cause of extremism in the United States; power devaluation as a result of social and cultural change, however, does appear to spur such mobilization.

The Asymmetrical Effect of Polarization on Support for Independence: The Case of Catalonia

The article analyses the consequences of elite polarization at the mass level in the centre-periphery dimension. We analyse the rapid rise in support for independence in Catalonia, focusing on the role of party competition around the centre-periphery cleavage. We argue that mainstream actors’ adoption of centrifugal party strategies with respect to the national question produced a polarizing dynamic in the party system that eventually caused voters’ attitudes regarding the centre-periphery issue to harden. Indeed, we posit that this increase in mass polarization was a consequence of party agency that subsequently helped to drive attitudes regarding independence. To test this hypothesis, we measure centre-periphery polarization (as perceived by voters) by adopting two different perspectives—inter-party distances (horizontal polarization) and party-voter distances (vertical polarization)—and then run logistic regressions to explain support for independence. The findings show an asymmetrical effect on polarization. While the centrifugal strategy implemented by Catalan regionalist parties paved the way for a radicalization of voters on the Catalan nationalist side, among voters for non-regionalist parties, attitudes towards independence were initially less conditioned by this polarization. The results provide evidence of the political effects of elite polarization.

Education and support for Scottish Independence, 1979-2016

ABSTRACT The rise in support for Scottish independence between the 1970s and the 2010s has shaped Scottish politics and policy profoundly. The rise provokes a paradox: in this same period, the average educational level of people living in Scotland has also risen strongly, and yet, at each particular moment in time, higher levels of education have been associated with lower levels of support for independence. Scotland is an interesting case of wider developments. Recent political science theories of national populism in many countries would also lead us to expect that a movement for national sovereignty would be based mainly on the support of people with minimal education. Why both independence support and educational levels have risen is investigated using a series of 20 surveys of the Scottish population from 1979 to 2016. Using a long-time series allows the effects of survey year and birth cohort to be disentangled, and to be interpreted in the light of educational expansion since the middle of the twentieth century and also the different periods of political socialisation of successive cohorts.

Moral Polarization Predicts Support for Authoritarian and Progressive Strong Leaders via the Perceived Breakdown of Society

Polarization in society may hold consequences beyond the undermining of social cohesion. Here we provide the first evidence highlighting the power of perceived moral polarization in society to drive support for strong leaders. Across two studies and four samples drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States (N = 1,664), we found evidence linking perceived moral polarization with perceived anomie in society (defined as the perceived breakdown of social fabric and leadership) and with the rise in support for leaders with both a conservative/authoritarian and progressive/democratic style. Specifically, via the perceived breakdown in social fabric, heightened moral polarization predicted increased support for conservative/authoritarian style strong leaders, and via the perceived breakdown of leadership, increased support for progressive/democratic style strong leaders. Experimentally, using a fictionalized society paradigm, we then established causal links between moral polarization and the desire to elect conservative/authoritarian and progressive/democratic strong leaders. The current research is the first to identify the potential political consequences of heightened perceived moral polarization in two‐party liberal democracies and contributes to the growing body of research highlighting the role of societal factors in driving support for strong leaders.

Brexit and the ‘left behind’: Job polarization and the rise in support for leaving the European Union

AbstractThis paper focuses on the changing relationship between attitudes towards European Union (EU) membership and workers affected by globalization and technological advances in the lead‐up to the UK's EU referendum in 2016. It is found that workers employed in middling occupations, where both relative wages and employment have fallen, were significantly more likely than workers in high‐paying occupations to indicate that the UK's long‐term policy should be to leave the EU. This view was particularly noticeable amongst males with middling occupations in the post‐recessionary period between 2012 and 2015 and had increased significantly relative to the mainly pre‐recessionary period between 2004 and 2008.

Are Populists Insecure About Themselves or About Their Country? Political Attitudes and Economic Perceptions.

We investigate whether greater economic insecurity increases distrust in government and fosters authoritarian politics. Using the 2016 American National Election Studies dataset, we build on the literature regarding “egotropic" and “sociotropic" economic concerns to distinguish between “micro" insecurity (perceived insecurity regarding the individual’s own personal economic well-being), and “macro" insecurity (negative expectations concerning the macro economy). Our results suggest micro insecurity is not significantly correlated with attitudinal differences, but macro-level insecurity is associated with increased levels of political distrust, accompanied by greater authoritarianism. Greater macro-level insecurity is also associated with more negative feelings toward “out-groups" (e.g. Muslims, the LGBTQ+ community, feminists, immigrants) and was a key predictor in reduced affinity for Hillary Clinton and the rise in support for Donald Trump. Results are robust to controls for political affiliation and aggregate macroeconomic indicators, suggesting that rising levels of income inequality and weakening social safety nets increase political polarization and encourage xenophobia, racism, and homophobia.

What’s Work Got to Do with It? How Precarity Influences Radical Party Support in France and the Netherlands

The rising support for radical parties in Europe has triggered a new interest in the political sociology of voting and how voters with socio-economic insecurity are moving away from establishment politics. In this article, we apply Standing’s concept of ‘precarity’ to capture insecurity among ordinary voters and thereby expand the individual socio-economic explanations behind the vote for radical populist right (RPR) and radical left (RL) parties. We develop a multidimensional measure of precarity to capture subjective labour market insecurity in its different manifestations. The article examines the influence of precarity on voting in two countries – France and the Netherlands – that, in the 2017 elections, saw the culmination of a decline in support for establishment parties and a rise in support for both RPR and RL parties. We use panels of voters collected during these elections through online Voting Advice Applications, weighted against national census benchmarks. We identify and assess the role of two dimensions of precarity: ‘precarity of tenure’ and ‘precarity at work’. We find that in both France and the Netherlands precarity is, overall, negatively correlated with voting for established parties and positively correlated with voting for RPR and RL parties. Furthermore, our investigation shows that ‘precarity at work’ is more significant in explaining voting support than the more widely investigated ‘precarity of tenure’. Our results stress the importance of assessing how subjective work insecurity explains voting and support for RPR and RL parties.

Prejudice towards Immigrants: The Importance of Social Context, Ideological Postulates, and Perception of Outgroup Threat

Recent years have witnessed a rise in support for political parties with an anti-immigration sentiment and nationalistic rhetoric as their distinguishing traits. Within this context, our study, through a survey, analyses the relation of prejudice toward immigrants with ideological postulates of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance and outgroup threat. With a sample of 247 individuals (54.7% men and 45.3% women), our results reveal that positions favouring right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance and perception of realistic and symbolic threat have an influence on negative attitudes toward immigrants. At the same time, greater prejudice is found in those individuals scoring high in authoritarianism and symbolic threat. These results confirm, on one hand, the dual process motivation model of ideology and prejudice, and on the other, the bifactor structure of outgroup threat. As a conclusion, we propose that in order to foment peaceful coexistence and reduce hostility towards minority groups within today’s social context, it is important to consider the relevance of ideological postulates and outgroup threat. It is a priority to design public policies that favour the inclusion and integration of minority groups with the goal of building more sustainable societies that respect human rights.

Dual-Identity Incompatibility as a Cause of Radicalization: A Case Study of Hong Kong

This study focuses on increasing support for radical means among the Hong Kong youth. Previous studies have suggested the incompatibility between two components of a dual identity as a cause of radicalization, yet few have explored the mechanics of this process in detail. This study employs qualitative methods to investigate how the growing incompatibility between the identity of Hong Kong citizens as Hongkongers and as Chinese may contribute to radicalization among tertiary students. This study first conducted quantitative analyses to confirm the positive relationship between identity incompatibility and support for radical means. Past research has argued that nested identities should not be perceived as mutually exclusive. However, qualitative interviews revealed that some respondents did perceive the two identities in zero-sum terms and saw mainland China as a “cultural other.” Our study distinguished these two types of identity incompatibilities as either an “ambiguous incompatibility” or a “manifest incompatibility.” We propose that a “manifest incompatibility” has contributed to radicalization through three pathways: (1) pathways defined by the need for an identity, (2) emotional pathways, and (3) ideological pathways. Support for radical means is likely driven by a variety of factors that include perceived threats to a local identity, the negative emotions that accompany identity incompatibility, and the adoption of a new ideology that involves the rejection of previously accepted moral principles. By illuminating the possible mechanisms that explain how identity incompatibility may lead to a rise in support for the use of radical means, this study not only contributes to the theoretical discussion on radicalization but also sheds light on the widespread participation in recent protests in Hong Kong.

Meeting the Challenge of Populism to Children’s Rights: The Value of Human Rights Education

AbstractThis article analyses the rise of the new right-wing, nationalistic, xenophobic, and authoritarian populism as a challenge to children’s human rights. Informed by human needs theory, it situates the new populism in the context of globalization, economic grievances, and cultural resentment and backlash against out-groups. Fuelling the rise in support for populism has been growing existential insecurity combined with a lack of effective education on human rights. The outcome, as shown in countries where populism has come into power, has been a threat and an attack on the human rights of children, as described in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. An important means of meeting the challenge of populism, we contend, is comprehensive and robust human rights education in schools, underpinned by education on children’s rights. As called for by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, children’s rights education needs to be integrated into school curricula, policies, practices, teaching materials, and teacher training. Models of human rights education in schools are available and studies have shown positive results in promoting knowledge, understanding, and support for human rights. As described by the United Nations, through providing education about, through, and for human rights, the ultimate goal—yet to be realized—is to advance a culture of human rights. Such a culture would serve as a counter to populism.

The Making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985: A Memoir by David Goodall ed. by Frank Sheridan

The Making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985: A Memoir by David Goodall, edited by Frank Sheridan with contributions by Morwenna Goodall, Michael Lillis, Robert Renwick, Charles Powell, Stephen Collins and Maurice Manning (National University of Ireland, 2021), 244 pages Sir David Goodall was a British diplomat educated by the Benedictine monks at Ampleforth and then at Oxford. He was central on the British side at official level to the negotiation with the Irish government of what has been called the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. After retirement from the diplomatic service in 1991 he wrote quite a frank memoir of the negotiation, which he lodged in an archive for the benefit of historians to be read later. Now published five years after his death in 2016, it affords a unique insight into the tortuous process that produced the Agreement and into the principal players. It all began for him shortly after he was seconded to serve in Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet office in 1982. He found himself at a small dinner party she was giving for Lord Shackleton, the son of the polar explorer. Shackleton, a former Labour cabinet minister, was helping out with advice on the Falklands Islands, disagreements about whose recent reconquest had fractured relations between the Prime Minister and Taoiseach Charles Haughey. After dinner she bade Goodall to stay on for a drink. The conversation turned to Ireland. Goodall remarked sadly that the only place where the lives of British soldiers were now being lost in anger was in Northern Ireland. They discussed their Irish ancestry – both Goodall’s grandfathers were born in Ireland and Mrs Thatcher confessed to having a great-grandmother called Sullivan. ‘If we get back next time,’ she rounded off the exchange, ‘I think I would like to do something about Ireland’. When she got back in 1983 she was receptive to an approach from Garret FitzGerald’s government to revive the Anglo-Irish Governmental Council established by Thatcher and Haughey when they were getting on well. At the steering committee, which met in Dublin to prepare for it, Goodall encountered Michael Lillis, head of the Anglo-Irish Division in the Department for Foreign Affairs. They went for a walk along the Grand Canal. Lillis had authority to speak for Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald, whose most trusted adviser he was. He floated a radical new departure for Northern Ireland, offering unequivocal Irish acceptance of the right of Northern Review Articles: Winter 2021–22 Studies • volume 110 • number 440 488 Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom for as long as it was the wish of the majority there. In exchange he asked for the participation of Irish security forces in operations in the North and for judges from the Republic to sit in terrorist trials there. It was hoped that this, buttressed by giving the Irish government a say on security in Northern Ireland, would reconcile the Catholic minority in the North to the institutions of law and order and so stem the rise in support for Sinn Féin, which could have disastrous consequences for the island as a whole. Goodall was taken aback by what he described as ‘astonishingly far reaching ideas’ and was uncertain if they were to be taken seriously; he had little doubt that a suggestion to have Irish troops and police operating in the North would be a non-starter in London. The immediate British response was orientated to the problems created by attacks from the Republic and the ease with which those involved could escape across the border and avoid apprehension. Their counter-proposal was to create a security zone on both sides of the border that would be jointly policed, so allowing the security forces in Northern Ireland to invade the Republic in pursuit of terrorists. It was a non-starter in Dublin. Goodall had read Cecil Woodham-Smith’s book on the Irish famine and shared her view that ‘the English, normally kind, behaved in Ireland as they behaved nowhere else’ and was disposed to make amends. His research into his own family history in Ireland had given him a feel what it was like to be both a Catholic nationalist...

Changes in health and functioning of care home residents over two decades: what can we learn from population-based studies?

BackgroundCare home residents have complex care and support needs. There is a perception that the needs of residents have increased, but the evidence is limited. We investigated changes in health and functioning of care home residents over two decades in England and Wales.MethodsWe conducted a repeated cross-sectional analysis over a 24 year period (1992–2016), using data from three longitudinal studies, the Cognitive Function and Ageing Studies (CFAS) I and II and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). To adjust for ageing of respondents over time results are presented for the 75–84 age group.ResultsAnalysis of 2,280 observations from 1,745 care home residents demonstrated increases in severe disability (difficulty in at least two from washing, dressing and toileting). The prevalence of severe disability increased from 63% in 1992 to 87% in 2014 (subsequent fall in 2016 although wide confidence intervals). The prevalence of complex multimorbidity (problems in at least three out of six body systems) increased within studies over time, from 33% to 54% in CFAS I/II between 1992 and 2012, and 26% to 54% in ELSA between 2006 and 2016.ConclusionOver two decades, there has been an increase in disability and the complexity of health problems amongst care home residents in England and Wales. A rise in support needs for residents places increasing demands on care home staff and health professionals, and should be an important consideration for policymakers and service commissioners.

Party decline or social transformation? Economic, institutional and sociological change and the rise of anti-political-establishment parties in Western Europe

AbstractThe rise in support for anti-political-establishment parties (APEp), especially since the beginning of the 2008 Great Recession, has put democracy in peril. Some scholars have warned us about the negative implications the recent rise of APEp might have for the development of democracy in Western Europe. For that reason, it is important we begin to understand what generates APEp’s electoral success. Drawing on a new comparative dataset that examines all Western European democracies from 1849 until 2017, the current article attempts to provide an explanation. In particular, our analyses examine three alternative explanations put forward by the literature: economic, institutional, and sociological. Our results show that it is not economic performance but both institutional and sociological change which together can help to understand the current wave of support for APEp.